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Simone F. van den Driest
Remedial Secession
It is increasingly often suggested in literature that a right to unilateral secession, 
stemming from the right to self-determination of peoples, may arise in case of 
serious injustices suffered by a people. In those extreme circumstances, an 
alleged right to unilateral secession operates as an ultimum remedium. While 
such a right to remedial secession may well be morally desirable, the question is 
to what extent it has actually emerged under contemporary international law. 
The right to self-determination of peoples is generally considered to be one 
of the most fundamental norms in international law. Outside the context of 
decolonization, the right to self-determination is a continuous right, which is 
to be exercised primarily within the framework of an existing State. In contrast 
to this internal dimension of self-determination, claims to external self-
determination beyond decolonization are much more controversial, primarily due 
to their relation with the principle of territorial integrity of States and the fear of 
the international community to create disrupting precedents. 
In seeking to answer the question as to the extent to which a right to 
remedial secession has emerged under contemporary international law, this 
book examines the conventional content and meaning of the right to self-
determination and scrutinizes whether the various sources of international law 
disclose (traces of) a right to remedial secession. Assessing the existence of 
a customary norm in this respect, the international responses to attempts at 
unilateral secession are examined, paying particular attention to the recent 
case of Kosovo. It is concluded that while there is a certain body of support for 
the doctrine of remedial secession, no (customary) right to remedial secession 
has materialized under contemporary international law. However, in view of 
the humanization of the international legal order, an entitlement to remedial 
secession might emerge in the future. 
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“Until recently in international practice the right to self-determination was in prac-
tical terms identical to, and indeed restricted to, a right to decolonisation. In recent 
years a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right of self-
determination if their human rights are consistently and flagrantly violated or if they 
are without representation at all or are massively under-represented in an undemo-
cratic and discriminatory way. If this description is correct, then the right to self-
determination is a tool which may be used to re-establish international standards of 
human rights and democracy.” 
Judge Luzius Wildhaber* 
1. balancing oRdeR and JuStice: exteRnal Self-deteRmination 
afteR SeRiouS inJuSticeS?
1.1. The Contentious Issue of Unilateral Secession
On 17 February 2008, Serbia’s restive province of Kosovo declared itself “to be an 
independent and sovereign State”, thus seceding from the sovereign State of Serbia 
in the absence of the consent of the latter.1 Serbia strongly opposed Kosovo’s dec-
laration of independence by claiming that its territorial integrity had been violated. 
Kosovo’s secession from Serbia marked the end of a turbulent era for Kosovo: an 
era in which ethnic violence ultimately triggered NATO bombings in order to put 
an end to the ethnic cleansing of civilians, and in which the territory was subse-
quently administered by the United Nations for many years.2 A considerable number 
of States responded to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence by formally 
* European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment (Merits), 
18 December 1996, Concurring opinion of Judge Wildhaber joined by Judge Ryssdal, at para. 2.
1 Kosovo’s declaration of independence can be consulted at the website of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, Kosovo Declaration of Independence, available at <http://www.
mfa-ks.net/?page=2,25>, last consulted on 24 September 2012. 
2 For an accessible account of the history and possible future of Kosovo, see T. Judah, Kosovo: What 
Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, New York: 2008). For a more critical analysis of a 
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recognizing the Republic of Kosovo as an independent State.3 Yet, to date, approxi-
mately as many States remain reluctant to do so. Russia and Serbia, for instance, have 
reacted to Kosovo’s declaration of independence with maximal restraint. The Serbian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vuk Jeremić, even initiated a resolution for the United 
Nations General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court 
of Justice on the legality of Kosovo’s attempt to secede unilaterally. Sending the 
question to the International Court of Justice “would prevent the Kosovo crisis from 
serving as a deeply problematic precedent in any part of the globe where secession-
ist ambitions are harboured”, the Serbian Minister explained in his introduction to 
the text of the draft resolution.4 During its sixty-third session, the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 63/3 with a slim majority.5 The States participating in the advi-
sory proceedings expressed “radically different views” on the question of Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence and the question of whether the “law of self-determina-
tion confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate from 
that State”, as the Court observed.6 While some States indeed contended that present-
day international law acknowledges a right to secede as a remedy to serious injustices 
committed against a people, other States – most prominently Serbia – excluded this 
possibility by emphasizing the prevalence of the sovereign prerogatives of the State, 
primarily the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States. 
The controversy with respect to the specific case of Kosovo and the diverging 
views expressed following its proclaimed independence reflect well the debate sur-
rounding claims to self-determination and accompanying more general attempts at 
unilateral secession. Kosovo is just one example of a territory on which its popu-
lation has persistently called for self-determination. Today, dozens of secessionist 
movements and associated conflicts can be counted world-wide,7 ranging from the 
Basque country to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and from Kurdistan to West Papua, to 
prominent episode in Kosovo’s history, i.e. its struggle for independence, see M. Weller, Contested State-
hood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009).
3 Before the International Court of Justice issued its Advisory Opinion on the matter, sixty-nine States 
had recognized Kosovo as a sovereign State. By December 2012, ninety-six States had formally recog-
nized the Republic of Kosovo. For an updated list of recognitions, see the website of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, Countries that have recognized the Republic of Kosova, available 
at <www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33>, last consulted on 30 December 2012.
4 UN Press Release, Backing Request by Serbia, General Assembly Decides to Seek International 
Court of Justice Ruling on Legality of Kosovo’s Independence, UN Doc. GA/10764, 8 October 2008.
5 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/3 (Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with Inter-
national Law), UN Doc. A/Res/63/3, 8 October 2008. 
6 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, at para. 82.
7 M. Weller, ‘Settling Self-Determination Conflicts: Recent Developments’ (2009) 20 European Jour-
nal of International Law 111 at p. 112.
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mention a few.8 Yet, since unilateral secession is generally seen to conflict with fun-
damental principles within international law, the international community of States 
has been extremely reluctant to consider and accept claims to unilateral secession. 
1.2. Unilateral Secession and Self-Determination
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the issue, these days, it is gener-
ally contended that unilateral secession is an expression – albeit the most extreme 
expression – of the right to self-determination of peoples. This right became most 
prominently visible against the backdrop of the decolonization process, when self-
determination was primarily realized through the emergence of sovereign and inde-
pendent States, casting off the yoke of the colonial powers.9 This approach has led 
to the conclusion that the right to self-determination of colonial peoples was attained 
as soon as a dependent territory achieved independence from the colonial power. 
Beyond decolonization, the right to self-determination continued. It became a right of 
all peoples rather than merely colonial ones, and is now generally seen to involve two 
dimensions: one internal, the other external.10 The internal dimension implies that 
self-determination should be achieved within the framework of the existing State, in 
the relation between the population of a State and its authorities. It seems to imply 
that the people concerned are able to choose their legislators and political representa-
tives, without third State intervention and without any manipulation or interference 
from the central authorities, in order to express the popular will. Moreover, it requires 
the equal participation of the peoples in the general political decision-making pro-
cess within a State.11 In contrast to this internal dimension, the external dimension of 
the right to self-determination was prominent during the post-World War II decolo-
nization period. Beyond the context of decolonization, it is accepted that the right to 
external self-determination may be exercised through the peaceful dissolution of a 
State, through consensual merger or (re)union with another State, or through consen-
sual or constitutional secession.12 
8 For an overview of regions and groups with active secessionist movements, see A. Pavković and P. 
Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2007) at 
pp. 257-259 (Appendix). It is noteworthy that after a decades-long civil war, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), a 
very active secessionist movement in Sri Lanka, was declared defeated by the national government on 19 
May 2009. The government announced that the rebel leader Prabhakaran had been killed during the final 
offensive in May and the Tamil Tigers announced they would lay down their arms. For more information 
on the conflict in Sri Lanka, see ‘Sri Lanka Conflict History’, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org>, 
last consulted on 24 September 2012.
9 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at 
paras 54-59.
10 See Chapter III of the present study.
11 See Chapter III, Section 3 of the present study.
12 See Chapter III, Section 4 of the present study.
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As was already seen above, whether unilateral secession – i.e. without the consent 
of the parent State or constitutional authorization – is also included in these options, 
is more questionable. International law does not explicitly acknowledge this mode 
of exercising the right to self-determination. In fact, unilateral secession seems to be 
irreconcilable with the fundamental position within the international legal order of 
the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States, which is aimed at main-
taining the territorial status quo of sovereign States,13 while (unilateral) secession 
is precisely aimed at territorial change by modifying the external boundaries of the 
existing State. It is in this respect that unilateral secession is seen to challenge the 
very foundations of the State and the international order in general. It is often feared 
that unilateral secession will lead to the fragmentation of States and as such, have 
severely disruptive effects on the international legal order, since a large number of 
States harbours groups with secessionist ambitions. Hence, it is not surprising that 
beyond the context of decolonization, the emphasis is generally put on the internal 
rather than the external dimension of the right to self-determination. Considering the 
high value attributed to the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States 
within the system of international law, it seems that no general entitlement to unilat-
eral secession can exist. 
1.3. Unilateral Secession as a Remedial Right? 
A different situation, however, may be seen to arise when a people is submitted to seri-
ous injustices on the part of the State in which it resides. One may think of the situa-
tion in which, for instance, a people is persistently oppressed by the State, or in which 
its fundamental human rights are grossly and systematically violated by the central 
authorities. In those circumstances, and when the possibilities for reaching a peaceful 
solution within the framework of the existing State are either denied or exhausted, 
taking territorial integrity as being absolute, no human and just solution seems possi-
ble. That point of departure, requiring a people to remain within the borders of a State 
whatever the circumstances, would possibly “erect a principle of tyranny without 
measure and without end”.14 With a view to balancing order and justice, one might 
therefore argue that considering the well-established right to self-determination of 
peoples, in those exceptional circumstances when a people is flagrantly denied its 
right to internal self-determination, it should be endowed with a right to external 
self-determination by means of unilateral secession as a remedy to such gross injus-
tices. Put differently, under specific circumstances, a people’s right to internal self-
determination might arguably become a right to external self-determination in the 
13 The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States is referred to in Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter.
14 A. Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (Collins, London 1969) at p. 138.
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manifestation of a right to unilateral secession. Until this critical point is reached, the 
right to self-determination could only be exercised within the limits set by the princi-
ple of respect for the territorial integrity of States, i.e. internally. As will be seen in the 
present study, legal literature has increasingly presented such an outlook and a con-
siderable number of scholars has even maintained that a right to remedial secession 
does already exist under international law.15 When seen from a moral perspective, 
it may indeed be attractive to warrant such a right. The question however remains 
to what extent a legal entitlement to remedial secession has actually emerged under 
contemporary international law. The present study aims to shed light on this issue.
2. the appRoach of thiS Study
Before embarking on the substance of the issue outlined above, the approach of this 
study merits some explanation. Since the concepts of (unilateral) secession and reme-
dial secession are at the heart of this thesis, it is important to formulate definitions 
of these notions for the present purposes. Subsequently, the principal research ques-
tion will be phrased, after which the methodology and structure of this study will be 
outlined. 
2.1. Defining (Unilateral) Secession and Remedial Secession
Considering the Latin roots of the word secession,16 it is apparent that the concept of 
secession is related to “leaving or withdrawing from some place”.17 However, when 
seeking to formulate the meaning of the concept in greater detail, one will discover 
that in literature, various definitions are used, and that there is only little consensus 
on a definition of secession. Some definitions propounded by authors are broad and 
included many situations, while others are narrow, only applying to a limited set of 
circumstances.18 Peter Radan, to give an example, suggested that secession should 
be defined as “the creation of a new State upon territory previously forming part of, 
or being a colonial entity of, an existing State”.19 This broad definition makes clear 
that, in essence, secession is viewed as a process which enables the creation of a new 
State. A similar, process-oriented definition is used by Georg Nolte and Bruno Cop-
pieters. Nolte contended that secession means “the – not necessarily forceful – break-
ing away of an integral part of the territory of a State and its subsequent establishment 
15 See Chapter IV, Section 2.2 of the present study.
16 The Latin word ‘se’ means ‘apart’, and the verb ‘cedere’ means ‘to go’. 
17 P. Radan, ‘The Definition of “Secession”’ (2007) Macquarie Law Working Paper Series at p. 2.
18 See ibid. at pp. 5-15.
19 See ibid. at p. 2.
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as a new State”20 and Coppieters defined the concept as the “withdrawal from a State 
or society through the constitution of a new sovereign and independent State”.21 
James R. Crawford, however, used a narrower definition as he describes secession as 
“the creation of a State by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former 
sovereign”.22 As such, Crawford emphasized that secession involves the process of 
State-creation, but implies that not all cases in which the creation of the State results 
from the decolonization process are included. Moreover, according to Crawford, 
secession involves opposition from the existing sovereign State (i.e. the parent State). 
In the present study, a middle course is adopted, defining secession as follows:
The establishment of a new independent State through the withdrawal of an integral 
part of the territory of an existing State from that State, carried out by the resident 
population of that part of the territory, either with or without the consent of the parent 
State or domestic constitutional authorization.
Thus, this definition first articulates that secession is a process, of which – if suc-
cessful – a new independent State is the outcome. Furthermore, implicit in this defi-
nition of secession is that, since only an integral part of the territory withdraws, the 
remaining part of the State continues the legal personality of the already existing 
parent State.23 It is to be emphasized that the definition formulated above covers both 
instances of secession with and instances of secession without the consent of the 
parent State or a domestic constitutional arrangement authorizing withdrawal. The 
first category is referred to as consensual or constitutional secession, while the latter 
category is generally labelled as unilateral secession. Since this unilateral mode of 
secession will be at the centre of the present study, it merits a definition:
The establishment of a new independent State through the withdrawal of an integral 
part of the territory of an existing State from that State, carried out by the resident 
population of that part of the territory, without either the consent of the parent State or 
domestic constitutional authorization.
20 G. Nolte, ‘Secession and External Intervention’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) at p. 65.
21 B. Coppieters, ‘Introduction’ in B. Coppieters and R. Sakwa (eds) Contextualizing Secession Norma-
tive Studies in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) at p. 4.
22 J.R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd revised edn, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 2006) at p. 375.
23 On this issue, see P. Radan, ‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opin-
ions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 50 at p. 56; 
D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) at p. 
359; M. Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ (2005) 4 Ethnopolitics 3 at p. 8. 
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This definition emphasizes the problematic one-sided character of unilateral seces-
sion and, hence, the difference to consensual or constitutional secession.24 Similar 
to Nolte but in contrast to Crawford’s definition, the label of unilateral secession as 
used in the present study does not necessarily involve the threat or use of forceful 
means. One could call such an element superfluous, since, as Michael Schoiswohl 
observed, “an element of force is already inherent in the lack of approval by the pre-
vious sovereign”.25 In other words, it can be assumed that, if the claim to statehood by 
the secessionist movement is opposed by the parent State, at least an implicit threat of 
the use of force must be present. 
Embroidering on the definitions of both secession and unilateral secession as 
presented above, it now becomes possible to formulate a definition of the concept 
of remedial secession. For the present purposes, remedial secession is defined as 
follows:
The establishment of a new independent State through the withdrawal of an integral 
part of the territory of an existing State from that State, carried out by the resident 
population of that part of the territory, without either the consent of the parent State 
or domestic constitutional authorization, yet as a remedy of last resort to the serious 
injustices which the resident population of that part of the territory has suffered at the 
hands of the authorities of the parent State.
It should be emphasized, however, that the above is a working definition. While this 
definition considers the presence of serious injustices and the absence of any other 
remedies as a justification for unilateral secession, it may well be that the substance 
of this study will reveal additional or more specific circumstances which are seen to 
be relevant in this respect. 
24 On unilateral secession and consensual or constitutional secession, see A. Buchanan, Justice, Legiti-
macy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2004) at pp. 338-339; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 313-316. On 
constitutional secession, see Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at pp. 16-23. However, some com-
mentators refer to the term dissolution in instances of consensual or constitutional separation. See, for 
instance, J. Dugard, ‘A Legal Basis for Secession: Relevant Principles and Rules’ in J. Dahlitz (ed.) 
Secession and International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2003) at p. 89. Yet, in this study, it is 
the continuation or discontinuation of the legal personality of the previous sovereign which is considered 
as the key distinguishing feature between secession and dissolution, even though it is to be pointed out 
that the contrast between the two concepts appears to be less strict as has been traditionally argued. See 
Radan, ‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbi-
tration Commission’ at p. 56; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 358-360. On this 
distinction, see Chapter III, Section 4.1.4.
25 M. Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in 
International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’. The Resurrection of Somaliland Against All International 
‘Odds’: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden 2005) at p. 48.
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2.2. Principal Research Question
In view of the indeterminacy of the external dimension of the right to self-determina-
tion as touched upon previously in this Chapter, in particular with respect to the issue 
of remedial secession, the principal question of this study reads as follows: 
To what extent has a legal entitlement to ‘remedial secession’, i.e. a right to exter-
nal self-determination as a remedy to serious injustices, emerged under contemporary 
international law? 
The present study seeks to answer this question by dealing with three broad sub-
questions: (1) What is the conventional meaning of the right to self-determination of 
peoples? (2) To what extent has a legal entitlement to ‘remedial secession’ emerged 
under the sources of international law other than custom? (3) To what extent has a 
legal entitlement to ‘remedial secession’ emerged under customary international law? 
As will be seen below, these sub-questions will guide the structure and methodology 
of the present study.
2.3. Structure and Methodology
In this study, the classical legal methodology will be adopted. In the field of inter-
national law, this involves an examination of the various sources of international 
law. These sources are enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice and include international conventions, customary international law, 
general principles of (international) law, judicial decisions and opinions, and doc-
trine. In addition, the unilateral acts of States and acts of international organizations 
will also be examined in the present study. Although not listed in Article 38(1), over 
time, they have often been suggested as sources of international law and therefore 
deserve to be considered as well. While the classical legal methodology of studying 
the sources of international law will be most apparent in Chapter IV and Chapter VI, 
explicitly assessing these sources one by one, it is important to note that this meth-
odology will act as a guide throughout the present study as a whole. It should be 
emphasized, however, that it is by no means a straitjacket, as the various sources of 
international law are sometimes connected. For instance, international conventions 
may include codified norms of customary international law, and judicial decisions 
and opinions as well as doctrine are often based on the other sources of international 
law. This makes it impossible to strictly distinguish between the different sources 
of international law impossible. Further methodological choices – for instance con-
cerning the approach adopted towards ascertaining norms of customary international 
law – will be made and explained in the individual Chapters where necessary. At this 
stage, it may also be noted that this study will be merely consider legal literature. 
While much has been written on the issues of self-determination and secession from 
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a non-legal perspective – for instance through a philosophical, international relations, 
or political science lens – no such literature will be included as that is beyond the 
scope of the present research.
For the purpose of providing good insight into the structure of the present study, 
this thesis is divided into three parts, each of them corresponding to one of the sub-
questions posed above. First, a theoretical framework concerning the generally 
accepted, conventional meaning of the right to self-determination will be construed. 
For this purpose, an examination of its history and development up to the decoloni-
zation period and beyond is necessary, as this evolution to a large extent determined 
the shape and content of the contemporary right to self-determination. Chapter II will 
therefore be devoted to the development of the concept of self-determination from 
principle to right. Subsequently, Chapter III will assess the extension of the right to 
self-determination beyond decolonization, i.e. its contemporary meaning. In doing 
so, a close look will be taken at the conceptual split into the external and internal 
dimensions. The present-day interpretation of these dimensions will be elaborated 
upon by examining their respective content, legal status and subjects. It is against this 
background that the full extent of the indeterminacy and controversy as regards the 
right to self-determination and unilateral secession will become apparent. 
Secondly, the question needs to be answered as to what extent a legal entitlement 
to remedial secession has emerged under the sources of international law other than 
customary international law.26 To answer this question, the various sources of inter-
national law will be examined one by one. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the sources listed therein will act as a guide in this respect. 
More specifically, Chapter IV will deal with international conventions, doctrine, judi-
cial decisions and opinions, and general principles of (international) law, in order to 
scrutinize whether traces of a right to remedial secession are reflected. In addition 
to this, a couple of other sources which are not listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, but are often mentioned as additional sources 
of international law, will be addressed. These sources involve the unilateral acts of 
States and acts of international organizations. Where traces of the acknowledgement 
of a right to remedial secession are found, Chapter IV will also seek to identify the 
conditions for such an entitlement to arise. 
Thirdly, the question arises as to what extent a right to remedial secession has 
emerged under customary international law. It is important to note that this question 
merits separate elaboration, as the law of self-determination is constantly moulded by 
international practice. Moreover, should it be found that no right to remedial seces-
sion has emerged under the other sources of international law, then the question of a 
customary right to remedial secession would become all the more important. All in 
all, a detailed examination of State practice and opinio juris is of great significance 
26 For reasons explained below, the source of customary international law will be dealt with separately. 
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for the present study. Before assessing these traditional constituents of custom against 
the backdrop of the question of remedial secession, however, the source of customary 
international law in general first merits elaboration. Chapter V will therefore elabo-
rate on the two traditional constituents of custom and demonstrate how these ele-
ments have traditionally been interpreted in literature and jurisprudence. Over time, 
various approaches towards customary international law have been adopted. Chapter 
V will critically consider the conventional approach as well as some progressive 
methodologies, such as the so-called human rights method towards ascertaining cus-
tomary international law. This critical appraisal will lead to some preliminary obser-
vations as regards assessing the existence of a customary right to remedial secession, 
i.e. the contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach towards custom, 
which will be utilized in the following Chapter. 
Having made some preliminary observations in this respect, Chapter VI will be 
devoted to the exercise of examining the emergence of a right to remedial secession 
under customary international law. For this purpose, international responses to (suc-
cessful) attempts at unilateral secession beyond the context of decolonization will be 
analysed. In doing so, a prominent role will be granted to Kosovo’s relatively recent 
attempt to secede unilaterally from Serbia in 2008 and the international reactions in 
this respect. Two prominent reasons may be seen to justify this choice. First, in view 
of the background of the case and particularly its history of oppression and gross 
human rights violations by the Serbian authorities, Kosovo is frequently regarded as 
a test-case or experimental plot for the contemporary validity of an alleged right to 
remedial secession.27 Secondly, the case of Kosovo offers an exceptional insight in 
the present-day views of the international community with respect to unilateral seces-
sion. This is the result of the large number of States having responded to the issuing 
of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, within international fora such as 
the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, as well as in formal recogni-
tion statements and during the advisory proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice.28 In addition to Kosovo, some other cases which are sometimes suggested as 
supporting the existence of a right to remedial secession will be reviewed. The selec-
tion of cases in this respect is to a large extent founded on the international responses 
in the case of Kosovo and the references – or the apparent lack thereof – to other rel-
evant instances in practice. The creation of Bangladesh and Croatia have sometimes 
27 See, for instance, A. Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process” in the Creation of States through Seces-
sion’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2006) at pp. 187-188.
28 See UN General Assembly Resolution 63/3 (Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with 
International Law), UN Doc. A/Res/63/3, 8 October 2008; International Court of Justice Press Release, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion). Public hearings to be held 
from 1 December 2009, No. 2009/27, 29 July 2009.
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been adduced as cases which reveal State practice on the matter of remedial seces-
sion. Such reference was also made during the advisory proceedings, although with-
out further elaboration upon the relevance.29 Other instances which have occasionally 
been referred to as situations endorsing the doctrine of remedial secession are the 
emergence of Eritrea, the independence of the Baltic States and the other successor 
States to the former Soviet Union, and – generally in connection with Slovenia – the 
creation of Croatia and the other successor States to the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. These events will also be addressed to see whether they indeed present 
evidence for the thesis that a right to remedial secession does exist. Having dealt with 
these cases of State creation beyond the decolonization context, Chapter VI will sub-
sequently turn to an appraisal of the international responses to attempts at unilateral 
secession. In doing so, the elements of State practice and opinio juris with respect 
to a right to remedial secession as reflected in the abovementioned responses will be 
reviewed. First and foremost, this will be done on the basis of the contemporary inter-
pretation of the conventional approach towards ascertaining customary international 
law. To see whether adherence to a more liberal and progressive methodology will 
lead to different outcomes – as is sometimes contended – the progressive human 
rights approach will be applied on a subsidiary level. This review will lead to answer-
ing the question which is at issue in this third part of the study.
Finally, the threefold analysis as outlined above will logically culminate into an 
answer to the principal question of this study. Therefore, after having recapitulated 
the main findings in this respect, Chapter VII will present the general conclusions and 
offer some final reflections on the concept of remedial secession, its alleged effectua-
tion through recognition value and its possible future development.
29 See International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory 





the development fRom  
pRinciple to Right
“[T]he countries of the world belong to the people who live in them, and […] they have 
a right to determine their own destiny and their own form of government and their own 
policy, and […] no body of statesmen, sitting anywhere, no matter whether they rep-
resent the overwhelming physical force of the world or not, has the right to assign any 
great people to a sovereignty under which it does not care to live.” 
T. Woodrow Wilson*
1. intRoduction
Defining the principle of self-determination is far from being a simple matter. The 
principle is included in some of the most prominent international legal instruments, 
in which it is ascribed to be the basis for friendly relations amongst States, peace 
and development, and as a precondition for the enjoyment of human rights. In prac-
tice, the concept of self-determination is widely invoked by groups claiming political 
autonomy or even full independence. As such, it is simultaneously linked to national-
ism, to political participation and democracy, and to secession as well as statehood. 
Yet, the precise content of the notion of self-determination, its subject and application 
are highly contested. Therefore, it is helpful to consider the historical roots of the con-
cept to shed some light on this indeterminacy. To this end, the present Chapter will 
explore the historical development of the notion of self-determination, from theories 
and ideologies underlying and arising from the American and French Revolutions 
to the political ideas of Lenin and Wilson, and from the League of Nations’ Man-
date System to the United Nations Charter. Subsequently, this Chapter will deal with 
*  T. Woodrow Wilson, speech at Billings (Montana) on 11 September 1919, quoted in: A. Cassese, 
Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995) at 
p. 20, footnote 26.
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what is often referred to as the traditional context of the right to self-determination: 
the decolonization process. In doing so, it will demonstrate how self-determination 
evolved from a political principle to a legal right.
2. the emeRgence of the pRinciple of Self-deteRmination
2.1. Democratic Political Theory
It is in the ideas underlying the American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth 
century that the roots of the notion of self-determination may be found. It is impor-
tant to note that before these revolutionary ideas could flourish, States frequently did 
not respond to the needs and will of their populations. Gradually, these populations 
refused to accept the exercise of power by an authority which they experienced as 
‘alien’.1 Against this background, the idea took root that (the legitimacy of) govern-
mental power should depend on the will and consent of the people, rather than on the 
will of the monarch, aristocracy or privileged elite. In other words, peoples are not 
the subjects of States, but “can do their own State-making”.2 
In the case of the American Revolution, this line of thought resulted in American 
opposition to British rule. The claim of peoples to govern themselves was expressed 
in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America of 4 July 1776. 
This declaration, written by Thomas Jefferson, proclaimed that: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. 
That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the 
Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.3 
Similar views were also reflected in the French Revolution of 1789, during which the 
French population turned against the ruling monarch, leading to the fall of monar-
chical authority.4 These revolutionary events were rooted in the rise of political-
1 D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 
at p. 173.
2 A. Whelan, ‘Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement’ (1994) 43 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 99 at p. 99.
3 Quoted in J. Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination 
Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2007) at pp. 95-96.
4 See, for instance, N.G. Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood (Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University 
2008) at pp. 78-79; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 74.
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philosophical theories, such as Locke’s theory of government with the consent of 
the governed,5 and Rousseau’s contrat social and volontée générale, which were 
aimed at protecting democratic order, freedom of the individual, and the exercise of 
legitimate governmental power.6 The key notion in this respect was that of popular 
sovereignty: the idea that the people are the highest authority and, therefore, State 
authority should be founded on the free will of the people. As such, the ideas under-
lying both revolutions connect closely to the more contemporary conception of self-
determination, namely that a people has the right to freely determine its political 
status and economic, social and cultural development. This does not imply, however, 
that the concept of self-determination can be equated with the driving forces under-
lying the two revolutions, such as the Enlightenment and the doctrine of liberalism. 
For, both emphasized individualism and equal rights rather than the rights and status 
of a collectivity, with which the concept of self-determination is concerned. But one 
cannot deny that “the substantive development of several aspects of the concept of 
self-determination is linked to primarily Western democratic political thought and 
ideology as expressed in the American and French Revolutions”.7 
2.2. Ethnic Nationalism
A second idea which is important in understanding the principle of self-determina-
tion also originated at the time of the French Revolution and is closely related to the 
notion of popular sovereignty, namely nationalism. Adherents of this theory assumed 
that the world community could be divided into different ethnicities, called nations or 
peoples. Moreover, they put forward the ideal of ethnicities functioning as the foun-
dations of legitimate statehood, since nationalists believed that individuals could only 
achieve self-realization and freedom through their nation. In turn, only free nations 
could maintain peaceful and friendly relations and accomplish progress and develop-
ment, so it was viewed.8 
Consequently, a system was pursued in which the State and the ethnic ‘national-
ity’ living on the territory are congruent: the State in an ethnic sense.9 As such, the 
5 See J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government [1689] (Thomas Hollis edn, A. Millar et al., London 
1764). See also Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination 
Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at pp. 94-95.
6 See J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses [1761] (G.D.H. Cole edn, J.M. Dent and 
Sons, London/Toronto 1923), Book I, Chapter 6 (‘The Social Compact’), pp. 43-44. 
7 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 175.
8 Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Con-
temporary Law of Nations at pp. 9-10.
9 See A. Eide, ‘The National Society, Peoples and Ethno-Nations: Semantic Confusions and Legal 
Consequences’ (1995) 64 Nordic Journal of International Law 353 at p. 355; Raič, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination at p.174; Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and 
Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at p. 9.
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meaning of the term ‘State’ came to encompass more than just a legal and territorial 
concept, as it also added a social and cultural dimension to it.10 
2.3. Liberal Nationalism
In the aftermath of the Revolutions, while democratic political thought and the ideol-
ogy of ethnic nationalism developed further, both theories gradually converged. The 
merger of liberal and nationalist values created the view that, for popular sovereignty 
to be effective, a common identity to some extent, or at least a sense of solidar-
ity amongst the members of the group was necessary. Put differently, to construct a 
system based on representative, democratic government, it was viewed that national-
ist conceptions were to be taken into account,11 possibly necessitating the break-up or 
merger of States for equating State and nation. 
It is this ideology of liberal nationalism which reflects how the concept of self-
determination was both nurtured by the call for representative government and popu-
lar self-rule on the one hand, and the claim of ethnic nationalities to independent 
statehood for the purpose of determining their own destiny on the other hand. This 
observation is particularly interesting since, as will be demonstrated in the following 
Chapter, the contemporary notion of self-determination is generally seen to be bipar-
tite in character, as it has an internal dimension and an external one. In this respect, 
it will become apparent that liberal theory emphasized what is now considered the 
internal dimension of self-determination, while nationalist ideology was concerned 
with what is called the external dimension of self-determination.
3. Self-deteRmination befoRe the Second woRld waR
Democratic political theory, the theory of ethnic nationalism, and compound liberal 
nationalist thought not only provided for the historical roots of what later became 
known as the principle of self-determination. In addition, it appears that both theories 
exerted considerable influence on the actual development of the principle of self-
determination. Although it was only after the Second World War that it came into 
general acceptance, the principle of self-determination was brought to the attention of 
the international community in the early twentieth century. In this respect, an impor-
tant part was played by Vladimir I. Lenin and T. Woodrow Wilson, both of whom also 
contributed to the development of the content of the concept of self-determination. 
10 This concept of ethnic nationalism can be contrasted with what is called civic nationalism, which 
holds that “everybody living within the state should be part of the nation on a basis of equality, irrespec-
tive of their ethnic background”. See Eide, ‘The National Society, Peoples and Ethno-Nations: Semantic 
Confusions and Legal Consequences’ at p. 355.
11 Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Con-
temporary Law of Nations at p. 110.
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As will be demonstrated below, it is unsurprising to observe that in an era of com-
peting political ideologies, Lenin and Wilson advocated distinct conceptions of self-
determination. Nevertheless, in both perspectives, democratic political theory as well 
as the theory of ethnic nationalism is reflected in some way or other.
3.1. Lenin’s Conception of Self-Determination
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s seizing of power 
made the concept of self-determination appear explicitly within international politics. 
Being one of the first to enunciate this right, in his ‘Theses on the Socialist Revolu-
tion and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’ (1916) and in subsequent Soviet 
declarations, Lenin claimed that a right to self-determination was a general condition 
for the liberation of oppressed nations. To Lenin, self-determination signified a right 
for subjugated nations to break away from the oppressor and create a new, independ-
ent State. Thus, Lenin’s conception of self-determination implied a right to secession. 
Yet, it should be noted that he viewed secession as a last resort option only, as he 
wrote that a nation should only proceed to secession:
[w]hen national oppression and national friction make joint life absolutely intolerable 
and hinder any and all economic intercourse. In that case, the interest of capitalist 
development and of the freedom of class struggle will be best served by secession.12
Unsurprisingly, Lenin’s argument arose from tactical considerations. As the excerpt 
above indicates, for Lenin, self-determination in the form of secession did not serve 
to protect the collective identity of the nation involved. Rather, Lenin believed that 
the concept of self-determination would serve as an instrument for the spread of 
socialist revolution throughout the world and creating a universal socialist commu-
nity in the long run.13 In this context, Hurst Hannum has aptly noted that “it should be 
underscored that self-determination in 1919 had little to do with the demands of the 
12 V.I. Lenin, ‘The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, in: V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Progress 
Publishers, Moscow 1964), at p. 146, quoted in: Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at 
p. 186.
13 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 15; Summers, Peoples and 
International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at 
p. 127; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 186; P. Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or 
Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern 
Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at pp. 106-107; D. Thürer and 
T. Burri, ‘Self-Determination’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(fully updated online edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2010) at para. 3.
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peoples concerned, unless those demands were consistent with the geopolitical and 
strategic interests of the Great Powers”.14 
Notwithstanding his Bolshevik objectives, one cannot deny that Lenin managed 
to stimulate the international debate on the role of self-determination. Antonio Cas-
sese has identified three meanings expressed in Lenin’s formulation of self-deter-
mination. First, it was to serve as an instrument for ethnic and national groups to 
freely determine their own destiny. This aim could be realized by means of more 
autonomy while remaining within the existing borders of the State, but also by means 
of secession.15 In this context, secession should be seen “as a necessary final guar-
antor of the existence of the right”.16 Secondly, self-determination was to function 
as a guiding principle for territorial ordering in the aftermath of military conflicts 
between sovereign States. As such, it prohibited territorial annexation contrary to the 
will of the peoples at issue. This meaning of self-determination was a reiteration of 
the ideas proclaimed after the French Revolution. Thirdly, self-determination was to 
provide for a measure for anti-colonialism, to be invoked by colonial peoples against 
their imperialist powers, leading to independence.17 This final meaning should not be 
underestimated, since the Soviet Union’s urge for the liberation of colonial peoples 
played an important part in the decolonization efforts initiated by the United Nations 
after its establishment.18
It follows from the Bolshevik leader’s theory that he stressed an external dimen-
sion of self-determination as he defined it as the right of a nation to choose its politi-
cal status in the international sphere by means of secession from the parent State. At 
the same time, however, one should bear in mind that, in essence, the core meaning 
of Lenin’s conception of self-determination is concerned with an internal element. 
Lenin believed that the concept of self-determination enabled nations to freely deter-
mine their political destiny by means of ‘self-government’, thus affecting the inter-
nal relationship between the government and the governed within the borders of the 
State. In this respect, he viewed political separation of a collectivity, i.e. secession, as 
a remedy of last resort to effectuate internal self-determination.19 
3.2. Wilson’s Conception of Self-Determination
With his formulation of the United States’ perspective of self-determination, the 
American President T. Woodrow Wilson provided a counterbalance to Lenin’s 
14 H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights (2nd revised edn, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1996) at p. 28.
15 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 16.
16 Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood at p. 80.
17 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 16.
18 Ibid. at p. 19.
19 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 187-188. 
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conception of self-determination. In contrast to Lenin, for Wilson, self-determina-
tion signified true self-government, rather than “incorporation in a larger, centralized 
communist State”.20 As such, the origins of Wilson’s conception of self-determina-
tion can be traced back to democratic political thought as developed in the era of the 
American and French Revolutions.21 More specifically, Wilson linked a democratic 
governmental system with a peaceful society. He argued that only a democratic form 
of government would offer an ethnically identifiable people or nation the opportunity 
to both choose its own government as well as control the actions of the government, 
thus ensuring that it would not lose track of the rights and interests of its population. 
According to Wilson, only this form of government could be the foundation for a 
lasting world peace.22 
It was from this conviction that Wilson, in his famous Fourteen Points Address 
of 8 January 1918,23 proposed a post-war settlement taking his point of departure 
from the idea that each people or nation has the right to determine the system of 
government under which it would live. This implied the division of the Ottoman and 
Austro-Hungarian Empires and the restructuring of Europe in accordance with the 
interests of the populations involved.24 In his Fourteen Points Address, Wilson did 
not explicitly mention the term self-determination. Yet, it is broadly accepted that six 
of the fourteen points implicitly concern the concept of self-determination. Wilson 
himself confirmed that his proposed post-war settlement was founded upon the idea 
of self-determination in his address to the Congress on 11 February 1918, which 
became known as the Four Principles Address. In this speech, he explicitly dealt with 
the concept of self-determination by stating that “[s]elf-determination is not a mere 
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore 
at their peril”.25
Analysing Wilson’s theory, two dimensions of self-determination can be distin-
guished.26 The first dimension is internal, requiring a continuing democratic relation-
ship between the government and its people. In contrast, the second dimension is 
external, claiming that ethnic groups should have the opportunity to govern their own 
territory. In other words, this theory opened doors to the establishment of ethnically 
20 Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood at p. 81.
21 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 177-178.
22 See ibid. at p. 178. See also Whelan, ‘Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement’ at 
p. 100.
23 The speech was delivered to a joint session of the United States Congress. See T.W. Wilson, ‘An 
Address to a Joint Session of Congress’ in A.S. Link (ed.) The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 1984). 
24 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 20-21.
25 Quoted in: Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 182.
26 Compare to Cassesse, who provides for a brief analysis of Wilson’s ideas by distinguishing four 




homogeneous States.27 It should be noted that Wilson’s perception of self-determina-
tion did not entail a norm of international law, meaning “a right, that is, with verifi-
able bearers (‘peoples’) and corresponding duties owed by other parties (States)”.28 
Rather, as a result of Wilson’s efforts, self-determination had evolved into a political 
principle in the international political arena. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Wilson paved the way for the development of self-
determination within international law, his theory was heavily criticized as well. 
First, Wilson’s theory was phrased generally and remained rather indeterminate 
since significant questions as to, for instance, the subjects or ‘units’ of a right to self-
determination remained unanswered.29 Secondly, perhaps somewhat naively, Wilson 
underestimated the consequences of his words on the world stage when giving utter-
ance to his ideas. Again, an illustrative extract in this respect comes from Lansing, 
who wrote:
The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of ‘self-determina-
tion’, the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of 
certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress 
and create trouble in many lands. 
 What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the national-
ists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and rebellion? Will not 
the Mohammedans of Syria and Palestine and possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely 
on it? How can it be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically 
committed?
 The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be 
realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end, it is bound to be discredited, 
to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to 
check those who attempt to put the principle in force. What a calamity that the phrase 
was ever uttered! What a misery it will cause!30
A third drawback of Wilson’s theory which should be noted here is that it was not meant 
to be applied internally, in the United States itself. What is more, Wilson rejected the 
concept of self-determination which was aimed at the protection of American minor-
ities and ethnic groups. Rather, Wilson’s concept of self-determination was designed 
to function internationally – in particular on the European continent. Finally, it must 
27 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 
at pp. 30-31. See also Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 183.
28 Whelan, ‘Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement’ at p. 105.
29 Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote: “When the President talks of “self-determination” what unit 
has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit which 
is practical, application of this principle to dangerous to peace and stability”. See R. Lansing, The Peace 
Negotiations. A Personal Narrative (Constable and Company, London 1921) at p. 86.
30 Ibid. at p. 87.
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be pointed out that Wilson’s theory remained largely unadopted on the international 
level due to its incoherence, which will be touched upon below.31 
3.3. Self-Determination in the Wake of the First World War
Approximately one year after Wilson delivered his famous speeches, he had the 
opportunity to enunciate his theory of self-determination at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence, which was held from 18 January to 21 January 1919. The Allied victors of 
World War I had assembled at Versailles to design a post-war settlement and create 
the League of Nations.32 Most of them agreed that a re-division of Europe was nec-
essary to create a lasting peace, and the Allies had advocated the formation of new 
States and made promises as regards self-government for oppressed populations at 
various occasions during the war. As a consequence, however, the nationalities con-
cerned had already started to form their own States – a process which was not exe-
cuted consistently and did not correspond to the ideas of the Allies.33 Furthermore, 
competing interests among the Allies forced Wilson to depart from his bold demands 
and make concessions. In both respects, Wilson failed to live up to the expectations 
raised as a result of his pleas for self-determination.
Eventually, the Paris Peace Conference resulted in the application of the concept 
of self-determination by the allied powers, albeit rather arbitrarily: groups which had 
been allegiant to the victors were granted the opportunity to create their own, inde-
pendent State, whereas claims made by other, less loyal communities fell on deaf 
ears. It goes without saying that political, strategic and economic interests of the 
allies often were of overriding importance.34 Yet, practical obstacles occurred as well, 
since it appeared to be simply unattainable to apply the principle of self-determina-
tion without any limitations whatsoever, thus dividing Europe into ethnically homo-
geneous nation States.35 
As already mentioned above, the victors of World War I did not merely assemble 
in Versailles to design a post-war peace settlement. They also aimed at establishing 
31 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 23.
32 For a discussion of power relations at Versailles, see G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States. 
Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) at 
pp. 154-159.
33 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 188-189.
34 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 25; Raič, Statehood and the Law 
of Self-Determination at p. 190.
35 See L.C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Yale University Press, New 
Haven 1978) at p. 64, quoting C. Webster, The League of Nations in Theory and Practice (Allen and 
Unwin, London 1933) at p. 206, and explaining that if self-determination would be applied without any 
restraint, the inescapable consequence would be that “[t]he solution of one set of minority problems 
[would] involve the creation of another set, with the dismal prospect of the commencement of a fresh 
cycle of conflict, revolt and war”. 
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an international alliance of States which was dedicated to, inter alia, the promotion 
of international co-operation, the settlement of disputes among States, and achieving 
international peace and security: the League of Nations.36 In drawing up the League 
of Nations Covenant, however, the failure of the Wilsonian concept of self-determi-
nation became unpleasantly apparent again. Wilson’s draft provision on self-determi-
nation remained unenshrined in the Covenant, despite his efforts. Although he aimed 
at including the concept as a basis for potential territorial adjustments “by reason of 
changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political 
relationships”,37 the final version of the Covenant made no reference to self-determi-
nation at all. A general fear for disintegration must be considered as the preliminary 
reason for this exclusion.38 
Despite of this lack of explicitly mentioning self-determination, the concept of 
self-determination is generally viewed as the main idea behind the so-called Man-
date System of the League of Nations, which was provided for in Article 22 of the 
Covenant. The Mandate System was established in order to solve the problem of the 
colonies of the defeated powers which – after the war and collapse of the empires 
of old – no longer fell under the sovereignty of an existing, independent State.39 
Instead of “distributing” these formerly colonized territories among the victors of the 
war, they were placed under supervision of the League of Nations and governed on 
a day-to-day basis by so-called mandatory powers, while the territories themselves 
only had a limited degree of autonomy as they were not yet conceived to be ready to 
govern themselves.40 
The Mandate System created three categories of mandate, with a decreasing 
level of self-administration in accordance with their degree of advancement – or 
what this degree was conceived to be. First, so-called ‘A’ mandates encompassed 
the highest level of autonomous administration. The former Turkish Empire terri-
tories were placed under this mandate, and were expected to be independent rather 
soon. Secondly, the former German territories in Central Africa were categorized as 
‘B’ mandates. Thirdly, ‘C’ mandates related to territories which required governance 
by more “advanced nations”, and applied to South-West Africa and several South 
Pacific Islands.41 Although this system might convey the impression of disguised 
36 See P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2001) at pp. 9-13 for an introduction to the League of Nations system.
37 D.H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (Putnam’s, New York 1928), quoted in: Raič, Statehood 
and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 194.
38 See S. Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Prac-
tice (Doctoral Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 2001) at p. 58.
39 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 194.
40 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2007) at p. 116.
41 See Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. For an overview of the territories under 
the Mandate System, see J.R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd revised edn, 
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colonialism,42 it was established for the purpose of achieving exactly the opposite, 
as it attempted to “protect the interests of backward people, to promote their welfare 
and development and to guide them toward self-government and, in certain cases, 
independence”.43 One might argue that by stressing these benevolent aims of the 
Mandate System, the League of Nations sought to justify the administration of for-
merly colonized peoples, which would otherwise strongly hint at neo-imperialism.44 
Yet, the Mandate System can also be viewed as an important shift in the international 
legal realm, for it introduced a new approach to the management of ‘backward’ terri-
tories. Governing these territories was no longer conducted by colonial powers which 
were driven by pure self-interest, but rather by administrators who aimed at collect-
ing detailed knowledge of these backward societies and economies for the purpose 
of outlining policies needed to guide the native peoples involved to development and 
self-government.45 
In addition to the Mandate System, the League of Nations also provided for a 
settlement for those minorities or ethnic groups which could not – out of fear of the 
disintegration of Europe – exercise a right to self-determination by forming their own 
State. For these communities, the founding States of the League of Nations came up 
with international guarantees for national minorities,46 which were intended to ensure 
the preservation of their racial, national and cultural peculiarities and to “place them 
on a footing of perfect equality” with the other communities within the State.47 This 
was not implemented by means of the development of a universal instrument, but 
rather by means of a system based on individual minority treaties. These treaties 
were concluded between the allies on the one hand, and the individual State in which 
minority protection was needed on the other. As such, minority treaties were signed 
primarily with Central and Eastern European States. Since it was aimed to draw iden-
tical treaties, the treaty with Poland was used as a basis for the system.48 
The League of Nations was involved in the supervision of the minority protec-
tion system. Special committees, each composed of three members of the Council, 
were created to monitor compliance with the obligations concerning the protection of 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006) Appendix 2, at pp. 741-745.
42 See ibid. at p. 568.
43 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law at p. 120.
44 Ibid. at p. 140.
45 Ibid. at p. 185 and p. 195.
46 On this topic, see A.K. Meijknecht, ‘Minority Protection System between World War I and World 
War II’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated online 
edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2010).
47 Permanent Court of International Justice, Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ 
Series A/B, No. 64, (1935), at p. 17.
48 See Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Prac-
tice at pp. 58-59. On the content of the treaty with Poland, see A.K. Meijknecht, Towards International 
Personality: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law (School of Human 
Rights Research Series, Intersentia/Hart, Antwerp/Groningen/Oxford 2001) at pp. 124-127.
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minorities as conferred by the treaties. A significant element in the supervision was 
the petition procedure. Aggrieved minorities could file a petition with the League of 
Nations regarding a minority’s issue, which was forwarded to both the authorities at 
issue and the members of the Council. If one of the members drew attention to the 
alleged (risk of) violation of the obligations as stipulated in the relevant treaty, the 
petition could be examined by one of the special committees. The petition system, 
however, became an ineffective instrument. Although hundreds of petitions were 
filed and found admissible, only a few were eventually addressed by the Council.49 
In the League’s minority protection system, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice played an indirect yet important role. Minorities themselves had no standing 
before the Court, but the case law and advisory opinions it issued can be said to have 
contributed considerably to the development of minority rights law.50 
With World War II, the minority system of the League of Nations collapsed. The 
United Nations succeeded the League, but its system of minority protection was dis-
continued. Not only did the minorities in Europe almost vanish as a result of the 
genocide during the war, but the United Nations also opted for a different approach. 
No special protection for minorities was deemed necessary, as the principle of non-
discrimination and the concept of universal human rights were found to provide for 
sufficient protection to everyone, including minorities.51 It was not until 1966 with 
the inclusion of Article 27 in the ICCPR that the United Nations explicitly made ref-
erence to special minority rights.52
3.4. The Åland Islands Case
As demonstrated above, the notion of self-determination was used in a somewhat 
haphazard manner in the aftermath of World War I. It was only through its invoca-
tion in the Åland Islands case in 1920 that the notion acquired significance in a legal 
context. What is more, it is said that what would later be labelled as a remedial right 
to secession has its origins in this case.53 In this connection, the Åland Islands case 
and its background will be further elaborated upon elsewhere in this study.54 For the 
purpose of this Chapter, the case will only be dealt with briefly at this point. 
49 Meijknecht, ‘Minority Protection System between World War I and World War II’ at paras 18-23.
50 See ibid. at paras 24-25.
51 See A. Eide, ‘The Non-Inclusion of Minority Rights: Resolution 217C (III)’ in G. Alfredsson and A. 
Eide (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1999).
52 Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice at 
p. 61. See also Meijknecht, ‘Minority Protection System between World War I and World War II’ at para. 
31.
53 See M. Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans”, Secession and the Great 
Powers’ Rule (Working Paper, Cleveland State University 2009) at p. 5.
54 See Chapter IV, Section 2.3.1.
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In short, the Åland Islands case dealt with a legal dispute between Sweden and 
Finland. It involved, inter alia, the question of whether the inhabitants of the Åland 
Islands – an archipelago situated in the Baltic Sea, between Finland and Sweden – 
were allowed to secede from Finland and subsequently attach themselves to Swe-
den.55 An International Commission of Jurists and a Committee of Rapporteurs, both 
established by the Council of the League of Nations for the purpose of this very case, 
were seized to write an advisory opinion on the matter. The report by the Commis-
sion of Jurists (hereafter: Jurists) was supposed to clarify the question of whether the 
League of Nations Council was entitled to exercise jurisdiction regarding the Åland 
Islands dispute. In this context, the relationship between self-determination and State 
sovereignty was explored, which gave the Jurists occasion to express their view on 
the status of self-determination within international law. It appeared that the Jurists 
did not consider self-determination, interpreted as secession, to be a legal right under 
positive international law: 
Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an important part in 
modern political thought, especially since the Great War, it must be pointed out that 
there is no mention of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of 
this principle in a certain number of international treaties cannot be considered as suf-
ficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations. On the 
contrary, in the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of dis-
posing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. 
Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to 
separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of 
a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. 
Generally speaking, the grant or the refusal of such a right to a portion of its population 
of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method is, exclu-
sively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitely constituted.56
In other words, although the Jurists denied self-determination by means of the sepa-
ration of part of a territory as being a right under positive international law, that thesis 
only applied to States which were definitively constituted. 
After the opinion of the Jurists had made the Åland Islands dispute subject to 
international jurisdiction by the League of Nations, a Committee of Rapporteurs 
(hereafter: Rapporteurs) was set up so as to analyze the matter and formulate a solu-
tion. In this connection, the Rapporteurs made some general remarks on self-deter-
mination as well. It stated that:
55 See, generally, J. Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (Yale 
University Press, New Haven 1968).
56 Report of the International Commission of Jurists (Larnaude, Huber, Struycken), LNOJ Special Sup-
plement No. 3 (October 1920), at para. 5.
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[t]his principle is not, properly speaking a rule of international law and the League of 
Nations has not entered it in its Covenant. […] It is a principle of justice and of liberty, 
expressed by a vague and general formula which has given rise to most varied interpre-
tations and differences of opinion. […] Is it possible to admit as an absolute rule that 
a minority of the population of a State, which is definitely constituted and perfectly 
capable of fulfilling its duties as such, has the right of separating itself from her in 
order to be incorporated in another State or to declare independence? The answer can 
only be in the negative. To concede minorities, either of language or religion, or to any 
fraction of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they 
belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and 
stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to 
uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and politi-
cal unity. […] The separation of a minority from the State can only be considered as an 
altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the 
power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.57 
As the Rapporteurs were of the opinion that the language and culture of the Ålanders 
could be safeguarded through the introduction of political autonomy under Finnish 
sovereignty, secession of the Åland Islands was out of the question. Only if Finland 
would manifestly fail to meet the proposed standards, would the breaking-away of 
the islands be an alternative supported by the Rapporteurs.58 
In conclusion, it can be said that although both the Commission of Jurists and the 
Committee of Rapporteurs denied the existence of self-determination as an absolute 
right for minorities and national groups to separate unilaterally, the possible resort 
to secession was acknowledged for cases where no alternative solution would be 
reasonably expected as a result of extreme oppression. Moreover, the political impor-
tance of the concept was recognized. All in all, the Åland Islands case can be viewed 
as a landmark in the history of self-determination. As Cassese put it: “a policy line 
was put forward which the world community, to some extent, took up and, indeed, 
which might yield even more fruit in the future”.59
4. Self-deteRmination in the poSt-waR eRa
With the entry into force of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the notion 
of self-determination entered the second stage of its evolution, as the principle was 
now codified in an international legal document. It was further crystallized against 
the backdrop of the decolonization process – a process in which the concept of 
57 Report of the International Committee of Rapporteurs (Beyens, Calonder, Elkens), 16 April 1921, LN 
Council Document B7/2I/68/106 [VII], at paras 22-23.
58 Ibid., at paras 33-34.
59 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 33 (emphasis added).
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self-determination was explicitly applied in practice for the very first time. Both con-
texts of self-determination will be discussed in the following sub-sections.
4.1. The Charter of the United Nations
Already towards the end of the Second World War, in 1944, various draft proposals 
were made for a charter of a new world organization. In these initial Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals, no mention was made of self-determination or any peoples’ rights whatso-
ever. However, when the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
assembled in San Francisco, a provision regarding the principle of self-determination 
was presented. Pressure from the Soviet Union was the principal cause for reconsid-
ering the matter. The provision proposed by the Soviet Union expressed the organiza-
tion’s purpose “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appro-
priate measures to strengthen universal peace”.60 What followed was a laborious pro-
cess in the relevant bodies of the San Francisco Conference, during which it became 
apparent that not all of the States present were receptive to the proposed charter pro-
vision. Most objections stemmed from fear that a provision regarding self-determi-
nation would encourage civil strife and secessionist movements, having destabilizing 
effects. Moreover, it was stipulated that the concept of self-determination is prone to 
misuse, for example as a justification for intervention and annexation.61 As the Sixth 
Committee specified in its final report:
[c]oncerning the principle of self-determination, it was strongly emphasized on the one 
side that this principle corresponds closely to the will and desires of peoples every-
where and should be clearly enunciated in the Charter; on the other side, it was stated 
that the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied 
the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession.62
At last, the participating States managed to agree on the matter. The final text of the 
United Nations Charter, which entered into force in October 1945, explicitly refers 
to the notion of self-determination twice. First, Article 1(2) of the Charter designates 
“respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” as one of 
the purposes of the organization, with a view to the development of “friendly rela-
tions among nations”. Secondly, reference to self-determination is made in Article 
55, this time against the backdrop of international economic and social cooperation 
and respect for human rights. 
60 Ibid. at p. 38.
61 Ibid. at pp. 39-40.
62 UN Conference on International Organization, UNCIO Doc. 343, I/1/16, Vol. VI (1945), at p. 296.
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In sum, the codification of the principle of self-determination in the Charter is 
important for the reason that it placed self-determination in context. Yet, at the same 
time, the codification led to questions concerning the content of self-determination, 
as the Charter did not provide a definition of the notion and the references con-
cerned were rather cryptic. Who were to be regarded as ‘peoples’? Was the provision 
intended to refer to States, or also to the inhabitants of a territory? Was it meant to 
be an anti-colonial principle only? Did it apply to groups with secessionist ambitions 
as well? Unfortunately, the travaux préparatoires of the Charter offer little guidance 
in this respect.63 On this matter, Helen Quane noted that in 1945, the term ‘seces-
sion’ could refer to two types of situation. On the one hand, “[i]t could refer to colo-
nial peoples demanding independence”, while on the other hand, it could refer “to 
claims by national groups within the continuous boundaries of independent States to 
break away from these States”. Although the latter is the meaning which is generally 
attributed to the term ‘secession’ today, Quane contended that no support for such 
interpretation can be found in the drafting history of the Charter.64 Furthermore, the 
codification of the principle of self-determination gave rise to questions concern-
ing its legal status. Was the principle to be regarded as a binding right at that time? 
The majority view held that the general terms employed in the Charter are insuf-
ficient to conclude so.65 As Malcolm N. Shaw pointed out, “[n]ot every statement 
of a political aim in the Charter can be regarded as automatically creative of legal 
obligations”.66 While in this respect, the Charter may be called a lex imperfecta, and 
although Articles 1(2) and 55 of the Charter provided neither for the firm establish-
ment of a positive legal right, nor for an expansion of the notion of self-determina-
tion, or an account of how to deal with it in practice, it was an important step in the 
evolution of self-determination, as the Charter introduced self-determination as one 
of the principal aims of the new world organization.67 The subsequent major step in 
this evolution was taken in the context of the decolonization process, when various 
resolutions dealing with self-determination were adopted, in particular by the Gen-
eral Assembly. This will be elaborated upon below.
63 For an elaborate review of the travaux préparatoires, see H. Quane, ‘The United Nations and the 
Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 537 at 
pp. 541-544. See also Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 37-43.
64 See H. Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ at p. 547.
65 See Thürer and Burri, ‘Self-Determination’ at para. 8.
66 M.N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) at p. 226.
67 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 43; Raič, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination at p. 200; Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determina-
tion with Some Remarks on Federalism’ at p. 109.
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4.2. The Decolonization Process
4.2.1. The Meaning of Self-Determination in the Context of Decolonization
Although the notion of self-determination was not explicitly mentioned in Chapter XI 
or Chapter XII of the Charter, these chapters played an important part in the develop-
ment of the notion. At this point, the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Ter-
ritories and the International Trusteeship System of the United Nations, as provided 
for in Chapter XI and Chapter XII respectively, need to be addressed. The theoretical 
roots of the Trusteeship System can be found in the Mandate System of the League of 
Nations,68 as the “entrusted powers”69 were obliged to guide the peoples of trust terri-
tories70 towards independence as appropriate, thereby fortifying self-determination of 
these groups. As such, the Trusteeship System can be viewed as a tool to bring about 
decolonization. Chapter XI applies to non-self-governing territories other than trust 
territories71 and requires that on these territories administered by UN Member States, 
self-government will be developed progressively, thereby taking “due account of the 
political aspirations of the peoples”.72 
In the early 1950s, however, this aspiration of the gradual development towards 
self-government and independence was put under pressure in practice. Communist 
States within the General Assembly – in particular the Soviet Union – urged imme-
diate decolonization by the Western powers.73 Unsurprisingly, East-European and 
Asian-African countries supported the idea of decolonization, the latter group of 
countries demanding a speedy end to colonialism during the Bandung Conference 
in 1955.74 In the course of time, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolu-
68 See Section 3.3 of this Chapter.
69 Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood at p. 89.
70 According to Article 77, such territories were to consist of territories held under mandate, areas 
detached from enemy States responsible for their administration. Nowadays, there are no trust territories 
left.
71 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples), UN Doc. A/Res/1514, 14 December 1960, states that it is presumed 
that Article 73 of Chapter XI is applicable to every territory “which is geographically separate and is 
distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it”. For a large part, such territo-
ries have gained independence during the decolonization period. See, for instance, P. Malanczuk, Ake-
hurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th revised edn, Routledge, London/New York 1997) 
at pp. 329-332.
72 Article 73(b) of the UN Charter.
73 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 203-204; Cassese, Self-Determination 
of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 44.
74 During this conference in Bandung (Indonesia) in April 1955, representatives from twenty-nine gov-
ernments of both Asian and African States assembled for the purpose of discussing the issue of peace 
and the role of the Third World as regards the Cold War, economic development and decolonization. The 
final resolution drafted at the close of the Bandung Conference provided for a number of objectives, such 
as the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation, the protection of human rights and the principle 
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tions concerning decolonization, non-self-governing territories and self-determina-
tion in order to clarify and supplement the Charter provisions. Resolution 1514 (XV) 
is generally viewed as one of the most important contributions in this regard, setting 
the terms for the debate. The Resolution proclaimed “the necessity of bringing to a 
speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”75 and 
stated that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development”.76 More specifically, independence was the principal goal 
of the Resolution, and it even stated that lack of sufficient political, economic, social 
or educational attentiveness cannot be an excuse for delaying independence.77 Fur-
ther, the Resolution declared that:
[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all 
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to 
the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance 
with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or 
colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.78
Yet, it is important to note that the following paragraph of the Resolution set forth 
another fundamental principle of international law, namely that of territorial integrity. 
By stressing that “[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national 
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations”, the scope of the reference to self-
determination was mitigated.79 In addition, from the general language employed one 
can deduce that, although from the perspective of trust, independence is the preferred 
outcome of the right to self-determination, other outcomes are not ruled out either.80 
of self-determination, and the ending of racial discrimination. Moreover, it emphasized the importance 
of peaceful coexistence of States. See U.S. Department of State, Timeline of U.S. Diplomatic History, 
Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference), 1955, available at <http://history.state.gov/>, last con-
sulted on 24 September 2012.
75 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples), UN Doc. A/Res/1514, 14 December 1960, preamble.
76 Ibid., at para. 2.
77 Ibid., at para. 3.
78 Ibid., at para. 5.
79 See Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights at p. 34.
80 The United Nations agreed with the integration of twelve territories, namely the Netherlands Antil-
les and Surinam, Alaska, Hawaii, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna Islands, British Togoland, northern British 
Cameroons, southern British Cameroons, North Borneo and Sarawak, West Irian, the Mariana Islands 
and the Cocos Islands. Moreover, seven colonial territories integrated with independent States, namely 
Puerto Rico, Greenland, Cook Islands, Niue, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia 
and Palau. See Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ at p. 550 and 
p. 553.
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4.2.2. The Subjects and Legal Status of Self-Determination in the Context of 
Decolonization
Having determined what can be called the core meaning of self-determination during 
the decolonization period, questions arise regarding the subject and legal status of 
the right to self-determination in this context. When it comes to the subject of self-
determination, one might think that the terms “all peoples” in Resolution 1514 (XV) 
suggests universal applicability of the ‘right’ to self-determination. State practice, 
however, demonstrates that application of the right was primarily restricted to the 
colonial context. Furthermore, attempts to exercise self-determination on an ethnic, 
linguistic or religious basis were by and large unsuccessful, indicating that, at that 
time, the concept of “peoples” was conceived to be a territorial one.81 
In this respect, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the 
Namibia (South West Africa) case should be pointed out as well.82 In considering the 
legality of the presence of South Africa in Namibia, the Court stressed that: 
the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing ter-
ritories as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all of them. […] These developments leave little doubt that 
the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence 
of the peoples concerned.83 
Accordingly, self-determination was viewed as a right for both trust territories 
and non-self-governing territories.84 As was explained in Resolution 1541 (XV), 
81 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 
at p. 36. Over time, some exceptions have been made to this tendency. These concern the reunification 
of a pre-colonial entity, the opposition of the inhabitants to maintain the colonial entity, or the voluntary 
union of two separate colonies. See Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determi-
nation’ at p. 552.
82 This advisory opinion emanated from a request of the UN Security Council, and was the fourth inter-
ference of the International Court of Justice on the status of Namibia, a former German colony which 
was administered by South Africa. This complex relationship had caused a long-lasting dispute between 
South Africa and the UN. In the present advisory opinion, the request by the Security Council concerned 
the following question: What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South 
Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)? 
83 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 31, paras 52-53.
84 For a clear discussion of the contribution of this advisory opinion to the clarification of the right to 
self-determination, see, for instance, A. Cassese, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Right of Peo-
ples to Self-Determination’ in V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice (eds) Fifty Years of the International Court of 
Justice Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996) at pp. 
353-356; G. Zyberi, ‘Self-Determination through the Lens of the International Court of Justice’ (2009) 
56 Netherlands International Law Review 429 at pp. 435-437.
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Principle VI, a non-self-governing territory is a “territory which is geographically 
separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering 
it”.85 This theory is frequently referred to as the ‘salt water barrier’.86 Subsequently, 
the Resolution listed three modes of effectuating self-determination. According to 
Principle VI, full self-government can be attained by (a) emergence as a sovereign 
independent State; (b) free association with an independent State; or (c) integration 
with an independent State. Principles VII and IX of the Resolution stipulate that “free 
association” should be achieved by a “free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the 
territory concerned”, and that “integration” is to be based on “the freely expressed 
wishes of the territory’s peoples”. As such, democratic processes seem to be required 
for realizing the right to (external) self-determination.
Another issue which needs to be addressed is that of the legal status of self-deter-
mination in the context of the decolonization process. The explicit reference to a 
‘right’ to self-determination rather than a ‘principle’ of self-determination in Resolu-
tion 1514 (XV) suggests that, by adopting this document, a positive legal right was 
created. In this respect, a remark should be made. Although General Assembly reso-
lutions are recommendatory in nature, they might contribute to the development of 
international (customary) law, depending on, inter alia, the voting record at the time 
of adoption and the subsequent State practice.87 Resolution 1514 (XV) was adopted 
by 89 votes to none. Nine States, all colonial powers, abstained from voting. These 
abstentions and their dissent on fundamental provisions may prevent the conclusion 
that the Resolution mirrored rules of general international law. In addition, statements 
made at the time of adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV) reveal that it was generally not 
considered to be legally binding.88 By contrast, some legal scholars find it plausible 
that the General Assembly considered self-determination as a right under customary 
international law at the time of the adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV). To under-
pin this argument, they point to a number of General Assembly resolutions which 
were already adopted in the 1950s, and in which reference was made to the “right” 
of peoples to self-determination.89 Moreover, these scholars emphasize the fact that 
85 UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) (Principles Which Should Guide Members in Deter-
mining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Article 73(e) 
of the Charter), UN Doc. A/Res/1541 (XV), 15 December 1960.
86 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 206-207.
87 Shaw, International Law at pp. 106-110.
88 Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ at p. 551.
89 UN General Assembly Resolution 637 A-B-C (The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determina-
tion), UN Doc. A/Res/637, 16 December 1952; UN General Assembly Resolution 742 (VIII) (Factors 
Which Should be Taken into Account in Deciding Whether a Territory Is or Is not a Territory Whose 
People No Yet Attained a Full Measure of Self-Government), UN Doc. A/Res/742 (VIII), 27 Novem-
ber 1953; UN General Assembly Resolution 1188 (XII) (Recommendations Concerning International 
Respect for the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination), UN Doc. A/Res/1188 (XII), 11 
December 1957.
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approximately thirty Non-Self-Governing Territories and Trust Territories became 
independent prior to December 1960, when the Resolution was adopted.90
In sum, it is difficult to ascertain whether Resolution 1514 (XV) created a posi-
tive, legal right to self-determination, or merely mirrored a political obligation. 
Despite this uncertainty and despite the limitations discussed above, Resolution 1514 
(XV) and Resolution 1541 (XV) are regarded as marking an important change in the 
approach to self-determination. Whereas the notion of self-determination first served 
to authorize the actions of colonizers and mandatory powers, with the adoption of 
Resolution 1514 (XV) in particular, the emphasis then shifted to the inhabitants of 
the territories concerned.91 
Even so, the development of the principle of self-determination continued. In 
its advisory opinion on the Western Sahara case, the International Court of Justice 
affirmed the importance of the right of peoples to self-determination in the decolo-
nization context. It stressed that the “essential feature of the right of self-determi-
nation” is that its “application requires a free and genuine expression of the will of 
the peoples concerned”.92 The case concerned the decolonization of the territory of 
Western Sahara. This territory was controlled by Spain, the colonial power. It was 
the irredentism of Morocco and Mauritania, however, which caused the dispute. The 
Court, therefore, was requested to give its opinion with regard to two questions. The 
first concerned the question of whether Western Sahara was a territory that belonged 
to no-one (terra nullius) at the time of colonization by Spain.93 The second ques-
tion – and more important in this context – concerned the legal ties between West-
ern Sahara and Morocco on the one hand, and between the Western Sahara and the 
Mauritanian entity on the other hand. In its discussion of the merits of the case, the 
Court analysed the provisions of the UN Charter and the relevant resolutions of the 
General Assembly. Subsequently, it reached the conclusion that the legal ties which 
had existed between the territory of Western Sahara and both claimants during the 
90 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 215-217.
91 Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood at pp. 92-92; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determina-
tion at p. 204.
92 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at 
para. 55.
93 The Court unanimously answered this first question in the negative: at the time of colonization by 
Spain – the period beginning in 1884 – Western Sahara was not terra nullius. The term terra nullius is 
considered to be “a legal term of art employed in connection with ‘occupation’ as one of the accepted 
legal methods of acquiring sovereignty over territory” (para. 79). For an occupation to be legally valid, 
the given territory should be terra nullius at the time of the commencement of the occupation. Therefore, 
the Court was of the opinion that it could only be determined that Western Sahara was terra nullius if it 
was established that at the time of colonization, “the territory belonged to no-one in the sense that it was 
then open to acquisition through the legal process of ‘occupation’” (para. 79). In this period, State prac-
tice demonstrated that territories which were inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political 
organization, were not conceived to be terrae nullius. Since at the time of colonization, Western Sahara 
was this kind of territory, the Court concluded that the territory was not terra nullius (paras 80-83).
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relevant period did not affect the application of either Resolution 1514 (XV) in the 
decolonization of Western Sahara or “the principle of self-determination through the 
free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory” in particular.94 
Furthermore, the Court noted that some discretion was left to the Court concern-
ing the forms and procedures for realizing self-determination.95 From this, it can be 
derived that the Court considered self-determination to be a legal principle in the 
context of decolonization.96 Even if one would question the legal status of self-deter-
mination under international law in the early decolonization period, this authoritative 
judgment indicates that by 1975, self-determination was to be regarded as a legal 
entitlement rather than a mere political principle. This conclusion seems to be cor-
roborated by the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (also abbreviated to the Friendly Relations Declaration), which was 
adopted by the General Assembly in 1970. It refers to the ‘principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples’ and in this respect imposes upon States “the duty 
to respect this right”.97 As the scope of this document extends beyond the decoloniza-
tion context, it will be elaborated upon in the following Chapter.98
The status of self-determination in the context of decolonization was put on a 
higher plane with the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the East Timor 
case.99 In its judgment, by considering the UN Charter and relevant previous judg-
ments of the Court in the cases of Namibia (South West Africa) and Western Sahara 
respectively, the Court emphasized the elementary and special character of the right 
to self-determination. It observed that this right is “one of the essential principles of 
94 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at para. 
162 (cfm. paras 54-59).
95 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at 
para. 71.
96 See, for instance, Shaw, International Law at p. 229; Zyberi, ‘Self-Determination Through the Lens 
of the International Court of Justice’ at pp. 437-438.
97 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
98 See Chapter III, Section 2.2 of the present study.
99 International Court of Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90. 
This case addressed a dispute between Portugal as the administering power of East Timor and Australia. 
Portugal and Australia had negotiated and concluded the Treaty of 11 December 1989, thus creating a 
“Zone of Cooperation […] in an area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Aus-
tralia” (para. 18). In the proceedings, Portugal maintained that Australia, as a consequence, “in initiating 
performance of the Treaty, in taking internal legislative measures for its application, and in continuing to 
negotiate with Indonesia, ha[d] acted unlawfully, in that it ha[d] infringed the rights of the people of East 
Timor to self-determination” (para. 19).
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contemporary international law”100 and determined that the right to self-determina-
tion had irreproachably evolved into a norm erga omnes.101 
In the East Timor case, the International Court of Justice did not (expressly) note 
that self-determination had become a norm of jus cogens.102 Nevertheless, the Inter-
national Law Commission referred to this judgment and other judgments of the Court 
in order to confirm its qualification of the obligation to respect the right to self-deter-
mination of dependent territories as a peremptory norm of international law, having 
the status of jus cogens.103 This opinion is also supported by a substantial number of 
prominent legal scholars.104 
5. concluSionS
This Chapter has outlined the historical development of the notion of self-determi-
nation, the origins of which may be traced back to the theories and ideologies under-
lying and arising from the American and French Revolutions. It was seen how the 
phrase of self-determination was embedded in the political ideas of both Lenin and 
Wilson, each in their own way, and how eventually, the League of Nations’ Man-
date System may be said to be founded on the notion of self-determination, albeit 
as a justification for the administration of formerly colonized territories. Moreover, 
it was demonstrated that in the Åland Islands case, self-determination first gained 
100 International Court of Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90, 
at para. 29.
101 Ibid. In short, the erga omnes character of a norm indicates that the norm concerned applies to the 
international community as a whole and that all States can be said to have a legal interest in its protection. 
See also International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium 
v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, at para. 33. As will be seen in the next Chapter 
of the present study, the Court classified the right to self-determination as a norm erga omnes beyond the 
context of decolonization as well. See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136 at 
paras 155-156. 
102 In its final draft on the Law of Treaties (1966), Article 50, the International Law Commission accepted 
the concept of jus cogens as involving “peremptory norm[s] of general international law from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character”. 
103 International Law Commission, 53rd session, 23 April – 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 2001, UN 
GAOR, 56th session, Suppl. No.10, A/56/10, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, 26 July 2001, Chapter III at p. 113. 
See also Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 219.
104 See, for instance, UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations 
Resolutions. Study Prepared by Héctor Gros-Espiell, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980); I. 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) at p. 
511; Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 133-140; J.R. Crawford, The 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002) at p. 38. 
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significance in a legal context. In painting this historical picture, it was seen how 
self-determination evolved from a mere political principle into a legal entitlement. 
The inclusion of the notion of self-determination in the Charter of the United Nations 
in 1945 was an important step in this particular development. Despite the explicit 
reference to self-determination in the Charter, the precise legal status and content 
of the notion remained ambiguous at that time. Against the backdrop of the decolo-
nization process, with the issuing of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 
and Resolution 1541 (XV), light was shed on these issues. In these documents, the 
need to end colonialism was expressed and all (colonial) peoples were granted the 
right to self-determination. In this context, the right to self-determination first and 
foremost implied the right to establish a sovereign and independent State, thus ena-
bling the people at hand to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development”. When a colonial territory became 
independent from its colonizer, the right to self-determination was considered to be 
realized. 
In its judgment in the East Timor case, the International Court of Justice stressed 
the elementary and unique character of the right to self-determination by conclud-
ing that it had developed into a norm erga omnes. While not confirmed by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, it is often argued that with regard to dependent territories, 
the right to self-determination has also attained the status of jus cogens. In the context 
of decolonization as well, the International Court of Justice observed that the core 
element of the right to self-determination involves the “free and genuine expression 
of the will of the peoples concerned”. As will be seen in the following Chapter, the 
phrasing of this very essence may be seen to have enabled the further development of 
the right to self-determination beyond the decolonization process.
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chapteR iii
the contempoRaRy meaning of the  
Right to Self-deteRmination
“Self-determination has never simply meant independence. It has meant the free 
choice of peoples.” 
Rosalyn Higgins*
1. intRoduction
Having traced the roots of the concept of self-determination, its role beyond decolo-
nization shall be examined. In the post-decolonization era, two important develop-
ments with regard to self-determination can be discerned. The first development is 
the continuing evolution of the legal status of self-determination. What was once 
nothing more than a political principle had gradually grown into a valuable positive 
legal right as a result of several new international legal documents elaborating on the 
notion of self-determination. The second development relates to the crystallization 
and acknowledgement of the two previously mentioned dimensions of self-determi-
nation. During the post-war decolonization period, emphasis was placed primarily on 
the external dimension of self-determination. In this context, the right to self-determi-
nation could be realized through the formation of independent States. Here, the Wil-
sonian concept of self-government is reflected: it is only by giving colonial people 
the opportunity to choose their external political status within the international com-
munity that the ‘consent of the governed’ could be realized. This approach has led to 
the conclusion that the right to self-determination was attained as soon as a dependent 
territory achieved independence.1 
*  R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University Press, 
New York 1994) at p. 119.
1 D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 
at p. 226. Yet, one might also perceive the external dimension of self-determination “as continuous 
defence against external subversion or intervention”. In that line of thought, the continuous character 
is not exclusively reserved for the internal dimension of the right to self-determination. See P. Thorn-
berry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism’ in 
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Over recent decades, however, State practice and international legal and political 
documents began to reflect that, in addition, self-determination has an internal dimen-
sion, related to the relationship between a people and its government and accompa-
nied by a continuing character.2 This development accords with what may be called 
a “general trend” concerning the decrease of the absolute nature of State sovereignty 
in favour of human rights,3 popular sovereignty and a democratic governmental sys-
tem.4 In a statement by UNESCO to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, it was aptly expressed that the right to 
self-determination is “a reminder of the ultimate accountability of every State and 
every political system of the peoples who live under its legal jurisdiction”.5 Thus, 
C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at 
p. 101.
2 See A. Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determination’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determina-
tion (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at p. 229.
3 See, for instance, K. Mills, Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order. A New Sovereignty? (Pal-
grave Macmillan, New York 1998); W.M. Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law’ in G.H. Fox and B.R. Roth (eds) Democratic Governance and International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000).
4 Some legal scholars have even argued that a right to democratic governance is emerging. With his 
well-known article ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, Thomas M. Franck initiated the 
discussion on the question of whether an international legal right to representative government is coming 
into existence. Franck holds that the provisions in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), 
the major human rights conventions and several regional instruments constitute “a net of participatory 
entitlements” (p. 79). In addition, an important role is attributed to the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) in specifying the elements of democratic government. As a result, Franck 
argues, democracy is no longer a moral prescription, but is “while not yet fully word made law, […] rap-
idly becoming in our time, a normative rule of the international system” (p. 46). To support his proposi-
tion, Franck discerns three overlapping stages in the evolution of the gradually augmenting entitlement. 
First, the internal dimension of the right to self-determination is the oldest aspect of the right to demo-
cratic governance, as “self-determination postulates the right of a people organized in an established terri-
tory to determine its political destiny in a democratic fashion” (p. 52). Secondly, Franck presents the right 
to free political expression, found in common Article 1(1) of the international human rights covenants of 
1966 and Articles 18, 19, and 22 UDHR, as a building block of a legal right to democracy. The third and 
newest aspect of the democratic entitlement is the “emerging normative requirement of a participatory 
electoral process” (p. 63). Article 25 ICCPR extends this right to every citizen, as does Article 21 UDHR. 
See T.M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86 American Journal of Inter-
national Law 46. On this topic, see also G.H. Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International 
Law’ (1992) 17 Yale Journal of International Law 539; G.H. Fox and B.R. Roth (eds), Democratic Gov-
ernance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000); C.M. Cerna, ‘Universal 
Democracy: An International Legal Right or a Pipe Dream of the West?’ (1995) 86 NYU Journal of Inter-
national Law and Politics 289; S. Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determina-
tion: Theory and Practice (Doctoral Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 2001) at pp. 259-330; S. Wheatley, 
‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly.
5 UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UNESCO 
activities concerning prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1992/6, 24 July 1992.
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self-determination is not merely realized through the formation of new States, but 
also requires a continuous implementation of the people’s self-determination within 
States.6 As such, a different mode of implementation of the right to self-determination 
has become increasingly relevant, which may even be said to constitute the focus of 
most contemporary instruments including this right. This will be expounded in the 
present Chapter.
2. Self-deteRmination aS a continuouS entitlement
Although initially, the right to self-determination was intended to be applicable to 
a colonial context only, the right underwent further development and the field of 
application changed with the creation of several new international legal instruments. 
While some of these instruments were drafted and adopted during the decolonization 
era, as will be demonstrated below, their interpretation of the right to self-determina-
tion extends beyond the context of decolonization. In fact, they were intended to be 
universally applicable. In view of this, the 1966 international human rights covenants 
as well as the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration will be addressed below and not, 
as their dates of origin may suggest, in the previous Chapter.7
2.1. The International Human Rights Covenants of 1966
For an understanding of the present-day significance of the right to self-determi-
nation, it is important to address the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) in the first place. Both Covenants were adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1966 and are international treaties which have to date been ratified by a 
large majority of States.8 
The right to self-determination can be found in Article 1 of both Covenants. Most 
important is the first paragraph of common Article 1, which reads as follows:
All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.
6 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 234.
7 In view of this, the Covenants of 1966 were not addressed in Chapter II, in the context of the decolo-
nization process, but rather they will be addressed in the present Chapter, where the contemporary mean-
ing of the right to self-determination is central. 
8 In October 2012, 167 States were party to the ICCPR, while the ICESCR had 160 State parties. 
See the website of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reser-
vations, updates available at <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en>, last 
consulted on 5 October 2012.
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With the introduction of this article, both the content and mode of application of the 
right to self-determination and its field of application shifted. A significant element of 
common Article 1(1) is the phrase “freely determine their political status”. Although 
not explicitly stated, it requires that the people concerned are able to choose their 
legislators and political representatives, without third State intervention and without 
any manipulation or interference from the current authorities, in order to express their 
popular will.9 In this respect, an internal dimension of the right to self-determination 
manifests itself,10 as well as a continuing entitlement to self-determination. The latter 
implies that, unlike the external dimension which ceases to exist as soon as independ-
ence is achieved, the internal dimension of the right to self-determination “is neither 
destroyed nor diminished by its having already been evoked or put into effect”,11 but 
should be pursued continuously.
Focusing on the content of this internal dimension of the right to self-determina-
tion, one may take issue with Antonio Cassese that this concept is, in fact, a mani-
festation of the various civil and political rights and freedoms as provided for in the 
ICCPR, such as freedom of expression, the right of peaceful assembly, the right to 
freedom of association, the right to vote and the right to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, for the exercise of these rights and freedoms enables expression of pop-
ular will.12 Or one might take issue, slightly differently, with James R. Crawford, who 
conceives internal self-determination as “essentially a summary of other rights”.13 Be 
that as it may, it should be emphasized that the right to self-determination is not lim-
ited to the freedom of peoples to determine their political status. It also includes peo-
ples’ freedom to pursue their desired economic, social and cultural development. It 
is clear that these latter goals are, in essence, achieved by participation of a people in 
the general political decision-making process within a State.14 In this context, Article 
9 Antonio Cassese even calls this the “primary significance” of common Article 1(1). See A. Cassese, 
Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995) at 
p. 53. 
10 As Allan Rosas rightly noted, since this provision is part of a human rights convention, it should be 
read in this context as well. Accordingly, it goes without saying that the provision on self-determination 
addresses the relation between citizens and their own government. See Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determina-
tion’ at p. 243. 
11 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 101.
12 Ibid. at p. 53; S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000) at p. 103.
13 J.R. Crawford, ‘The Right to Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’ 
in P. Alston (ed.) Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) at p. 25.
14 For a similar argument, see A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-
Determination, Culture and Land (Cambridge University Press, New York 2007) at pp. 158-159: “Pursu-
ing [economic, social, and cultural] development essentially involves establishing policy priorities and 
trade-offs in policy allocations and benefits; this is political in nature. Political, but also economic and 
social policies can only be decided and implemented through a political process, where the state and its 
institutions are involved.”
The Contemporary Meaning of the Right to Self-Determination
41
25 ICCPR is of particular importance, as this provision seems to touch upon the core 
of the rights guaranteed in Article 1(1).15 Article 25 ICCPR16 states that:
[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity […] (a) to take part in the con-
duct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and 
to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of 
the electors; (c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country. 
Thus, (political) self-determination functions as a tool to attain self-determination – 
politically, economically, socially and culturally – in general,17 and Article 25 ICCPR 
can play an important role in this respect. Common Article 1(3) of the human rights 
covenants of 1966 may illustrate this interrelationship of the various aspects of self-
determination. By virtue of this provision, the inhabitants of a territory are granted 
the right to control and benefit from the natural wealth and resources of that territory. 
This facet of the right to self-determination can be viewed as a logical consequence 
of the political one, for it implies a duty for the authorities chosen to divert the natural 
wealth and resources in conformity with the interests of the people as reflected when 
participating in the political sphere.18
15 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 54; Raič, Statehood and the Law 
of Self-Determination at p. 239. See also the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) in its General Recommendation No. 21 on the right to self-determination, stressing the link 
between the internal aspect of the right to self-determination and “the right of every citizen to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs at any level” and referring to Article 5(c) of the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
General Recommendation No. 21: Right to Self-Determination, UN Doc. A/51/18 (1996), Annex VIII, at 
para. 4. Words to that effect were also used by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment on 
common Article 1 of the human rights covenants of 1966. See Human Rights Committee, General Com-
ment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-Determination), The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, UN 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994), 13 March 1984. 
16 For a rather detailed commentary on this article, see Joseph, Schultz and Castan, The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary at pp. 497-511. 
17 Although the use of the term ‘political self-determination’ is obvious, strictly speaking, it is not nec-
essary. The general interpretation of self-determination stresses a people’s freedom to determine its politi-
cal status (both externally and internally), but simultaneously is an instrument to enable the achievement 
of self-determination in an economic, social and cultural context. As a result, the use of the general term 
‘self-determination’ suffices as well.
18 Although an elaborate discussion of this resource dimension of the right to self-determination is 
beyond the scope of this Study, which focuses mainly on the political dimension of self-determination, it 
must not go unrecorded that disregard of this aspect of self-determination can represent serious obstruc-
tion in the enjoyment of other human rights, for example the right to adequate food. For a brief discus-
sion of this resource dimension of the right to self-determination and the corresponding duties for States, 
see Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 55-57. For a comprehensive 
analysis of the evolution and content of the underlying principle of sovereignty over natural resources 
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As was already mentioned, not only the content and mode of application of the 
right to self-determination shifted with the adoption of the human rights covenants of 
1966, in addition, the field of application of the right to self-determination changed. 
In contrast to the conception of self-determination in General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (XV), the phrase “all peoples” suggests universal applicability of the principle. 
Put differently, it appears that the international human rights covenants do not merely 
apply to colonial peoples or other specific categories of peoples. This notion is also 
reflected in the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR.19 Yet, formulating a definition 
of ‘peoples’ remained challenging. Various suggestions were made, but none of the 
proposals were adopted. In the end, it was agreed upon that the term ‘peoples’ was 
to be understood “in its most general sense and that no definition was necessary”.20 
Nevertheless, restraint should be exercised with regard to conclusions drawn from 
this open concept of ‘peoples’, since a substantial number of States emphasized that 
this did not imply the existence of a right to secede. This is noteworthy, for Article 1(1) 
ICCPR does not provide for explicit restrictions as to the different modes available for 
‘peoples’ to exercise the right to freely determine their political status, for instance by 
excluding the possibility of establishing a new, independent State. Hence, as Helen 
Quane aptly noted, “the blanket denial of a right to secession suggests that groups 
within States or colonial territories cannot be regarded as peoples for the purpose of 
Article 1”.21 The travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR indicate that proposals were 
made to include reference to a right to “establish an independent State”, to “choose 
its own form of government”, or to “secede from or unite with another people”.22 
These suggestions, however, remained unadopted, since it was found that listing the 
components of the right to self-determination would probably be incomplete. Accord-
ingly, preference was given rather to sketch the right in the abstract.23 This resulted 
in continuing uncertainties as regards the scope of common Article 1(1): even though 
it was clear that the term “all peoples” in the international human rights covenants 
and its relationship with other branches of international law, see N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008).
19 See M.J. Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987) at pp. 32, 44-45. For an account of 
preliminary discussions leading to the codification of common Article 1(1), see also Cassese, Self-Deter-
mination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 52-62; J.R. Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination 
in International Law: Its Development and Future’ in P. Alston (ed.) Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2001) at pp. 28-29; H. Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ (1993) 34 Virginia Jour-
nal of International Law 1 at pp. 18-25.
20 Cited in Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights at p. 32.
21 H. Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ (1998) 47 Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 537 at p. 560.
22 See Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights at p. 34.
23 Ibid. at p. 34.
The Contemporary Meaning of the Right to Self-Determination
43
of 1966 was no longer limited to colonial peoples or the inhabitants of Trust or Non-
Self-Governing Territories, it remained questionable which ‘peoples’ were entitled to 
which manifestation of self-determination.24 For, it appears that not all ‘peoples’ are 
permitted to exercise all levels of self-determination under all circumstances. 
2.2. The Friendly Relations Declaration
An additional document which has been essential for the development of the right 
to self-determination was adopted four years after the ICCPR and ICESCR. In 1962, 
the General Assembly had authorized a study of the principles of the United Nations 
and the duties these principles imposed on the Member States.25 For this purpose, a 
committee was established,26 which drafted the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter: Friendly Relations 
Declaration). The General Assembly adopted this Declaration almost unanimously27 
as Resolution 2625 (XXV).28 Notwithstanding its legally non-binding status, the 
Friendly Relations Declaration is nowadays commonly viewed as the most authorita-
tive expression of the scope and meaning of the basic principles of the international 
legal order.29 It endeavours to be more explicit on the implications of self-determina-
tion than previous texts have been.30 The reference to ‘[t]he principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples’ (Principle V) provides as follows:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in 
the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right to freely determine, with-
out external interference, their political status and pursue their economic, social and 
24 This issue will be dealt with in Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of the present Chapter. 
25 UN General Assembly Resolution 1815 (XVII) (Consideration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/1815 (XVII), 18 December 1962.
26 UN General Assembly Resolution 1966 (XVIII) (Consideration of Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/1966 (XVIII), 16 December 1963.
27 See General Assembly Official Records, 25th Session: 1883th Plenary Meeting, UN Doc. A/PV.1883, 
24 October 1970, and the official records of the 1872th-1879th plenary meetings, and the 1881th-1882th 
plenary meetings. 
28 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
29 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at paras 
100-103.




cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance 
with the provisions of the Charter.
Every State has the duty to promote […] realization of the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples […] in order:
 (a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; and
 (b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed 
will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the prin-
ciple [of self-determination], as well as denial of fundamental rights, and is con-
trary to the Charter […]
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or inte-
gration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status 
freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples 
referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-deter-
mination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, 
such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such 
peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter. 
The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, 
a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such 
separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony 
or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in 
accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integ-
rity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.
It needs little explanation that, in view of the above, the Friendly Relations Declar-
ation contains a reference to the existence of both an external and internal dimension 
of the right to self-determination. Principle V states that self-determination may be 
exercised through the formation of an independent State, or the association or inte-
gration with an independent State. Since these modes of implementation of the right 
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to self-determination by a people result in the alteration of the boundaries of the State 
of which that people are inhabitants, this reference to the right to self-determination 
concerns the external dimension of the right.31 In addition, Principle V clearly implies 
that a right to self-determination does not cease to exist as soon as independence has 
been achieved, since it links self-determination with the internal commitment to “a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinc-
tion as to race, creed or colour”. The inclusion of this phrase may be explained by the 
concern of the international community at the time of drafting the Declaration, which 
involved the Apartheid regime in South Africa and white minority rule in Southern 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), both in which the non-white majority of the popula-
tion was denied a representative government.32 Nonetheless, taking into account the 
abovementioned phrase and the travaux préparatoires of the Declaration, it appears 
that, similar to the international human rights covenants of 1966, the Declaration was 
intended to be universally applicable, rather than applicable to colonial situations 
only.33 Furthermore, Principle V addresses all States – not merely colonial powers – 
as a consequence of which every State is obliged to live up to the requirements set 
by the right to self-determination.34 Despite this broad scope of application and ref-
erence to the external dimension of the right, it is questionable whether the right to 
self-determination as embodied in the Friendly Relations Declaration should be inter-
preted as either prohibiting or allowing a people to determine their external political 
status by means of secession. The travaux préparatoires disclose that some States 
were rather hesitant about the inclusion of the penultimate paragraph of Principle 
V. They feared that it would contribute to the progressive development of the right 
to self-determination and could hence be invoked to legitimize secession.35 Conse-
quently, the final text of the Declaration attributes considerable weight to the princi-
ple of territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and independent States. At 
the same time, however, secession is not explicitly ruled out either. As will be seen 
elsewhere in the present study, this has led a considerable number of authors to argue 
that the text of the Declaration opens up the possibility for unilateral secession.36 
31 See, for instance, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 289.
32 See, for instance, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 119-121; Xan-
thaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and Land at p. 147.
33 Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ at pp. 562-563.
34 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 231.
35 See Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination’ at p. 564. See also 
Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 115-118.
36 The academic debate on this issue will be dealt with in Chapter IV, Section 2.2 of the present study. 
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2.3. Subsequent Documents 
In addition to the Friendly Relations Declaration, evidence for the suggestion that the 
right to self-determination transcends colonialism can also be found in the Helsinki 
Final Act,37 as this document was adopted during the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975.38 By that time, there were no longer colonial 
situations in Europe and Northern America. The fact that the States participating to 
the Helsinki Conference explicitly rejected the argument that, because of the end of 
the decolonization process, no reference to self-determination was needed makes the 
inclusion of Principle VIII of the Helsinki Final Act even more telling.39 It states that:
[b]y virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peo-
ples always have the rights, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their 
internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as 
they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.
Several legal scholars have even called the Helsinki Final Act innovative, arguing 
that the aforementioned excerpt is much less restrained than previous references to 
self-determination.40 Whereas the Friendly Relations Declaration does not explicitly 
grant the right to self-determination to “all peoples”, the Helsinki Final Act does 
so. The travaux préparatoires reveal that it was intended to refer to peoples organ-
ized as nations in the first place.41 Moreover, it uses the specific terms “always” and 
“when and as they wish” to emphasize that it concerns an ongoing (internal) right, 
which continues to exist even after a people has determined its internal and external 
political status.42 Yet, this broad scope of application of the right to self-determi-
37 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe Final Act, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, available at <http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true>, 
last consulted on 20 September 2012.
38 As from 1 January 1995, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was 
renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Participating States of the 
OSCE are not merely European States, but cover a geographical area “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” as 
North America and Central Asia are also involved. The OSCE conducts a wide range of activities which 
are all related to three ‘dimensions of security’: the politico-military, the economic-environmental, and 
the human dimension. 
39 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 231.
40 See, for instance, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 285-288.
41 See ibid. at pp. 285-286.
42 See ibid. at p. 285. Against this backdrop, it is interesting to note that the so-called Copenhagen Doc-
ument, which was also adopted by the CSCE, affirmed that “democracy is an inherent element of the rule 
of law” (para. 3) and declared “that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic 
and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government. The participating 
States will accordingly respect the right of their citizens to take part in the governing of their country, 
either directly or through representatives freely chosen by them through fair electoral processes” (para. 
6). In addition, the Copenhagen Document spelled out the contents of the rights of political participation 
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nation should be viewed against the backdrop of two important principles, i.e. the 
inviolability of frontiers (Principle III) and the territorial integrity of States (Principle 
IV).43 Moreover, it should be noted that the Helsinki Final Act is a political document 
rather than a document to which the States involved are legally bound. In addition, it 
does not concern a universal document, but a regional one. Nonetheless, the Helsinki 
Final Act is considered to be important with respect to an understanding of the devel-
opment and content of the right to self-determination – not only because of its inno-
vative language used, but also because it reflected concurrence between the Western 
and Soviet powers on the very topic of self-determination and other matters, while 
the Cold War was in full swing.44 
More recently, the Charter of Paris was adopted during the CSCE summit meeting 
in November 1990.45 The reference to self-determination in this document: 
reaffirm[ed] the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in con-
formity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of inter-
national law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of States.
Here as well, the point was made that the right to self-determination excluded the 
justification of secession, since this mode of implementation would violate the ter-
ritorial integrity of States.46
Subsequently, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted during 
the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, strongly reflected the importance of 
the internal dimension of the right to self-determination. The Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action even considered “the denial of self-determination as a viola-
tion of human rights”, and required that there be a government which effectively rep-
resents the entire population of the territory concerned, “without distinction of any 
in more concrete terms – to ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of gov-
ernment. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting 
of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, 29 June 1990, available at <http://www.osce.
org/odihr/elections/14304>, last consulted on 20 September 2012. Drafted in reaction to the events in the 
former Soviet Union, the Moscow Document subsequently expressed in a very clear way the value of 
representative government by strongly condemning the attempted Soviet coup of 1991. One may argue 
that this document substitutes the Wilsonian notion of popular sovereignty, as it called on participating 
States not to recognize “unreservedly forces which seek to take power from a representative government 
[…] against the will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections” (para. 17.1). See Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, 
Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Procedures for 
Fact-Finding, Moscow, 3 October 1991, available at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14310>, last 
consulted on 20 September 2012.
43 Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at p. 29.
44 See ibid. at p. 28. 
45 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 
November 1990, available at <http://www.osce.org/mc/39516>, last consulted on 20 September 2012.
46 Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at p. 29.
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kind”.47 Similar to the Helsinki Final Act, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action concerns a political document rather than a legally binding one. But in con-
trast to the Helsinki Final Act, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action can 
be viewed as a universal document, since it was adopted by consensus by 171 States. 
Moreover, during the preparatory process leading to the World Conference, three 
regional meetings had been organized in Tunis, San José and Bangkok, contributions 
and suggestions had been made by governments, intergovernmental and non-govern-
mental organizations, and various studies had been prepared by independent experts. 
This input was all taken into account when drafting the declaration.48
In addition, support for the proposition that the right to self-determination goes 
beyond the context of decolonization can also be found in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. This document was adopted by the Assembly of Heads 
of States and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1981, by 
which time colonialism had almost vanished on the continent. Article 20 provides for 
the right to self-determination:
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they 
have freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds 
of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community. 
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the present 
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic 
or cultural.
The first paragraph of this provision demonstrates some similarities with common 
Article 1 of the Covenants of 1966, as it grants all peoples the right to self-determina-
tion, which the text of the paragraph seems to interpret as having the right to choose 
political status and economic and social development. However, as the second and 
third paragraphs of Article 20 seem to indicate, in certain situations, a right to exter-
nal self-determination was also envisaged. Even so, the communication of the Afri-
can Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights concerning Katangese Peoples’ 
Congress v. Zaire49 imposed some restraints on such an extensive interpretation of 
47 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted on 25 
June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, at para. 2.
48 Ibid., preamble.
49 See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, 
Comm. No. 75/92, 1995 (not dated). For a more elaborate account of this case, see Chapter IV, 
Section 2.3.2. 
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the right to self-determination. It was emphasized that the right to self-determination 
as reflected in Article 20 should be implemented “in any […] form of relations that 
accords with the wishes of the people but fully cognisant of other recognised prin-
ciples such as sovereignty and territorial integrity”. In view of the above, it may be 
concluded that the right to self-determination under the African Charter should be 
interpreted as first and foremost including a right to internal self-determination. 
Finally, reference should be made to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples (UNDRIP), which was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007.50 
While this document and its legal status will be discussed in more detail elsewhere in 
the present Chapter,51 at this point, it is important to note that the Declaration explic-
itly provides a right to self-determination for indigenous peoples, thus extending the 
right to self-determination beyond decolonization. In addition, the Declaration dem-
onstrates a clear focus on the internal dimension of the right. In express terms, Article 
3 UNDRIP grants indigenous peoples the right to self-determination, as it provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development.
Since this phrasing is almost identical to that of common Article 1 of the Covenants 
of 1966, it seems that an internal right to self-determination was envisaged. This 
assumption is confirmed by subsequent provisions in the Declaration. First, Articles 
4, 18, and 31 UNDRIP positively refer to and elaborate on autonomy rights for indig-
enous peoples. Secondly, Article 46(1) UNDRIP limits the modes of exercising the 
right to self-determination as it emphasizes the need for upholding the right to ter-
ritorial integrity when interpreting the rights granted in the Declaration. As such, 
interpreting the right to self-determination as including a right to secession seems out 
of the question. 
Having outlined the development of the right to self-determination beyond the 
context of decolonization, two dimensions of self-determination have become appar-
ent: the continuous, internal dimension and the traditional, external dimension. Sub-
sequently, the question arises as to what the implications of this development of the 
concept are with regard to the present-day interpretation of self-determination. In 
view of this, the contemporary meaning of both modes of self-determination will be 
discussed below. 
50 UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295 (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples), UN Doc. A/Res/61/295, 13 September 2007. 





While in essence, the principal question of this study concerns external self-deter-
mination, the internal mode also should be assessed for the present purposes. First, 
elaboration of the internal dimension of the right to self-determination is vital for the 
purpose of understanding the present-day meaning of the right to self-determination. 
As has become apparent above and will also be seen below, contemporary interna-
tional law seems to emphasize internal rather then external self-determination, hence 
explaining (part of) the controversy surrounding the latter dimension. In addition to 
this, it has sometimes been argued that the persistent denial of the right to internal 
self-determination may, at a certain point, convert into a right to external self-deter-
mination. For this reason as well, it is important to shed light on the contemporary 
meaning of the internal dimension. In this respect, the status, content and subjects of 
the right to internal self-determination are to be determined in order to know who is 
entitled to it, who is to observe it, and when it has been violated.
3.1. The Content of the Right to Internal Self-Determination
As has been outlined in the previous Chapter, the notion of self-determination has 
evolved from a political principle to a legal right under international law. Above, 
it was seen that in this capacity, the development of the right to self-determination 
continued beyond the context of decolonization. The analysis of these developments 
enables painting a more detailed picture of the contemporary core meaning of the 
right to internal self-determination. 
The essence of the contemporary meaning of the right to internal self-determi-
nation can be said to have been introduced by the International Court of Justice in 
the Western Sahara case and was “defined as the need to pay regard to the freely 
expressed will” of the peoples at issue.52 This core meaning may be specified by 
adding a context in which the political status or political interests of a people are at 
stake. In these instances, a decision on the matter at hand needs to result from the 
“free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned”.53 
The above formulated core meaning, however, does not reveal the rationale of 
the right to internal self-determination. Hence, the question left is as to why, accord-
ing to the concept of self-determination, there is a need to found decisions affecting 
the political status or interests of what may be called a ‘people’ on the freely and 
52 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at para. 
59. However, it should be noted that this remark was made in the context of dependent territories. See 
also Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 319-320; Rosas, ‘Internal Self-
Determination’ at pp. 232-236.
53 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 223, cf. International Court of Justice, 
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at para. 55.
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genuinely expressed will of these people. As the Commission of Jurists observed 
in its report concerning the Åland Islands case, the purpose of the concept of self-
determination is “to assure some group the maintenance and free development of its 
social, ethnical or religious characteristics”.54 What is more, Dietrich Murswiek has 
argued that the rationale is that a group can inhabit its traditional territory and, in this 
environment, is enabled to “cultivate, preserve, and develop the specific character-
istics determining its identity”.55 All in all, it can be alleged that the rationale of the 
notion of self-determination is:
[t]he protection, preservation, strengthening and development of the cultural, ethnic 
and/or historical identity or individuality (the ‘self’) of a collectivity, that is, of a 
‘people’, and thus guaranteeing a people’s freedom and existence.56
Put differently, it may be suggested that the objective of the principle of self-determi-
nation to protect, preserve, strengthen and develop the ‘collective identity’. 
3.1.1. Implementation of the Right to Internal Self-Determination
Having touched upon the purpose of the concept of self-determination, the question 
arises as to the more practical implications of the core meaning of the right to self-
determination. In the words of Antonio Cassese, the right to internal self-determi-
nation presumes that all peoples are “allowed to exercise those rights and freedoms 
which permit the expression of the popular will”.57 That popular participation in the 
political decision-making process of the State plays a key role in achieving self-deter-
mination is also emphasized by various other scholars, international bodies and judi-
cial organs.58 Political participation in public affairs can be exercised either directly 
54 Report of Commission of Jurists (Larnaude, Huber, Struycken), LNOJ Special Supplement No. 3 
(October 1920), at para. 6.
55 D. Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law 
of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at p. 27.
56 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 223.
57 Accordingly, Antonio Cassese has pointed out that the right to internal self-determination is to be 
viewed as a “manifestation of the totality of rights embodied in the [ICCPR]”. See Cassese, Self-Deter-
mination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 53.
58 See, for instance, L.C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven 1978) at p. 16; A Eide, Second Progress Report on ‘Possible Ways and Means 
of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, UN Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37, at para. 165; Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at pp. 33-35; Franck, ‘The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ at pp. 58-59; See also Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determination’ 
at p. 249. Likewise, the Human Rights Committee has explained the connection between the right of 
peoples to self-determination and the right of citizens to political participation. See UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), 
The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right to Equal Access to Public Service, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), 12 July 1996, at paras 1-2. See also Raič, Statehood and the 
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or indirectly. Although plebiscites or referenda as regards public matters59 may func-
tion as avenues for direct participation of citizens, in most societies, it is practically 
impossible to provide for direct participation in public affairs by all citizens in view 
of the large number of peoples involved. Therefore, indirect participation by means 
of a representative government is generally accepted to be an acceptable and work-
able alternative. Against this backdrop, the notion of direct participation primarily 
refers to the right to stand for election for the purpose of creating a representative 
government, while the notion of indirect participation generally refers to periodic 
voting processes in order to elect the political representatives of the people.60 
As was expressed in the preparatory debates of the adoption of the Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration,61 in the Friendly Relations Declaration itself and in the Vienna 
Law of Self-Determination at pp. 237-238, sources referred to in footnote 42. To that effect, several judi-
cial decisions have proclaimed that political participation of the entire population is essential with regard 
to the exercise of the internal aspect of self-determination. See Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re 
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Republic 
of Tatarstan, 13 March 1992, Decision No. 671; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. No. 75/92, 1995 (not dated). For a consideration of these 
cases against the background of the right to self-determination, see J. Summers, Peoples and Interna-
tional Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2007) at pp. 265-267, 274-278, 293-301; M. Suski, ‘Keeping the Lid 
on the Secession Kettle: A Review of Legal Interpretations Concerning Claims of Self-Determination by 
Minority Peoples’ (2005) 12 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 189 at pp. 207-216.
59 Plebiscites and referenda may be defined as J. Patrick Boyer did: “The referendum is generally an 
established procedure provided or by existing constitutional or legislative provisions, while a plebiscite 
arises either by a special legislative Act providing for it or by a special initiative of a government, utiliz-
ing procedures already provided by statutes […] The main difference between the two voting devices 
is therefore that a plebiscite is essentially a public opinion poll but a referendum automatically binds a 
government to enact a law (or to refrain from doing so) according to the voters’ wishes.” See R.A. Miller, 
‘Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy?’ (2003) 41 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law 601 at p. 626, quoting J. Patrick Boyer.
60 See Joseph, Schultz and Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary at pp. 501-511.
61 Concerning the provision dealing with self-determination of peoples which, in the end, was deter-
mined as Paragraph 7 of Principle V of this document, the United Kingdom submitted a proposal which 
stated under (4): “States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and possessed of a representative 
government, effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within their territory, shall be consid-
ered to be conducting themselves in conformity with the principle as regards those peoples”. See UN 
Doc. A/Ac.125/L44, 19 July 1967. This proposal bears likeness to the proposal which had been made by 
the United States, which read as follows: “[t]he existence of a sovereign and independent State possessing 
a representative Government, effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within its territory, 
is presumed to satisfy the principle of equal rights and self-determination as regards these peoples”. See 
UN Doc. A/AC.125/L32, 12 April 1966, at para. B. Finally, the Italian proposal can be seen as both con-
firming and refining the abovementioned proposals: “States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, 
and possessed of a government representing the whole of their population, shall be considered to be con-
ducting themselves in conformity with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
regards that population. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing any action 
which would impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity, or political unity, of such States”. See UN 
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Declaration and Programme of Action, the presence of a representative government 
is vital for the exercise of the right to internal self-determination. Hence, it is helpful 
to consider what exactly should be understood by this important concept of repre-
sentative government. In general, such a government claims to represent the authority 
or will of its people.62 More specifically, when a government claims to represent its 
people, this implies that it represents the population as a whole. Thus, the implemen-
tation of the right to internal self-determination is inextricably linked to the principle 
of equal rights of peoples and, in particular, the principle of non-discrimination. The 
government should be seen to represent all inhabitants of its territory without any 
distinction.63 This aspect can also be found in the UN Charter (Article 2(1)), in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration (Principle V, paragraph 7), and in the Vienna Declar-
ation and Programme of Action (Part I, Article 2). 
Above, it was argued that, for a political system to qualify as representative and 
participatory, open electoral processes, by means of which the people’s representa-
tives are chosen, and continuing possibilities to participate in the decision-making 
process, are of vital importance. An additional – in fact preceding – aspect facilitates 
the people to constitute its own political system, in this way acting as a so-called 
pouvoir constituant.64 As the right to self-determination is often characterized as inal-
ienable and ongoing,65 this also implies that at any moment in time, the people can 
change or re-create the manifestation of their system of government and administra-
tion.66 Furthermore, a representative government should allow its people to partici-
pate in the general decision-making process of the State, in this way effectively – not 
merely formally – determining not only its political, but also its economic, social 
and cultural development. Put differently, governmental responsiveness is essential. 
In this regard, policy outcomes may function as a continuous measuring instrument 
Doc. A/AC.125/L80, 1969. For an elaborate account of the preparatory works to the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, see Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 115-118.
62 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 273.
63 In order to ensure such government without distinction, “measures in favour of the minority group, 
such as autonomy” might be required. See J. Wright, ‘Minority Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determina-
tion’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 605 at p. 618.
64 Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determination’ at pp. 230, 249. See also Suski, ‘Keeping the Lid on the Seces-
sion Kettle: A Review of Legal Interpretations Concerning Claims of Self-Determination by Minority 
Peoples’ at p. 201, referring to M. Suski, ‘On Mechanisms of Decision-Making in the Creation (and the 
Re-Creation) of States – with Special Reference to the Relationship between the Right to Self-Determi-
nation, the Sovereignty of the People and the pouvoir constituant’ (1997) 3 Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 
426.
65 See, for instance, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-
Determination), The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994), 13 
March 1984.
66 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 238. In this respect, plebiscites or referenda 
may be viewed as appropriate avenues for allowing the people to act as a pouvoir constituant.
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for qualifying a political system as participatory and representative, and for checking 
whether the core meaning of the right to internal self-determination is complied with.
3.1.2. Internal Self-Determination and Democratic Governance?
When considering the relevant human rights instruments, it might appear that recog-
nition of the right to internal self-determination requires the creation and upholding 
of a democratic governmental system as perceived by the West, albeit implicitly. 
Whether this is true or not, it is indeed the view of the Human Rights Committee.67 
When considering the net of political entitlements provided for in the ICCPR and 
explained in the context of this Covenant,68 the Western conception of representative 
democratic government is mirrored. What is more, the Human Rights Committee 
has stressed that the (individual) rights of political participation as provided for in 
Article 25 ICCPR69 are related to, yet distinct from, the right to self-determination 
of peoples. The Committee contended that the rights to political participation enable 
“individuals to participate in those processes which constitute the conduct of public 
affairs” and stressed that these rights lie “at the core of democratic government based 
on the consent of the people”.70 One of the former members of the Committee, Dame 
Rosalyn Higgins, has explained that “Article 25 is concerned with the detail of how 
free choice (necessarily implied in Article 1) is to be provided – by periodic elec-
tions, on the basis of universal suffrage”.71 From this outlook, ultimately, the con-
clusion may be drawn that some of these details from Article 25 are a conditio sine 
qua non for observance of the internal dimension of the right to self-determination. 
The reason behind this conclusion is that without ensuring rights to both direct and 
indirect participation no free choice is possible, as a result of which there can be no 
67 See J.R. Crawford, ‘Democracy and International Law’ (1993) 64 British Yearbook of International 
Law 113 at p. 114. See also J.R. Crawford, ‘Democracy and the Body of International Law’ in G.H. Fox 
and B.R. Roth (eds) Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2000) at pp. 94-95. 
68 See, in general, Joseph, Schultz and Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary; Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
69 Article 25 ICCPR shows that the rights of political participation, attributed to every citizen, can be 
divided into rights to indirect participation in public affairs, and rights to direct participation in public 
affairs (Article 25(a)). The first is exercised through periodic voting processes freely electing the political 
representatives of the people (Article 25(b)); the latter requires that citizens have the right to stand for 
election (Article 25(b)) and equal access to the public service (Article 25(c)). See Joseph, Schultz and 
Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary at 
pp. 501-511. See also Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ at pp. 553-560. 
70 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs 
and the Right to Vote), The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right to Equal 
Access to Public Service, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), 12 July 1996, at paras 1-2. 
71 Dame Rosalyn Higgins, quoted in Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 274. 
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genuine exercise of internal self-determination either.72 As a logical consequence, 
it might even be argued that the internal aspect of the right to self-determination 
implies that the right to freedom of thought (Article 18 ICCPR), the right of peaceful 
assembly (Article 21 ICCPR), the right to freedom of association (Article 22 ICCPR) 
and the right to freedom of expression (Article 19 ICCPR) need to be safeguarded,73 
for compliance with these political rights is presupposed for the effectuation of true 
political participation.74 That the effective implementation of the internal dimension 
of the right to self-determination necessitates, in one way or another, democratic 
governance is also acknowledged in several State reports to the Human Rights Com-
mittee.75 From the relevant paragraphs in these reports, ostensibly, the argument may 
be derived “that the only form of government compatible with the right to internal 
self-determination is a democratic one: a regime in which political power is based on 
the will of the people, and which provides all citizens the opportunity to participate 
equally in the political life of their societies”.76 
In sum, the argument that the internal aspect of the right to self-determination 
can be equated with the Western-style concept of democratic governance would be 
an argument too drastic for a number of interrelated reasons. First, communis opinio 
as regards the interpretation of the concept ‘representative government’ is lacking 
72 Ibid. at p. 274.
73 See also UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) (Universal Declaration on Human Rights), UN 
Doc. A/Res/217, 10 December 1948, Articles 19 (right to freedom of opinion and expression) and 20 
(right to peaceful assembly and association).
74 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 54. In reaction to Cassese, 
it has been argued by one commentator that, “[i]n this way, the concept of self-determination becomes 
the mirror image of the human rights situation in that area of the public sector that in a large sense is 
commonly associated with the political life of a society”. See P. Hilpold, ‘Self-Determination in the 21st 
Century: Modern Perspectives for an Old Concept’ in Y. Dinstein (ed.) Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 
(Nijhoff, Dordrecht 2006) at p. 263.
75 In this respect, reference can be made to the following reports: Second periodic report (Bolivia), 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/63/Add 4, para. 2; Second periodic report (Cameroon), UN Doc. CCPR/C/63/Add 1, 
para. 26; Initial report (Croatia), UN Doc. CCPR/C/HRV/99/1, para. 10; Fourth periodic report (Ecua-
dor), UN Doc. CCPR/C/84/Add 6, para. 11; Third periodic report (India), UN Doc. CCPR/C/76/Add 
6, para. 32; Second periodic report (Jamaica), UN Doc. CCPR/C/42/Add 15, para. 2; Second periodic 
report (Republic of Korea), UN Doc. CCPR/C/114/Add 1, para. 18; Second periodic report (Lebanon), 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/42/Add 14, para. 2; Initial report (Lesotho), UN Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add 14, paras 4-8; 
Third periodic report (Mauritius), UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/Add 12, para. 5; Initial report (Nepal), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/Add 2, para. 1; Fourth periodic report – Addendum (Peru), UN Doc. CCPR/C/PER/98/4, 
para. 3; Fourth periodic report (Romania), UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/Add 7, paras 6-7; Second periodic report 
(Sudan), UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/Add 2, para. 22; Third and Fourth periodic report (Trinidad and Tobago), 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/TTO/99/3, paras 20-21; Second periodic report (Zambia), UN Doc. CPR/C/75/Add 2, 
para. 22.
76 Wheatley, ‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’ at p. 232. Yet, if the ICCPR 
would indeed require the introduction of a Western democratic system, this would raise the question of 
whether this implies that States which are not party to the Covenant are under the obligation to introduce 
a democratic governmental system as well. See ibid. at p. 233.
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on the international level.77 What is more, even though some contend that a right to 
democratic governance is emerging,78 under contemporary international law, an obli-
gation to democratic governance does not exist (yet).79 To put it even more strongly, 
there is no single mould of democracy either.80 In the words of the then UN Secre-
tary-General, Kofi A. Annan, democracy is “not a model to be copied but a goal to 
be attained”.81 Rather, many manifestations of a democratic system can be discerned, 
differing from society to society and depending on their particular characteristics 
and circumstances.82 These various manifestations of democracy may involve vari-
ous senses – stronger and weaker – of political representation and participation.83 As 
such, it can be argued that the notion of democracy operates on a sliding scale.84 All 
in all, the concept of democracy is both adaptable and evolutionary. As a result of 
this lack of clarity, accepting an international legal entitlement to or obligation for 
democratic government would even lead to a meaningless term, prone to political 
misuse. The second objection follows naturally from the previous line of argument: 
by equating internal self-determination with the Western idea of representative demo-
cratic government, hardly any room would be left “for a population’s own perception 
of the representative character of its government and for a people’s own (traditional) 
procedures”.85 It should be remembered that, as Jean Salmon observed, 
77 During the drafting process of the Friendly Relations Declaration, Third World States pronounced 
that their interpretation of the phrase “a government representing the whole population belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour” mainly concerns the requirement of a non-racist 
government. See T.D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1997) at pp. 100-101; M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht 1982) at p. 39. See also Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at 
p. 276.
78 See footnote 4 supra, referring to the famous article by Thomas M. Frank. See also Cerna, ‘Universal 
Democracy: An International Legal Right or a Pipe Dream of the West?’.
79 For a substantiated argument, see J. Wouters, B. De Meester and C. Ryngaert, ‘Democracy and Inter-
national Law’ in I.F. Dekker and E. Hey (eds) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (T.M.C. Asser 
Press, The Hague 2003) at pp. 155-156. 
80 Political scientists generally discern four main approaches in conceptualizing democracy: consti-
tutional, procedural, substantive and process-oriented. See C. Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2007) at p. 7. Likewise, the UN Commission on Human Rights has recognized the 
“rich and diverse nature of the community of the world’s democracies”. See Commission on Human 
Rights, Promotion of the Right to Democracy, UN Doc. E/CN4/Res/1999/57, 28 April 1999. For an 
elaborate discussion of different theoretical approaches to democracy, see, for instance, F. Cunningham, 
Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, London/New York 2002).
81 UN Secretary-General, Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Pro-
mote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, UN Doc. A/2/513, 21 October 1997, para. 27.
82 UN Secretary-General, Supplement to Reports on Democratization, UN Doc. A/51/761, 20 Decem-
ber 1996, para. 1. 
83 See Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on 
Federalism’ at p. 116.
84 Wheatley, ‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’ at p. 235
85 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 277.
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there are many regimes in the world which are not similar to Western parliamentarism 
and which may, however, be viewed as truly representative of the peoples concerned 
according to their own social and historic traditions. Furthermore, the Western democ-
racies do not all present the same features. It is also an historical fact that authoritarian 
governments may turn out from ballot-boxes. The concepts of democracy and repre-
sentation are therefore to be handled with care. It seems indispensable to advocate a 
concept of democracy sufficiently wide to encompass the diversity of forms of repre-
sentation rooted in the culture and the history of peoples, provided their genuine will 
is ascertained.86
As such, the automatic and necessary linking of internal self-determination with the 
Western notion of democracy, thus imposing a particular political model on a popula-
tion, would be incompatible with the core meaning of the right to self-determination 
itself, which involves the principle of free choice. In sum, to a certain extent, one can 
agree with writers who have contended that “there is no self-determination without 
democratic decision-making”87 or that the internal dimension of the right to self-
determination necessitates the introduction and maintenance of some form of demo-
cratic government.88 However, it is to be emphasized that the notion of democracy 
involves more than just the classical Western conception, focusing on “representative 
legislative bodies acting under procedures of majority rule, freely elected under uni-
versal suffrage, competition for office, periodic elections and the rule of law”.89 This 
necessarily implies that other forms of government which are conceived as being 
representative and participatory by the people at issue, may also ensure respect for 
the right to internal self-determination. The basic principle for observance of this 
right and, hence, for governance, should be the freely expressed will of the people 
concerned.90 As such, full respect for the political rights as granted by the ICCPR 
should be seen as a possible means of implementing the internal aspect of the right 
to self-determination. Yet, it is not the sole means towards observance of this right.
In view of the above, a caveat is appropriate here. A governmental system which 
entitles the people to participate in the political decision-making process by means 
of organizing elections, on the basis of which representatives of the population 
are chosen, is not necessarily a guarantee for respecting the right to internal self-
determination of a people constituting a (numerical) minority group within a State. 
86 J. Salmon, ‘Internal Aspects of the Right to Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy 
Principle?’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993) at p. 280. In this respect, reference can be made to the constitutional 
structures of the Marshall Islands, Palau, the Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, where governance is based 
upon traditional social structures, but is nonetheless in conformity with democratic structures. See 
Wheatley, ‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’ at p. 233, footnote 59.
87 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 54. 
88 Wheatley, ‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’ at pp. 231-233.
89 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 275.
90 Ibid. at p. 279.
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Put differently, an electoral system which is based upon simple majoritarianism may 
not be said to ensure observance of the core meaning of the right to self-determina-
tion of minority groups, since the formal procedures of majority rule adhered to may 
be used as a cover for unequal treatment and discrimination in substance.91 This may 
result in a threat to the collective identity of the people at issue.92 While it is true that, 
generally, the internal dimension of the right to self-determination does not require 
any particular organizational outcome, in plural societies, the introduction of specific 
structures of participation may be instrumental in achieving and ensuring that the 
possibilities for effective and ongoing participation and true representation may be 
better achieved.93 In this respect, arrangements such as autonomy,94 federalism95 or 
91 Wright, ‘Minority Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination’ at pp. 616-617; Xanthaki, Indigenous 
Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and Land at pp. 160-161. This was 
also acknowledged by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment on Article 25 ICCPR. See 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 25, Article 25: Participation in Public Affairs and the 
Right to Vote, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), 12 July 1996, at para. 7.
92 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 281.
93 See, for instance, K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual 
Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague 2000) at p. 315; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 281; Summers, Peo-
ples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of 
Nations at pp. 342-343; Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with 
Some Remarks on Federalism’ at p. 133; Wright, ‘Minority Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination’ 
at pp. 608, 614. 
94 Although there is little agreement on the precise meaning of the term, the concept of autonomy 
is generally understood to refer to self-government or self-rule in relation to devolved competences. 
As autonomy provides local actors with the competence to take decisions which concern themselves, 
autonomy has been the classical means of settling self-determination disputes beyond the context of 
decolonization. Examples in this respect are the settlement for the Åland Islands, the arrangement for 
the Azores in relation to Portugal, and arrangements for Aceh and West Papua in Indonesia. Autonomy 
can be operationalized in various ways: it may be restricted to certain issues concerning a (numerical) 
minority, such as their cultural matters, natural resources, and education, but it may also be extended 
to refer to complete self-government of a certain territory. The extent of autonomy which is granted in 
a particular situation is usually established in the constitution or in an autonomy statute. See, in gen-
eral, Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority 
Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at pp. 311-313; R. Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to 
Ethnic Conflicts (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 1997); M. Weller, Escaping the 
Self-Determination Trap (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2009) at pp. 78-90. See also J. Rehman, 
‘The Concept of Autonomy and Minority Rights in Europe’ in P. Cumper and S. Wheatley (eds) Minority 
Rights in the ‘New’ Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/Boston 1999) at pp. 218-
219; Wright, ‘Minority Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination’ at p. 614. On the ‘legal notion’ of 
autonomy (and its different manifestations), see H. Hannum and R.B. Lillich, ‘The Concept of Autonomy 
in International Law’ (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 858. 
95 Federalism is a more symmetrical mode of organization than autonomy arrangements. The core of a 
federal structure, which is laid down in a constitution or basic law, is twofold. First, the territory of the 
State is divided into multiple components (‘cantons’). Secondly, the powers within the State are divided 
between the government at a central level having authority within the entire State territory on the one 
hand, and a number of cantonal governments with authority within their demarcated territory on the other. 
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complex power-sharing96 should be mentioned, as these offer enhanced self-govern-
ment. Moreover, in view of the opportunities which these organizational structures 
offer to (minority) groups seeking to assert their separate identity, autonomy, fed-
eralism and complex power-sharing are frequently seen as instruments to mediate 
secessionist claims or even as alternatives to secession.97 At the same time, however, 
it cannot be denied that this kind of arrangement does not always prove capable of 
With regard to the distribution of powers, subsidiarity principles are incorporated. As such, federalism 
provides for a balanced division of competences and, in addition, enables the development of a separate 
identity without obtaining a sovereign status, such a structure may indicate and simultaneously promote 
mutuality among the various groups residing within the State. An example of a federal-type arrangement 
is the United Cyprus Republic, which consists of a federal government and two equal constituent States, 
that is the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State. See, for instance, Y. Dinstein, ‘The Degree 
of Self-Rule of Minorities in Unitarian and Federal States’ in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds) 
Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993); Henrard, 
Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the 
Right to Self-Determination at pp. 308-309; Suski, ‘Keeping the Lid on the Secession Kettle: A Review 
of Legal Interpretations Concerning Claims of Self-Determination by Minority Peoples’ at pp. 193-194; 
Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federal-
ism’ at pp. 133-134; Weller, Escaping the Self-Determination Trap at pp. 91-112. 
96 Complex power-sharing arrangements consider a broad range of issues and do so at different levels 
of government. As such, complex power-sharing is a multi-dimensional system in which both horizon-
tal and vertical layers of public authority are created. In the words of Marc Weller, “[t]his will include 
autonomous structures [and] is matched by the application of consociationalist techniques, such as gov-
ernmental power-sharing, guaranteed parliamentary representation for the minority, veto rights for ethnic 
communities or ethno-territorial entities, the granting of minority rights and agreements on the transfer 
of economic resources. In addition, there is an element of international involvement in the negotiation 
and implementation of the settlement, and in post-conflict governance”. Complex power-sharing was 
deployed, for instance, in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. See M. Weller, ‘Settling Self-Determina-
tion Conflicts: An Introduction’ in M. Weller and B. Metzger (eds) Settling Self-Determination Dispute: 
Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2008) at 
pp. xiii-xiv. Notwithstanding the positive influence the introduction of complex power-sharing arrange-
ments may exert on the implementation of the right to self-determination, Steven Wheatley notes that, 
since internal self-determination is an ongoing right, “[a]ny proposed scheme which provides for consti-
tutionally entrenched [arrangements], substitutes self-determination for pre-determination, and is unac-
ceptable”. See S. Wheatley, ‘Minority Rights, Power Sharing and the Modern Democratic State’ in P. 
Cumper and S. Wheatley (eds) Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague/London/Boston 1999) at p. 202.
97 See, for instance, Suski, ‘Keeping the Lid on the Secession Kettle: A Review of Legal Interpretations 
Concerning Claims of Self-Determination by Minority Peoples’; Weller, ‘Settling Self-Determination 
Conflicts: An Introduction’ at p. xiii; M. Weller, ‘Why the Legal Rules on Self-Determination Do Not 
Resolve Self-Determination Disputes’ in M. Weller and B. Metzger (eds) Settling Self-Determination 
Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 
2008) at pp. 18-19. Weller, however, refers to these settlements as “circumven[ing] the underlying self-
determination issue”. See M. Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ (2005) 4 Ethnopolitics 3 at p. 27.
Chapter III
60
settling conflicts. Rather, it may even promote ethnic self-awareness while failing to 
accommodate grievances,98 which might result in increased clamour for secession.99
In summary, the core meaning of the right to internal self-determination concerns 
the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples at issue. Observance 
of this right is vital, since the principal aim of the right to internal self-determination 
boils down to the protection, preservation, strengthening and development of the 
‘collective identity’ of a people. Above, it was demonstrated that against this back-
ground, international law appears to require a representative government and, as a 
consequence, political participation. From these strict prerequisites, some presuppo-
sitions naturally follow. These should be viewed as possible means of ensuring that 
the popular will can be freely and genuinely expressed. Subsequently, it was empha-
sized that although the internal dimension of the right to self-determination requires 
some kind of democracy in both procedure and substance, the Western-style repre-
sentative democracy is by no means the sole governmental model which can meet the 
standard set by the right to self-determination of peoples.
3.2. The Status of the Right to Internal Self-Determination
Above, the analysis of the development of the concept of self-determination has 
already dealt with the shift of its status from mere political principle to legal right. 
Since it became apparent that the content of the internal dimension of the right to 
self-determination differs from that of the external dimension, it is helpful to con-
sider the legal status of both aspects separately. For this purpose, the various sources 
of international law will be touched upon: international instruments, State practice, 
jurisprudence and legal doctrine.
As has already been demonstrated in previous sections, self-determination beyond 
decolonization has been acknowledged as a right of peoples in various international 
legal and political instruments, such as the International Human Rights Covenants 
of 1966, the Friendly Relations Declaration, the Helsinki Final Act and the Afri-
can Charter.100 In view of their phrasing, these relevant documents denote that even 
beyond the colonial context, the right to self-determination is a right of all peoples 
which should be observed by all States, and evidence the existence of an internal 
dimension to self-determination, as they indicate that self-determination primarily 
involves the relationship between the State and its population. As such, this internal 
98 In this respect, the ethnic federalist structures in Ethiopia may serve as an example. See International 
Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and its Discontents (2009), in particular at pp. 22-29.
99 See S. Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2005) at p. 84.
100 See Section 2 of this Chapter.
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dimension of self-determination cannot be excluded from self-determination as a 
positive legal right.101 
This conclusion is confirmed by State practice. Today, no less than 167 States 
are party to the ICCPR,102 which grants the right of peoples to internal self-determi-
nation as was demonstrated previously. States which are not party to this Covenant 
are in many cases party to another legal instrument which provides for the right to 
internal self-determination, such as the African Charter.103 Moreover, State reports 
demonstrate that the internal aspect of the right to self-determination is considered 
to be a legal entitlement under positive international law. As was already touched 
upon previously in this Chapter, in their reports to the Human Rights Committee, the 
majority of States account – both implicitly and explicitly – for their implementation 
of the right to self-determination within the borders of the State, particularly in the 
relationship between the government and the governed.104 In this respect, the general 
tendency of ‘democratization’ in the sense of providing for a representative govern-
ment and enabling political participation of citizens should be recalled here as well.105 
Despite these developments, it cannot be denied that the legal character of the right 
to internal self-determination is disputed by some States. Nonetheless, as David Raič 
has argued, considering “the opposition by clearly oppressive regimes as evidence 
of the absence of a customary rule of internal self-determination is unacceptable”.106 
Such an argument is in line with the position of Judge Tanaka, who in his dissenting 
opinion to the South West Africa cases wrote that a few ‘dissidents’ do not prohibit the 
possibility of creating a norm of customary international law.107 
Furthermore, reference must be made to jurisprudence. Several judicial decisions 
have shown that the peoples’ right to self-determination is to be qualified as a legal 
right under positive international law. What is more, the International Court of Justice 
has even declared it to have an erga omnes character.108 Although this characterization 
101 Rosas, ‘Internal Self-Determination’ at p. 239. 
102 For the up-to-date status of this Covenant, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, Status of Ratification, Reservations, Declarations, available at 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en>, last consulted on 5 October 2012.
103 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 288, footnote 251.
104 For an analysis of this State practice, based on State reports submitted under Article 40 ICCPR, see 
H. Quane, ‘A Right to Self-Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?’ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law 219 at pp. 221-222. Quane conducted a survey of the periodic reports of 97 States. Of these 
States, 87 reports amplified on the right to self-determination. Of these reports, 69 States referred to the 
internal dimension of self-determination either directly or indirectly. 
105 See Section 3.1.2 of this Chapter.
106 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 288.
107 International Court of Justice, South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South 
Africa), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, p. 6, at p. 291, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka.




was made against the background of decolonization,109 it also applies beyond this 
context for, in 2004, the Court underpinned this classification in the Construction of 
a Wall advisory opinion. It stated the following:
The Court would observe that the obligations violated by Israel include certain obliga-
tions erga omnes. As the Court indicated in the Barcelona Traction case, such obliga-
tions are by their very nature “the concern of all States” and, “In view of the importance 
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection” 
(Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33). The obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are 
the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and 
certain of its obligations under international humanitarian law.
As regards the first of these, the Court has already observed […] that in the East Timor 
case, it described as “irreproachable” the assertion that “the right of peoples to self-
determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has 
an erga omnes character” (ICJ Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29). The Court would also 
recall that under the terms of General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) […], “Every 
State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying 
out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of 
the principle.”110
From the context of the above cited case and from the Court’s reference to the par-
ticular phrasing of the Friendly Relations Declaration, it can be deduced that the 
internal dimension of the right to self-determination beyond decolonization should 
also be viewed as a right with an erga omnes character. 
The proposition of internal self-determination as imposing obligations towards 
all members of the international community has been adopted by legal doctrine 
as well.111 What is more, some authors have gone so far as to contend that internal 
self-determination has, in addition, become a peremptory norm of international law 
from which no derogation is possible, otherwise known as a norm of jus cogens.112 
Whether such an argument is correct is by no means undisputed. As endorsed in 
109 See also Chapter II, Section 4.2.2 of the present study.
110 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, at paras 155-156.
111 See, for instance, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 133-134.
112 On the concept of jus cogens, see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) at pp. 510-512; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to 
International Law (7th revised edn, Routledge, London/New York 1997) at pp. 57-58; M.N. Shaw, Inter-
national Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) at pp. 115-119; H. Thirlway, ‘The 
Sources of International Law’ in M.D. Evans (ed.) International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2003) at pp. 141-142.
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Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a rule cannot 
become a peremptory norm unless it is “accepted and recognized [as such] by the 
international community of States as a whole”.113 Although this notion of jus cogens 
appears to be generally accepted, the content of this category of norms remains rather 
obscure to date.114 Consequently, it seems that there are only few rules which seem 
to pass this stringent test. The prohibition of the use of force, genocide, slavery and 
racial discrimination may be mentioned in this respect, although these examples are 
not uncontested either.115 According to some writers, the right to self-determination 
should be added to this enumeration as well.116 Indeed, there are signs that such a 
position may be correct. For instance, one might argue that the jus cogens character 
of the internal dimension of self-determination may be derived from custom.117 More-
over, the sweeping consequences stemming from a violation of the internal aspect of 
the right to self-determination118 appear to support a jus cogens character.119 Nonethe-
less, it is to be emphasized that it is highly questionable whether the right to internal 
self-determination has evolved into a norm of jus cogens and if so, whether all ele-
ments of this right can be considered as such. Antonio Cassese, for instance, held the 
opinion that only particular aspects of the right to internal self-determination belong 
113 Texts adopted subsequently to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties have employed 
similar language. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organ-
izations or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986, A/Conf.129/15, Art. 53 (not entered 
into force). Moreover, nowadays, the concept of peremptory norms is applied outside the context of treaty 
law as well. See International Law Commission, 53rd session, 23 April – 1 June and 2 July – 10 August 
2001, UN GAOR, 56th session, Suppl. No.10, A/56/10, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, 26 July 2001, Arts 26, 
40, 50(1)(d).
114 J.R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd revised edn, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 2006) at p. 101.
115 See ibid. at p. 101; Shaw, International Law at pp. 117-118. 
116 See, for instance, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at p. 511; Cassese, Self-Determi-
nation of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 133-140; K. Doehring, ‘Self-Determination’ in B. Simma 
(ed.) The Charter of the United Nations A Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) 
at p. 62; J.A. Frowein, ‘Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations Under International Law’ in C. 
Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at 
pp. 218-221; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at p. 327; Rosas, ‘Internal 
Self-Determination’ at p. 247. In contrast, others have denied that internal self-determination has become 
a norm of jus cogens. See, for instance, Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 101; 
Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice at pp. 70-72.
117 Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at p. 58.
118 For instance, the violation of internal self-determination may lead to an obligation of non-recogni-
tion, as happened in the case inter alia of Southern Rhodesia. On this issue, see Chapter VI, Section 2.1 
of the present study.
119 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 289, footnote 254. Likewise, Hugh 
Thirlway has argued that “it is accepted that the status of peremptory norm derives from the importance 
of the content of the norm to the international community”. See Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International 
Law’ at p. 141.
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to the body of jus cogens, specifically the right of a people to freely choose its rulers 
and the right of ethnic groups to have access to government.120 In view of these uncer-
tainties, this study will not regard the internal dimension of the right to self-determi-
nation as a norm of jus cogens, but merely as an obligation erga omnes. This finding 
is relevant for the purposes of the present study, as the jus cogens status of the right to 
internal self-determination could have added to the argument that the violation of this 
norm constitutes a breach of international law so serious that it warrants the extreme 
measure of unilateral secession as a remedy. 
3.3. The Subjects of the Right to Internal Self-Determination
In previous sections, it has been demonstrated that self-determination extends beyond 
the colonial context in the form of a continuous entitlement concerning the inter-
nal relation between ‘peoples’ and their State. Accordingly, the subject of the right 
cannot be limited to ethnicities or populations of colonies and dependent territories.121 
Hence, the question arises as to what collectivities can be considered as ‘peoples’ 
holding a right to internal self-determination. Phrased differently: who are the ‘self’ 
to which the right to internal self-determination attaches?
International law does not offer an authoritative definition of who or what con-
stitutes a ‘people’.122 Several attempts at formulating a definition have been made, 
but no consensus has been reached to date. The main reason for this seems to be that 
States fear for the proliferation of claims by ‘peoples’ once agreement exists on what 
constitutes a ‘people’. The lack of definition, however, has made some commentators 
rather cynical about the right to self-determination. Already in 1956, W. Ivor Jen-
nings noted:
Nearly forty years ago a Professor of Political Science who was also President of 
the United States, President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but 
which was widely accepted as a sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determina-
tion. On the surface, it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridicu-
lous because the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people.123
Similarly, in his comment on the Friendly Relations Declaration, Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice criticized the idea of a right to self-determination as ‘nonsense’, wondering 
120 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 133-140.
121 See, for instance, Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some 
Remarks on Federalism’ at pp. 119-120; UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on 
Azerbaijan, UN Doc. A/49/40, 3 August 1994, at para. 296.
122 On the notion of a ‘people’ more in general, see, for instance, J.R. Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peo-
ples (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988).
123 W.I. Jennings, The Approach of Self-Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1956) at 
pp. 55-56.
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how a legally non-existent entity could possibly be the holder of a legal right.124 
Nonetheless, there is a diversity of viewpoints on the concept of ‘peoples’ in the spe-
cific context of self-determination and more generally. A group of UNESCO experts, 
for instance, envisaged the term ‘peoples’ as a concept which is dynamic and might 
imply a different scope for different rights.125 It does not require explanation that such 
a specification is not particularly helpful in seeking to determine who are the holders 
of the internal dimension of the right to self-determination. Therefore, the views most 
often presented on this issue will be discussed below.
3.3.1. All Inhabitants of a State
The first understanding of the term ‘peoples’ is territorial in nature: entire popula-
tions of existing States are viewed as subjects of, and hence having a right to, internal 
self-determination.126 When defining ‘peoples’ in this fashion, neither ethnic consid-
erations nor a colonial context are relevant. In fact, this understanding refers to the 
nation as the subject of the right to internal self-determination. According to Asbjørn 
Eide, this view is a sound one, since “[f]rom the standpoint of international law, the 
‘permanent population’ is identical to the nation”.127 Support for this position can be 
found in international legal documents concerning self-determination. 
First, although Article 1 ICCPR does not mention the term ‘nations’ and the draft-
ing history reveals that the emphasis of the right to self-determination was on the 
external dimension, it has become clear that the phrase “all peoples” at least refers 
to people organized as States. Both Western and non-Western States agreed that self-
determination should “afford a right to be free from an authoritarian regime” to all 
inhabitants of a State.128 What is more, the Human Rights Committee has confirmed 
that the term ‘peoples’ is not restricted to colonial peoples, but refers to the popula-
tions of sovereign and independent States.129 State reports submitted to the Human 
Rights Committee also reflect the fact that internal self-determination is primarily 
124 I. Sinclair, ‘The Significance of the Friendly Relations Declaration’ in V. Lowe and C. Warbrick (eds) 
The United Nations and the Principles of International Law (Routledge, London/New York 1994) at 
pp. 7- 8.
125 UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peo-
ples. Final Report and Recommendations, Paris, 22 February 1990, SHS-89/CONF.602/7, at paras 19, 
24. See also J. Dugard, ‘Secession: Is the Case of Yugoslavia a Precedent for Africa?’ (1993) 5 African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 163 at p. 171, referring to the concept of ‘peoples’ as 
being variable.
126 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 244; Musgrave, Self-Determination and 
National Minorities at pp. 151-154 (calling this approach the “representative government definition”).
127 A. Eide, ‘Territorial Integrity of States, Minority Protection, and Guarantees for Autonomy Arrange-
ments: Approaches and Roles of the United Nations’ (Local Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and 
Protection of Minorities 1996) at para. 2.2.
128 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 50-51, 59-60.
129 See Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law at p. 80.
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implemented as being a right for the entire population of a territory.130 Such an inter-
pretation is also endorsed by judicial decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the case Reference re Secession of Quebec, although the Supreme Court argued that 
the subjects of the right cannot be restricted to “the entirety of a State’s population” 
only.131 Furthermore, the Friendly Relations Declaration more explicitly states that 
the right to self-determination is complied with when States provide for a government 
which represents “the whole people belonging to the territory”.132 The Vienna Dec-
laration and Programme of Action contains a similarly phrased statement.133 Finally, 
the Helsinki Final Act should be mentioned here, as its travaux préparatoires make 
clear that the term ‘peoples’ was intended to refer to peoples organized as nations in 
the first place.134 In sum, it can be concluded that evidence exists for the view that 
nations are subjects of the right to internal self-determination under international law. 
3.3.2. Subgroups within States
A question which has yet remained unanswered is whether – in addition to the entire 
population of a State – certain subgroups within States may also be considered as 
subjects of the right to internal self-determination. This issue will be touched upon 
below. As already noted, the Friendly Relations Declaration stresses that the right 
to self-determination requires “a government representing the whole people to the 
territory”; a phrase which is supplemented with the words “without distinction as to 
race, creed or colour”.135 This addition, which can be found in the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action in similar wording,136 appears to provide an argument for 
extending the applicability of internal self-determination to separate groups within 
130 Quane, ‘A Right to Self-Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?’ at pp. 221-222.
131 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, 20 August 1998, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 
at para. 124. For an examination and discussion of this case from the perspective of international law, 
see P. Dumberry, ‘Lessons Learned from the Quebec Secession Reference before the Supreme Court of 
Canada’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2006). See also Section of Chapter IV, Section 2.3.4 of this study.
132 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, at para. 7.
133 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted on 25 
June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, at para. 2.
134 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 265-266.
135 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, at para. 7.
136 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action stipulates that States conduct themselves in com-
pliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination if they provide for “a government rep-
resenting the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind” (emphasis added). 
See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted on 25 
June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, at para. 2.
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a State.137 Yet, several other arguments can be mentioned for broadening the field of 
application of the right. First of all, in the international instruments containing ref-
erences to self-determination, the term ‘peoples’ is often used simultaneously with 
words such as ‘nations’ or ‘States’, which seems to be indicative of a difference in 
meaning between these two terms.138 An additional argument for assuming that not 
only entire populations of a State are subjects of the right to self-determination can 
be found in the fact that international documents emphasize that the right to self-
determination may only be exercised within the limits of the principle of territorial 
integrity of States. This caveat can only imply that distinct divisions of the State are 
holders of the right to self-determination as well, since, in the words of Erica-Irene 
Daes:
It would have been unnecessary to make such a qualification unless it was understood 
that the population of a State could consist of a number of ‘peoples’, each possessing 
the right of self-determination.139 
The Supreme Court of Canada held the same view, as it concluded in its judgment 
that:
[t]o restrict the definition of the term to the population of existing States would render 
the granting of a right to self-determination largely duplicative, given the parallel 
emphasis within the majority of the source documents on the need to protect the ter-
ritorial integrity of existing States, and would frustrate its remedial purpose.140
Finally, David Raič has added an argument derived from a theoretical point of view. 
He aptly noted that broadening the field of application of the right to internal self-
determination to subgroups seems to be “a logical and necessary consequence of the 
raison d’être of self-determination”, which involves, inter alia, the promotion and 
protection of the collective identity of a group. The majority of States are not ethni-
cally homogeneous territories, but rather accommodate more than one ethnic group. 
Considering the fact that these ethnic groups are often in a non-dominant position 
within the State, it can be contended that with respect to these (ethnic) subgroups, the 
137 See, for instance, Quane, ‘A Right to Self-Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?’ at p. 223; Raič, 
Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 255.
138 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, 20 August 1998, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 
at para. 124. See also Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 249.
139 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of 
Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, 
Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the concept of “indigenous people”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2-AC.4/1996/2 
(1996), at para. 19.
140 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 124.
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protection of collective identity is more vital than with regard to nations as a whole, 
for their position is more vulnerable.141
Obviously, identifying subgroups within a State as the subjects of the right to 
internal self-determination is much more difficult than indicating nations as the sub-
jects of this right. In order to justify a claim for internal self-determination, it is often 
argued that a subgroup needs to satisfy the criterion of collective individuality, as 
not every social or political group constitutes a ‘people’.142 Collective individual-
ity is generally seen to determine the ‘peoplehood’ of a group and is based on the 
idea that “there can be no ‘me’ if there is no ‘you’, so there can be no ‘us’ if there is 
no ‘them’”.143 In essence, it concerns a factual question rather than a legal one. Yet, 
since the identification of collective individuality may have significant implications 
for the application of international law, it is important to phrase the relevant criteria 
as accurately as possible. 
First, an objective element can be discerned in the concept of collective individu-
ality: the members of the group concerned share objectively identifiable common fea-
tures, which distinguishes them from other groups which do not share these common 
features. In this respect, this may concern some or all or the following features: “(a) 
a (historical) territorial connection, on which territory the group forms a majority; (b) 
a common history; (c) a common ethnic identity or origin; (d) a common language; 
(e) a common culture; (f) a common religion or ideology”.144 The term ‘objective’ 
does not imply that the features referred to cannot change over time or that these 
features exist completely independent from the decisions and opinions of the sub-
group itself. Rather, it refers to those features which are ‘objectively’ perceptible 
for outside observers and which are often associated with an ethnic group.145 While 
it usually depends on the specific context which of the features present themselves 
as regards a particular group,146 the territorial connection is often referred to as a 
141 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 248.
142 See J. Wilson, ‘Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination’ (1996) 11 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 433 at p. 440; Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at pp. 35-36.
143 Wilson, ‘Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination’ at p. 440.
144 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 262. For a similar enumeration, see 
UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples. 
Final Report and Recommendations, Paris, 22 February 1990, SHS-89/CONF.602/7, at para. 22; UN 
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of 
United Nations Instruments. Study Prepared by A. Cristescu, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981), 
at pp. 40-41.
145 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 263.
146 See J. Klabbers and R. Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’ in C. 
Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at p. 39. 
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necessary condition for collective individuality. It should be stressed, however, that 
this criterion an sich is insufficient in this respect.147 
Secondly, a subjective element is present in the criterion of collective individuality: 
the belief of being a distinct people distinguishable from any other people inhabit-
ing the globe, and the wish to be recognized as such, as well as the wish to maintain, 
strengthen and develop the group’s identity.148 
Considering the aforementioned elements, in essence, the ‘peoplehood’ of a group 
is determined by a combination of objective and subjective features.149 This is not 
to say, however, that determining whether a particular subgroup actually meets the 
requirements of collective individuality and can thus be identified as a subject of the 
right to (internal) self-determination is without any difficulties. Since the concept of 
collective individuality is a relative one, which merely determines the ‘peoplehood’ 
of a subgroup in comparison with other subgroups, it may be complicated to clearly 
distinguish between these groups for the purpose of delimiting the ‘people’ at hand.150 
Furthermore, as the subjective element concerns the internal perception of the sub-
group itself, this feature may not always be visible. Consequently, it may be difficult 
for outside observers to ascertain whether the subjective element is present.151 At 
the same time, however, it is often contended that the subjective element is the most 
important criterion for ‘peoplehood’. For, the objective characteristics will only be 
maintained as long as the members of the group actually have the will to preserve 
these objective features which distinguish them from any other people.152 All in all, it 
can be concluded that while the practical application ma be rather complicated, those 
subgroups within States which satisfy the criterion of collective individuality may 
also be seen as the subjects of the right to internal self-determination under inter-
national law. 
147 See Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 37; Raič, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination at pp. 263-264. 
148 Ibid., at pp. 262-263. See also Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination 
with Some Remarks on Federalism’ at p. 124.
149 Wilson, ‘Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination’ at p. 440.
150 See K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2002) at p. 80,
151 For a similar argument in the context of identifying minorities and indigenous peoples, and for sev-
eral suggestions to overcome this problem, see A.K. Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The 
Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law (School of Human Rights Research 
Series, Intersentia/Hart, Antwerp/Groningen/Oxford 2001) at pp. 86-93. 




The relevant international documents on self-determination seem to point towards 
a difference between the concept of ‘people’ and that of ‘minority’. For, the inter-
national instruments dealing with the right to self-determination do not explicitly 
include minorities as bearers of the right. Moreover, the international instruments 
dealing with the rights of minorities do not include any express reference to the right 
of self-determination of these groups.153 Yet, a subsequent question which may arise 
is whether minorities are also meant to refer to ‘peoples’ as subgroups within a State, 
hence bearing a right to internal self-determination as well. 
Although minorities are recognized as a set of ‘groups’ within international human 
rights law,154 and although various (working) definitions of the term ‘minority’ have 
been formulated by various authors,155 no legal definition has been formally accepted 
yet.156 States are generally unwilling to accept such a definition as they are aware and 
afraid of the risk that groups on their territory will lay claims, including secession-
ist demands. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that a great variety of minority 
groups exists worldwide, as a result of which it is complicated to subsume all these 
groups with their particular characteristics under one and the same abstract ‘heading’. 
Nonetheless, the (working) definitions which have been proposed over time do reveal 
some recurring elements, some of which are objective, while others are subjective in 
nature. With respect to the objective elements, a numerical factor is often included, 
requiring that the group concerned constitutes less than half of the population of the 
State. A related component is that of non-dominance, which demands that the group 
concerned is in a non-dominant position within society. Even when a group consti-
tutes a numerical minority within the State, this element would preclude that group 
from being a minority under international law if it holds a dominant position within 
153 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 265.
154 See Wilson, ‘Ethnic Groups and the Right to Self-Determination’ at pp. 465-468. 
155 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities. Study Prepared by F. Capotorti, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1-7 (1991) at para. 568; 
UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities. Proposal Concerning a Definition of the Term ‘Minority’. Report Submitted by Mr Jules 
Deschênes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31 (1985) at para. 181; UN Commission on Human Rights, 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Protection of Minor-
ities, Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems 
Involving Minorities. Report Submitted by Asbjørn Eide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (1993) at para. 
29. See also Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, 
Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at pp. 21-24, discussing the definitions proposed by 
Capotorti, Deschênes and Eide.
156 See, for instance, Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law at pp. 70-71. 
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society. The rationale of this feature is that dominant minorities would not need the 
special protection which minorities are granted. A third recurring objective compo-
nent is that of nationality. This element implies that only those groups composed 
of individuals who are nationals or citizens of the State can be considered to form 
a minority, thus excluding people temporarily residing in a country, such as immi-
grants and migrant workers,157 refugees and nomads.158 Whatever the accuracy of 
these recurring elements, it appears that the core features of a minority are a certain 
(objective) distinctiveness of the group from the rest of the population and the (sub-
jective) will to be recognized as a separate entity.159 The objective feature requires 
that the group has certain ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which distin-
guish it from the rest of the population of the State. The subjective element demands 
some kind of self-identification on the part of the minority. It is vital for its status as 
a minority that the group has the wish to exist and to be recognized as an entity with 
a distinct identity, and to preserve this distinctiveness.160 
Having established that minority groups are generally characterized by this com-
bination of objective and subjective features, it is to be noted that the aim of (the 
various systems of) minority protection is generally twofold. On the one hand, it is 
to ensure that minorities are placed on an equal footing with other nationals of the 
State, thus implementing the principle of non-discrimination. On the other hand, it is 
to protect and promote the separate identity of minorities, including for instance their 
ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics.161 In view of these objectives, includ-
ing minority groups within the set of subjects of the right to internal self-determina-
tion would not seem incongruous considering the raison d’être of the right, which 
157 It should be noted, however, that immigrant communities and migrant workers cannot be excluded 
from the rights enshrined in Article 27 of the ICCPR. See Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of 
Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at 
pp. 37-42. Moreover, immigrant communities and migrant workers are sometimes suggested to form a 
category of ‘new’ minorities. On this issue, see, for instance, R.M. Letschert, ‘Successful Integration 
While Respecting Diversity: ‘Old’ Minorities Versus ‘New’ Minorities’ (2007) 18 Helsinki Monitor 46. 
158 See Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minor-
ity Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at pp. 30-42; Meijknecht, Towards International Personal-
ity: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law at pp. 77-85.
159 See Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minor-
ity Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at pp. 43-45; Meijknecht, Towards International Person-
ality: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law at p. 70; M.N. Shaw, 
‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ in Y. Dinstein (ed.) The Protection of Minorities and 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1992) at pp. 23-31. 
160 See M. van den Bosch and W.J.M. van Genugten, ‘International Protection of Migrant Workers, 
National Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Comparing Underlying Concepts’ (2002) 9 International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights 195 at pp. 198-199; Meijknecht, Towards International Personal-
ity: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law at p. 87.
161 See Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minor-
ity Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at pp. 8-11.
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concerns, amongst other things, the protection of the collective (or, separate) identity 
of a group.162 As Dietrich Murswiek put it:
The intrinsic idea of the right to self-determination is to provide every people with the 
possibility to live under those political, social and cultural conditions that correspond 
best with its characteristic singularity, and above all to protect and develop its own 
identity.163 
Indeed, various international instruments have recognized the importance of politi-
cal participation by subgroups within a State, including minorities.164 In Article 27 
of the ICCPR, it was stipulated that (persons belonging to) ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities have the collective right “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language”. In this respect, it may be 
contended that: 
there seems to be no reason, in law, why a minority cannot constitute a ‘people’. There 
may be strong political objections to this position, but those objections stem from fears 
regarding the concept of self-determination, particularly the equating of a right of self-
determination with a right to secede.165
Although it is true that the aforementioned core features of a minority (i.e. distinc-
tiveness and self-identification) bear a resemblance to some important characteristics 
of subgroups constituting a ‘people’ as was discussed previously,166 minority groups 
162 This was also concluded by the Commission of Jurists in the Åland Islands case, as it noted that the 
principle of self-determination and the protection of minorities “have a common object – to assure some 
national groups the maintenance and free development of its social, ethnical or religious characteristics”. 
See Report of the International Commission of Jurists (Larnaude, Huber, Struycken), LNOJ Special Sup-
plement No. 3 (October 1920), at para. 3. See also Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority 
Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at pp. 315-
316, and Chapter IV, Section 2.3.1 of the present study.
163 Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 38.
164 See Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on 
Federalism’ at p. 127, referring to, inter alia, the Helsinki Final Act and the Copenhagen Document, both 
drafted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. See also Section 2.3 of the present 
Chapter, elaborating on these documents. More specifically, reference can be made to discussions on the 
report of Iraq which was submitted to the Human Rights Committee. One of the Committee members 
argued that everyone “including minorities, had the right to take part in the political system and social 
destiny; if that was not the case, they did not enjoy their right to self-determination”. See Rosalyn Higgins 
on the third periodic report of Iraq, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1108 at para. 65, quoted in Thornberry, ‘The 
Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism’ at p. 127. Yet, 
it was not made explicit that the references to internal self-determination for minorities do include ethnic 
and national minorities as well.
165 Wright, ‘Minority Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination’ at p. 627.
166 This was also observed by Patrick Thornberry, who aptly noted that the descriptions of ‘people’ 
and of ‘minority’ “can be compared (and confused) […] since they revolve around essentially the same 
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do not necessarily constitute subgroups in the sense of ‘peoples’ enjoying a right to 
internal self-determination. First, it should be noted that international law generally 
does not consider minority groups as right bearers, but rather, rights are granted to 
‘persons belonging’ to minorities. Thus, these persons bear individual rights as a con-
sequence of their belonging to a minority, while eventually it is the minority group 
which exercises the right.167 This idea has been referred to as concept of ‘in-commu-
nity-with-others-rights’: individual human rights which can be exercised in commu-
nity with other members of a certain group.168 Article 27 ICCPR is an example in this 
respect. Furthermore, the feature of collective individuality, reflecting the ‘people-
hood’ of a group that makes one particular group discernible from others, may oper-
ate as an important distinguishing aspect between the concepts of ‘people’ (including 
subgroups) and ‘minority’. It has been argued by David Raič that not all minority 
groups seem to possess this characteristic of collective individuality. His argument 
stems from the observation that the distinctiveness of a minority, as referred to in 
various working definitions, 
essentially concern[s] the distinctiveness of a ‘minority’ in relation to the rest of the 
population (the majority) of the State wherein such a ‘minority’ resides. Thus, the 
characteristic of distinctiveness in the case of ‘minorities’ (which do not constitute a 
‘people’ in an anthropological sense) does not relate to communities beyond the exter-
nal borders of that State.169 
In this connection, it is important to elaborate on the term ‘ethnic’ or ‘national minor-
ity’, which is often included in documents on the rights of minorities. This term is 
most commonly used to refer to collectivities inhabiting one particular State, while 
their kith and kin have created their own State. The Serb minority in Croatia, for 
instance, exemplifies this respect.170 Even though these groups do have a ‘sense of 
community’,171 ethnic or national minorities generally do not satisfy the subjective 
criterion of collective individuality,172 as they “cannot (apart from the geographical 
characteristics”. See Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some 
Remarks on Federalism’ at p. 125. See also Section 3.3.2 of this Chapter.
167 See Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: The Position of Minorities and Indigenous Peo-
ples in International Law at p. 171. 
168 On this category of rights in the context of migrant workers, national minorities and indigenous 
peoples, see Van den Bosch and Van Genugten, ‘International Protection of Migrant Workers, National 
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Comparing Underlying Concepts’ at pp. 216-225.
169 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 267.
170 See ibid. at p. 268.
171 See Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ at pp. 27-28.
172 As was noted previously, both objective and subjective criteria are to be met before a group can 
be said to possess a collective individuality. The objective elements involve (a) a (historical) territorial 
connection, on which territory the group forms a majority; (b) a common history; (c) a common ethnic 
identity or origin; (d) a common language; (e) a common culture; (f) a common religion or ideology. The 
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factor) and, indeed, do not wish to be distinguished from their kith and kin residing 
in the kin State”.173 Consequently, it appears that ethnic or national minorities do not 
constitute peoples as subgroups within the State which are considered to be subjects 
of the right to internal self-determination.174 Rather, the members of these minority 
groups may claim minority rights only.175 As Raič aptly noted, although such a dis-
tinction may be morally reprehensible, it seems that this is the way things are under 
contemporary international law.176 
The exclusion of ethnic or national minorities as subjects of the right to internal 
self-determination, however, is not to say that a minority can never and will never in 
the future qualify as a ‘people’ within the meaning of that concept. First, it should be 
emphasized that, in some instances, minority groups can possess the characteristic 
of collective individuality and, hence, at the same time constitute a ‘people’ as the 
subject of the right to internal self-determination. As such, reference can be made 
to ethnic groups which constitute a numerical minority in relation to the other the 
inhabitants of the State in which they reside, which can and wish to be distinguished 
from the rest of the population of that State as well as from those residing in the kin 
State.177 
Secondly, it might be argued that contemporary international practice reveals a 
careful tendency towards extending the scope of the right to internal self-determi-
nation to ethnic or national minorities.178 This seems to be suggested by the inter-
national response to the Kosovo crisis. From the support for substantial autonomy for 
subjective element concerns the wish of the group to exist and to be recognized as an entity with a distinct 
identity. See Section 3.3.2 of the present Chapter. 
173 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 269. 
174 See also C. Ryngaert and C.W. Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the 
Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ (2009) Chinese Journal of International Law – 
Advance Access at paras 11-12.
175 For members of a minority, a right comparable to the people’s right to self-determination can be 
found in Article 27 ICCPR. 
176 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 270.
177 See ibid. at p. 269. See also Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determina-
tion in the Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 12, contending that “minor-
ities and peoples are no mutually exclusive terms”. But see Rosalyn Higgins, who was of the opinion that 
minorities are under no circumstances entitled to self-determination since the rights of people belonging 
to minorities are contained in Article 27 ICCPR. Higgins maintained that “one cannot […] assert that 
minorities are peoples and therefore minorities are entitled to the right of self-determination. This is 
simply to ignore the fact that the Political Covenant provides for two discrete rights”. See R. Higgins, 
‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession. Comments’ in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck 
(eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at 
p. 32.
178 See, for instance, Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human 
Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination at pp. 315-316; Raič, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination at pp. 270-271; P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 2001) at pp. 14-15. 
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the Kosovo Albanians as expressed in several texts elaborating on the future political 
status of Kosovo, one might deduce that ethnic or national minorities can be consid-
ered to constitute peoples for the purpose of the right to internal self-determination.179 
However, one should be cautious in drawing (far-reaching) conclusions. Although 
the UN Security Council has on several occasions unambiguously commented that 
the future status of Kosovo should be based on a “substantially greater degree of 
autonomy and meaningful self-administration”,180 it is to be noted that reference to 
the concept of self-determination in this context remained forthcoming. Rather, it 
appears that the support for autonomy arrangements with respect to Kosovo was 
expressed against the backdrop of minority rights and minority protection. And even 
though the opinion concerning the right to self-determination as drafted by the Arbi-
tration Committee181 may invoke the impression that ethnic groups within States, 
such as the Kosovo Albanians, do possess a confined right to internal self-determi-
nation, the juridical importance of this opinion may be subverted for several reasons. 
Generally, the weight of the opinion is undermined because the European Commis-
sion did not always consider the Committee’s opinions to be binding. More specifi-
cally, in this particular opinion on self-determination,182 the Committee provided few 
arguments underpinning its conclusion, despite the fact that this conclusion was not 
in line with State practice on the matter.183 As such, for the time being, conclusions to 
179 See Quane, ‘A Right to Self-Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?’ at pp. 219-220; Ryngaert and 
Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response 
to the Agora Papers’ at para. 12. But see G. Lauwers and S. Smis, ‘New Dimensions of the Right to Self-
Determination: A Study of the International Response to the Kosovo Crisis’ (2000) 6 Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics 43 at pp. 55-57.
180 UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) (On the letters from the United Kingdom (S/1998/223) 
and the United States (S/1998/272)), UN Doc. S/Res/1160, 31 March 1998, at para. 5. See also UN 
Security Council Resolution 1199(1998) (On the situation in Kosovo (FRY)), UN Doc. S/Res/1199, 23 
September 1998, Preamble, at para. 12; UN Security Council Resolution 1203 (1999) (On the situation 
in Kosovo), UN Doc. S/Res/1203, 24 October 1998, Preamble, at para. 8; UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1244 (1999) (On the situation relating Kosovo), UN Doc. S/Res/1244, 10 June 1999, Preamble, at 
para. 11.
181 In August 1991, during a peace conference on Yugoslavia, the Arbitration Committee was created by 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and its Member States. This Committee is better known as 
the Badinter Arbitration Committee, named after its chairman Robert Badinter, who was President of the 
French Constitutional Council. Other members of the Committee were the Presidents of the German and 
Italian Constitutional Courts, the Belgian Court of Arbitration and the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal. 
The Badinter Arbitration Committee was given the mandate to issue binding decisions upon request from 
“valid Yugoslavian authorities”. See A. Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A 
Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 
178 at p. 178.
182 Arbitration Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2 (Self-Determination), 11 Jan-
uary 1992. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Opinions No. 1-3 of the Arbitration 
Commission of the International Conference on Yugoslavia’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International 
Law 182 at pp. 183-184.
183 See Quane, ‘A Right to Self-Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?’ at p. 225.
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the extent that the international response to the events in Kosovo have contributed to 
the evolution of the right to self-determination, in the sense that its internal dimension 
can also be invoked by ethnic and national minorities, seem premature.184 Nonethe-
less, these responses do not preclude future developments as regards extending the 
right to internal self-determination to ethnic and national minorities. More than that, 
they may even have laid the foundations for such developments. 
In conclusion, so far, two categories of subjects of the right to internal self-deter-
mination can be identified beyond the colonial context: entire populations of exist-
ing sovereign States and subgroups within such States. Minority groups may only 
be viewed as subgroups covered by the second category if they possess collective 
individuality. The aforementioned findings justify adding another feature to the inter-
nal right to self-determination: the group characteristic. After all, it has emerged that 
international law does not recognize individual human beings as holders of the right 
to self-determination, but merely groups. This may be called the ‘surplus value’ of 
the right to self-determination,185 or simply what sets this particular right apart from 
the collection of individual rights and freedoms as provided for in the ICCPR and 
ICESCR. 
3.3.4. Indigenous Peoples
Having considered whether subgroups within States and minorities are subjects of 
the internal dimension of the right to self-determination of peoples, one may wonder 
whether indigenous peoples are viewed to be subjects of this right as well. To answer 
this question, the notion of indigenous peoples merits some explanation first. Over 
time, various (working) definitions and sets of criteria have been proposed. The term 
indigenous peoples was initially used to refer to the descendants of the inhabitants of 
a territory prior to its Western colonization.186 In this respect, the definition used in the 
study conducted by Special Rapporteur José R. Martínez Cobo is relevant:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical con-
tinuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and 
are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, 
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.187 
184 See ibid. at p. 227; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 272.
185 See, for instance, ibid. at pp. 239-240. 
186 See International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim Report, 
The Hague Conference (2010), at p. 7.
187 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Final Report, 
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Consequently, this definition covers well-known communities such as the Aborigi-
nes, Inuit, and Maori, but excludes other groups, such as the Saami people, who had 
not suffered from colonial oppression. As a result of the adoption of ILO Convention 
No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples,188 which contains a slightly broader defi-
nition, these communities were also included.189 Article 1.2 of ILO Convention No. 
169 describes indigenous peoples as follows:
Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment 
of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or 
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
So far, this Convention has been ratified by twenty States only, as a consequence of 
which the abovementioned definition cannot be seen to be universally accepted.190 
Despite sustained efforts, it has proved difficult to formulate a definition which meets 
with general approval. Nonetheless, a number of core elements can be derived from 
the various attempts to define the notion of ‘indigenous peoples’. As Asbjørn Eide 
aptly noted, while “controversial in its boundaries”, “[t]he definition of indigenous 
peoples is clear enough at its core”.191 The International Law Association’s Committee 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples suggested the following indicia for ascertaining 
whether a certain community can be considered as an indigenous people: self-iden-
tification, historical continuity, special relationship with ancestral lands, distinctive-
ness, non-dominance and perpetuation.192 According to the Committee, merely two 
of these indicia are crucial, that is the special relationship with ancestral lands, and 
the self-identification as both indigenous and as a people.193 This approach reflects 
the well-known combination of an objective and a subjective element respectively.194 
submitted by the Special Rapporteur Mr. José R. Martínez Cobo, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and 
Add. 1-4, at para. 379 (emphasis added). 
188 International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Inde-
pendent Countries, ILO Convention C169, adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991. 
189 See A. Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Achievements in International Law During the Last 
Quarter of a Century’ (2006) 37 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 155 at p. 187.
190 See International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, <http://www.ilo.org/indig-
enous/lang--en/index.htm>, last consulted on 24 September 2012.
191 Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Achievements in International Law During the Last Quarter of 
a Century’ at p. 186.
192 International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim Report, The 
Hague Conference (2010), at pp. 7-8. 
193 International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Final Report, Sofia 
Conference (2012), at p. 3.
194 International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Final Report, Sofia 
Conference (2012), at pp. 2-3. See also Section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 of the present Chapter.
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Over the last two decades, the attention for the position of indigenous peoples 
under international law has increased significantly.195 This development was high-
lighted by the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) in 2007.196 Being a General Assembly resolution, the Declaration con-
cerns a legally non-binding document per se and its content as a whole cannot yet 
be seen to constitute customary international law. Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that some of its key provisions do reflect general principles of international law or 
even existing customary rules.197 Moreover, it seems that those provisions not yet 
corresponding to customary norms may be seen as emerging customary law as they 
“express the aspirations of the world’s indigenous peoples, as well as of States, in 
their move to improve existing standard for the safeguarding of indigenous peoples’ 
human rights”.198 
Yet, it should not go by unrecorded that the drafting of this Declaration was a 
long-term and intricate process,199 during which indigenous peoples have dedicated 
195 See, for instance, Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Achievements in International Law During 
the Last Quarter of a Century’; Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law at pp. 109-123; 
Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and Land at pp. 
47-127.
196 UN General Assembly Resolution 61/295 (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples), UN Doc. A/Res/61/295, 13 September 2007. The Declaration was adopted by a majority of 144 
states in favour, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), and 11 absten-
tions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Feder-
ation, Samoa and Ukraine). 
197 International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Resolution No. 
5/2012, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 75th Conference of the International Law Association held in 
Sofia, Bulgaria, 26-30 August 2012, at para. 2. See also International Law Association, Committee on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim Report, The Hague Conference (2010), at pp. 51-52; Interna-
tional Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Final Report, Sofia Conference 
(2012), at p. 28.
198 International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Resolution No. 
5/2012, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 75th Conference of the International Law Association held in 
Sofia, Bulgaria, 26-30 August 2012, at para. 3. 
199 The Declaration was drafted by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(UNWGIP), which was established in 1982 as a subsidiary UN body. It was one of the six working groups 
supervised by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities 
(as of 1999 known as the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), which 
at the time was the main subsidiary body of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The 
UNWGIP’s mandate was twofold: “to review developments pertaining the promotion and protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples” and “to give attention to the evolution of 
international standards concerning indigenous rights”. Within this mandate, the UNWGIP developed the 
draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples upon request by the Sub-Commission. Its drafting 
was a protracted process. A draft Declaration was first completed in 1993, but lingered for years. It was 
not before June 2006 that a revised text of the Declaration was adopted during the very first session of the 
new Human Rights Council. Subsequently, the Declaration was submitted to the General Assembly for its 
final approval. On the drafting process, see E.I.A. Daes, ‘The Spirit and Letter of the Right to Self-Deter-
mination of Indigenous Peoples: Reflections on the Making of the United Nations Draft Declaration’ in 
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themselves to, inter alia, the inclusion of an express and unlimited right to self-
determination. Most States, however, remained reluctant in considering such an 
indigenous right, as they valued traditional concepts such as State sovereignty and 
territorial integrity highly, and feared indigenous claims for separate statehood, based 
on an interpretation of self-determination, as including the right to secede. One may 
question whether this fear is realistic, as only few indigenous communities, if any, 
desire full independence. Rather, most indigenous groups have stressed that the cre-
ation of a sovereign State is neither what they aim for, nor what seems to be viable: 
Indigenous peoples are not geographically or economically situated in a way that 
makes independence particularly attractive. Most, if not all indigenous peoples are 
constantly seeking democratic reforms and power sharing within existing states.200
It seems inconsistent that, notwithstanding these exclusively internal aspirations, 
indigenous communities have strongly opposed a restricted understanding of the 
right to self-determination. This stance may be seen as an attempt to leave open the 
possibility for demands of full independence in case the government of the State 
refuses to grant an apposite degree of internal self-determination.201 States, however, 
were only willing to accept the inclusion of the right to self-determination on the con-
dition of the insertion of Article 46(1), affirming that: 
[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity to perform any act contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States.
P. Aikio and M. Scheinin (eds) Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination 
(Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo 2000); Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Achievements in International Law During the Last Quarter of a Century’; Xanthaki, Indigenous 
Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and Land at pp. 102-121.
200 Statement of the Four Directions Council distributed during the 1995 Commission Working Group, 
quoted in Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and 
Land at p. 168. See also UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities (by E.-I.A. Daes, Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations), Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples: Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26/Add.1 (1993), at para. 28: 
“Most indigenous peoples also acknowledge the benefits of a partnership with existing states, in view of 
their small size, limited resources and vulnerability. It is not realistic to fear indigenous peoples’ exercise 
of the right to self-determination. It is far more realistic to fear that the denial of indigenous’ rights to self-
determination will leave the most marginalised and excluded of all the world’s peoples without a legal, 
peaceful weapon to press for genuine democracy in the states in which they live.”
201 Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Achievements in International Law During the Last Quarter of 
a Century’ at pp. 198-199.
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As this provision confirms that the Declaration does not involve a general right for 
indigenous peoples to unilaterally create their own State, it cleared the way for the 
acknowledgement of a right to self-determination.202 Most explicitly, this right is 
enshrined in Article 3 UNDRIP, which states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development.
This phrasing is identical to that of common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR, 
with the replacements of the term ‘all peoples’ by ‘indigenous peoples’.203 Connected 
to Article 3 is Article 4 UNDRIP, which may be read as a possible limitation to the 
modes of exercising the right to self-determination, as it stipulates that in exercising 
this right, indigenous peoples “have the right to autonomy or self-government in mat-
ters relating to their internal and local affairs”. Both provisions of the Declaration are 
seen to reflect existing norms of customary international law.204 
In view of the provisions addressed above, it appears that the right to self-determi-
nation for indigenous peoples is restricted to the internal dimension of the right and 
by no means includes a right to unilateral secession. As such, the right to self-deter-
mination may be seen to focus on two aspects: the free determination of a people’s 
political status and representation on the one hand, and autonomy on the other. The 
first aspect is referred to in Article 18 UNDRIP, which stipulates that: 
[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which 
would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance 
with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous 
decision-making institutions.
The aspect of autonomy is elaborated upon in Article 31 UNDRIP, providing that:
[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well as 
202 See International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim Report, 
The Hague Conference (2010), at p. 9. 
203 This is not to say, however, that the application of common Article 1 of the 1966 International Cov-
enants in the context of indigenous peoples is undisputed. On the contrary: since its adoption, the ques-
tion has been raised as to whether indigenous peoples can be considered as ‘peoples’ for the purpose of 
Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR. The Human Rights Committee was requested to address this issue 
twice, but it declared the communications concerned inadmissible for other reasons. See, for instance, 
Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and Land at pp. 
133-134. See also Chapter IV, Section 2.3 of the present study.
204 See International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim Report, 
The Hague Conference (2010), at p. 51.
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the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and 
genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, 
oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and per-
forming arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional 
cultural expressions.
In addition to the Declaration, doctrine also recognizes that indigenous peoples are 
subjects of the right to self-determination, although prima facie limited to the inter-
nal aspect of the right.205 Erica-Irene A. Daes, for instance, has argued that the mean-
ing of the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples should be understood 
in accordance with what she – in the early 1990s – called the “new meaning” of the 
right, i.e. its internal dimension. More specifically, the right to self-determination 
should allow indigenous peoples “to negotiate freely their political status and rep-
resentation in the States in which they live”.206 Similar remarks have been made by 
other commentators. S. James Anaya, for instance, maintained that self-determina-
tion for indigenous peoples is to be regarded “in relation to the institutions of govern-
ment under which they live”.207 
Having established the (internal) core of the right to self-determination for indig-
enous peoples, the question presents itself as to how this right may be implemented in 
this specific and relatively new context. Unfortunately, there is no unequivocal answer 
to this question, since appropriate measures will differ from case to case. Neverthe-
less, some general remarks can be made in this respect. As was explained previously, 
the internal dimension of the right to self-determination generally requires a partici-
patory and representative political system. In the present context, it is to be recalled 
that an electoral system based upon simple majoritarianism may be inadequate to 
achieve the indigenous peoples’ self-determination within the political structures of 
the State.208 As indigenous peoples are usually non-dominant groups, they are likely 
205 Ibid., at pp. 9-12. 
206 E.-I.A. Daes, ‘Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination’ 
(1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 1 at pp. 8-9.
207 S.J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2004) at p. 104. See also G. Alfredsson, ‘The Right to Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples’ in 
C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) 
at pp. 50-53; Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Achievements in International Law During the Last 
Quarter of a Century’ at pp. 196-199; C.E. Foster, ‘Articulating Self-Determination in the Draft Declar-
ation on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 141 at pp. 
150-156; B. Kingsbury, ‘Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach’ in P. Aikio and M. 
Scheinin (eds) Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (Institute for 
Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, Turku/Åbo 2000) at pp. 23-27; D. Sanders, ‘Self-Determina-
tion and Indigenous Peoples’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at pp. 79-80. 
208 This was already noted in Section 3.1.1 of the present Chapter.
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to be overruled by the majority. Additional measures may therefore be necessary to 
include and reflect indigenous voices in the political decision-making process. In this 
respect, some States have adopted special arrangements, such as designated parlia-
mentary seats for indigenous representatives and the introduction of so-called tribal 
delegates in parliament, who are neither elected, nor members of the parliament.209 In 
addition, as the twofold focus in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
indicated, autonomy arrangements may be introduced for meeting the demands for 
the right to internal self-determination. Such arrangements can take various forms. 
They can be territorial in character, involving autonomy for indigenous peoples over 
their traditional lands and accompanying natural resources. An alternative is to extend 
autonomy arrangements to certain matters which are of special concern to indigenous 
peoples, for instance culture.210 As such, autonomy may not only be instrumental 
in implementing indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination; it may be a tool 
for protecting the distinct identity of an indigenous population as well. However, as 
Alexandra Xanthaki cautioned, “autonomy is not a panacea for indigenous problems 
around the world. It also has disadvantages, not least that it promotes segregation and 
separation and fails to encourage dialogue”.211
In this connection, a relatively recent development should be addressed. The prin-
ciple of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ is increasingly considered to be connected 
to the right to self-determination in the context of indigenous rights.212 More than that, 
it arguably is the most far-reaching corollary of the internal dimension of the right 
to self-determination for indigenous peoples. The concept has been discussed and 
debated in both national and international fora, such as the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues. This UN body views ‘free, prior and informed consent’ as a partic-
ipatory process which implies and requires free discussions, consultations, meetings 
and agreements between the indigenous peoples, States, intergovernmental organiza-
tions and the private sector in matters affecting the indigenous peoples’ land, territo-
ries, resources and their way of life, in order to protect their rights.213 Put differently, 
for indigenous peoples, the concept of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ appears to 
209 See Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and 
Land at pp. 160-161.
210 See Eide, ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Achievements in International Law During the Last Quarter 
of a Century’ at p. 197; Sanders, ‘Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples’ at pp. 70-71; Xanthaki, 
Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and Land at pp. 163-165.
211 Ibid., at pp. 165-166.
212 See T. Ward, ‘The Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples Participation 
Rights within International Law’ (2011) 10 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 54. 
See also International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim Report, 
The Hague Conference (2010), at pp. 14-15; International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Final Report, Sofia Conference (2012), at pp. 3-4.
213 See Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on the International Workshop on Methodolo-
gies Regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/C.19/2005/3, 17 
February 2005, at para. 43. 
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be a prerequisite and manifestation of the exercise of the right to self-determination 
as it is defined under international law. Although the Declaration both implicitly and 
explicitly affirms the concept of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ in its provisions,214 
the precise scope of the requirements has not yet been clarified entirely. It seems that 
this elucidation is reserved for the Inter-American Human Rights System, which has 
developed an advanced body of jurisprudence on the rights of indigenous peoples.215 
All in all, it can be concluded that in addition to the entire populations of existing 
sovereign States and subgroups within such States, indigenous peoples are subjects 
of the right of internal self-determination as well. The right to indigenous peoples to 
self-determination involves a norm of customary international law and focuses on the 
free determination of a people’s political status and representation, and on forms of 
autonomy to implement this. However, the right to self-determination for indigenous 
peoples clearly excludes a general right to unilateral secession.216 
3.4. Conclusions on Internal Self-Determination
Above, the internal dimension of the right to self-determination was scrutinized. As 
explained at the outset, the purpose of this section was twofold. First, elaboration 
on internal self-determination is necessary in order to fully understand the contem-
porary meaning of the right to self-determination, with its emphasis on the internal 
dimension. Secondly, it is important to assess the content, status, and subjects of the 
right to internal self-determination as it is sometimes contended that the persistent 
denial of this right may trigger a right to external self-determination through unilat-
eral secession. 
214 Implicit references to the concept of free, prior and informed consent can be found in, for instance, 
Articles 10, 11, 28, and 29 UNDRIP. Article 19 UNDRIP contains an explicit reference to the concept, 
which holds that “States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.”
215 The Saramaka case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) is often considered 
to be a landmark case in this respect. See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, Series C No. 172, Judgment, 28 November 2007, at paras 134-137. For an explora-
tion of the content and requirements of the concept of ‘free, prior and informed consent’, thereby also 
considering the decisions and opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see Ward, ‘The 
Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples Participation Rights within International 
Law’. 
216 It is striking, however, that while the International Law Association’s Committee on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples focused on the internal implementation of the right to self-determination and 
excluded a general right to unilateral secession, it left open the possibility of unilateral secession in what 
it termed as “appropriate cases”, i.e. when they are denied meaningful access to government to pursue 
their political, economic, social and cultural development. According to the Committee, “under general 
international law indigenous peoples who find themselves in such a condition have the right to pursue 
secession”. See International Law Association, Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Interim 
Report, The Hague Conference (2010), at p. 10.
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It was demonstrated above that the internal dimension of the right to self-determi-
nation has become increasingly important after the decolonization process. It became 
clear that today, the right to self-determination cannot be seen to be realized as soon 
as an independent State is created, but instead involves a continuous entitlement of all 
peoples. As such, the right to internal self-determination requires the free and genuine 
expression of the will of a people, so as to enable a people to determine its political, 
economic, social, and cultural development. More specifically, it demands free popu-
lar participation in the political decision-making process and a representative govern-
ment. While its erga omnes character is undisputed, it remains uncertain whether the 
internal dimension of the right to self-determination has also attained the status of jus 
cogens. Having established the core meaning and status, the question was raised as 
to which entities are considered to be the subjects of this internal dimension of the 
right to self-determination. It was found that, at present, entire populations of existing 
States are bearers of this right, as well as those subgroups within States who consti-
tute a ‘people’, and indigenous peoples. Minorities may only be subjects of the right 
to internal self-determination if they have collective individuality and, hence, can be 
considered as subgroups constituting a people. 
4. exteRnal Self-deteRmination
It was seen in the previous Chapter that the traditional context in which the external 
dimension of the right to self-determination was exercised was that of the decoloniza-
tion process. Whereas in due course, both international legal and political documents 
have increasingly focused on the internal dimension of the concept of self-deter-
mination, official legal documents have not paid much attention to the content of 
the external dimension beyond the context of decolonization. Nonetheless, in both 
scholarly literature and practice, this aspect of self-determination has been addressed 
and invoked frequently. This section will deal with the meaning, status and subjects 
of the contemporary external dimension of the right to self-determination rather 
briefly, while the following Chapter will elaborate upon the most controversial issue 
as regards the right, i.e. the concept of secession. 
4.1. The Content of the Right to External Self-Determination
The text of the Friendly Relations Declaration is regarded as including the princi-
pal reference to the external dimension of the right to self-determination outside the 
colonial context.217 After phrasing a general right for all peoples to freely determine 
217 See Section 2.2 of this Chapter.
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their political status and development,218 it expresses that this right to self-determina-
tion may be implemented through the “establishment of a sovereign and independent 
State, the free association or integration with an independent State, or the emergence 
into any other political status freely determined by a people”.219 More specifically, 
the external dimension of the right to self-determination is viewed as being exercised 
through the peaceful dissolution of a State, through the (re)union or merger of one 
State with another State, or though secession.220 The different modes of implement-
ing the external dimension of the right to self-determination will be addressed here-
after, although it is to be emphasized that these are not mutually exclusive concepts. 
Rather, it appears that the distinctions between the different concepts are blurred. 
This point will be made below. 
4.1.1. Dissolution
To start with, dissolution refers to the establishment of a new independent State 
through the separation of one or more integral parts of the territory of an existing 
State from that State, resulting in the discontinuation of the legal personality of the 
previous sovereign.221 Commonly, dissolution occurs in the context of federal-type 
territorial units. In these instances, the possibility of dissolution is often provided 
for in the constitution by confirming a right to self-determination for the constituent 
units.222 In this respect, the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
218 See also Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 21: 
Right to Self-Determination, UN Doc. A/51/18 (1996), Annex VIII, at para. 4.
219 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, at para. 4.
220 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 289. In addition to these modes of imple-
menting the right to external self-determination, the text of the Friendly Relations Declaration concerning 
the right to self-determination is generally seen to give rise to a right to independence for the population 
of a State whose territory has been annexed or occupied by foreign powers as well (Principle V, para. 
5). As such, it is not quite proper to speak about the exercise of the right to self-determination by means 
of the creation of a new, independent State, but rather by means of the de facto re-establishment of the 
independence of a State. In this respect, reference may be made to Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait in 1990. 
See also Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 90-99.
221 See P. Radan, ‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the 
Badinter Arbitration Commission’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 50 at p. 56; Raič, State-
hood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 358-360.
222 See Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at pp. 20-22.
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(SFRY)223 and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)224 in 1990 and 1991 
respectively are frequently mentioned as examples.225 Both instances will be elabo-
rated upon elsewhere in the present study.226 
4.1.2. (Re)union or Merger
Secondly, and in addition to dissolution as a mode of exercising the external dimen-
sion of the right to self-determination, the possibility of (re)union or merger is to be 
noted. As such, the right to external self-determination is exercised by the consolida-
tion of two or more States – whether or not they had previously existed as one State 
– thereby creating a new sovereign State. Although instances of (re)union or merger 
occur only infrequently, there are some examples in this respect. Most commonly 
known is probably the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 after the fall 
223 The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the result of a complex and violent 
process, which started late 1990 and can be said to have reached a conclusion in December 1995 with 
the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six repub-
lics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia) and two autonomous 
regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina). In short, four of the six constituent republics attempted to break away 
by proclaiming their independence. Subsequently, in April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the 
establishment of a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), composed of the territories and popula-
tions of both republics. The United Nations, however, did not recognize the newly proclaimed FRY as a 
continuation of the legal personality of the old Socialist Federal Republic. In view of this, labeling the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia as dissolution rather than secession seems to be the most obvious conclu-
sion. See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 290-291; M. Weller, ‘The Interna-
tional Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (1992) 86 American 
Journal of International Law 569.
224 In the case of the Soviet Union, prior to the declaration of independence, referenda were held as 
regards this issue. Thereupon, a tripartite meeting of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus was held in Minsk on 
8 December 1991 and subsequently, eleven of the fourteen republics participated in the Alma Ata con-
ference of 21 December 1991. During both meetings, declarations were adopted with the tenor of form-
ing the Commonwealth of Independent States and hence making the USSR extinct. Moreover, it was 
declared that the eleven newly established States would support Russia taking over the membership of 
the Soviet Union within the United Nations. In this respect, one may argue that with this declaration, State 
continuity was recognized and, as such, that the republics had seceded from the Soviet Union. See Y.Z. 
Blum, ‘Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nations’ (1992) 3 European Journal of 
International Law 354 at p. 355 and pp. 357-360. However, as Raič explains, “[i]f Russia continued the 
legal personality of the Soviet Union, this would mean that the Republics, except for Russia, had seceded 
from the Soviet Union. For reasons of Soviet domestic politics, this position was not feasible. Therefore, 
and although legitimized through recognition, the continuity of the legal personality of the Soviet Union 
by Russia should essentially be explained in political terms”. As such, it seems more appropriate to speak 
of dissolution than of secession. See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 290-291.
225 On both the cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, see R. Müllerson, ‘The Continuity and Succes-
sion of States by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia’ (1993) 42 International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly 473; Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at pp. 17-20. 
226 See Section 4.1.4 of the present Chapter and Chapter VI, Section 3.2.3 and Section 3.2.4.
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of the Berlin Wall.227 Moreover, the establishment of the United Arab Republic by 
the sovereign States of Egypt and Syria in 1958 may be mentioned in this context.228 
4 1.3. Secession
A third mode of implementing external self-determination is secession. As was 
already expounded in Chapter I, secession generally refers to the establishment of a 
new independent State through the withdrawal of an integral part of the territory of 
an existing State from that State, carried out by the resident population of that part of 
the territory, either with or without the consent of the parent State or domestic con-
stitutional authorization.229 In cases of secession, the legal personality of the previous 
sovereign is continued.230 This kind of withdrawal by a subgroup on the territory may 
occur with the consent of the parent State or as a result of a clause in the domestic 
constitution enabling separation.231 If secession occurs in absence of consent or a con-
stitutional provision, reference is generally made to the term unilateral secession. The 
two first-mentioned manifestations of secession will be addressed below, whereas the 
issue of unilateral secession will be examined in detail separately in view of its con-
troversial and complex character on the one hand, and the fact that it constitutes the 
very core of the present study on the other. 
The concept of consensual secession does not require much explanation. It refers 
to the separation of part of the territory with prior consent of the central govern-
ment.232 Secession by agreement has only occurred in a few instances, such as the 
227 After World War II, the defeated German State was divided into different sections and placed under 
quadripartite government by the Allied powers, i.e. France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Subsequently, in 1949, the sections ruled by the Western Allies 
were merged into the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BDR), while the Soviet zone became the Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik (DDR). By 1973, these territories were both recognized as States. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall finally enabled the reunification of Germany, which was concluded on 3 October 1990. See 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at pp. 452-466.
228 The United Arab Republic was created by the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958, but dissolved in 1961 
when Syria withdrew from the union. See ibid. at p. 489.
229 See Chapter I, Section 2.1.
230 See, for instance, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 359; Weller, ‘The Self-
Determination Trap’ at p. 8.
231 On constitutional secession, see, for instance, A. Pavković and P. Radan, Creating New States: 
Theory and Practice of Secession (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2007) at pp. 221-232; Weller, ‘The 
Self-Determination Trap’ at pp. 16-23. For a critical view of constitutional secession, see D. Philpott, 
‘Self-Determination in Practice’ in M. Moore (ed.) National Self-Determination and Secession (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2003) at pp. 93-98.
232 Some authors have labeled this manifestation of secession as implied constitutional secession. 
According to Marc Weller, this would be the case “where a distinct ‘nation’ or ‘people’ inhabit a clearly 
constitutionally defined territory. Where the central government consents to the holding of a referendum 
on the issue of secession, or where such provision exists according to the constitution in the absence of 
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separation of Singapore from Malaysia,233 and, more recently, the separation of 
Southern Sudan from Sudan.234 
The concept of constitutional secession refers to constitutions which, in a clear 
and unambiguous fashion, determine that specific constituent entities enjoy a right 
to external self-determination, provided that particular procedural conditions are 
met.235 A clear example in this respect is the Ethiopian constitution from 1994, 
declaring that “[e]very Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an uncondi-
tional right to self-determination, including the right to secession”.236 The possibility 
of secession provided for in the constitution is generally restricted to federal-type 
entities, since these usually have a clearly defined territory.237 Nonetheless, the 
constitution of the Principality of Liechtenstein may also be mentioned here, as it 
authorizes every municipality to “remove itself from the state-community”.238 As 
will be pointed out in the following sub-section, the constitutions of the former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have sometimes been suggested in the context of con-
stitutional secession as well. 
an express reference to self-determination, there is an expectation that such a referendum would need to 
be respected by the central authorities”. See Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at p. 22.
233 After becoming independent from its colonial power Great Britain in 1963, Singapore merged with 
three other territories to form Malaysia. This federation, however, did not prove successful and on 9 
August 1965, Singapore seceded from the federation by means of a Separation Agreement, which was 
signed by both Singapore and Malaysia. It provided that “it has been agreed by the parties thereto that 
fresh arrangements should be made for the order and good government of the territories comprised in 
Malaysia by the separation of Singapore from Malaysia upon which Singapore shall become an inde-
pendent and sovereign state and nation separate from and independent of Malaysia and so recognized by 
the Government of Malaysia”. As such, Singapore became independent while Malaysia retained its inter-
national legal personality. See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at pp. 392-393.
234 From 9 to 15 January 2011, a referendum was held in Sudan on the question whether the Southern 
part of the country should separate from the North. An overwhelming majority of 98.83 percent voted 
in favour of secession. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement determined that the ten regions of 
Southern Sudan may secede from Sudan if the voter turnout for the referendum is no less than 60 per-
cent and, in addition, 50 percent of the voters vote in favour of independence. Moreover, following the 
announcement of the official results of the referendum, President Omar Al-Bashir promulgated a formal 
decree acknowledging the outcome. In a speech on State television, Al-Bashir noted that he welcomes 
the results of the referendum as they reflect the will of the people in Southern Sudan. On 9 July 2011, the 
Republic of South Sudan, the newest African State, was announced. For more information on the refer-
endum, see Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, available at <http://southernsudan2011.com/>, last 
consulted on 24 September 2012.
235 Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at p. 16 and p. 19.
236 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, adopted on 8 December 1994, Article 
39(5).
237 See Pavković and Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession at p. 221; Weller, 
‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at p. 17.
238 Constitution of the Principality of Liechtenstein, published on 15 September 2003, Article 4(2).
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4.1.4. Dissolution and Secession: A Blurred Distinction
In addition to being mentioned as examples of constitutional secession, the demise 
of both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), also illustrate that the various concepts concern-
ing the exercise of the right to external self-determination cannot be strictly distin-
guished. Both matters will be elaborated on below.
The Constitution of the former Soviet Union provided – in conformity with 
Lenin’s ideas – that the Union is “an integral, federal, multinational state formed 
on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free self-determination of 
nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics”.239 More 
specifically, it stated that “[e]ach Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede 
from the USSR”.240 Indeed, as was already touched upon previously, the Baltic repub-
lics asserted this constitutional right to self-determination and announced their intent 
to move towards full independence. This triggered strong opposition by the Soviet 
authorities, which pointed at a constitutional provision regulating that the territory of 
a Union Republic may not be altered in absence of mutual agreement.241 Obviously, 
such an interpretation of the provision at issue would counteract the right to unilat-
eral secession as granted elsewhere in the Constitution. The rigid stance of the Soviet 
authorities not only led to a legal tussle on the issue between the Baltic republics and 
Moscow, but also between Moscow and some Western States, such as the United 
States and Germany, which were of the opinion that the Baltic republics were never 
lawfully incorporated into the Soviet Union, since this inclusion was the result of 
forceful annexation.242 
It is notable that three different views on or characterizations of the relevant 
events have been expressed as regards the separation of the Baltic republics from the 
Soviet Union. First, the Baltic republics themselves considered their move towards 
independence as the exercise of their constitutional right to secession. In contrast, the 
Soviet authorities viewed the events as an act of (illegitimate) unilateral secession, 
while some Western States represented the third view, as they regarded all this as 
annexed territories regaining independence. The separation of the Baltic republics set 
in train the demise of the Soviet Union,243 and as such, the case of the Soviet Union 
is generally referred to as one of the principal examples of absolute dissolution of 
239 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted on 7 October 1977, Article 70.
240 Ibid., Article 72.
241 Ibid. Article 78.
242 See, for instance, Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at pp. 394-395; Murswiek, 
‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at pp. 31-32; Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ 
at p. 17.
243 See, for instance, Pavković and Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession at pp. 
138-141. See also Chapter VI, Section 3.2.3.
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a federal-type entity. Accordingly, the doctrine of express constitutional secession 
cannot be said to have been tested completely. 
In this respect, the example of the former Yugoslavia deserves some elabora-
tion as well. This case also demonstrated that the distinctions between the concepts 
addressed above are indefinite. The Constitution of the SFRY, in a clear and unam-
biguous phrasing, granted the right to self-determination, including the right to seces-
sion, to all ‘nations’, i.e. federal republics, within the federation.244 This constitutional 
clause was challenged in 1991, when, in response to changes in power relations, 
Croatia and Slovenia were the first republics attempting to break away from the fed-
eration by declaring their independence.245 As it took the line that the doctrine of ter-
ritorial integrity prohibited the declarations of independence, the central government 
in Belgrade responded to these acts with the use of force. The European Community 
(EC), being the principal mediator in the Yugoslav crisis, took a different view: it was 
of the opinion that Croatia and Slovenia had already become States or were entitled to 
become States and, hence, that they enjoyed the right to territorial integrity and unity 
and the protection against the use of force. Against this backdrop, the EC sought to 
provide for a well-ordered and peaceful secession, whereby the legal personality of 
the SFRY was continued. However, this attempt failed.246 
In response to the continuing crisis, the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was 
established by the EC. In turn, the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia created an 
Arbitration Committee, presided by Robert Badinter, for the purpose of giving the 
EC advice on legal issues in the context of the Yugoslav crisis.247 This Committee 
reported on its first findings in its Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991. This report 
was written at the request of Lord Carrington, President of the Peace Conference 
on Yugoslavia, who had addressed a letter to the Arbitration Committee, question-
ing whether the declarations of independence by the Yugoslav republics which had 
244 See Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted on 21 February 1974, 
Section I.
245 See Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at p. 18l; Weller, ‘The International Response to the Dis-
solution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ at pp. 569-570. For a more elaborate discussion 
of the separation of Croatia and Slovenia, see Chapter VI, Section 3.2.4.
246 Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ at p. 19.
247 The Committee was chaired by the President of the French Constitutional Court and further com-
prised of the Presidents of the German and Italian Constitutional Courts, the Belgian Court of Arbitration 
and the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal. The mandate of the Committee was rather obscure, as it was 
envisaged that it would rule at the request of ‘valid Yugoslavian authorities’ and that its decisions would 
be binding. Nonetheless, the Committee issued no less than fifteen opinions between late 1991 and the 
middle of 1993, of which several were handed down in response to requests by Lord Carrington. For gen-
eral information on the Badinter Arbitration Committee, see: M.C.R. Craven, ‘The European Community 
Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia’ (1995) 66 British Yearbook of International Law 222; Pellet, 
‘The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of 
Peoples’ at pp. 178-179; Radan, ‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opin-
ions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission’ at pp. 50-53.
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already been issued or which would be issued in the future, should be regarded as 
States established as a consequence of secession or as a consequence of the dissolu-
tion of the SFRY. The letter made clear that the request ensued from the differing 
views in this respect as presented by Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand and the 
other former republics on the other hand. In response to Lord Carrington’s request, 
the Committee stated that the Yugoslav federation was in the process of dissolution, 
involving the emergence of its constituent republics as independent States, although 
that process was still ongoing.248 
An important point should be made here. Both the Committee’s opinions and the 
declarations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia indicate that the traditionally 
strict distinction between dissolution and secession is inaccurate. For, the Committee 
first stated that the SFRY had “retained its international personality [even though] the 
Republics have expressed their desire for independence”. As such, the Committee 
seemed to implicitly label the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia 
as acts of (unilateral) secession.249 In spite of this observation, the Committee referred 
to the events in Yugoslavia as being a “process of dissolution”. In its Opinion No. 8, 
the Committee expressed the view that this process was to be completed. It reiterated 
what the Security Council had uttered previously, namely that the “claim by the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically (the 
membership) of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in the United 
Nations) has not been generally accepted”.250 In addition, it was noted that Croatia, 
Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognized as newly established, 
independent States, and that Serbia and Montenegro had adopted a new constitution 
for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.251 Consequently, the Committee concluded 
that the SFRY had ceased to exist.252 In Opinion No. 11, the Committee stated that 
the process of dissolution in the SFRY had commenced on 29 November 1991,253 
so before the republics of Croatia and Slovenia had proclaimed independence. 
248 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, reprinted as: 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Opinions No. 1-3 of the Arbitration Commission of 
the International Conference on Yugoslavia’ at pp. 182-183, at para. 3.
249 Ibid. at pp. 182-183, at para. 2(a).
250 See UN Security Council Resolution 757 (1992) (Bosnia and Herzegovina), UN Doc. S/Res/757 
(1992), 30 May 1992, Preamble; see also UN Security Council Resolution 777 (1992) (Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia), 19 September 1992. This statement was recalled in: Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitra-
tion Commission, Opinion No. 8, 4 July 1992, reprinted as: International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia, ‘Opinions No. 4-10 of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on Yugo-
slavia’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 74 at pp. 87-88, at para. 3. 
251 Ibid. at pp. 87-88, at para. 3.
252 Ibid. at pp. 87-88, at para. 4.
253 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 11, 16 July 1993, reprinted in: 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Advisory Opinions No. 11-15 of the Arbitration 
Commission of the International Conference on Yugoslavia’ (1993) 32 International Legal Materials: 
Current Documents 1586 at pp. 1587-1589, at para. 2. 
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Hence, from the statements of the Committee, it may be inferred that the acts of 
Croatia and Slovenia actuated the process of dismemberment of the SFRY, which 
ultimately resulted in the demise of the Yugoslav Republic.254 Accordingly, as was 
aptly formulated by one commentator, “the proclamations of independence by the 
two republics must be seen as acts of unilateral secession which, in combination with 
other factors, led to the dissolution of the SFRY”.255 This particular outlook is not 
only reflected in the declarations of independence of the Croatia and Slovenia,256 but 
is also confirmed in scholarly literature.257 In view of this blurred distinction between 
the concepts of dissolution and secession, it should be concluded that considering the 
break-up of a State requires a phased approach, judging the separation of entities one 
by one, in order to correctly link the situation to one of the concepts concerning the 
exercise of external self-determination.
4.2. The Status and Subjects of the Right to External Self-Determination
As was pointed out above, there is no single mode of implementation of the external 
dimension of the right to self-determination beyond decolonization. Rather, several 
means have been discerned – from consensual or constitutional modes to the much 
more drastic unilateral act of secession. It may therefore not come as a surprise that 
this range of applications of the contemporary concept of external self-determination 
brings along nuances as regards the status and subject of the right. Yet, it is rather 
difficult to determine which position external self-determination beyond decoloniza-
tion has attained within international law. This indistinctness appears to have its roots 
in the fact that the implementation of external self-determination inevitably leads 
to the modification of borders of an existing State, which is a far-reaching effect. In 
this respect, a group of UNESCO experts noted that when the exercise of the right to 
254 See, generally, P. Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law (Routledge, London/
New York 2002).
255 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 360 (emphasis included). For a discussion 
of the role of nationalism in the break-up of the SFRY (and the Soviet Union), see Musgrave, Self-Deter-
mination and National Minorities at pp. 108-124.
256 Both proclamations emphasized that the republics of Croatia and Slovenia disassociated from the 
SFRY by establishing independent States, which implied that, in principle, these acts would leave the 
SFRY intact. 
257 See, for instance, Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at pp. 30-33; Radan, 
‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration 
Commission’ at pp. 54-55; Weller, ‘The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’ at p. 606; Weller, ‘The Self-Determination Trap’ A. Whelan, ‘Wilsonian Self-
Determination and the Versailles Settlement’ (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
99 at pp. 114-115. Likewise, Malcolm Shaw observed that “[w]hether the federation dissolves into two 
or more states also brings into focus the doctrine of self-determination in the form of secession. Such 
dissolution may be the result of an amicable and constitutional arrangement or may occur pursuant to a 
forceful exercise of secession”. See Shaw, International Law at p. 196 (emphasis added).
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self-determination comes into conflict with the principles of territorial integrity and 
State sovereignty, “[t]here is an understandable fear that, understood in one way, the 
peoples’ right to self-determination might lead to the fragmentation of States, the dis-
ruption of settled international boundaries, the breakdown of governmental authority 
and even manipulation of peoples for the purpose of disrupting the internal affairs of 
States”.258 Consequently, the sources of international law (other than doctrine) tend 
not to focus on the external dimension of self-determination as a right of peoples 
beyond the context of decolonization. Rather, they emphasize the internal – and less 
problematic – dimension of the right and stress its importance and special legal status. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the Friendly Relations Declaration in its 
clear phrasing proclaimed that non-violent dissolution, merger or (re)union are 
lawful modes of implementing the right to external self-determination.259 There is no 
rule or principle of international law prohibiting the creation of new States by these 
means – neither the principle of territorial integrity, nor the principle of State sover-
eignty. The rationale behind it is that in these instances, the right to self-determination 
is understood to be implemented by all inhabitants of a State, regardless of ethnic or 
other considerations.260 In real terms, this usually implies that such a decision is based 
on majority rule. The holding of a referendum or the use of any other procedure so 
as to determine and reflect the genuine will of the people at issue seems appropri-
ate here.261 In cases of consensual or constitutional separation, the right to secession 
underlying this act is based in national rather than international law. To put it even 
more strongly, international law is not concerned with these kinds of arrangements, 
for it considers these types of secession to be exclusively within the domestic realm.
More uncertain, however, is the question of the exercise of external self-deter-
mination by a portion of the population – i.e. subgroup – of an existing State, which 
is neither based on consent nor on a constitutional clause. In these instances, there 
appears to be a clear conflict between the exercise of this right, which is aimed at 
territorial change, on the one hand, and the principles of territorial integrity and uti 
possidetis juris, which are aimed at maintaining the territorial status quo, on the 
other hand. Most controversial is the issue of unilateral secession and its contem-
porary status under international law. International legal documents do not explic-
itly acknowledge a right to unilateral secession, nor do they explicitly deny such 
a right. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated hereafter, various (ethnic) subgroups 
258 UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peo-
ples. Final Report and Recommendations, Paris, 22 February 1990, SHS-89/CONF.602/7, at para. 5.
259 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, para. 4.
260 In this respect, reference should be made to Section 3.3.1 of the present Chapter, which elaborated 
upon this territorial interpretation of the subject of a right to (internal) self-determination.
261 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 292-293.
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within States have claimed the existence of a right to unilateral secession and several 
legal scholars have argued in favour of it. Hence, the question of a right of peoples 
to unilateral secession comes to mind. This issue will be addressed in the following 
Chapter. 
4.3. Conclusions on External Self-Determination
This section has dealt with the right to external self-determination beyond the decolo-
nization context. In contrast to the internal dimension, the external dimension inevi-
tably leads to the alteration of borders of an existing State. While it was seen that 
there is no single mode of implementation of this right, it is generally acknowledged 
that this right may be realized through the peaceful dissolution of a State, and the 
(re)union or merger of one State with another State. Secession is another means of 
exercising the right to external self-determination. It was explained that in practice, 
the distinction between dissolution and secession is not always as clear as may be 
suggested in theory. 
As non-violent dissolution, (re)union or merger are generally seen to be exercised 
by all inhabitants of the State, these arrangements are uncontested under interna-
tional law. Usually, referenda or other techniques are used to determine the will of the 
nation as a whole. Acts of secession which have been approved by the parent State 
or are based on a constitutional arrangement do not pose specific international legal 
questions either. In fact, these manifestations of secession are considered to be mat-
ters concerning domestic rather than international law. Controversial, however, is the 
establishment of a new State following an act of unilateral secession by a subgroup 
within the State, as this is often seen to conflict with other fundamental principles of 
international law, such as that of respect for the territorial integrity of the State. The 
question thus arises as to whether unilateral secession is a lawful mode of exercising 
the external dimension of the right to self-determination.
5. concluSionS
In this Chapter, the development of the right to self-determination beyond the context 
of decolonization and hence its contemporary meaning were expounded. In doing so, 
two dimensions of the right to self-determination have become apparent: an external 
and an internal dimension. It is this latter element of the right to self-determination 
which has come to play an important role in contemporary international law. It was 
expounded that the internal dimension of the right to self-determination basically 
presumes that all peoples are “allowed to exercise those rights and freedoms which 
permit the expression of the popular will”.262 In this respect, it was emphasized that 
262 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 53.
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both popular participation in the political decision-making process of a State and a 
government representing the people play a key role in implementing self-determi-
nation, as these concepts allow a people to freely determine its political, economic, 
social and cultural development. In order to ensure this, arrangements such as auton-
omy, federalism or complex power-sharing may be necessary, especially in a multi-
ethnic State. For, not only entire populations of existing sovereign States, but also 
subgroups within such States and indigenous peoples can be viewed as subjects of the 
right to internal self-determination. All in all, this examination of the further devel-
opment of the concept of self-determination beyond decolonization has shown that 
the contemporary right to self-determination is not attained when a new, independent 
State is created, but rather, that the right to self-determination is an ongoing right of 
all peoples, which should be respected continuously. 
Nonetheless, the more traditional dimension of the right to self-determination, 
i.e. external self-determination is still relevant today. It is generally considered to be 
exercised through the dissolution of a State, (re)union or merger, or through seces-
sion. When exercised by the nation as a whole, the claim of external self-determina-
tion is undisputed under international law. As it was pointed out in this Chapter, there 
is no rule of international law which proscribes the creation of new States as a result 
of these actions, since in these cases self-determination is presumed to be either an 
expression of the entire population of a State, or a consensual or constitutional sepa-
ration. Yet, the creation of a new State as a result of unilateral secession is much more 
controversial and contested. It appears that this – disputed – mode of exercising the 
right to self-determination is at odds with the prominent international legal principles 
of State sovereignty and territorial integrity, as already briefly touched upon in the 
present Chapter. This perceived field of tension between preserving the territorial 
status quo on the one hand, and effectuating territorial change on the other hand, 
however, has not prevented various subgroups within States to claim a right to exter-
nal self-determination in the form of unilateral secession. It also leaves unanswered 
the main question of this study, i.e. the question of unilateral secession as a remedy 
to serious injustices. Against this backdrop, the following Chapter will examine the 





tRaceS of a (Remedial) Right 
to unilateRal SeceSSion in 
contempoRaRy inteRnational law?
“In the present stage of evolution of the law of nations (le droit des gens) it is unsus-
tainable that a people should be forced to live under oppression, or that control of 
territory could be used as a means for conducting State-planned and perpetrated 
oppression. That would amount to a gross and flagrant reversal of the ends of the 
State, as a promoter of the common good.”
Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade*
1. intRoduction
As was noted in the previous Chapter, despite the emphasis on the internal dimension 
of the right to self-determination outside the context of decolonization, the external 
aspect of self-determination is still applicable today. It may be exercised through the 
dissolution of a State, merger or (re)union with another State, or through secession. 
With respect to secession, the constitutional and consensual modes do not raise any 
pressing international legal questions. In contrast, the exercise of the right to self-
determination by means of secession absent of constitutional authorization or prior 
consent of the parent State is certainly not uncontested under international law. This 
controversy is due to several circumstances. First of all, neither an explicit right to 
unilateral secession, nor an express proscription of unilateral secession can be found 
in the written sources of international law. Some authors, such as James R. Crawford, 
have even contended that “secession is neither legal nor illegal in international 
law, but a legally neutral act the consequences of which are, or may be regulated 
* International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate Opinion of Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado 
Trindade, at para. 137.
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internationally”.1 In this respect, he has argued that “unilateral secession [does] not 
involve the exercise of any right conferred by international law”.2 Secondly, the 
potential “deeply subversive and disruptive” effect of the concept of self-determina-
tion is to be mentioned.3 Conventional international law generally gives priority to 
the traditional principles of State sovereignty and territorial integrity, which seem to 
cause a field of tension with the unilateral withdrawal of an integral part of the terri-
tory of an existing State from that State, carried out by the resident population of that 
part of the territory. Furthermore, as UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
noted, 
[i]f every ethnic, religious or linguistic group [could claim] statehood, there would be 
no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security, and well-being for all would become 
even more difficult to achieve.4 
In spite of the controversy touched upon above, it appears elsewhere in this Chapter 
that the possibility of resorting to external self-determination by means of unilat-
eral secession is not excluded completely, judging by, inter alia, the phrasing used 
in the Friendly Relations Declaration. Consequently, the question presents itself as 
to whether unilateral secession can currently be regarded as the lawful exercise of 
the right to self-determination. Phrased differently, does modern international law 
recognize a right to unilateral secession for subgroups constituting peoples within 
sovereign States? And if so, is this right absolute or does it arise under certain cir-
cumstances only? Does it arise as a remedy to persistent oppression and gross human 
rights violations? In order to paint a clear picture as regards the acknowledgement or 
otherwise of a (remedial) right to unilateral secession under current international law, 
the present Chapter will consider the sources of international law other than custom. 
As the law of self-determination “is continuously shaped by the realities of practice”,5 
thoroughly examining State practice and opinio juris is of great importance for the 
1 J.R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd revised edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
2006) at p. 390. See also P. Hilpold, ‘The Kosovo Case and International Law: Looking for Applicable 
Theories’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 47 at p. 55; T.D. Musgrave, Self-Determination 
and National Minorities (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997) at p. 210; J. Vidmar, ‘Explaining the 
Legal Effects of Recognition’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 361 at p. 375.
2 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 388.
3 A. Cassese, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination’ in V. 
Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice (eds) Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice Essays in Honour of Sir 
Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996) at p. 351.
4 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keep-
ing. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992, UN Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992, at para. 17.
5 L.M. Graham, ‘Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: Translating Self-Determi-
nation “Into Practice” and “Into Peace”’ (2000) 6 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 
455 at p. 457.
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purpose of this study. Before assessing these traditional constituents of custom against 
the backdrop of the question of remedial secession, the source of customary inter-
national law first merits some elaboration. Over time, various approaches towards 
ascertaining customary international law have been adopted, as a consequence of 
which it becomes necessary to critically consider the various relevant theories and 
argue which approach will be utilized in this study. In view of this, the question of 
whether customary international law recognizes a (remedial) right to unilateral seces-
sion merits separate elaboration. This will be done in Chapters V and VI. 
2. Recognizing a (Remedial) Right to unilateRal SeceSSion?
The question of whether a right to unilateral secession does, in fact, exist as a means 
of exercising the right to external self-determination of peoples under contemporary 
international law will be answered by examining the sources of international law6 
as identified in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and 
some possible other sources. As such, international conventions will serve as a start-
ing point for searching traces of a right to unilateral secession, followed by a review 
of doctrine, judicial decisions and opinions, general principles of (international) law 
and, finally, unilateral acts of States and acts of international organizations. 
2.1. Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in International 
Conventions 
Although Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not 
explicitly reflect a hierarchy of sources, international conventions are generally seen 
as the most important source of international law.7 Their importance is highlighted 
by the observation that they “are the only way states can create international law 
consciously”,8 since they are the result of a voluntary and deliberate act. Moreover, 
the legally binding force of this source of international law is clear: State parties are 
bound by the terms of conventions and treaties vis-à-vis the other parties to that par-
ticular instrument.9 As a consequence of these characteristics, international conven-
tions are more likely to be complied with than other sources of international law.10 
6 On this topic, see generally H. Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in M.D. Evans (ed.) 
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003).
7 There is no set nomenclature for this source of law. Treaties may also be referred to as conventions, 
covenants, acts, charters, statutes or protocols. See M. Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) at p. 55.
8 See ibid. at p. 26.
9 In contrast to the obvious legally binding character of treaties, the binding force of other international 
instruments often is more obscure. As will be expounded in Section 2.5.2 of the present Chapter, the bind-
ing force of acts of international organizations, for instance, is ambiguous and largely depends upon the 
circumstances. 
10 Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 27.
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The above explains the relevance of a reference to a right to post-decolonization 
unilateral secession as part of the peoples’ right to self-determination in international 
conventions. Yet, as was already briefly noted in Chapter I, international conven-
tions lack such an explicit reference. In these international legal instruments, merely 
general references to a right to self-determination of peoples can be found. At the 
same time, weighty references to the principle of territorial integrity of States seem 
to delimit the meaning of the right to self-determination beyond the context of decol-
onization, resulting in great obscurity as regards the issue of unilateral secession. 
Indeed, the text of the UN Charter, which can be regarded as the cornerstone of inter-
national law, does not provide much clarity, since its Articles 1(2) and 55 only refer 
to a right to self-determination of peoples in fairly general terms, without expounding 
whether this right also includes unilateral secession. Although neither offering a con-
clusive answer, the travaux préparatoires demonstrate that some debate was devoted 
to the question of unilateral secession. The preparatory works disclose two opposite 
approaches to the matter of unilateral secession shown during the drafting process at 
the San Francisco Conference: 
Concerning the principle of self-determination, it was strongly emphasised on the one 
side that this principle corresponds closely to the will and desires of peoples every-
where and should be clearly enunciated in the Charter; on the other side, it was stated 
that the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied 
the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession.11
From this, some commentators derived that the drafters of the UN Charter had no 
intention of establishing a right to unilateral secession,12 while others carefully con-
cluded that the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter remain neutral on the ques-
tion of whether unilateral secession is considered to be part of the general right to 
self-determination.13 
Similar comments can be made with regard to the International Covenants of 
1966, since both the texts of these documents and the preparatory works are quite 
inconclusive on the matter. Common Article 1 of the Covenants does not make 
11 N.G. Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood (Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University 2008) at p. 87, quot-
ing the Final Report of the Sixth Committee, San Francisco 1945, UNCIO, doc. 343, I/1/16, Vol. 6 296 
(1945).
12 See, for instance, D. Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ in C. Tomuschat 
(ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at pp. 34-35; G. 
Lauwers and S. Smis, ‘New Dimensions of the Right to Self-Determination: A Study of the International 
Response to the Kosovo Crisis’ (2000) 6 Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 43 at p. 62; S. Smis, A Western 
Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice (Doctoral Thesis, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel 2001) at p. 204.
13 See, for instance, Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities at pp. 181-182; L.C. Buch-
heit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Yale University Press, New Haven 1978) at p. 73.
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reference to secession. Nonetheless, the issue was debated extensively during the 
drafting process of the ICCPR. Some States opposed the legal recognition of self-
determination as they viewed secession as a possible mode of exercising self-deter-
mination and, hence, feared that inclusion of an article on the matter would trigger 
secessionist claims. Other States expressly turned against the acceptance of unilateral 
secession as an inherent form of asserting self-determination. Nonetheless, it should 
be emphasized that no State initiated a draft of Article 1 which explicitly prohib-
ited or acknowledged secession.14 Besides, the State reports submitted to the Human 
Rights Committee only rarely refer to a right to secession and where they do so, refer-
ence is generally made to cases of constitutional secession, which is not very relevant 
to international law.15 
In addition, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties is relevant when seeking traces of a right to unilateral secession. Article 34 
of this Convention regulates issues regarding the “succession of States in cases of 
separation of parts of a State”. Although not mentioned explicitly, the first paragraph 
of this Article refers to both instances of dissolution and secession, and regulates the 
consequences of these modalities of separation.16 From this, one may deduce that this 
Convention did not view secession as an infringement of international law. Such a 
conclusion seems to be confirmed by Article 6 of this Convention, which expresses 
that the treaty is merely applicable to the effects of a succession which occurred in 
conformity with international law. Accordingly, it may even be inferred that some 
forms of secession are in compliance with international law.17
In the context of analysing international (legal) documents in search of traces of 
a right to unilateral secession, the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)18 should be addressed as well. Despite the 
14 See Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination at pp. 79-83; Smis, A Western 
Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice at pp. 209-210; C. Tomus-
chat, ‘Secession and Self-Determination’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) at pp. 26-27. For the drafting history of Article 1(1) of 
the ICCPR, see M.J. Bossuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987) at pp. 32-37. 
15 Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice at p. 
209.
16 The text of Article 34(1) reads as follows: “When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to 
form one or more States whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist: (a) any treaty in force at 
the date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in 
force in respect of each successor State so formed; (b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of 
States in respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State which has become a successor 
State continues in force in respect of that successor State alone” (emphasis added).
17 See Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice 
at pp. 208-209.
18 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195, 
adopted on 21 December 1965.
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fact that this Convention does not deal with self-determination explicitly, it is closely 
linked to this concept, since it was drafted against the background of anti-colonialism 
and anti-apartheid. As such, this Convention may also be relevant in the context of 
self-determination. In one of its General Recommendations, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination focused on self-determination, thereby elabo-
rating on both the internal and external dimensions of the concept. With regard to the 
latter dimension, General Recommendation XXI stated:
In accordance with the Declaration of the General Assembly on Friendly Relations, 
none of the Committee’s actions shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial or political 
unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and possessing a gov-
ernment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as 
to race, creed or colour. In the view of the Committee international law has not recog-
nized a general right of peoples to unilaterally declare secession from a State. In this 
respect, the Committee follows the views expressed in the Agenda for Peace (paras 17 
et seq.), namely that a fragmentation of States may be detrimental to the protection of 
human rights as well as to the preservation of peace and security. This does not, how-
ever, exclude the possibility of arrangements reached by free agreements of all parties 
concerned.19
That the above should not be read as outlawing secession, but rather allows for seces-
sion in three exceptional situations, was expressed by one of the Committee mem-
bers, who stated the following:
If a part of the population of a particular country wanted to change their status, there 
were three contexts in which this could be achieved: when the constitution established 
a right to self-determination; when all parties concerned agreed to secession; and when 
that part of the population was denied the right to participate freely in the conduct of 
public affairs or if their civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights were denied.20
In view of this, the General Recommendation of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination can be said to be progressive, for it adduces that under certain 
circumstances, unilateral secession as a remedy may be legal.21
19 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 21: Right 
to Self-Determination, UN Doc. A/51/18 (1996), Annex VIII.
20 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations seminar to access the implementation 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination with particular 
reference to articles 4 and 6, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/68/Add.1, para. 27.
21 See Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice 
at p. 211.
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In sum, it is to be concluded that conventions and treaties offer only little guid-
ance as regards the possible existence of a right to unilateral secession. No clear 
traces of such a right can be found in conventional treaty law. As will be demon-
strated hereafter, it is sometimes contended that the Friendly Relations Declaration 
contains the very first reference to a right to unilateral secession, albeit still implicitly. 
2.2. Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in Doctrine
Doctrine has provided substantial support for the thesis that a qualified right to uni-
lateral secession does exist under contemporary international law. In this respect, two 
international instruments have proved particularly significant: the Friendly Relations 
Declaration and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Both instruments 
were already touched upon in the context of the contemporary meaning of the right to 
self-determination.22 It should be emphasized that technically speaking, these instru-
ments ought to be addressed in the context of other (possible) sources of international 
law, i.e. the acts of international organizations. However, since doctrine heavily relies 
on the Friendly Relations Declaration and Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, the relevant paragraphs deserve to be considered before addressing the view-
points of various eminent scholars on the existence of a (remedial) right to unilateral 
secession. Therefore, the content of both instruments will already be touched upon in 
the present Section.23
The Friendly Relations Declaration has been characterized as “the most authori-
tative statement of the principles of international law relevant to the questions of 
self-determination and territorial integrity”,24 as it appears to balance the right to 
self-determination with the territorial integrity of a sovereign State. Hence, unsur-
prisingly, the Friendly Relations Declaration is frequently cited in the context of 
unilateral secession. After having endorsed that all peoples have a right to self-deter-
mination, it stipulates that: 
[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encourag-
ing any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves 
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people of 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.25
22 See Chapter III, Section 2.2 and 2.3.
23 The legal value of these documents will be discussed in Section 2.5.2 of the present Chapter, in the 
context of the acts of international organizations. 
24 International Commission of Jurists, ‘East Pakistan Staff Study’ (1972) 8 International Commission 
of Jurists Review 23 at p. 44.
25 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
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This so-called ‘safeguard clause’26 was reiterated in the Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, albeit phrased somewhat differently. The relevant paragraph in 
this document provides:
In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, this [i.e. the right to self-determination] shall not be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States con-
ducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determi-
nation of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.27 
Affirming respect for the territorial integrity of States complying with the right to 
internal self-determination, and thus possessing a representative government, the 
phrasing of these ‘safeguard clauses’ suggests that a State is entitled to the protec-
tion of territorial integrity as long as its government represents the whole people of 
the territory without distinction of any kind. The core of this argument consists of 
the words ‘without distinction’, which is interpreted in human rights terminology as 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination.28 Reasoning a contrario, one might 
contend that lack of such representative, non-discriminatory government would 
negate a State’s right to territorial integrity. It is plain that, interpreting the phrase as 
such, this clause would not rule out the existence of a right to external self-determina-
tion in the form of secession. Accordingly, it has been argued that the paragraph in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration and the one in the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, Para. 7.
26 This formula is frequently referred to as ‘safeguard clause’ or ‘saving clause’ since it can be inter-
preted as a safeguard against secession for States complying with the principle of self-determination. This 
was the viewpoint of the Government of Canada in the case before the Supreme Court of Canada, Refer-
ence re Secession of Quebec, 20 August 1998, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at paras 133-134.
27 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted on 25 
June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, Part I, Para. 2. It was reaffirmed in the UN General 
Assembly, Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN, UN Doc. A/Res/50/49, 24 
October 1995, para. 1. The relevant paragraph declares that the United Nations will “[c]ontinue to reaf-
firm the right to self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples 
under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognize the right of peo-
ples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inal-
ienable right of self-determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action 
that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign 
and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging 
to the territory without distinction of any kind.”
28 Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice at 
p. 141.
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of Action remain neutral as regards the possibility of secession, while others have 
asserted that the ‘safeguard clauses’ implicitly recognize the lawfulness of secession, 
albeit in specific situations only, such as in the absence of representative government 
or respect for a peoples’ right to internal self-determination. This position is taken by, 
inter alia, Lee C. Buchheit and Antonio Cassese.29 
The preparatory works of the Friendly Relations Declaration may be said to 
include some support for the argument made by Buchheit, Cassese and others. Pre-
senting their views in the Special Committee on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations,30 the Western States articulated their ideology of popular 
and national sovereignty, hence emphasizing support for internal self-determination 
for peoples of sovereign States.31 By contrast, socialist and developing States viewed 
the right to self-determination first and foremost as a right to free colonial territories 
from alien rule, while they considered the Western focus on internal self-determi-
nation as a threat to their autocratic tool.32 Both extreme positions, however, did 
not gain sufficient support in order to be included in the Declaration. Consequently, 
clarity was to be forfeited to bring the divergent viewpoints together in a consensus 
29 Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination at pp. 221-222; A. Cassese, Self-Determi-
nation of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995) at p. 118. These 
and other doctrinal visions will be dealt with hereinafter. 
30 The Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States was established in 1963 by the UN General Assembly and composed of thirty-
one ‘jurists’ – eminent or otherwise – representing the Member States, thereby taking into consideration 
“the principle of equitable geographical representation and the necessity that the principal legal systems 
of the world should be represented”. The Special Committee was initially asked to study four essential 
principles of international law, i.e. the prohibition of the use of force, the principle of peaceful dispute 
settlement, that of non-intervention and that of sovereign equality of States. See UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1966 (XVIII) (Consideration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations), UN Doc. 
A/Res/1966 (XVIII), 16 December 1966. Later, three other principles were added to the mandate of the 
Special Committee: the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the duty to co-operate, 
and the principle of good faith. After having issued five reports on these seven principles, the Special 
Committee was requested to finish its work and provide the General Assembly with a full draft Declar-
ation. The debates leading to this draft are summarized in the Special Committee’s sixth and final report: 
Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
Among States, Report 6, UN Doc. A/8018 (XXV). 
31 See, for instance, UN Doc. A/AC/125/SR.44, 27 July 1966, para. 12 (United States): “no rational 
international legal order could exist if the Charter were taken to sanction an unlimited right of secession 
by indigenous peoples from sovereign and independent States”; UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR.69, 4 December 
1967, p. 19 (United Kingdom): “in the language of the Charter [nothing can be found] about the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination to support the claim that part of a sovereign independent State was 
entitled to secede”.
32 See, for instance, UN Doc. A/AC.125/S.106, 5 November 1969, p. 62 (Soviet Union); UN Doc. A/
AC.125/SR.40, 27 July 1966, p. 10 (Yugoslavia).
Chapter IV
106
text.33 In this respect, several other statements reflected a more moderate attitude. The 
statement made by the Netherlands, for instance, reads as follows:
The real problem [is] whether the firm determination to safeguard the concept of ter-
ritorial integrity of sovereign States should go so far as to exclude under all circum-
stances the possibility of the existence or emergence of the right to self-determination 
[i.e. a right to unilateral secession] on the part of a given people within a given State 
[…]. So long as adequate provision was made against abuse, the Committee would not 
serve the cause of justice by excluding the possibility that a people within an existing 
or future State would possess sufficient individual identity to exercise the right of self-
determination. If, for example – in the opinion of the world community – basic human 
rights and fundamental freedoms which imposed obligations on all States, irrespective 
of their sovereign will, were not being respected by a certain State vis-à-vis one of the 
peoples living within its territory, would one in such an instance – whatever the human 
implications – wish to prevent the people that was fundamentally discriminated against 
from invoking its right to self-determination? […] The concept of self-determination 
was based on the right of collective self-expression and it was conceivable that there 
were cases, albeit exceptional, where a people within a State had, or might have in the 
future, the right of self-determination.34 
On the basis of this and some other moderate statements pointing at the acceptance 
of unilateral secession under certain circumstances,35 it has been argued that the safe-
guard clause from the Friendly Relations Declaration may be interpreted as reconcil-
ing these conflicting views on the matter of a right to unilateral secession.36 
If this argumentation is indeed correct, then the Friendly Relations Declaration 
may be said to recognize a qualified right to unilateral secession which subjects 
the lawfulness of acts of secession to both the legitimacy and performance of the 
33 See Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice 
at p. 138.
34 UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR.107, 5 November 1969, pp. 85-86 (the Netherlands). 
35 See, inter alia, UN Doc. A/AC/125/SR.69, 4 December 1967, pp. 22-23 (Kenya); UN Doc. A/
AC/125/SR.68, 3 August 1967, p. 12 (Ghana); UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR44, 27 July 1966, para. 12, (United 
States), referred to in D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague 2002) at p. 320.
36 See Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination at pp. 88-97; Cassese, Self-Deter-
mination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 115-120; H. Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ 
(1993) 34 Virginia Journal of International Law 1 at pp. 17; J. Summers, Peoples and International 
Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2007) at pp. 218-222; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at 
pp. 319-320; Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and 
Practice at p. 138. Yet, it is to be noted that the travaux préparatoires have also been used to conclude 
that the Friendly Relations Declaration does not imply a right to unilateral secession. See D. Thürer, Das 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker: mit einem Exkurs zur Jurafrage (Stämpfli, Bern 1976) at pp. 186-
189, referred to in Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and 
Practice at p. 143.
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government of the parent State.37 More precisely, in this line of reasoning, unilateral 
secession may be justified when the parent State does not act in conformity with 
the right to internal self-determination, which requires representative, non-discrim-
inatory government. As such, a link between the internal dimension and external 
dimension of the right to self-determination presents itself. In case a State seriously 
and persistently violates the right to internal self-determination, it forfeits its right 
to territorial integrity and, hence, a right to external self-determination by means of 
unilateral secession may be exercised.38 This relationship may even be pursued by 
arguing that under certain extreme circumstances, the internal dimension of the right 
to self-determination turns into a right to external self-determination. Until this criti-
cal point has been reached, the right to self-determination might only be implemented 
within the framework of the existing State, thus internally.39 
In conclusion, the safeguard clauses of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action seem to have become the “interpreta-
tive touchstone” for a qualified or remedial right to unilateral secession in doctrine, 
as they arguably make an exception to the right to territorial integrity under specific 
circumstances.40 The significance and scope of the safeguard clauses will become 
even more apparent below, where the viewpoints of Buchheit and Cassese will be 
elaborated upon and the opinions of other scholars on this matter will be explored.
2.2.1. The Content of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession
Buchheit’s argument originates from the broad acceptance on the international level 
of “the State as a privileged but not absolutely unassailable entity”. According to 
Buchheit, this development is reflected in the reluctance of the UN General Assem-
bly to ensure in the Friendly Relations Declaration the territorial integrity of a State 
which does not possess a government representing the inhabitants of the territory. In 
addition, he considered the international response to the events in Bangladesh – and 
to a lesser degree Biafra – as confirming the thesis that the international community 
of States “has accepted the legitimacy of secession as a self-help remedy in cases of 
extreme oppression”.41 In this connection, Buchheit contended that: 
37 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 321.
38 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 120; J. Dugard and D. Raič, 
‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession 
International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) at pp. 103-104, 137; 
Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 321.
39 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 321-322.
40 K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2002) at p. 74.
41 Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination at pp. 221-222.
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[t]he focus of attention here is on the condition of the group making the claim. Reme-
dial secession envisions a scheme by which, corresponding to the various degrees of 
oppression inflicted upon a particular group by its governing State, international law 
recognizes a continuum of remedies ranging from protection of individual rights, to 
minority rights, and ending with secession as the ultimate level. At a certain point, 
the severity of a State’s treatment of its minorities becomes a matter of international 
concern. This concern […] may finally involve an international legitimation of a right 
to secessionist self-determination as self-help remedy by the aggrieved group (which 
seems to have been the approach of the General Assembly in its 1970 declaration).42
It is clear from this paragraph that Buchheit considered a right to unilateral secession 
as a remedy of last resort only. Until this point is reached, less extreme remedies from 
the continuum, such as regional or economic autonomy, are to be applied. Buchheit’s 
plea, however, fails to specify exactly which groups can invoke a right to ‘remedial 
secession’. It remains unclear whether minorities are the legal subjects of this right, 
or whether it applies more generally to “any segment of [the State’s] population”.43
In the vein of Buchheit, Antonio Cassese has elaborated on the question of a right 
to unilateral secession as well. In doing so, he granted a prominent role the safe-
guard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration, as he contended that, in view of 
the preparatory works and the text of the document, the safeguard clause implicitly 
authorizes unilateral secession. Subsequently, the question was raised as to under 
which circumstances the Friendly Relations Declaration allows the right to self-
determination to violate the territorial integrity of a State.44 Cassese did not go into 
details before stressing that the safeguard clause should be interpreted restrictively, 
since “the reference to the requirement of not disrupting the territorial integrity of 
States was placed at the beginning of the clause, in order to underscore that territorial 
integrity should be the paramount value for States to respect”. Accordingly, he sug-
gested that the safeguard clause merely permits secession when strict conditions are 
met.45 The mere lack of a representative government is insufficient to warrant a right 
to unilateral secession. In addition, flagrant violations of fundamental human rights 
are necessary to reach the threshold and a peaceful solution within the framework of 
the existing State must have been excluded.46 In the opinion of Cassese, a situation 
legitimizing unilateral secession may only arise: 
when the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant participa-
tory rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their 
42 Ibid. at p. 222 (emphasis original).
43 Ibid. at pp. 222-223.
44 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 118. 
45 See ibid. at p. 118. Likewise, see Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination at p. 222. 
46 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 119-120.
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fundamental rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within 
the framework of the State structure.47
In addition to Buchheit and Cassese, a vast number of other authors have alleged that 
a qualified right to unilateral secession does exist under contemporary international 
law and have touched upon circumstances under which such a right may be war-
ranted.48 Christian Tomuschat, for example, has conceived the question of a right to 
47 Ibid. at p. 119.
48 See for instance S.V. Chernichenko and V.S. Kotliar, ‘Ongoing Global Debate on Self-Determination 
and Secession: Main Trends’ in J. Dahlitz (ed.) Secession and International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 
The Hague 2003) at pp. 78-79; Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of 
Self-Determination’ at pp. 103-104; R. Emerson, ‘The Logic of Secession’ (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 
802 at pp. 807-809; T.M. Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession’ in C. Brölmann, R. 
Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht 1993) at pp. 13-14; J.A. Frowein, ‘Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations Under Inter-
national Law’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht 1993) at p. 213; Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood at p. 105; O.S. Kamenu, ‘Secession and 
the Right of Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma’ (1974) 12 Journal of Modern African Studies 355 
at p. 361; F.L. Kirgis Jr, ‘The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era’ (1994) 88 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 304 at p. 306; J. Klabbers and R. Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost Between Self-
Determination and Uti Possidetis’ in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds) Peoples and Minorities 
in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at pp. 47-48; Knop, Diversity and 
Self-Determination in International Law at pp. 74-77; P.H. Kooijmans, ‘Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-
Determination’ (1996) 43 Netherlands International Law Review 211 at p. 215; D. Kumbaro, The Kosovo 
Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and the NATO Inter-
vention (2001) at pp. 18-19, 29; R. McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach’ 
(1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 857 at pp. 879-880; Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a 
Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at pp. 26-27; Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities 
at pp. 188-192; V.P. Nanda, ‘Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of Bangladesh 
in Retrospect’ (1979) 1 Houston Journal of International Law 71 at p. 85; F. Ouguergouz and D.L. Tehin-
drazanarivelo, ‘The Question of Secession in Africa’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) at pp. 288-289; A. Peters, ‘Does Kosovo 
Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 95 at pp. 102-103; 
H. Quane, ‘A Right to Self-Determination for the Kosovo Albanians?’ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law 219 at p. 223; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 324-328; C. Ryn-
gaert and C.W. Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In 
Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ (2009) Chinese Journal of International Law – Advance Access at 
para. 14; M.P. Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty. Juridical Underpinnings’ (2004) 31 Denver Journal of Inter-
national Law and Policy 373 at pp. 381-385; M.N. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ (1997) 
8 European Journal of International Law 478 at p. 483; Smis, A Western Approach to the International 
Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice at pp. 154-156, 257-258; L.-A. Thio, ‘International 
Law and Secession in the Asia and Pacific Regions’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) at pp. 299-300; C. Tomuschat, ‘Self-Deter-
mination in a Post-Colonial World’ in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of Self-Determination (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at pp. 9-11; Tomuschat, ‘Secession and Self-Determination’ at p. 42; 
L. Wildhaber, ‘Territorial Modifications and Breakups in Federal States’ (1995) 33 Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law 41 at p. 71; R.C.A. White, ‘Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?’ (1981) 28 
Netherlands International Law Review 147 at pp. 160-166; G. Wilson, ‘Self-Determination, Recognition 
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unilateral secession in the perspective of the developments as regards the relationship 
between a State and its citizens. States are no longer unassailable, but rather have 
a specific raison d’être. By implication, if States radically fail to meet their most 
elementary obligations, their legitimacy will fade and eventually their rationale can 
be disputed.49 Against this background, Tomuschat has argued that the concept of 
“remedial secession should be acknowledged as part and parcel of positive law, not-
withstanding the fact that its empirical basis is fairly thin, but not totally lacking”.50 
In this regard, this scholar has perceived evidence for a conditional right to unilateral 
secession in the events leading to the creation of Bangladesh and the events leading 
to the autonomous position of Kosovo under international administration.51 
To the same effect, Michael P. Scharf has pointed at “the modern trend”, evi-
denced by most sources of international law, of support for the right of peoples to 
secede unilaterally in exceptional cases. Following Buchheit, he refers to this concept 
as the “remedial right to secession”.52 More specifically, Scharf has contended that: 
if a government is at the high end of the scale of representative government, the only 
modes of self-determination that will be given international backing are those with 
minimal destabilizing effect and achieved by consent of all parties. If a government 
and the Problem of Kosovo’ (2009) 56 Netherlands International Law Review 455 at pp. 467-472. It 
should be noted, however, that the argument that present-day international law includes a qualified to 
unilateral secession is not well argued by all writers, as a result of which the underlying considerations 
sometimes remain obscure. See, for instance, Karl Doehring, who acknowledges that a right to unilat-
eral secession may arise “if the minority discriminated against is exposed to actions by the sovereign 
State power which consist in an evident and brutal violation of fundamental human rights, e.g. through 
killing or unlimited imprisonment without legal protection, destroying family relations, expropriation 
without any regard for the necessities of life, though special prohibitions against the following religious 
professions or using one’s own language, and, lastly, through executing all these prohibitions with brutal 
methods and measures”, but does not substantiate his argument. See K. Doehring, ‘Self-Determination’ 
in B. Simma (ed.) The Charter of the United Nations A Commentary (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2002) at p. 58. See also UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Historicaland Current 
Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments. Study Prepared by A. Cristescu, UN Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1 (1981) at para. 173 (holding that a “right to secession unquestionably exists, how-
ever, in a special but very important case: that of peoples, territories and entities subjugated in violation 
of international law. In such cases, the people have the right to regain their freedom and constitute them-
selves independent sovereign States”). 
49 Tomuschat, ‘Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World’ at p. 9. In this connection, it may be noted 
that similar arguments have been put forward to raise the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs 
in cases of gross violations of human rights. See Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of 
Self-Determination: Theory and Practice at p. 143.
50 Tomuschat, ‘Secession and Self-Determination’ at p. 42.
51 Ibid. at p. 42.
52 Scharf, ‘Earned Sovereignty. Juridical Underpinnings’ at pp. 381-385. His claim is based on an 
examination of “the writings of numerous scholars, UN General Assembly resolutions, declarations 
of international conferences, judicial pronouncements, decisions of international arbitral tribunals, and 
some state practice”. 
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is extremely unrepresentative and abusive, then much more potentially destabiliz-
ing modes of self-determination, including independence, may be recognized as 
legitimate.53 
With this phrasing, Scharf seems to link the internal dimension of the right to self-
determination to the external dimension: denial of the meaningful exercise of the right 
to internal self-determination may lead to a right to external self-determination by 
means of unilateral secession. A considerable number of other commentators have 
discerned a similar connection, while in addition indicating discriminatory treat-
ment of a people54 and serious breaches of fundamental human rights55 as constitutive 
parameters for a right to unilateral secession. It appears that these three factors should 
not be regarded separately, but rather as being interrelated. The point of departure in 
this respect is the deprival of internal self-determination, either directly or indirectly. 
Thus, a people may not only be formally denied this right by the central authorities, 
but in addition, other governmental acts may qualify as a violation of the right to inter-
nal self-determination as well. A people formally granted this right may be denied the 
practical exercise of that right as a result of a persistent campaign of discrimination.56 
But not only are the parameters of the denial of internal self-determination and of dis-
criminatory treatment strongly linked, what is more, discriminatory practices by the 
central authorities often violate the enjoyment of other fundamental human rights.57 As 
Tomuschat observed, “discrimination in the political field is often co-terminous with 
discrimination and even persecution over the whole breadth of human activities”.58 In 
53 Ibid. at p. 385.
54 See, for instance, Doehring, ‘The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary’ at p. 66; Emerson, 
‘The Logic of Secession’ at pp. 808-809; Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law at 
pp. 75-77; Kooijmans, ‘Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination’ at pp. 214-216; McCorquodale, 
‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach’ at pp. 879-880; Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of 
Secession – Reconsidered’ at pp. 26-27; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 332; 
Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Par-
tial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 6; Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-
Determination: Theory and Practice at p. 207; White, ‘Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?’ 
at pp. 160-161, 164; Wilson, ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’ at p. 467.
55 See, for instance, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 118-119; 
Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at pp. 103-
104; Klabbers and Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’ at pp. 47-48; 
Kooijmans, ‘Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination’ at pp. 214-215; Kumbaro, The Kosovo 
Crisis in an International Law Perspective: Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and the NATO Inter-
vention at p. 19; Ouguergouz and Tehindrazanarivelo, ‘The Question of Secession in Africa’ at pp. 288-
295; Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: 
In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 6; Wilson, ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the 
Problem of Kosovo’ at p. 467.
56 See, for instance, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 368; White, ‘Self-Deter-
mination: Time for a Re-Assessment?’ at p. 161.
57 See, for instance, Kooijmans, ‘Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination’ at pp. 214-215.
58 Tomuschat, ‘Secession and Self-Determination’ at p. 39.
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turn, obvious and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of the members 
of a certain people may arguably amount to a denial of internal self-determination 
and as such, may warrant unilateral secession. This is particularly true for serious and 
widespread violations of the right to life, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, but less 
excessive situations may also qualify. An example in this respect would be the mas-
sive and arbitrary use of armed force against a people, for this may constitute a threat 
to a people’s existence and the maintenance of its collective identity.59 
All in all, the parameters of serious and persistent denial of the right to internal 
self-determination, discriminatory treatment and violations of fundamental human 
rights appear to be interrelated. For some scholars, it seems that the essential touch-
stone is that of discrimination.60 This reference point is not limited to discrimination 
on grounds of race, creed or colour, as was formulated in the safeguard clause of the 
Friendly Relations Declaration. Rather, as the relevant paragraph of the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action indicates, it is suggested that it concerns dis-
crimination of any kind.61 It is to be noted, however, that the touchstone of discrimi-
natory treatment does not imply that unilateral secession is warranted in all instances 
of discrimination. Particularly when there is no clear evidence of a high level of 
discrimination against the people at issue62 and when chances are that the central 
government may stop the discrimination when called for or when legal remedies are 
provided, no right to unilateral secession can be claimed.63 
Most scholars regard a conditional right to unilateral secession as a way of exer-
cising the right to self-determination. In fact, Raič has expressed the view that the 
former is even an integral and essential component of the right to self-determination: 
Given the fact that self-determination is, firstly, recognized as a legal right by the inter-
national community, secondly, that its principal objective is to guarantee the effec-
tive development and preservation of the collective identity of a people as well as the 
effective enjoyment of the individual human rights of its members, and thirdly, that 
the guarantee of the right to self-determination logically implies the guarantee of that 
people’s freedom and existence, it is difficult to accept that self-determination would 
not encompass a conditional right of unilateral secession.64
59 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 368-369.
60 See, for instance, Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 26; White, 
‘Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?’ at p. 164.
61 For an argument in the same vein, see, for instance, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determina-
tion at p. 255.
62 In this regard, White has emphasized that the “assertion of a high level of discrimination reflects the 
status of secession as a remedy of last resort assailing the territorial integrity of states. Low levels of dis-
criminatory activity should be processed through the existing machinery for the international protection 
of human rights, imperfect though the available procedures may be”. See White, ‘Self-Determination: 
Time for a Re-Assessment?’ at p. 164.
63 Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 26.
64 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 326.
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In this regard, Raič recalls that international law does not provide for remedies which 
may enforce a peoples’ right to self-determination. Accordingly, only little would 
remain of the rationale and objective of the right to self-determination if the right 
is seriously infringed by the authorities of the State while no effective and realistic 
remedy for a peaceful settlement would be available within the framework of that 
State. In such situations, a right to unilateral secession is a last resort response to seri-
ous injustices. An argument of similar purport has been made by Dietrich Murswiek, 
who noted that, without a right to unilateral secession in exceptional situations, the 
people’s right to self-determination would be but a hollow shell.65 Admittedly, not 
all writers accepting a right to unilateral secession explicitly consider such a right to 
be an intrinsic element of the right to self-determination as Raič and Murswiek do. 
Nevertheless, most of those writers do share the view that the existence of a situation 
in which a right to secede unilaterally arises cannot be assumed lightly. They contend 
that unilateral secession may only be permitted as an ultimum remedium,66 that is 
when all adequate settlements within the legal and political system of the parent State 
have failed or cannot be reasonably expected. In other words, a claim to unilateral 
secession may only be legitimate if it is established that all other legal and political 
options for effectively ensuring the people at issue their right to self-determination 
internally have been exhausted or rejected by the majority of the population of the 
parent State.67 As such, this high threshold can arguably be seen as an additional yet 
fundamental condition for the legitimate exercise of a right to unilateral secession. 
According to Raič, however, it may not always be required to have exhausted all 
reasonable and effective remedies before unilateral secession may be warranted. He 
submitted that “in cases of widespread and serious violations of fundamental human 
rights” this condition may be deemed to be fulfilled, in addition to that of the viola-
tion of the right to internal self-determination. As such, the argument would be that 
the cruelties committed by the authorities may not only have amounted to a denial 
65 Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 26.
66 This terminology is used by, for instance, Pieter H. Kooijmans and David Raič. See Kooijmans, ‘Tol-
erance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination’ at p. 216; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determina-
tion at p. 326. In this respect, Christian Tomuschat uses the term ultima ratio. See Tomuschat, ‘Secession 
and Self-Determination’ at pp. 35, 41.
67 See, inter alia, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 119-120; Dugard 
and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at p. 109; Kamenu, 
‘Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma’ at p. 361; Klabbers and Lefeber, 
‘Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’ at pp. 47-48; Kooijmans, ‘Tolerance, Sov-
ereignty and Self-Determination’ at pp. 215-216; Lauwers and Smis, ‘New Dimensions of the Right to 
Self-Determination: A Study of the International Response to the Kosovo Crisis’ at p. 66; Ouguergouz 
and Tehindrazanarivelo, ‘The Question of Secession in Africa’ at p. 288-289; Raič, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination at pp. 370-371; Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-
Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 14; Tomuschat, 
‘Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World’ at p. 11; White, ‘Self-Determination: Time for a Re-
Assessment?’ at pp. 161, 164.
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of the people’s right to internal self-determination as was noted above, but they may 
also have caused feelings of hatred and distrust to such an extent that it would be 
unreasonable and even futile to require further negotiations to reach a peaceful settle-
ment within the framework of the existing State. Under those circumstances, seces-
sion would be the only reasonable and realistic option left for protecting the human 
rights of the members of the people concerned and simultaneously safeguarding their 
collective right to self-determination.68 
Some writers have taken a slightly different approach than those described above. 
They link the justifiability of unilateral secession to some elements of the traditional 
notion of colonialism, without making reference to unilateral secession as being a 
contemporary component of the peoples’ right to self-determination. This so-called 
internal colonialism doctrine holds that the characteristics and consequences of colo-
nialism are applicable to peoples on the territory of non-colonial States under certain 
circumstances. Thomas M. Franck, for example, has contended that: 
when a minority within a sovereign State – especially if it occupies a discrete ter-
ritory within that State – persistently and egregiously is denied political and social 
equality and the opportunity to retain its cultural identity […] it is conceivable that 
international law will define such repression, prohibited by the [ICCPR], as coming 
within a somewhat stretched definition of colonialism. Such repression, even by an 
independent State not normally thought to be “imperial” would then give rise to a right 
of “decolonization”.69 
This approach is also advocated by James R. Crawford, who noted that a central gov-
ernment may treat a people inhabiting a demarcated territory within the State in such 
a way that, in effect, it becomes a non-self-governing territory with respect to the rest 
of that State. To put it in the words of Crawford, such territories are subject to carence 
de souveraineté.70 Although he considered Bangladesh, Kosovo and possibly Eritrea 
to present cases of internal colonialism, Crawford emphasized that those situations 
are exceptional.71 It is noteworthy to point out that the essence of both the internal 
colonialism doctrine and the doctrine of a qualified right to unilateral secession is that 
they require a serious and persistent deprivation of the right to internal self-determi-
nation, possibly accompanied by widespread violations of fundamental human rights 
before the people at issue are allowed to break away from the State. As such, it can 
be argued that the internal colonialism approach underpins the existence of a condi-
tional right to unilateral secession. What is more, it seems that the critical point is not 
68 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 372.
69 Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession’ at pp. 13-14.
70 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 126.
71 J.R. Crawford, ‘Outside the Colonial Context’ in W.J.A. Macartney (ed.) Self-Determination in the 
Commonwealth (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen 1988) at pp. 13-14; Crawford, The Creation of 
States in International Law at p. 126. 
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whether a situation can be labelled as colonialism, but whether the preconditions of 
a grave and enduring violation of the right to internal self-determination, discrimina-
tory treatment and/or massive violations of basic human rights have been met.72 
2.2.2. The Subjects of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession
Having found that the idea of a remedial right to unilateral secession is broadly sup-
ported in scholarly literature and having identified some widely accepted constitutive 
parameters for its exercise, the question arises as to which collectivities may arguably 
be entitled to appeal to such a right. Evidently, as (unilateral) secession is generally 
considered to be a means of exercising the right to external self-determination, the 
subject of a qualified right to unilateral secession is a ‘people’. And in contrast to the 
subjects of the right to internal self-determination, a ‘people’ in the context of seces-
sion is not understood to refer to the population of a State as a whole, but rather to a 
numerical minority in relation to the rest of the population of the State, since seces-
sion concerns the separation of only a part of a State’s territory. 
Regrettably, only few commentators have elaborated on the issue of the benefi-
ciaries of a right to unilateral secession and sought to elucidate the meaning of the 
term ‘peoples’ in this context.73 Since it was seen above that in scholarly literature the 
safeguard clauses of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action are generally viewed as the “interpretative touchstone” for 
a qualified right to secession,74 the question as to the beneficiaries of such a right may 
be considered in light of the texts of these clauses. It was already pointed out previ-
ously that when reading the safeguard clauses a contrario, denial of the meaningful 
exercise of the peoples’ right to internal self-determination arguably triggers a right 
to external self-determination by means of unilateral secession. Pursuing this argu-
ment further, it seems that infra-State groups entitled to internal self-determination 
should be regarded as the subjects of a qualified right to unilateral secession as well.75 
Put differently, in absence of internal self-determination, peoples entitled to this 
72 In this connection, David Raič has observed that “the attempts […] to defend a qualified right of ter-
ritorial separation through the ‘stretching’ of concepts and definitions appears to be somewhat artificial”. 
See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 328.
73 A number of authors do not specify which collectivities they consider to be the subjects of a right to 
unilateral secession. Those who do particularize this issue often just use notions as ‘minority’, ‘people’ or 
‘group’ with no further detail. 
74 See also Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law at p. 74. 
75 In the previous Chapter, two categories of subjects of the right to internal self-determination were 
identified: entire populations of existing sovereign States and subgroups within such States. Here, it is 
to be emphasized that entire populations of existing sovereign States are obviously not entitled to a right 
to unilateral secession, for, by definition, secession concerns the breaking away of only a segment of the 
population and territory of a sovereign State. 
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dimension of the right to self-determination may likewise be entitled to a right to 
secession by way of a remedy as well. 
In this connection, Cassese has argued that a right to unilateral secession can only 
be invoked by religious and racial groups, while this right is to be withheld from 
linguistic and national groups.76 This interpretation is based on the fact that nowhere 
in the Friendly Relations Declaration is reference made to ethnic or linguistic minor-
ities as subgroups to which this document is addressed. In fact, it merely emphasizes 
that discrimination on the basis of race, creed or colour is contrary to the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination.77 Cassese’s restrictive interpretation of 
the safeguard clause from the Friendly Relations Declaration has been criticized by 
David Raič, arguing that the subgroups entitled to internal self-determination are not 
restricted to religious and racial groups, but also include ethnic groups.78 His posi-
tion is substantiated by various arguments.79 Amongst others, Raič asserted that con-
sidering the travaux préparatoires, the motivation underlying the safeguard clause 
of the Friendly Relations Declaration appears to aim towards broad application of 
the provision rather than application to specific situations only, such as the situation 
in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia at that time.80 Moreover, he argues that this 
broad interpretation of the safeguard clause is confirmed by the text of the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993, which stipulates that States conduct 
themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights and self-determination 
if possessing “a Government representing the whole people to the territory without 
distinction of any kind”.81 This phrasing arguably includes peoples – or more spe-
cifically: subgroups possessing peoplehood – of any kind as bearers of the right to 
self-determination.82 As such, Raič suggested that a people constituting a numerical 
minority in relation to the rest of the population of the parent State may invoke a right 
to unilateral secession in certain situations, provided that this people comprises a 
76 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 114, 119.
77 See ibid. at pp. 112-121. This line of reasoning is adopted by, for instance, Smis, A Western Approach 
to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and Practice at pp. 141-142. 
78 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 251, 257-258. 
79 Ibid. at pp. 251-258.
80 Ibid. at pp. 253-254.
81 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted on 25 
June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, at para. 2 (emphasis added). In this connection, Fred-
eric L. Kirgis Jr held that “from about 1970 on, there could be a right of ‘peoples’ […] to secede from an 
established state that does not have a fully representative form of government, or at least to secede from a 
state whose government excludes people of any race, creed or colour from political representation when 
those people are the ones asserting the right and they have a claim to a defined territory. By 1993, the 
right had arguably expanded to be assertable against a government that is unrepresentative of people who 
are defined by characteristics not limited to race, creed or colour” (emphasis added). See Kirgis Jr, ‘The 
Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era’ at p. 306.
82 See also Smis, A Western Approach to the International Law of Self-Determination: Theory and 
Practice at pp. 145-146.
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majority possessing collective individuality within an identifiable part of the territory 
of that State. In this respect, it is important to realize that national or ethnic minorities 
are generally seen to be excluded as subjects of a right to unilateral secession. They 
do not constitute a ‘people’ under contemporary international law as a result of their 
lack of ‘collective individuality’. This distinction between peoples which are war-
ranted the right to self-determination and members of national or ethnic minorities 
which are merely entitled to minority rights was already elaborated upon previously 
in this study.83 Further, the requirement of a bond between the people concerned and 
an identifiable territorial unit implies that the people are entitled to exercise their right 
to external self-determination with regard to that particular territorial unit on which 
they represent a clear majority.84 While, in addition to Raič, the above reading85 has 
been adopted by some other writers as well86 and some corresponding interpretations 
have been suggested,87 it appears that there is no consensus in literature on the issue 
of the beneficiaries of a qualified right to unilateral secession.88 
2.2.3. Contraindications
Although doctrine shows considerable support for a right to unilateral secession as 
a remedy for serious injustices, admittedly, various authors remain hesitant in this 
83 See Chapter II, Section 3.3.3. 
84 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 367; Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of 
Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 37.
85 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 332. 
86 See Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at p. 
109; Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In 
Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 6; G. Zyberi, ‘Self-Determination through the Lens of the 
International Court of Justice’ (2009) 56 Netherlands International Law Review 429 at p. 447.
87 Robin C.A. White has noted that “there must be a ‘self’ or people who for a cohesive unit which is 
distinct from the main population of the State by reason of its ethnic, religious or national origins”. See 
White, ‘Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?’ at p. 161. In addition, Pieter H. Kooijmans has 
emphasized that the group concerned should possess “a definite territorial base”. See Kooijmans, ‘Toler-
ance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination’ at p. 216. Combining both views, Dietrich Murswiek has con-
tended that the people is to be “distinguished from other peoples by objective ethnic criteria, particularly 
by culture, language, birth or history. Secondly, a people must settle on a coherent territory, on which it 
forms at least a clear majority”. See Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 
37. 
88 See, for instance, Kooijmans, ‘Tolerance, Sovereignty and Self-Determination’ at pp. 213-215; 
Lauwers and Smis, ‘New Dimensions of the Right to Self-Determination: A Study of the International 
Response to the Kosovo Crisis’ at p. 63; Wilson, ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of 
Kosovo’ at p. 471. More than that, some authors have even contended that, since the safeguard clauses 
use the phrase “the whole people” rather than “all the distinct peoples”, subgroups within States cannot 
claim a right to unilateral secession, for this right is reserved for the population of the State as a whole. 
See, for instance, C.J. Iorns, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sover-
eignty’ (1992) 24 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 199 at p. 261. 
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respect. Malcolm N. Shaw, for instance, has contended that a theory of remedial 
secession based on an a contrario reading of the safeguard clause is troublesome: 
Such a major change in legal principle cannot be introduced by way of an ambiguous 
subordinate clause, especially when the principle of territorial integrity has always 
been accepted and proclaimed as a core principle of international law, and is indeed 
placed before the qualifying clause in the provision in question.89
Moreover, Shaw has put forward a practically oriented argument, which is that “no 
mechanism really exists to determine whether a particular State may be the subject 
of secession on the basis of nonconformity with the [safeguard clause]”.90 With his 
observation, Shaw seems to point at the problem of determining the (human rights) 
situations under which a State may be said to have violated the safeguard clause, 
hence warranting unilateral secession, and the risk of arbitrariness in this respect. 
Alexandra Xanthaki has raised a similar objection, as she wondered “[w]ho would 
be the interpreter of the law of self-determination” and determine whether a certain 
people has a right to secession in view of the circumstances?91 Since a qualified right 
to unilateral secession would generally arise as a remedy for the (in)actions of the 
State, the government of the State in which the people live would not be a very relia-
ble interpreter in this respect. According to Xanthaki, the international community as 
represented by the UN General Assembly would be a more dependable body. Yet, she 
admitted that, being a political body, it is more than likely that the General Assem-
bly will exercise restraint in assessing whether particular situations involve a right to 
secession.92 This seems to be demonstrated by the case of Kosovo.93
While these are indeed pertinent remarks, most commentators who remain cau-
tious with regard to the recognition of a qualified right to unilateral secession advance 
the argument that scholarly writings do not provide for sufficient and compelling 
89 Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ at p. 483. This stance was also reflected in M.N. 
Shaw, ‘Report by Malcolm N. Shaw: “Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30 September 1996”’ in 
A.F. Bayefsky (ed.) Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague 2000) at p. 138.
90 M.N. Shaw, ‘The Role of Recognition and Non-Recognition with Respect to Secession: Notes on 
Some Relevant Issues’ in J. Dahlitz (ed.) Secession and International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague 2003) at p. 248. 
91 A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and 
Land (Cambridge University Press, New York 2007) at p. 144. Likewise, Robin C.A. White has drawn 
attention to the need for international institutions competent to assess claims to self-determination. See 
White, ‘Self-Determination: Time for a Re-Assessment?’ at p. 169 (citing Hans Blix).
92 Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards. Self-Determination, Culture and Land at 
pp. 144-145.
93 See Section 2.3.6 of the present Chapter.
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evidence for the practical existence of a remedial right to unilateral secession.94 As 
Antonello Tancredi aptly stated: 
it is to be stressed that the remedial secession thesis has generated considerable litera-
ture during the last twenty years. It may be correctly affirmed that today most writers 
uphold this theory, at least form a de lege ferenda perspective. Notwithstanding its 
popularity among legal scholars, its correspondence to positive international law can 
still be doubted with good reason. The theory’s main flaw is the lack of a sufficient 
basis in State practice. Putting aside the Bangladesh case, whose exceptional character 
has been widely underscored, one can barely cite a case in which the scheme of reme-
dial secession has been concretely applied.95
Thus, while the concept of remedial secession is accepted from a de lege ferenda 
viewpoint, modern practice does not lend support for the view that peoples have a 
(qualified) right to unilateral secession, Tancredi contended.
In this connection, it is worth briefly touching upon scholarly writings in reaction 
to the events in Kosovo as well.96 Unsurprisingly, Kosovo’s contested declaration of 
independence in February 2008 generated a substantial amount of literature. Before 
the International Court of Justice issued its Advisory Opinion on the matter,97 most 
commentators remained relatively hesitant to argue in favour of a right to unilat-
eral secession for the Kosovo Albanians. It appears that this reluctance is primarily 
due to the indefinite status of such a right in general. In the words of Bing Bing Jia, 
“[i]t is felt, in any case, that more is required to clarify the existing law of seces-
sion before it can be suitably applied to such a situation like Kosovo”.98 Against this 
94 Peter Hilpold, for example, has argued that although “international lawyers are trying hard to make 
theory fit with reality […] no convincing proof for the existence of [a qualified right to unilateral seces-
sion] has been given”. See Hilpold, ‘The Kosovo Case and International Law: Looking for Applicable 
Theories’ at pp. 47, 55-56. See also J.R. Crawford, ‘Report by James Crawford: “Response to Experts 
Reports of the Amicus Curiae”’ in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.) Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec 
and Lessons Learned Legal Opinions Selected and Introduced (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
2000) at pp. 59-61; Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at pp. 42-43; M.G. Kohen, ‘Introduction’ 
in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2006) at pp. 10-11; Shaw, ‘Secession and International Law’ at pp. 247-248; A. Tancredi, ‘A Normative 
“Due Process” in the Creation of States through Secession’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International 
Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) at pp. 184-188; D. Thürer and T. Burri, 
‘Secession’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated 
online edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2009) at para. 17. 
95 Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process” in the Creation of States through Secession’ at p. 184.
96 These events will be touched upon in Section 2.3.6.1 of the present Chapter.
97 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403.
98 B.B. Jia, ‘The Independence of Kosovo: A Unique Case of Secession?’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 27 at p. 42.
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backdrop, reference has been made to the lack of clear State practice in support of 
that doctrine.99 Therefore, although many scholars agreed that Kosovo’s self-pro-
claimed independence might have a significant impact on the development of inter-
national law as regards the existence of a qualified or remedial right to unilateral 
secession,100 and some even referred to the Kosovo case as the “ideal test-case for 
the current validity of the remedial secession theory”,101 most writers in this context 
refrained from providing conclusive answers as to the existence of such a theory or 
right under contemporary international law.102 Moreover, it is to be noted that various 
writers referred to the uniqueness or sui generis character of the Kosovo case.103 The 
extraordinary concurrence of circumstances has often been put forward, including 
Kosovo’s history as an autonomous province, the background of the disintegration 
of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, the atrocities committed against the civilians 
in Kosovo, the military intervention by NATO, and the subsequent intensive inter-
national involvement on the territory, in particular by means of UN administration.104 
99 See, for instance, ibid. at p. 42; Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process” in the Creation of States 
through Secession’ at pp. 187-188; J. Vidmar, ‘International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 779 at pp. 814-818.
100 See, for instance, C.J. Borgen, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Seces-
sion and Recognition’ (2008) 12/2 ASIL Insights; Hilpold, ‘The Kosovo Case and International Law: 
Looking for Applicable Theories’ at pp. 54-56, 60-61; Jia, ‘The Independence of Kosovo: A Unique Case 
of Secession?’ at p. 29; R. Muharremi, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and 
Sovereignty Revisited’ (2008) 33 Review of Central and East European Law 401 at pp. 432-435; Tomus-
chat, ‘Secession and Self-Determination’ at p. 38; Wilson, ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the 
Problem of Kosovo’ at pp. 480-481; Zyberi, ‘Self-Determination Through the Lens of the International 
Court of Justice’ at pp. 442-444, 451.
101 Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process” in the Creation of States through Secession’ at pp. 187-188.
102 An exception is to be mentioned in this respect. Against the backdrop of Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, Cedric Ryngaert and Christine Griffioen have determinedly contended that contemporary 
international law does accept a remedial right to unilateral secession. They have argued that a modern 
interpretation of customary international law provides for the basis of such a right, and that State practice 
and institutional practice support this view. See Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to 
Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at paras 14-30; C.W. 
Griffioen, Self-Determination as a Human Right. The Emergency Exit of Remedial Secession (Master’s 
Thesis, Utrecht University 2009) at pp. 126-130.
103 See, for example, Jia, ‘The Independence of Kosovo: A Unique Case of Secession?’ at pp. 29-31; 
Muharremi, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and Sovereignty Revisited’ at 
p. 435; Wilson, ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’ at pp. 477-480; Zyberi, 
‘Self-Determination Through the Lens of the International Court of Justice’ at p. 443. 
104 In addition to the sources referred to above, see also C. Warbrick, ‘Kosovo: the Declaration of Inde-
pendence’ (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at pp. 679-680. The arguments put 
forward in this respect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VI of this study. For a critical consid-
eration of the uniqueness argument, see R. Müllerson, ‘Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and 
Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of Interna-
tional Law 2, contending that uniqueness, “or the parallels for that matter, are in the eye of the beholder. 
Whether certain situations, facts or acts can serve as precedents depends to a great extent on whether one 
is interested in seeing them as precedents or not” (para. 5).
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Consequently, it has been argued that Kosovo cannot serve as a precedent for other 
sub-State groups with secessionist intensions. This emphasis on the singularity of the 
Kosovo case may be interpreted as a rejection of the argument that serious injustices 
may justify unilateral secession as a remedy. To quote Robert Muharremi, “[o]ther-
wise, what sense would it make to qualify the Kosovo case as sui generis?”105 
2.2.4. Conclusions on Doctrine
In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that, while there is a clear trend towards 
the acceptance of a remedial right to unilateral secession, scholarship is not conclu-
sive on this issue. Writings on the case of Kosovo issued shortly after its declaration 
of independence seem to support this conclusion. It is, therefore, important to con-
sider other sources of international law and their attitude towards the concept of uni-
lateral secession as a qualified right and its interpretation. As the criticism towards the 
recognition of such a right already indicated, examining the status of State practice 
will be of great significance for this purpose. After all, as one commentator noted, 
“the development of self-determination as a legal construct is continuously shaped 
by the realities of practice”.106 But before turning to a review of State practice and 
opinio juris as elements of customary international law, judicial decisions and opin-
ions, general principles of (international) law, and some possible additional sources 
of international law will be explored first. 
2.3. Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in Judicial Decisions 
and Opinions
Although the right to self-determination as it has developed under international law 
has generated a vast amount of literature, it is frequently conceived as a right which is 
left aside or even avoided by judicial bodies, both on the national and the international 
level. Arguably, the practice of the UN Human Rights Committee has contributed to 
this image of the issue. This Committee, which is entrusted with the task of consid-
ering individual petitions on human rights violations under the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR, has repeatedly rejected appeals on the right to self-determination under 
Article 1 of the ICCPR. The line of argument generally presented by the Committee 
is that the complaints procedure established under the Optional Protocol is reserved 
for individuals, as a consequence of which merely the individual rights enshrined in 
105 Muharremi, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and Sovereignty Revisited’ 
at p. 435.
106 Graham, ‘Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: Translating Self-Determination 
“Into Practice” and “Into Peace”’ at p. 457.
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Part III of the ICCPR (i.e. Article 6 to Article 27 inclusive) can be invoked.107 This 
is remarkable, since it not only has the competence to deal with communications on 
all rights protected under the ICCPR,108 but more specifically, it has insisted on the 
obligation of State parties to include information on their implementation of both 
paragraphs of Article 1 in their reports submitted to the Committee.109 In more recent 
cases, the Committee has shown a reserved acknowledgement of the right by noting 
that it may be taken into account when interpreting other human rights enshrined in 
the Covenant.110 The International Court of Justice has been very cautious as well 
when commenting on self-determination. Over time, however, a number of judicial 
decisions and opinions dealing with the right to self-determination beyond the colo-
nial context have emerged, both on the international, regional, and national level. 
Interestingly, some of these judgments touch upon the question of a right to unilat-
eral secession as well. In search of traces of such a right in judicial decisions and 
107 In this connection, mention may be made of the case of A.D. v. Canada. In this case, the Grand Cap-
tain of the Mikmaq Tribal Society brought a claim before the Human Rights Committee, alleging that 
Canada had deprived the Mikmaq people of their right to self-determination and that the Mikmaq nation 
should be recognized as a State. The Committee dismissed the petition on the basis of the argument that 
the Grand Captain had not demonstrated that he was the authorized representative of the Mikmaq Tribal 
Society. Moreover, the Committee observed that he had failed “to advance any pertinent facts supporting 
his claim that he is personally a victim of a violation of any rights contained in the Covenant”. See UN 
Human Rights Committee, A.D. (the Mikmaq Tribal Society) v. Canada, Communication No. 78/1980, 
UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/39/40) at p. 200 (1984), at para. 8.2. In the case of Kitok v. Sweden, the Com-
mittee held that an individual “could not claim to be the victim of a violation of the right of self-deter-
mination enshrined in [A]rticle 1 of the Covenant”. See UN Human Rights Committee, Kitok v. Sweden, 
Communication No. 197/1985, UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988) at para. 6.3. The Committee 
maintained a similar position in the case of Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada. It further 
stressed that “[w]hile all peoples have the right of self-determination and the right freely to determine 
their political status, pursue their economic, social and cultural development and dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources, as stipulated in Article 1 of the Covenant, the question whether the Lubicon Lake 
Band constitutes a ‘people’ is not an issue for the Committee to address under the Optional Protocol to 
the Covenant. The Optional Protocol provides a procedure under which individuals can claim that their 
individual rights have been violated”. See UN Human Rights Committee, Ominayak and the Lubicon 
Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) at p. 1 (1990), at 
paras 13.3 and 32.1.
108 Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR stipulates that “individuals who claim that any of 
their rights enumerated in the Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted all available domes-
tic remedies may submit a written communication to the Committee for consideration.” 
109 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-Determination), 
The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994), 13 March 1984, at 
paras 3-6. 
110 See, for instance, UN Human Rights Committee, J.G.A. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, Commu-
nication No. 760/1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000), at para. 10.3; UN Human Rights 
Committee, Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/70/D/547/1993 (2000), at para. 9.2; UN Human Rights Committee, Gillot v. France, Communication 
No. 932/2000, UN Doc. A/57/40 at p. 270 (2002), at para. 13.4. 
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opinions, this section will address those cases in which a (remedial) right to unilateral 
secession is considered.111 The relevant cases will be presented here chronologically. 
2.3.1. The Åland Islands Case
The Åland Islands case was already briefly touched upon in the context of the devel-
opment of self-determination from principle to right.112 The present section, however, 
will elaborate on the case against the backdrop of the question of the existence of a 
(remedial) right to unilateral secession, as it is sometimes argued that such an entitle-
ment finds its origins in the Åland Islands case.113 
The Åland Islands case dealt with a legal dispute between Sweden and Finland in 
1920.114 It concerned the question whether the inhabitants of the Åland Islands – an 
archipelago located in the Baltic Sea, between Finland and Sweden – were allowed 
to secede from Finland and subsequently attach themselves to Sweden. It is impor-
tant to note that the Åland Islands had been under Swedish control from the twelfth 
to the early nineteenth century. Consequently, in large measure, the inhabitants of 
the archipelago were Swedish in language and culture. As such, Sweden remained 
the “cultural motherland” of the Ålanders.115 When Sweden was defeated by the 
Russian Empire in 1809, Finland – including the Aland Islands – was surrendered 
to Russia. Subsequently, Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy within the 
Russian Empire. Following the Russian Revolution, Finland declared its independ-
ence in December 1917. Hence, the question presented itself as to whether the Åland 
Islands had become part of the new and sovereign Finnish State, or whether they 
were allowed to reunite with Sweden. In June 1919, a plebiscite was held on the 
Åland Islands, which resulted in a vote of 96.4 per cent in favour of association of the 
archipelago with the Swedish territory. Unsurprisingly, proposals by Finland to offer 
the islands autonomy were rejected by the Ålanders. When in June 1920, Finland 
111 As such, the jurisprudence from the Inter-American Human Rights System will not be included, since 
to date, it has merely focused on the right to self-determination through land and resource rights rather 
than through unilateral secession. Likewise, those cases from the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights merely dealing with the internal dimension of the right to self-determination will be omit-
ted here. For a concise discussion of regional jurisprudence with regard to the right to self-determination 
in general, see, for instance, D. Shelton, ‘Self-Determination in Regional Human Rights Law: From 
Kosovo to Cameroon’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 60.
112 See Chapter II, Section 3.4. 
113 M. Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans”, Secession and the Great 
Powers’ Rule (Working Paper, Cleveland State University 2009) at p. 5. See also Raič, Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination at pp. 328-330; Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism 
and Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at pp. 285-293; Tancredi, ‘A Normative 
“Due Process” in the Creation of States through Secession’ at pp. 177-178.
114 See, generally, J. Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (Yale 
University Press, New Haven 1968).
115 Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at p. 8.
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sent military troops to the archipelago and detained two leaders of the Åland separa-
tist movement as they were allegedly guilty of treason, Great Britain intervened by 
referring the dispute to the League of Nations.116 
Subsequently, the Council of the League of Nations established two expert bodies 
in order to give an advisory opinion on the matter: an International Commission of 
Jurists and a Committee of Rapporteurs. The mandate of the Commission of Jurists 
(hereafter: Jurists) was primarily concerned with the question of whether, under Arti-
cle 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Åland Islands dispute was 
to be left within the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, or whether the League Council 
was entitled to exercise jurisdiction. As such, the mandate of the Jurists did not spe-
cifically address the question of a right to self-determination for the inhabitants of the 
Åland Islands. Nonetheless, the Jurists dealt with the issue of domestic jurisdiction 
by elaborating upon the relationship between self-determination on the one hand, and 
the principles of State sovereignty and minority rights on the other.117 It was in con-
nection with the balance between self-determination and State sovereignty118 that the 
Jurists dismissed the assumption of self-determination as a legal right within inter-
national law: 
Although the principle of self-determination of peoples plays an important part in 
modern political thought, especially since the Great War, it must be pointed out that 
there is no mention of it in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The recognition of 
this principle in a certain number of international treaties cannot be considered as suf-
ficient to put it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the Law of Nations. On the 
contrary, in the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of dis-
posing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. 
Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to 
separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of 
a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. 
Generally speaking, the grant or the refusal of such a right to a portion of its population 
of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method is, exclu-
sively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitely constituted.119
116 See ibid. at pp. 8-9; Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determi-
nation Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at p. 279.
117 See Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a 
Contemporary Law of Nations at p. 280.
118 With respect to the relationship between self-determination and minority rights, the Commission 
observed, inter alia, that the two concepts have a common goal, i.e. “to assure to some national Group 
the maintenance and free development of its social, ethnical or religious characteristics”. As such, the 
Commission considered self-determination and minority rights as being two distinct methods for achiev-
ing that goal. See Report of the International Commission of Jurists (Larnaude, Huber, Struycken), LNOJ 
Special Supplement No. 3 (October 1920), at para. 6.
119 Ibid., at paras 5-6.
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In short, State sovereignty prevailed for the Jurists, as it considered the question 
of self-determination in the form of secession to be a matter which should be – in 
general – left exclusively to the domestic jurisdiction of the State(s) concerned. The 
Jurists, however, touched upon circumstances which may shift the jurisdiction from 
the national to the international plane by stating that:
[t]he Commission, in affirming these principles, does not give an opinion concerning 
the question as to whether a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power, to the 
detriment of a section of the population of a State, would, if such circumstances arose, 
give to an international dispute, arising therefrom, such a character that its object 
should be considered as one which is not confined to the domestic jurisdiction of the 
State concerned, but comes within the sphere of action of the League of Nations.120
As regards the specific case under consideration, the Jurists reported that such a situ-
ation was not applicable to the Åland Islands question.121 Yet, they considered that 
Finland was not yet a definitively established sovereign State in 1917, since at that 
time Finland itself was breaking away from the Russian Empire and establishing 
its independence. Consequently, the matter did not exclusive involve Finland and, 
hence, the League of Nations Council was authorized to come up with recommenda-
tions for a settlement of the dispute under Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, the Jurists argued.122
After the report by the Jurists was submitted to open the Åland Islands dispute to 
international jurisdiction, a Committee of Rapporteurs (hereafter: Rapporteurs) was 
created for the purpose of examining the matter and formulating a solution. Similar 
to the report of the Jurists, the relationship between self-determination and State sov-
ereignty formed the basis for the Rapporteurs’ reflections. The question the Rappor-
teurs asked themselves concerned “that of Finland’s right of sovereignty with regard 
to the Åland Islands”.123 Was Finland a sovereign State after its declaration of inde-
pendence from Russia and did Finland have sovereignty over the Åland Islands? In 
contrast to the Jurists, the Rapporteurs did not consider Finland to be a new sovereign 
State. Having considered both historical and geographical factors, the Rapporteurs 
concluded that “the right of sovereignty of the Finnish State over the Åland Islands 
is, in our view, incontestable and their present legal status is that they form part of 
Finland”.124 Despite this sovereignty, the Rapporteurs held the view that the Åland 
Islands question surpassed the domestic jurisdiction of Finland.125 Consequently, it 
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., at para. 5.
122 Ibid., at para. 14.
123 Report of the International Committee of Rapporteurs (Beyens, Calonder, Elkens), 16 April 1921, LN 
Council Document B7/2I/68/106 [VII], at para. 22.
124 Ibid., at para. 25.
125 Ibid., at para. 22.
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considered whether “adequate reasons” and “sufficiently weighty considerations” 
were present to organize a plebiscite for the Ålanders and to alter their situation.126 In 
this connection, the relationship between self-determination and minority rights was 
explored. The Rapporteurs agreed with the Jurists that self-determination was: 
not, properly speaking a rule of international law and the League of Nations has not 
entered it in its Covenant. […] It is a principle of justice and of liberty, expressed by 
a vague and general formula which has given rise to most varied interpretations and 
differences of opinion.127 
In addition, the Rapporteurs stressed that minority rights should be seen as means of 
justice and liberty as well. Whether justice and liberty should be obtained through 
self-determination or through minority rights depended on two factors, i.e. stability 
and oppression. The Rapporteurs considered the following: 
Is it possible to admit as an absolute rule that a minority of the population of a State, 
which is definitely constituted and perfectly capable of fulfilling its duties as such, has 
the right of separating itself from her in order to be incorporated in another State or to 
declare independence? The answer can only be in the negative. To concede minorities, 
either of language or religion, or to any fraction of a population the right of withdraw-
ing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good 
pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anar-
chy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea 
of the State as a territorial and political unity.128
With this statement on the importance of stability, the Rapporteurs seemed to repu-
diate the existence of an absolute right to secede unilaterally. At the same time, the 
Rapporteurs expressed their awareness of situations in which justice and liberty are 
not served by forcing a minority to stay within the borders of a State. Hence, the Rap-
porteurs deliberately left open the possibility of secession as a last resort, for instance 
in cases of persistent and extreme oppression of a group:129
The separation of a minority from the State can only be considered as an altogether 
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to 
enact and apply just and effective guarantees.130
126 Ibid., at para. 25.
127 Ibid., at para. 27.
128 Ibid., at paras 27-28.
129 Thomas D. Musgrave referred to this concept as the ‘right of reversion’. See Musgrave, Self-Deter-
mination and National Minorities at p. 171. 
130 Report of the Committee of Rapporteurs (Beyens, Calonder, Elkens), 16 April 1921, LN Council 
Document B7/2I/68/106 [VII], at para. 28.
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According to the Rapporteurs, this special case did not apply to the Ålanders. In 
this respect, it considered that although the Ålanders were threatened in their lan-
guage and culture, and although two of their leaders had been arrested, no evidence 
of oppression could be found. Accordingly, the Rapporteurs deemed it possible to 
come to a settlement which would guarantee the cultural identity of the Ålanders, but 
short of separation.131 
Ultimately, the Rapporteurs concluded that, in principle, the Åland Islands dispute 
was to be settled by granting the archipelago political autonomy under Finnish sover-
eignty. More specifically, the proposed settlement entailed the extension of the 1920 
Autonomy Act with several measures concerning education, migration and property 
rights. This conclusion, however, was followed by a caveat, noting that if Finland 
would fail to grant the Ålanders the guarantees which the Rapporteurs deemed neces-
sary, they would recommend another solution, which was exactly the one which they 
wished to preclude:
The interest of the Ålanders, the interests of a durable peace in the Baltic, would then 
force us to advise the separation of the islands from Finland, based on the wishes of the 
inhabitants which would be freely expressed by means of a plebiscite.132
In sum, it can be concluded that both the report by the Commission of Jurists and 
the report by the Committee of Rapporteurs rejected self-determination to be a right 
for minorities or national groups to secede unilaterally from the sovereign State they 
belong to. At the heart of this conclusion were considerations of stability. Simultane-
ously, both reports admitted the option of application of the principle of self-deter-
mination by means of territorial separation for sub-State groups which are subjected 
to extreme misgovernment and oppression by the parent State.133 In this connection 
however, the Committee of Rapporteurs stressed that initially, the parties involved 
should seek to negotiate a settlement within the framework of the existing State, for 
instance through the granting of minority rights. Put differently, unilateral secession 
was seen as a last resort option. Arguably, the origins of the concept of remedial 
secession may be found here.134 
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., at para. 34.
133 This is what James R. Crawford termed carence de souveraineté. See Crawford, The Creation of 
States in International Law at p. 111. 
134 See Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans”, Secession and the Great 
Powers’ Rule at p. 5.
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2.3.2. Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire
The Kantangese Peoples’ Congress was a political organization claiming to repre-
sent the population of Katanga, a region of Zaire (as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo was then called) which had attempted to separate from that country in 1960. 
In 1992, the President of the Katangese Peoples’ Congress submitted a communica-
tion to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on behalf 
of the organization, involving a claim of denial of self-determination. The complaint 
aimed, inter alia, at gaining recognition of the Katangese Peoples’ Congress as a lib-
eration movement, at obtaining recognition of the right of the Kantagese people to 
secede from Zaire, and at safeguarding the withdrawal of Zaire from the territory.135 
The African Commission responded to these claims by stating that the right to 
self-determination as expressed in Article 20(1) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights136 (hereafter: African Charter) was, indeed, applicable to the circum-
stances at issue. Subsequently, it explained that the right to self-determination might 
be exercised by means of, for instance, “independence, self-government, federalism, 
confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that accords with the wishes 
of the people”.137 With this phrase, the African Commission recognized the exist-
ence of the external dimension of self-determination as well as the internal one. In 
this connection, the African Commission expressed its awareness of the principles 
of State sovereignty and territorial integrity, and observed that it had an obligation 
to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire, which was a member of 
the Organization of African Unity (today: African Union) and a party to the African 
Charter.138 The African Commission proceeded by stating:
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that the 
territorial integrity of Zaire should be called into question and in the absence of evi-
dence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in government as 
guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the African Charter, the Commission holds the view that 
Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.139 
135 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. 
No. 75/92, 1995 (not dated), at para. 1.
136 Article 20(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights reads as follows: “All peoples 
shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-deter-
mination. They shall freely determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social 
development according to the policy they have freely chosen.”
137 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. 
No. 75/92, 1995 (not dated), at para. 4.
138 Ibid., at para. 5.
139 Ibid., at para. 6.
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Thus, since the Katangese Peoples had merely complained of a violation of the right 
to self-determination without substantiating that other human rights guaranteed in 
the African Charter had been infringed, their right to self-determination was to be 
exercised within the framework of the existing State rather than by means of inde-
pendence. Consequently, the claim by the Katangese Peoples’ Congress was rejected. 
When reading the above reasoning a contrario, arguably, the African Commis-
sion took the view that under certain circumstances, the Katangese people would 
be allowed to exercise a modality of self-determination which would infringe the 
territorial integrity of Zaire, i.e. by means of unilateral secession. The first situation 
indicated was that of severe human rights violations; the second was that of lack of 
internal self-determination. Since evidence for such circumstances was not presented 
in this case, the African Commission ruled that the people of Katanga were compelled 
to implement their right to self-determination within the framework of the State they 
belonged to, so internally.140 Perhaps even more importantly, it should be emphasized 
that the African Commission did not refer to the notion of remedial secession explic-
itly, but rather an a contrario reading is needed for such an interpretation.
It may be noted that, with respect to the issues underlying the decision, the Afri-
can Commission remained obscure. For example, although it noted that “whether the 
Katangese consist of one or more ethnic groups is, for this purpose immaterial”,141 
the African Commission did not take a clear standpoint as regards the question of 
whether the inhabitants of the Katanga region were to be viewed as a people. The 
fact that it recognized that Katanga was entitled to “a variant of self-determination”, 
which is generally considered to be a right of peoples, possibly implied that the Afri-
can Commission considered the inhabitants of the territory to constitute a people.142
2.3.3. Loizidou v. Turkey
In the case of Loizidou v. Turkey,143 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
was not explicitly asked to comment on the issue of self-determination of peoples. 
Rather, Loizidou v. Turkey is generally considered to involve a landmark decision 
concerning the rights of refugees who wish to return to their former homes and prop-
erties. The applicant in the case, Mrs Titina Loizidou, was a Cypriot national who was 
140 See, for instance, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 330; D. Shelton, ‘Self-
Determination in Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon’ (2011) 105 American Jour-
nal of International Law 60 at p. 66; Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and 
Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at p. 266.
141 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. 
No. 75/92, 1995 (not dated), at para. 3.
142 See Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a 
Contemporary Law of Nations at pp. 266-267.




dispelled from her home in Kyrenia when Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus in 
1974. For years, she attempted to return to her properties, but being a Greek Cypriot, 
she was denied access to the northern part of Cyprus which was occupied by Turkish 
forces. As a result of the application by Mrs Loizidou, the European Court of Human 
Rights held Turkey responsible for violations of property rights in the northern part of 
Cyprus, since Turkish forces exercised effective overall control over this territory.144
It is to be noted that, as such, neither the facts of the case, nor the judgment itself 
is of great relevance to this Chapter. Yet, what is pertinent is the separate opinion 
of Judge Wildhaber, joined by Judge Ryssdal. This opinion was phrased against the 
backdrop of the circumstances of the case, which will only be highlighted here.145 
After nearly a decade of fierce bi-communal strife between the Turkish and Greek 
inhabitants of Cyprus, Turkish forces invaded Cyprus to occupy the Northern part of 
the island following a coup in 1974. When negotiations between the Greek and Turk-
ish Cypriots proved unsuccessful, the Turkish area declared itself the Turkish Repub-
lic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The UN Security Council subsequently adopted 
Resolution 541 (1983), which, inter alia, condemned the declaration establishing the 
TRNC and required that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from the Republic of 
Cyprus.146 Again, with the adoption of Resolution 550 (1984), the UN Security Coun-
cil condemned “all secessionist actions”, incited States not to recognize the TRNC, 
and called upon them “to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, 
unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus”.147 However, the UN peace pro-
posal efforts failed and in May 1985, the Turkish Cypriots approved a constitution 
for the TRNC by means of a referendum. Nonetheless, the independent status of this 
entity was recognized only by Turkey, which still deploys about 30,000 troops on the 
territory. 
It was in light of the events set forth above that Judge Wildhaber attached a sepa-
rate opinion to the judgment in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey. In his concurring 
opinion, Judge Wildhaber found that Turkey could not legitimately claim “that the 
‘TRNC’ was established by the Turkish Cypriot people in pursuance of their right to 
self-determination”, as it did not meet the conditions to warrant this right.148 In this 
respect, he observed that: 
144 Ibid., at paras 39-64. 
145 For a more elaborate overview of this historical background, see, generally, F. Hoffmeister, ‘Cyprus’ 
in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated online edn, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2010). See also European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, 
Application No. 15318/89, Judgment (Merits), 18 December 1996, at paras 16-25.
146 UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) (On Cyprus) UN Doc. S/Res/541 (1983), 18 November 
1983. 
147 UN Security Council Resolution 550 (1984) (On Cyprus), UN Doc. S/Res/550 (1984), 11 May 1984.
148 European Court of Human Rights, Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment (Merits), 
18 December 1996, Concurring opinion of Judge Wildhaber joined by Judge Ryssdal, at para. 1.
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[u]ntil recently in international practice the right to self-determination was in practical 
terms identical to, and indeed restricted to, a right to decolonisation. In recent years 
a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right of [exter-
nal] self-determination if their human rights are consistently and flagrantly violated 
or if they are without representation at all or are massively under-represented in an 
undemocratic and discriminatory way. If this description is correct, then the right to 
self-determination is a tool which may be used to re-establish international standards 
of human rights and democracy.149 
Regrettably for the purpose of the present study, Judge Wildhaber did not elaborate 
on the grounds on which he reached this conclusion. The context suggests that he 
identified an emerging agreement amongst scholars that the right to self-determi-
nation – more specifically its external dimension by means of secession – is to be 
interpreted as a remedy to a people whose rights have been abused by the State in a 
consistent and severe manner. At the same time, however, it seems that Judge Wild-
haber himself was not fully convinced of the correctness of this observation, as he 
phrased the latter sentence using rather careful language. Consequently, one needs to 
be cautious with drawing far-reaching conclusions from this extract.
2.3.4. Reference re Secession of Quebec 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the famous Reference re Secession 
of Quebec is generally viewed to provide guidance for the recognition of secession-
ist claims beyond colonization.150 It may be said that the Canadian Supreme Court 
showed a more considerate view of the right to self-determination than the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights did in the case of the Katangese Peoples’ 
Congress v. Zaire. In Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Canadian Supreme Court 
framed its view on the issues of self-determination and secession in very cautious 
language, thereby indicating a duty for all parties involved to negotiate a settlement 
and emphasizing that outside the colonial context, unilateral secession may only be 
permitted in exceptional and defined circumstances. What is more, in this case before 
149 Ibid., at para. 2.
150 See, for instance, A.F. Bayefsky, ‘Introduction’ in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.) Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000), for example 
at p. 4; P. Dumberry, ‘Lessons Learned from the Quebec Secession Reference before the Supreme Court 
of Canada’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2006) at pp. 416-452; Hansen, Modern Territorial Statehood at pp. 128-136; P. Oliver, ‘Can-
ada’s Two Solitudes: Constitutional and International Law in Reference re Secession of Quebec’ (1999) 6 
International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 65; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determina-
tion at pp. 331-332; Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination 
Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at pp. 293-301; M. Suski, ‘Keeping the Lid on the Secession 
Kettle: A Review of Legal Interpretations Concerning Claims of Self-Determination by Minority Peo-
ples’ (2005) 12 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 189 at pp. 214-216.
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the Canadian Supreme Court, international legal experts from around the world were 
invited to prepare written opinions on the questions at hand.151 These expert opinions 
should not only be viewed as useful insights into the ongoing scholarly debate con-
cerning the right to self-determination,152 but also as important input in the Supreme 
Court’s considerations. 
The case before the Canadian Supreme Court may be traced back to November 
1976, when the separatist Parti Québécois was elected into office in the Province 
of Quebec153 for the first time. The Parti Québécois capitalized on the sense of dis-
content amongst the French-Canadians, who form the majority in Quebec but are a 
minority in Canada as a whole, and have a distinct language and culture. In order to 
protect this special identity, the Parti Québécois presented a plan of sovereignty asso-
ciation for Quebec, which essentially encompassed the secession of Quebec com-
bined with an economic association and monetary union with Canada. This option 
was put before the enfranchised citizens of Quebec in a referendum in the spring of 
1980, during which it was declined by almost 60 per cent of the votes.154 In response 
to the outcome of the referendum, expectations of constitutional change were created 
by the federal government. The negotiations, however, did not satisfy the concerns 
of Quebec. Yet, after being re-elected in 1994, the Parti Québécois presented a draft 
bill to the Quebec National Assembly, which set out a proposal for Quebec’s transi-
tion to sovereignty. According to this draft bill, which was first to be approved by 
the Quebec National Assembly, a referendum on the matter was to be held to consult 
the entire population of Quebec. Following a positive outcome of the referendum, 
negotiations on an economic and political partnership with Canada were to be initi-
ated. Only if these negotiations would fail, could the National Assembly proclaim 
the independence of Quebec.155 Consequently, three separatist parties, i.e. the Parti 
Québécois, Bloc Québécois and Action Démocratique du Québec, concluded a Tri-
partite Agreement in 1995, in which they anticipated an economic partnership with 
151 The experts involved were Georges Abi-Saab, Christine Chinkin, James R. Crawford, Thomas M. 
Franck, Alain Pellet, Malcolm N. Shaw and Luzius Wildhaber. Crawford and Wildhaber were asked to 
write opinions for the Attorney General, while the other experts were nominated as Amicus Curiae to 
present arguments on behalf of the secessionist entity, for the government of Quebec refused to partici-
pate in the proceedings. The expert reports are documented in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in 
International Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000). 
152 For an outline of the scholarly debate on this matter, see Section 2.2 of the present Chapter.
153 Quebec is the largest Canadian province by area and the second largest in population. See M.D. 
Behiels, ‘Quebec’ Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica Online edn, 2010). 
154 See, for instance, Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons 
Learned at pp. 5-6; Oliver, ‘Canada’s Two Solitudes: Constitutional and International Law in Reference 
re Secession of Quebec’ at pp. 71-72; Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and 
Self-Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at p. 418.
155 Draft Bill, An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec, tabled at the National Assembly on 6 
December 1994.
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Canada and the (unilateral) proclamation of Quebec’s sovereignty after one year.156 
It is noteworthy that a lawyer from the city of Quebec, Mr Bertrand, initiated pro-
ceedings before the Quebec Superior Court aimed at preventing the referendum. He 
adduced that the draft bill and the proposal for Quebec’s transition to sovereignty 
were constitutionally invalid. Although the Court found that the constitutional rights 
of Mr Bertrand were indeed threatened by the draft bill since it intended to declare 
the independence of Quebec unilaterally, it deemed the issuing of an injunction as a 
means to prevent the referendum improper.157 
Ultimately, the referendum was held on 30 October 1995 and resulted in a rejec-
tion of Quebec’s move towards sovereignty with 50.58 per cent of the votes.158 After 
the alarming outcome of the referendum and bearing in mind the pending renewed 
litigation initiated by Mr Bertrand, the federal government changed to a strategy 
of opposition to the sentiment of separatism within Quebec. This policy involved, 
inter alia, the submission of a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada as regards 
a number of legal issues in the event of a future attempt by Quebec to secede from 
Canada unilaterally. Under Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, the following 
(hypothetical) questions were referred to the Court:
 1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or Gov-
ernment of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
 2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or Government 
of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
In this regard, is there a right to self-determination under international law that 
would give the National Assembly, legislature or Government of Quebec the right 
to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
 3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the 
National Assembly, legislature or Government of Quebec to effect the secession 
of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada?159
It is understood that the second question is most relevant for the purpose of this study. 
This question will therefore be examined before briefly touching upon the first and 
156 Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec, 1st Sess., 35th Leg., Quebec. The Tripartite 
Agreement of 12 June 1995 was included as a schedule within Bill 1. 
157 See, for instance, Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons 
Learned at pp. 10-12.
158 The question put before the enfranchised citizens read as follows: “Do you agree that Quebec should 
become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partner-
ship, within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 
1995 (i.e. the ‘Tripartite Agreement’)?”
159 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217. As the govern-
ment of Quebec declined the opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the Court, the Court 




third question. In approaching the second questions, the Supreme Court started by 
observing that: 
[i]nternational law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit 
denial of such a right, although such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the excep-
tional circumstances required for secession to be permitted under the right of a people 
to self-determination.160 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court explored the substance of this right to self-deter-
mination. In this respect, it noted that today, the existence of such a right is so widely 
accepted in various international legal documents that “the principle has acquired 
a status beyond ‘convention’ and is considered a general principle of international 
law”.161 The Supreme Court continued by exploring the relationship between self-
determination and territorial integrity and found that: 
international law expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peo-
ples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the main-
tenance of the territorial integrity of those states.162
Thus, according to the Supreme Court, self-determination was effectively restricted 
by the prevailing right to territorial integrity. In this connection, a second balance was 
applied. In the Åland Islands case, the Committee of Rapporteurs had struck a bal-
ance between self-determination on the one hand and minority rights on the other. In 
the present case, the Supreme Court balanced the internal dimension and the external 
dimension of self-determination. The Supreme Court interpreted the internal dimen-
sion as “a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development 
within the framework of an existing state”, while the external dimension was defined 
by using the wording of the Friendly Relations Declaration: “[t]he establishment of 
a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an inde-
pendent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a 
people”.163 On the basis of the sources of international law, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that, in principle, the right to self-determination is exercised through internal 
self-determination.164 Considerations of threats to the territorial integrity of and the 
stability of international relations among States were at the basis of this finding.165 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court admitted that in exceptional circumstances, 
the peoples’ right to self-determination may be exercised externally, which would 
160 Ibid., at para. 112.
161 Ibid., at para. 114.
162 Ibid., at para. 122.
163 Ibid., at para. 126.
164 Ibid., at para. 126.
165 Ibid., at para. 127.
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presumably include the means of secession. This only applies to “the most extreme 
of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances”.166 More specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court noted that the first context in which a right to external 
self-determination was certainly applicable was that of colonial people. Another 
undisputed and related context was that of a “people which is subject to alien subju-
gation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context”.167 Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court argued that several scholars – whom it did not mention by name – 
have advanced an additional circumstance under which external self-determination 
would be applicable:
Although this third circumstance has been described in several ways, the underly-
ing proposition is that, when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its 
right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by 
secession.168
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the text of the Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action – more specifically, its safeguard clause – added credence to this 
assertion. Nonetheless, it continued with the caveat that it “remains unclear whether 
this third proposition actually reflects an established international law standard”, but 
the Supreme Court did not find it necessary for the purpose of the reference to elabo-
rate on that issue.169 In sum, the three circumstances phrased all point at the precondi-
tion of a denial of internal self-determination. As such, the Supreme Court deemed 
the exceptional circumstances “manifestly inapplicable” to the case of Quebec. It 
therefore concluded that, under contemporary international law, Quebec did not pos-
sess a right to secede unilaterally from Canada.170 Notwithstanding this view, the 
Supreme Court remained ambiguous as regards the question of whether the inhab-
itants of Quebec constituted a ‘people’ according to international law. Although it 
acknowledged that characterization as a ‘people’ was the “threshold step” for the 
entitlement to self-determination,171 it refrained from determining whether the popu-
lation of Quebec would actually qualify as such. It merely noted that while for a 
large part the inhabitants of Quebec had common characteristics, which is important 
in considering whether a certain group constitutes a ‘people’, “it is not necessary to 
explore this legal characterization to resolve Question 2 appropriately”.172
With regard to the first question of the reference, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that “the legality of unilateral secession must be evaluated […] from the perspective 
166 Ibid., at para. 126.
167 Ibid., at paras 131-133.
168 Ibid., at para. 134.
169 Ibid., at para. 135.
170 Ibid., at para. 138.
171 Ibid., at para. 123.
172 Ibid., at para. 125.
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of the domestic legal order of the state from which the unit seeks to withdraw”.173 
It may be recalled in this respect that when dealing with the second question of the 
reference, it observed that “[i]nternational law contains neither a right of unilateral 
secession nor the explicit denial of such a right”. Rather, in large measure, “it leaves 
the creation of a new state to be determined by the domestic law of the existing state 
of which the seceding entity presently forms a part”.174 Exploring domestic law, the 
Supreme Court found that the Canadian Constitution remains silent on the matter of 
unilateral secession: it is neither expressly permitted nor prohibited. Nevertheless, it 
took the view that an act of secession would “alter the governance of Canadian ter-
ritory in a manner which undoubtedly is inconsistent with our current constitutional 
arrangements” and as such, it deemed unilateral secession to be illegal.175 As regards 
the effect of a referendum, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that an outcome in 
favour of secession would immediately exclude Quebec from domestic jurisdiction, 
as a result of which the case would be governed by international law. Accordingly, it 
considered that: 
the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of the 
desire to pursue secession by the population of a province would give rise to a recipro-
cal obligation on all parties to the Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to 
respond to that desire.176 
Thus, the Supreme Court imposed a duty on the parties involved to negotiate in good 
faith about the possibility and terms of secession. These negotiations should be con-
ducted in conformity with the constitutional principles of federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities,177 and should include 
all matters, ranging from borders to economic issues.178 In this connection, the impor-
tance of the popular will was emphasized and limited at the same time, since it was 
noted that the right to self-determination could not be invoked in order to impose 
the terms of the proposed secession to the other parties in question. For, “that would 
not be a negotiation at all”.179 Furthermore, attention was drawn to the relationship 
between the domestic and the international realms, as the Supreme Court held that the 
ultimate success of secession would depend on the recognition by the international 
community of the newly proclaimed State. Whether either of the parties involved has 
been unwilling to enter into negotiations might influence the process of international 
173 Ibid., at para. 83.
174 Ibid., at para. 112.
175 Ibid., at para. 84. 
176 Ibid., at para. 88.
177 Ibid., at paras 87-91, 149.
178 Ibid., at para. 96.
179 Ibid., at para. 91.
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recognition following an act of unilateral secession.180 Yet, it stressed that interna-
tional recognition could not provide for a justification of the secession in retroaction, 
neither under Canadian constitutional law nor under international law.181 Finally, con-
sidering the answers formulated to the first and second questions of the reference, the 
Supreme Court did not elaborate on the third question. It was merely noted that in 
casu, there was no conflict between domestic and international law.182 
In sum, it is to be noted that although the Canadian Supreme Court did not clearly 
express its own views as regards the existence of a right to unilateral secession under 
contemporary international law, it appears that it tended to recognize the existence of 
such a qualified right rather than to repudiate it.183 Yet, it should be kept in mind that 
the Supreme Court used very careful language, which conveys the impression that it 
sought to avoid attaching far-reaching consequences to its decision. First, it denied 
the existence of a constitutional right to secede and identified a constitutional obliga-
tion for all parties involved to enter into negotiations in case a majority expresses the 
wish to secede. Subsequently, with respect to the international legal perspective, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that, outside the colonial context, external self-determi-
nation could only be exercised in exceptional and defined situations. In addition, it 
remained rather indistinct as to the precise circumstances required to trigger a right 
to unilateral secession beyond colonialism, as it merely noted the situations of alien 
subjugation, domination or exploitation and that of the denial of the meaningful 
exercise of internal self-determination. What is more, the Supreme Court immedi-
ately mitigated its proposition by noting that it remains questionable whether such a 
right to unilateral secession is an established norm under contemporary international 
law. Likewise, it seemed to avoid the contentious issue of whether the inhabitants of 
Quebec constituted a ‘people’ under international law.184 Finally, it is to be empha-
sized that the acknowledgement of a right to remedial secession in this very case 
remained confined to an obiter dictum, which means that it concerns a comment by 
the Court which was not required for reaching a decision on the matter at hand and, 
therefore, is not binding.185 In view of the foregoing, although the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s decision certainly shows some support for the existence of a right to unilat-
eral secession, one should be cautious drawing extensive conclusions from it. 
180 Ibid., at paras 103, 142-143, 155.
181 Ibid., at para. 155.
182 Ibid., at para. 147.
183 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 331-332.
184 See also Dumberry, ‘Lessons Learned from the Quebec Secession Reference before the Supreme 
Court of Canada’ at p. 436; Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Deter-
mination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations at pp. 295-296.
185 This remark was also made by Jure Vidmar. See J. Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International 
Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ (2010) 6 St Antony’s International Review 37 at p. 39.
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2.3.5. Kevin Ngwanga Gumne et al. v. Cameroon
Years after having addressed the peoples’ right to self-determination in its decision 
regarding Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights was requested to deal with that right once again in the case of 
Kevin Ngwanga Gumne et al. v. Cameroon.186 In doing so, the African Commission 
reiterated the conditions for unilateral secession it had formulated in Katangese Peo-
ples’ Congress v. Zaire, as will be demonstrated below.
In the case of Kevin Ngwanga Gumne et al. v. Cameroon, fourteen individuals had 
brought a communication against the Republic of Cameroon before the African Com-
mission on their behalf and on behalf of the population of the Southern Cameroon 
region. After World War I, this part of the Republic of Cameroon became a territory 
administered by the British under the League of Nations Mandate System, while the 
remainder of the territory was placed under French rule. At the end of World War II, 
both territories converted into trust territories under the UN Trusteeship System. Sub-
sequent to the independence of the Republic of Cameroon in 1960, a UN plebiscite 
was held, offering the Southern Cameroonians two options, i.e. joining Nigeria or 
joining Cameroon. Although they voted for the latter option, the communication sub-
mitted to the African Commission alleged that the UN plebiscite disregarded a third 
alternative, that is, independent and sovereign statehood for Southern Cameroon. 
According to the complainants, a vast majority of 99 per cent of the region’s inhabit-
ants preferred independence over the two options which were presented in the plebi-
scite. The failure of the Republic of Cameroon to exercise that “third alternative” 
impacted negatively on the right of the people of Southern Cameroon to self-determi-
nation, so it was asserted.187 Furthermore, the complainants asserted that the Republic 
of Cameroon has systematically violated the human rights of several individuals.188
For the purpose of this study, most relevant are the paragraphs of the African Com-
mission’s decision considering the alleged violation of the right to self-determination 
under Article 20 of the African Charter.189 In this respect, the complainants claimed 
that the “alleged unlawful and forced annexation and colonial occupation” of South-
ern Cameroon by the Republic of Cameroon constituted a violation of this provi-
sion.190 In addition, it was asserted that the Southern Cameroonians were a “separate 
186 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Kevin Ngwanga Gumne et al. v. Cameroon, 
Comm. No. 266/2003, 2009 (not dated).
187 Ibid., at paras 1-6. For an elaborate account of the history of Cameroon, see M.W. DeLancey, ‘Cam-
eroon’ Encyclopædia Britannica (Encyclopædia Britannica Online edn, 2010). 
188 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Kevin Ngwanga Gumne et al. v. Cameroon, 
Comm. No. 266/2003, 2009 (not dated), at para. 18. More specifically, in addition to violation of the right 
to self-determination, the complainants asserted that Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(1), 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17(1), 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23(1), and 24 of the African Charter had been violated.
189 Ibid., at paras 163-203.
190 Ibid., at para. 163.
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and distinct people” as a result of the British administration over the territory. This 
had led to the use of the English language, the common law legal tradition and a dis-
tinct educational and governmental system. Moreover, the inhabitants of Southern 
Cameroon were said to have their own traditional cultures.191 
In response to these claims, the African Commission first sought to elucidate 
the meaning of the term ‘peoples’ under the African Charter. It started by acknowl-
edging the “controversial nature of the issue, due to the political connotation that it 
carries”.192 Although to date, international law has not been able to define the notion, 
a number of objective characteristics which are attributable to a collectivity of people 
and may qualify them as a ‘people’ have been recognized. Reference was made, 
inter alia, to the UNESCO group of experts, which in this respect listed a common 
historical tradition, a racial or ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, 
religious and ideological affinities, territorial connection and a common economic 
life.193 Having analysed literature on the matter and having reflected upon the argu-
ments put forward by the parties involved, the African Commission concluded that 
the population of Southern Cameroon can be viewed as a ‘people’ under international 
law, since:
they manifest numerous characteristics and affinities, which include a common his-
tory, linguistic tradition, territorial connection, and political outlook. More impor-
tantly, they identify themselves as a people with a separate and distinct identity.194
Subsequently, the question raised whether the people of Southern Cameroon may 
claim the right to self-determination. In answering this question, the African Com-
mission granted a prominent position to its considerations in Katangese Peoples’ 
Congress v. Zaire. In conformity with its reasoning in the latter case, it noted that the 
African Commission is required to uphold the territorial integrity of State Parties to 
the African Charter and accordingly, cannot allow or promote an act of secession by 
the Southern Cameroonians.195 In this connection, it expressed the view that the right 
to self-determination may only be exercised externally, through unilateral secession, 
if the test as phrased in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire is met. That is to say, 
there must be:
concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the point that the territorial integrity 
of the State Party should be called to question, coupled with the denial of the people, 
their right to participate in the government as guaranteed by Article 13(1).196
191 Ibid., at paras 167-168.
192 Ibid., at para. 169.
193 Ibid., at paras 169-170.
194 Ibid., at paras 178-179.
195 Ibid., at para. 190.
196 Ibid., at para. 194.
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Since the African Commission found that, in casu, the complainants had neither dem-
onstrated proof of massive human rights violations, nor that their right to partici-
pate in the government had been violated, it concluded that the people of Southern 
Cameroon were not entitled to secede unilaterally.197 Yet, as the African Commission 
recalled, secession is not the only means of exercising the right to self-determination. 
Autonomy arrangements within the framework of the existing State were also pos-
sible means for the people of Southern Cameroon to exercise their right to self-deter-
mination.198 Finally, the African Commission stated the conviction that resolving the 
grievances of the Southern Cameroons did not require secession, but would rather 
call for a “comprehensive national dialogue”.199
Summarizing, it may be said that in Kevin Ngwanga Gumne et al. v. Cameroon, 
the African Commission showed some traces of a qualified right to unilateral seces-
sion. It seems that it recognized the existence of such a right with more conviction 
than in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire. This time, no a contrario reasoning 
is needed to reveal the support for a right to unilateral secession, for the African 
Commission put the basis for the justified exercise of secession in more positive 
phraseology: 
in order for [human rights] violations to constitute the basis for the exercise of the right 
to [external] self-determination under the African Charter, they must meet the test set 
out in the Katanga case.200 
As such, it appears that the African Commission not only reiterated the view expressed 
in Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, but also convincingly reinforced that out-
look by establishing a touchstone in this respect. In sum, although the African Com-
mission generally gives precedence to the principle of territorial integrity of States 
and focuses on internal self-determination, it grants an important role to the political 
rights embodied in Article 13 of the African Charter in assessing whether or not a 
people is oppressed to the extent that their right to internal self-determination con-
verts into an entitlement to secede from the existing State.201
2.3.6. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion regarding Kosovo’s unilat-
eral declaration of independence was long-awaited by many people. From the Serb 
197 Ibid., at paras 195-200.
198 Ibid., at para. 191.
199 Ibid., at para. 203.
200 Ibid., at para. 194.
201 See Shelton, ‘Self-Determination in Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon’ at pp. 4-6.
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government and the Kosovo Albanian population to academics and the community 
of States, many expected this ruling to shed some light on important (legal) ques-
tions, including that of the (il)legality of Kosovo’s attempt to secede by declaring 
itself independent from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Although it may be said that 
the Court failed to live up to these high expectations, its Advisory Opinion is rel-
evant when searching for traces of a right to unilateral secession. Therefore, the back-
ground of the case, the Advisory Opinion itself and some individual opinions by 
Judges attached to it will be scrutinized below. 
2.3.6.1. Background of the Case
Within the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo had been an 
autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia.202 The ethnic make-up of Kosovo is 
majority Albanian with a Serb minority. In 1989, President Slobodan Milošević with-
drew Kosovo’s special autonomy.203 This decision seems to stem from fear of ethnic 
dominance of the Serb minority by the Albanian majority, while the Serbs consid-
ered Kosovo to be the cradle of their culture. Under Serb rule, the Albanian popula-
tion was oppressed and discriminated against: the Kosovo parliament was dissolved, 
Kosovo Albanians lost their jobs to Serb fellow citizens, restraints were imposed 
on the Albanian media, and reports concerning abuse and even torture of detained 
Kosovo Albanians were reported.204 Consequently, an underground movement led 
by Ibrahim Rugova was established, which created a shadow society. After years of 
peaceful yet unsuccessful resistance by Rugova and his followers, in 1996, a radi-
calized part of the Albanian population founded the Kosovo Liberation Army UÇK, 
which called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy. When they felt that their 
wishes were ignored, the UÇK shifted to an armed campaign. Attacks on primarily 
Serbian military targets followed, but assaults were also committed on Albanians 
suspected of collaboration. In turn, the Serb government responded with police and 
military action, resulting in widespread violence which was not only aimed at the 
UÇK, but also at Kosovo’s civilian population. These events are to be seen against 
the background of great unrest in the Balkans. Four of the six republics of the Social-
202 For a brief history of Kosovo, see, for instance, J.B. Allcock, ‘Kosovo’ Encyclopædia Britannica 
(Encyclopædia Britannica Online edn, 2010); T. Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford 
University Press, New York: 2008); J. Summers, ‘Kosovo: From Yugoslav Province to Disputed Inde-
pendence’ in J. Summers (ed.) Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory 
Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, Leiden/Boston 2011) at pp. 3-51; M. Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Inde-
pendence (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) at pp. 25-40.
203 See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Judg-
ment (vol. 1), ICTY-IT-05-87-T, 26 February 2009, at paras 213-222.
204 Ibid., at paras 223-230. See also UN General Assembly Resolution 48/153 (Situation of human rights 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia), UN Doc. A/Res/48/153, 20 December 1993, at paras 17-19.
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ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared independence, which set off the break-up 
of the Republic.205 
The UN Security Council adopted a couple of resolutions condemning the exces-
sive use of force by both Serbian troops and the UÇK, and calling on the parties 
involved to seek a political solution.206 Regrettably, these resolutions had no result. 
When reports concerning forced expulsion, streams of refugees, mass graves and 
ethnic cleansing were reported, the international community intervened.207 Initially, 
diplomatic means were employed, but the agreements reached were not complied 
with and the atrocities continued. Therefore, a special conference was organized in 
Rambouillet for the purpose of resolving the status of Kosovo and the rights of the 
Kosovo Albanians. In this context, in early 1999, a plan was drafted. This plan was 
signed by the Kosovo Albanians, but turned down by the Serbs: a three-year period 
of self-government for Kosovo and the presence of NATO forces on the territory 
appeared to be unacceptable to Serbia. Even when NATO Member States threatened 
air attacks, the Serb government did not waver. Eventually, without prior UN authori-
zation, NATO launched an air campaign in order to compel the Serb government to 
withdraw its forces.208 At first, the gross human rights violations committed by the 
Serb authorities continued: torture, rape, homicide and expulsion of the Albanian 
population from Kosovo continued to occur on a large scale.209 Seventy-eight days 
after the start of the air campaign, the Serb government signed an agreement and 
withdrew its military and police forces from Kosovo.
205 See also Chapter III, Section 4.1.4.
206 UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) (On the letters from the United Kingdom (S/1998/223) 
and the United States (S/1998/272)), UN Doc. S/Res/1160 (1998), 31 March 1998; UN Security Council 
Resolution 1199 (1998) (On the situation in Kosovo (FRY)), UN Doc. S/Res/1199 (1998), 23 September 
1998.
207 See, for instance, Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report. Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned, available at <http://reliefweb.int>, last consulted on 5 October 
2012; Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, available at <http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2001/kosovo/>, last consulted 5 October 2012, at pp. 38-58; International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Judgment (vol. 1), ICTY-IT-05-87-T, 26 Febru-
ary 2009, at paras 842-920. See also UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to 
resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1998/912, 3 October 1998, 
at paras 7-9.
208 It is to be noted, however, that the legality of NATO’s actions is highly contested. NATO started an 
air campaign without an explicit prior authorization by the UN Security Council, which is needed on the 
basis of the prohibition of the use of force and the formal exceptions as formulated in the UN Charter. 
See, for instance, S. Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001); B. Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal 
Aspects’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 1.
209 See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, available at <http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/>, last consulted 5 October 2012, pp. 109-154.
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The UN Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 1244 (1999),210 
which authorized a United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), a 
UN administration with far-reaching competences.211 The object of UNMIK was not 
just to execute administrative functions temporarily, but in addition to advance sub-
stantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, to facilitate a political process to 
determine Kosovo’s future status, to promote human rights, and to support the resto-
ration of the general infrastructure on the territory. In 2006, the international process 
for resolving the issue of Kosovo’s final status started. The Kosovo population, in 
the main, aspired to independence, but Serbia stuck to its guns and invoked its sov-
ereign rights. Although agreement was reached on certain matters, the parties were 
diametrically opposed in this respect. In 2007, UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti 
Ahtisaari submitted a plan which envisioned ‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo 
after a period of international administration.212 The plan was rejected by Serbia, but 
accepted by the Kosovo authorities.
About one year after the Ahtisaari Plan was submitted, in February 2008, the 
“democratically elected leaders” of Kosovo issued their declaration of independence. 
In this declaration, they proclaimed, inter alia, that the Republic of Kosovo was an 
“independent and sovereign State”.213 Although a significant number of States recog-
nized Kosovo’s claim to sovereign statehood,214 various States refused to recognize 
an independent Kosovo. Some States, including Serbia, even asserted the illegal-
ity of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. What is more, the Serbian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs initiated a resolution for the United Nations General Assembly to 
seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which led to 
the following question: is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provi-
sional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international 
law? In early October 2008, the General Assembly adopted the resolution with a slim 
majority.215 Following the request by the General Assembly, the Court decided that 
210 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) (Kosovo), UN Doc. S/Res/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999.
211 On the issue of temporary UN administration in post-conflict situations, see S. Chesterman, You, the 
People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2004).
212 See ‘Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status’and ‘Main 
Provisions of the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement’, both available in: Letter 
dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN 
Doc. S/2007/168, 26 March 2007.
213 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, Kosovo Declaration of Independence, available at <http://
www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,25>, last consulted 1 October 2012.
214 For an up to date overview of States which have recognized Kosovo, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Kosovo, Countries that have recognized the Republic of Kosova, available on <http://www.mfa-ks.
net/?page=2,33>, last consulted 30 December 2012.
215 UN General Assembly Resolution 63/3 (Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with Inter-
national Law), UN Doc. A/Res/63/3, 8 October 2008. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote 
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“the United Nations and its Member States are considered likely to be able to fur-
nish information on the question submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion”.216 
Consequently, thirty-six UN Member States filed written statements on the ques-
tion before the Court and after having held public hearings,217 the Court started its 
deliberations.218 
2.3.6.2. The Advisory Opinion
It was not until 22 July 2010 that the International Court of Justice issued its Advisory 
Opinion on the matter, concluding by ten votes to four that Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence did not violate international law.219 To arrive at this conclusion, first, 
the Court had to clear several jurisdictional hurdles which had been raised by States 
during the proceedings. It was alleged, for instance, that the request by the General 
Assembly was beyond the scope of its competences under the UN Charter, since the 
Security Council was already seized of the situation in Kosovo. Further, it was argued 
that the question phrased by the General Assembly was political in nature rather than 
legal, which was adduced as a reason for the Court to refuse rendering an opinion.220 
of 77 in favour to 6 against (Albania, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, 
United States), and with 74 abstentions. See UN Press Release, Backing Request by Serbia, General 
Assembly Decides to Seek International Court of Justice Ruling on Legality of Kosovo’s Independence, 
UN Doc. GA/10764, 8 October 2008. It is noteworthy that the draft resolution submitted by Serbia (UN 
Doc. A/63/L.2) contained a question which was phrased with slightly different wording to the question 
which the General Assembly eventually included in its resolution. The original text included a request for 
an advisory opinion of the ICJ on “whether the 17 February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence 
in Kosovo is in accordance with international law”. 
216 International Court of Justice Press Release, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request 
for Advisory Opinion). Filing of written statements and of a written contribution, No. 2009/17, 21 April 
2009. As was observed by Sienho Yee, it should be mentioned that it was the first time that all of the per-
manent members of the UN Security Council participated in the written as well as the oral proceedings. 
See S. Yee, ‘Notes on the International Court of Justice (Part 4): The Kosovo Advisory Opinion’ (2010) 
9 Chinese Journal of International Law 763 at para. 1.
217 International Court of Justice Press Release, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for 
Advisory Opinion). Public hearings to be held from 1 December 2009, No. 2009/27, 29 July 2009.
218 International Court of Justice Press Release, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for 
Advisory Opinion). Conclusion of public hearings. Court ready to begin its deliberation, No. 2009/34, 11 
December 2009.
219 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403. 
220 Ibid., at paras 24-26. It may be interesting to note that a recent article called upon the Court to 
“exercise its discretion and refuse a request for an advisory opinion when the underlying problem can be 
resolved only by lengthy and difficult political negotiations”, such as the case of Kosovo. See A. Aust, 
‘Advisory Opinions’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 123. 
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After a lengthy and formal assessment, the Court unanimously found that it had juris-
diction and that no compelling reasons were present not to respond to the question.221 
The Court subsequently decided to focus on the scope and meaning of the question 
put before it. According to the Court, 
[t]he question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or 
not the declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does 
not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask 
whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or 
legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as 
an independent State.222
Thus, in the Court’s reasoning, it was not requested to decide whether international 
law confers a positive right or entitlement upon entities within a State to separate 
unilaterally from their parent State and create a new sovereign State – neither in the 
specific case of Kosovo, nor in general. In this respect, the Court distinguished the 
question at issue from the one submitted to the Canadian Supreme Court in the Refer-
ence re. Secession of Quebec, which was discussed above.223 The Court likewise left 
aside the right to self-determination and the concept of remedial secession; it found 
that those issues were not covered by the question which was put before it.224 
In addressing the substance of this question, the Court first considered the lawful-
ness of declarations of independence under general international law (lex generalis).225 
In this context, it observed that declarations of independence have been issued for 
centuries and have only led to international recognition and actual independence in 
some instances. Nonetheless, State practice does not suggest that the issuing of these 
declarations was in violation of international law. Moreover, during the second half 
of the twentieth century, the right to self-determination evolved into a right to inde-
pendence for the peoples of colonial and non-self-governing territories. Although a 
great number of new States have come into existence by means of this right, beyond 
the context of decolonization, States have been created as well. In this respect, State 
practice does not point to the existence of a prohibition of declarations of independ-
ence, the Court considered.226 Yet, during the proceedings, several States had argued 
that such a prohibition is implicit in the principle of territorial integrity of States. As 
will be expounded elsewhere in the present Chapter, this principle protecting the bor-
ders of States is deeply rooted in international law and reflected in the UN Charter and 
221 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, at paras 29-48.
222 Ibid., at para. 51.
223 Ibid., at para. 56.
224 Ibid., at para. 51.
225 Ibid., at paras 78-84.
226 Ibid., at para. 79.
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other international legal and political instruments. The Court found that “the scope 
of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between 
States”.227 Thus, in the present case, Serbia’s territorial integrity was not violated, 
since Kosovo’s independence was declared by a non-State entity within the borders 
of the State. Anticipating a more elaborate review of this conclusion elsewhere in 
this study,228 it may be noted here that one may question the appropriateness of the 
Court’s statement. On the one hand, the Court’s statement may be called conserva-
tive, considering the emerging role of non-State actors within contemporary inter-
national law. Yet simultaneously, the Court’s finding that the acts of sub-State entities 
are not restricted by the principle of territorial integrity may be deemed remarkably 
progressive as well, as it appears to lift what has traditionally been regarded as the 
primary obstacle to unilateral secession. During the proceedings, a number of States 
had contended that in its resolutions, the UN Security Council has condemned sev-
eral declarations of independence, for instance in the cases of Southern Rhodesia and 
Northern Cyprus. In response to this observation, the Court noted that these condem-
nations were unrelated to the unilateral character of the declarations of independence 
issued in those instances. According to the Court, 
the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed […] from the 
fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or 
other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of 
a peremptory character (jus cogens).229
Considering the exceptional character of the Security Council resolutions referred 
to, the Court concluded that no general prohibition of unilateral declarations of inde-
pendence can be inferred from this.230 A number of States, including the Netherlands, 
alleged that the population of Kosovo could claim the right to self-determination 
and a right to remedial secession ensuing from this, as a result of which Kosovo was 
entitled to separate itself from Serbia and to create an independent State. As to the 
question of the extent of the right to self-determination beyond the context of decolo-
nization, the Court merely noted that the States taking part in the proceedings showed 
“radically different views” on the matter and that: 
[s]imilar differences existed regarding whether international law provides for a right 
of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what circumstances. There was also a sharp 
227 Ibid., at para. 80.
228 The Court’s statement regarding the principle of territorial integrity will be further considered in Sec-
tion 2.4.1 of the present Chapter. 
229 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, at para. 81.
230 Ibid.
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difference of views as to whether the circumstances which some participants main-
tained would give rise to a right of “remedial secession” were actually present in 
Kosovo.231
From this, one may deduce that the Court found that no opinio juris was reflected232 
on the contemporary scope of the right to self-determination and the existence of a 
remedial right to unilateral secession.233 Furthermore, the Court observed that the 
argument in favour of a right to remedial secession was in virtually every instance 
made as a secondary argument only.234 The Court accordingly considered it “not nec-
essary to resolve such questions in the present case” as it deemed those issues being 
“beyond the scope of the question” which was before it.235
The Court subsequently examined whether Security Council Resolution 1244 
(1999) had created special rules or measures, particularly the UNMIK Constitutional 
Framework, which affected the lawfulness of Kosovo’s declaration of independ-
ence.236 According to the Court, these regulations merely aimed at creating an interim 
regime for the purpose of stabilizing Kosovo and restoring basic public order and 
did not determine Kosovo’s final status or the preconditions for that status.237 In this 
connection, the Court also examined the identity of the authors of the declaration.238 
From the phrasing of the declaration and the conditions under which it was adopted, 
the Court inferred that these authors should not be regarded as the Provisional Insti-
tutions of Self-Government as established under the Constitutional Framework, but 
rather as an assembly of persons acting “as representatives of the people of Kosovo 
outside the framework of the interim administration”.239 According to the Court, a 
231 Ibid., at para. 82.
232 It may be interesting to note that the Court took a comparable approach in its Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion, where the observation that “the members of the international community [were] pro-
foundly divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons of the past 50 years consti-
tutes the expression of an opinio juris” led the Court to conclude that no such opinio juris existed. See 
International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1996, p. 226, at para. 67. 
233 For a similar conclusion, see Yee, ‘Notes on the International Court of Justice (Part 4): The Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion’ at para. 39. As Yee rightly observes, “[i]f one is to follow the normal method of find-
ing customary international law as required by Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, no custom regarding 
such a right can be found here”. Whether such a conclusion should indeed be drawn with respect to the 
question of remedial secession will be considered in the following Chapters of this study. 
234 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, at para. 82.
235 Ibid., at para. 83.
236 Ibid., at paras 94-121.
237 Ibid., at para. 98.
238 Ibid., at paras 102-109. This approach was criticized by Vice-President Tomka in his declaration 
attached to the Advisory Opinion. See ibid., Declaration of Vice-President Tomka, paras 10-21.
239 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, at para. 109.
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prohibition of declarations of independence can neither be derived from Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) nor the Constitutional Framework, as these merely 
determined Kosovo’s interim political structures, nor do these documents contain 
any legal obligation binding upon the authors of Kosovo’s declaration of independ-
ence.240 Considering the foregoing, the Court ultimately came to the conclusion that 
the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 “did not violate 
any applicable rule of international law”.241 
The Court’s approach as outlined above has been criticized by commentators for 
various reasons.242 Moreover, it has led several judges to attach a separate opinion to 
the decision, dissociating themselves from the Court’s narrow and restrictive read-
ing.243 Indeed, the question which was put before the Court concerned the “accord-
ance with international law of the action undertaken by the representatives of the 
people of Kosovo with the aim of establishing such a new State without the consent 
of the parent State”. The question as to the legality of Kosovo’s attempt to secede 
unilaterally from Serbia, however, logically flows from this. In the words of Judge 
Yusuf:
240 Ibid., at paras 118-121.
241 Ibid., at para. 122.
242 For a criticism on (primarily) the Court’s limited approach, see, for instance, B. Arp, ‘The ICJ Advi-
sory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo and the International Protection of Minorities’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 
847; T. Burri, ‘The Kosovo Opinion and Secession: The Sounds of Silence and Missing Links’ (2010) 11 
German Law Journal 881; T. Christakis, ‘The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has International Law 
Something to Say about Secession?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 73; R. Falk, ‘The 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent’ (2011) 105 American Journal of Inter-
national Law 50; H. Hannum, ‘The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: An Opportunity Lost, or a Poisoned 
Chalice Refused?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 155; M.G. Kohen and K. Del Mar, ‘The 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion and UNSCR 1244 (1999): A Declaration of ‘Independence from International 
Law’?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 109; R. Muharremi, ‘A Note on the ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 867; C. Ryngaert, ‘The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: A Missed Opportunity?’ (2010) 57 Netherlands International 
Law Review 481; N.J. Schrijver, ‘Kosovo: dynamiek of dynamiet?’ (2010) 85 Nederlands Juristenblad 
1737; M. Vashakmadze and M. Lippold, ‘”Nothing But a Road Towards Secession”? The International 
Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo’ (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law 619; R. Wilde, 
‘International Decisions – Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independ-
ence in Respect of Kosovo’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 301; Yee, ‘Notes on the 
International Court of Justice (Part 4): The Kosovo Advisory Opinion’. 
243 See International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Sepúlveda-Amor, at paras 33-35; ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, at paras 2, 5, 17; ibid., 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, at paras 4, 20; ibid., Declaration of Judge Simma, at paras 1, 6-7. 
For a more indirect criticism, see ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade. In total, nine 
judges appended a declaration or separate opinion.
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the Court was asked to assess whether or not the process by which the people of 
Kosovo were seeking to establish their own State involved a violation of international 
law, or whether that process could be considered consistent with international law in 
view of the possible existence of a positive right of the people of Kosovo in the specific 
circumstances which prevailed in that territory. Thus, the restriction of the scope of the 
question to whether international law prohibited the declaration of independence as 
such voids it of much of its substance.244
Viewed from this perspective, the request by the General Assembly deserved a more 
comprehensive assessment than the Court provided for.245 In sum, although the cir-
cumstances of the case seem to be of great relevance to this Chapter and several 
States participating in the proceedings explicitly invoked arguments relating to the 
right to self-determination and the concept of remedial secession,246 unfortunately, 
the majority opinion does not provide for much clarity with regard to the question 
of the existence of a (qualified) right to unilateral secession. Only implicitly, the 
Court noted that no opinio juris was shown on the scope of the right to self-deter-
mination beyond decolonization and the existence of a remedial right to unilateral 
secession. Yet, the Declaration of Judge Simma and the Separate Opinions of Judge 
Yusuf, Judge Cançado Trindade and Judge Koroma are significant in this respect. 
Their views will be discussed below. 
2.3.6.3. Individual Opinions of Judges on a Right to Remedial Secession
In his Declaration attached to the Advisory Opinion, Judge Simma criticized the 
“unnecessarily limited” and “potentially misguiding” analysis of the Court.247 
According to Judge Simma, the Court’s interpretation of the question before it 
showed an outdated view of international law, as it seemed to apply the so-called 
‘Lotus principle’248 by merely considering rules possibly prohibiting the promulga-
244 Ibid., Separate Opinion Judge Yusuf, at para. 2.
245 But see Marc Weller, arguing that “it seems strange to criticize the Court for not answering the ques-
tions it was – with great deliberation – not asked. Having failed to frame the question differently may 
have been a miscalculation on the part of Serbia, but this failing is hardly attributable to the Court”. M. 
Weller, ‘Modesty Can Be a Virtue: Judicial Economy in the ICJ Kosovo Opinion?’ (2011) 24 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 127 at p. 132. 
246 See, for instance, the submissions by Albania, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Jordan, the Neth-
erlands, Poland, Russia, and Switzerland. Their views will be elaborated upon in Chapter VI, Section 
3.1.2.1.
247 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Declaration Judge 
Simma, at paras 1-5.
248 The ‘Lotus principle’ flows from The Case of the SS Lotus and boils down to the proposition that 
what is not explicitly prohibited under international law is permitted for States. The Case of the SS 
Lotus concerned a dispute between France and Turkey following the collision of two ships on the high 
seas on 2 August 1926. In this accident between a French mail steamer (Lotus) and the Turkish collier 
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tion of a unilateral declaration of independence.249 Moreover, he observed that both 
the authors of this declaration and some of the States participating in the proceed-
ings made reference to the exercise of a right to self-determination.250 In view of this, 
Judge Simma contended that the question phrased by the General Assembly: 
deserve[d] a more comprehensive answer, assessing both permissive and prohibitive 
rules of international law. This would have included a deeper analysis of whether the 
principle of self-determination or any other rule (perhaps expressly mentioning reme-
dial secession) permit or even warrant independence (via secession) of certain peoples/
territories.251
Judge Simma did not scrutinize these issues in his Declaration, as he considered that 
it would be an inappropriate exercise of his judicial role.252 Yet, reading between the 
(Boz-Kourt), eight Turkish persons on board died. The Turkish authorities subsequently started criminal 
proceedings against a number of persons, including Lieutenant Demons, a French citizen who was the 
officer of the watch on the Lotus. Although Lieutenant Demons contended that Turkey had no jurisdiction 
on the matter, he was sentenced for involuntary manslaughter by the Criminal Court of Istanbul. These 
actions triggered diplomatic representations aimed at transferring the case to the French courts. Accord-
ingly, the Turkish government declared its willingness to bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), which had to rule on the question of whether the prosecution of Lieutenant 
Demons was inconsistent with the Article 15 of the Convention of Lausanne. This provision held that “all 
questions of jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and the other contracting Powers, be decided in accord-
ance with the principles of international law”. According to the French government, for Turkey to have 
criminal jurisdiction, an explicit international legal entitlement was needed. In the opinion of the Turkish 
government, however, it had jurisdiction unless it was prohibited under international law. In this respect, 
the Court considered, inter alia, that “[f]ar from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States 
may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and 
acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect with a wide measure of discretion which is only 
limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules” (emphasis added). In absence of such prohibitive rules, 
the Court concluded that Turkey had not acted in violation of the principles of international law when 
instigating the criminal proceedings against Lieutenant Demons. See Permanent Court of International 
Justice, The Case of the SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 10 (1927). One may 
criticize the highly positivistic approach which the PCIJ took in this case. Moreover, it is to be noted that 
the relevance of the Lotus principle for today’s international legal system is disputed due to various devel-
opments in international law. See, for instance, A. von Bogdandy and M. Rau, ‘The Lotus’ in R. Wolfrum 
(ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated online edn, Oxford University 
Press, New York 2010). 
249 Théodore Christakis, however, has qualified Judge Simma’s argument that the Court applied the 
Lotus principle in its Advisory Opinion. See Christakis, ‘The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: Has 
International Law Something to Say about Secession?’ at pp. 78-80.
250 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Declaration Judge 
Simma, at para. 6.
251 Ibid., at para. 7.
252 Ibid.
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lines, one may discern his implicit support for the acknowledgement of a right to 
remedial secession. 
Similar to Judge Simma, Judge Yusuf found it regrettable that the Court decided 
not to pronounce on the question of whether international law acknowledged a right 
to self-determination in the case of Kosovo. In his Concurring Opinion, he first enu-
merated four arguments in this respect. First, Judge Yusuf noted that although dec-
larations of independence as such are not regulated by international law, the latter is 
relevant when considering the aim and claim of the declaration: 
If such claim meets the conditions prescribed by international law, particularly in situ-
ations of decolonization or of peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation, the law may encourage it; but if it violates international law, the latter can 
discourage it or even declare it illegal.253 
Secondly, Judge Yusuf articulated that the Court could have contributed to a better 
understanding of the scope and legal content of the right to self-determination, both 
beyond the colonial context in general, and in the specific situation of Kosovo.254 
Thirdly, he feared that the restrictive approach by the Court may be misinterpreted 
as legitimizing attempts to secede by separatist groups. Fourthly and finally, Judge 
Yusuf observed that the Court’s remark that “the declaration of independence is an 
attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo” (para. 114) is inconsistent with the 
Court’s failure to assess whether the final status aimed at, i.e. separate statehood, is 
in accordance with international law.255 Subsequently, Judge Yusuf turned to the sub-
stance of the issue of self-determination itself. He recalled the internal dimension of 
the right to self-determination beyond decolonization256 and continued by pointing at 
the challenge which claims to external self-determination pose to international law as 
well as to States. He admitted that, in contrast to the generally accepted right to exter-
nal self-determination for inhabitants of non-self-governing territories and peoples 
under alien subjugation, domination or exploitation, contemporary international law 
does not grant a “general positive right” to all ethnically or racially distinct groups 
or entities within States to claim sovereign statehood.257 According to Judge Yusuf,
[t]his does not, however, mean that international law turns a blind eye to the plight of 
such groups, particularly in those cases where the State not only denies the exercise of 
their internal right of self-determination […], but also subjects them to discrimination, 
253 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate Opinion 
Judge Yusuf, at para. 5.
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid., at para. 6.
256 Ibid., at paras 8-9.
257 Ibid., at para. 10.
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persecution and egregious violations of human rights or humanitarian law. Under such 
exceptional circumstances, the right of peoples to self-determination may support a 
claim to separate statehood provided that it meets the conditions prescribed by inter-
national law, in a specific situation, taking into account the historical context.258
Judge Yusuf derived the acknowledgement of such a qualified right to unilateral 
secession from “various international instruments”, in particular from the Friendly 
Relations Declaration with its safeguard clause.259 To strengthen his argument, he 
referred to some phrases by the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
in the Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire and the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
Reference re. Secession of Quebec.260 He continued by noting that, 
[t]o determine whether a specific situation constitutes an exceptional case which may 
legitimize a claim to external self-determination, certain criteria have to be consid-
ered, such as the existence of discrimination against a people, its persecution due to its 
racial or ethnic characteristics, and the denial of autonomous political structures and 
access to government. A decision by the Security Council to intervene could also be 
an additional criterion for assessing the exceptional circumstances which might confer 
legitimacy on demands for external self-determination by a people denied the exercise 
of its right to internal self-determination. Nevertheless, even where such exceptional 
circumstances exist, it does not necessarily follow that the concerned people has an 
automatic right to separate statehood. All possible remedies for the realization of inter-
nal self-determination must be exhausted before the issue is removed from the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the State which had hitherto exercised sovereignty over the territory 
inhabited by the people making the claim. In this context, the role of the international 
community, and in particular of the Security Council and the General Assembly, is of 
paramount importance.261
Given the special context of the events in Kosovo, Judge Yusuf wrote, there was 
sufficient reason for the Court to consider whether the situation reflected the type of 
exceptional circumstances which may convert a right to internal self-determination 
into a right to secede unilaterally from the parent State.262 While Judge Yusuf – in 
contrast to the majority of judges – appeared to be convinced of the existence of a 
right to self-determination which may support a claim to separate statehood under 
certain circumstances, it should be noted that he ventured no opinion on the question 
of whether such a right could legitimately be invoked in the case of Kosovo. Neither 
258 Ibid., at para. 11.
259 Ibid., at paras 11-12.
260 Ibid., at paras 14-15.
261 Ibid., at para. 16.
262 Ibid., at para. 13. For an argument in the same vein, see International Court of Justice, Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Separate Decision of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, at para. 179.
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did he refer to other specific cases to which such a right would have applied. As such, 
his argument in favour of a right to remedial secession remains rather theoretical 
only. 
The Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade should be addressed when 
looking for traces of a (qualified) right to unilateral secession. Although less explicit 
than Judge Yusuf, he made reference to such a right as well. Throughout his seventy-
page account, Judge Cançado Trindade emphasized the humane ends of international 
law and the responsibility which States bear for human beings on their territory. From 
that perspective, he recalled that the principle of self-determination of peoples was 
widely applied in the decolonization process and contended that today, the notion 
“applies in new situations of systematic oppression, subjugation and tyranny”.263 He 
continued by arguing that:
[n]o State can invoke territorial integrity in order to commit atrocities (such as the 
practices of torture, and ethnic cleansing, and massive forced displacement of the pop-
ulation), nor perpetrate them on the assumption of State sovereignty, nor commit atroc-
ities and then rely on a claim of territorial integrity notwithstanding the sentiments and 
ineluctable resentments of the “people” or “population” victimized. What has hap-
pened in Kosovo is that the victimized “people” or “population” has sought independ-
ence, in reaction against systematic and long-lasting terror and oppression, perpetrated 
in flagrant breach of the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination 
[…]. The basis lesson is clear: no State can use territory to destroy the population. 
Such atrocities amount to an absurd reversal of the ends of the State, which was created 
and exists for human beings, and not vice-versa.264
Thus, although Judge Cançado Trindade did not expressly refer to the concept of 
remedial secession, the phrasing of his argument clearly discloses support for the 
existence of such a right under contemporary international law. Besides taking a gen-
eral humanist vision of international law,265 it appears that Judge Cançado Trindade 
considered the safeguard clause from the Friendly Relations Declaration and its reit-
eration in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action to be the primary basis 
for this right, both in general266 and in the specific event of Kosovo.267
263 Ibid., at para. 175. See also ibid., at para. 184.
264 Ibid., at para. 176.
265 See, in particular, ibid., at paras 75-96 (‘The Contemporaneity of the ‘Droit des Gens’: The Humanist 
Vision of the International Legal Order’).
266 Ibid., at paras 177-181.
267 Ibid., at para. 181: “The massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to 
which the Kosovar Albanians were subjected in the nineties met the basic criterion set forth in the 1970 
U.N. Declaration of Principles [i.e. Friendly Relations Declaration], and enlarged in scope in the 1993 
final document of the U.N.’s II World Conference on Human Rights [i.e. Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action]. The entitlement to self-determination of the victimized population emerged, as the 
claim to territorial integrity could no longer be relied upon by the willing victimizers.”
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Finally, the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma merits brief discussion. In con-
trast to the opinions of the three Judges referred to above, Judge Koroma rejected 
the existence of a (remedial) right to unilateral secession under international law. 
Judge Koroma first contended that the question which was put before the Court con-
cerned “a legal question requiring a legal response”, and hence, the Court should 
have answered it instead of avoiding it. According to Judge Koroma, 
the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo amounted to secession and was not in accordance with inter-
national law. A unilateral secession of a territory from an existing State without its 
consent, as in this case under consideration, is a matter of international law.268
In this respect, Judge Koroma strongly emphasized that international law upholds 
respect for the territorial integrity of States, being one of the fundamental principles 
of the international legal order. To substantiate his argument, Judge Koroma inter 
alia referred to this principle as enshrined in Principle V, paragraph 7 of the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, which stipulates that: 
[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States […]269
However, it is striking that Judge Koroma omitted to include the remaining phrase of 
the safeguard clause,270 which concerns precisely that part of the clause upon which 
Judge Yusuf and Judge Cançado Trindade – along with many legal scholars271 – had 
founded the existence of a right to remedial secession. 
In sum, it can be concluded that, whereas some individual Judges expressly or 
implicitly acknowledged the existence of a qualified right to unilateral secession and 
one Judge rejected this outlook, the Court’s majority opinion on the legality of Kos-
ovo’s unilateral declaration of independence did not reveal support for such a thesis. 
Rather, the Court determinedly remained silent as regards the issues of self-determi-
nation and remedial secession, as it found that these matters were beyond the scope 
268 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Koroma, at para. 20.
269 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, Para. 7.
270 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Koroma, at para. 22.
271 See Section 2.2. of the present Chapter.
Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in International Law?
155
of the question which was put before it. The Court nevertheless emphasized that the 
declarations of the States participating in the advisory proceedings reflected widely 
differing opinions on these matters. In view of the above, it may at best be said that 
the Court’s Advisory Opinion indicates that ‘there is something brewing’ when it 
comes to the existence of a right to unilateral secession. 
2.3.7. Conclusions on Judicial Decisions and Opinions
This section has demonstrated that over the last two decades, judicial decisions and 
opinions have shown some support for the thesis that the peoples’ right to self-deter-
mination includes a qualified right to unilateral secession. Although most decisions 
did not enlarge in great detail on the circumstances in which such a right to unilateral 
secession may be warranted, evidence of massive human rights violations and the 
denial of the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination are gener-
ally mentioned as conditions for reaching the threshold. 
However, some remarks are called for. First, it is to be noted that the judiciary 
sometimes relied on trends it had identified in scholarly literature rather than express-
ing its own views as regards the existence of a (qualified) right to unilateral secession 
under contemporary international law. This was clearly the case in the Reference re 
Secession of Quebec. Also, it is to be admitted that the acknowledgement of such a 
right has so far remained hypothetical, as no judicial decision or opinion has actu-
ally granted a people a right to secede unilaterally in view of the circumstances of 
the specific case at issue.272 Even in the case of Kosovo, which had frequently been 
referred to as the ultimate test case for the existence of a right to unilateral secession, 
the Court ventured no (majority) opinion on this question. Finally, it was seen that 
most courts were very cautious with respect to acknowledging the existence of a right 
to unilateral secession under contemporary international law. 
In light of the above, although the existence of a conditional right to unilateral 
secession has been acknowledged in some instances, it may be concluded that the 
judiciary remains rather ambiguous on the matter. One should therefore be cau-
tious in drawing conclusions from the judicial decisions and opinions regarding the 
existence of such a right. 
2.4. Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in General Principles 
of (International) Law
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies “the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as one of the sources 
272 A similar conclusion was reached by Jure Vidmar. See Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International 
Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 40.
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of international law. Although it is generally agreed that today, the term ‘civilized 
nations’ no longer attains a special meaning,273 opinions differ as regards the under-
standing of the concept of general principles of law in the main.274 Broadly speak-
ing, two diverging interpretations can be discerned. The one interpretation considers 
general principles of law to be principles which appear in the majority of the various 
systems of municipal law and are necessary for the proper implementation of inter-
national law. These principles, such as the principle of good faith, proportionality, 
equity and pacta sunt servanda may be referred to as ‘general principles of law’. The 
alternative interpretation considers general principles of law to be principles which 
have been developed within the international legal realm and which are applicable to 
the relations among States. Such ‘general principles of international law’ are differ-
ent from customary rules or norms codified in treaties in that they are – as the con-
cept itself already suggests – “more general and less precise”.275 As Antonio Cassese 
explained, they are often “the expression and result of conflicting views of States on 
matters of crucial importance”.276 The principle of self-determination of peoples is a 
prominent example in this respect.277 In practice, both approaches seem to have been 
adopted: principles stemming from domestic law as well as principles finding their 
origin on the international level are used as a source of international law.278 
Since general principles of (international) law are often loose, multifaceted, and 
even ambiguous it may be argued that they can be used for various applications 
which might even be contradictory. While these characteristics may be seen as weak-
nesses, at the same time, they provide general principles with their dynamic nature 
and normative potential.279 As such, general principles of (international) law may be 
said to play a twofold role in the main. First, they may be seen as a basic standard for 
interpreting international law where specific norms codified in treaties or developed 
through custom are obscure or ambiguous. Secondly, they may prove helpful in cases 
273 The new term applied is ‘peace-loving nations’, as is also stated in Article 4 of the UN Charter. See P. 
Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th revised edn, Routledge, London/
New York 1997) at p. 48.
274 It is even said that there was consensus neither among the drafters of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice nor among of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as to the exact 
import of the phrase. See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 2008) at p. 16; G. Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated online edn, Oxford University Press, New York 
2010) at paras 1-6.
275 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 128.
276 Ibid. at p. 128.
277 See, for instance, Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’ at paras 1-6; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law at p. 48; M.N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge 2003) at pp. 93-94; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at pp. 130-132. 
278 See Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’ at paras 7-20; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at 
pp. 131-132.
279 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 128-129. 
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which are not covered by specific rules of international law at all.280 In both respects, 
general principles of (international) law can provide a guideline for judges when 
positive international law does not provide a clear-cut answer,281 and simultaneously, 
they may confine the discretionary powers of both the judiciary and the executive 
branch with regard to decisions in individual cases.282 
Yet, as Hugh Thirlway noted, there is “a striking lack of evidence in international 
practice and jurisprudence of claims to a specific right of a concrete nature being 
asserted or upheld on the basis simply of the general principles of law”.283 This makes 
it difficult to identify a fixed set of general principles of law and to consider this 
array against the background of the issue of a (qualified) right to unilateral secession. 
Nonetheless, as was observed above, some principles seem to be broadly recognized 
as general principles of law. General principles common in municipal laws, such as 
good faith and proportionality, may certainly be taken into account when adducing 
arguments in support of the existence of a right to unilateral secession. For instance, 
it might be argued that in case of gross and systematic human rights violations, the 
principle of proportionality requires that the peoples’ right to self-determination will 
prevail over the sovereign rights of States rather then vice versa. Such principles may, 
however, play a marginal role only as they are background principles “informing and 
shaping the observance of existing rules of international law and in addition con-
straining the manner in which those rules may legitimately be exercised”.284 When it 
comes to general principles which are relevant only under international law, the prin-
ciples of respect for the territorial integrity of States and uti possidetis juris should be 
recalled in the present context, as it is often argued that these principles collide with 
the right to (external) self-determination. These principles will be addressed below. 
Moreover, self-determination of peoples will be considered in its quality of principle, 
thereby demonstrating the distinct role of the principle and its inaptitude in providing 
clarity as regards the existence of a right to remedial secession. 
2.4.1. The Principle of Respect for the Territorial Integrity of States
The principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States is considered to be one 
of the fundamental principles of the State-centred system on which international law 
is built.285 It is contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
280 See ibid. at pp. 132-133.
281 International law refers to this problem as non liquet. See Shaw, International Law at p. 93.
282 See M. Sepúlveda et al., Human Rights Reference Handbook (3rd revised edn, University for Peace, 
Ciudad Colon 2004) at p. 24.
283 Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at p. 132.
284 Shaw, International Law at p. 98.
285 See, for instance, S.K.N. Blay, ‘Territorial Integrity and Political Independence’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated online edn, Oxford University 
Press, New York 2010) at para. 1.
Chapter IV
158
articulates it as one of the organization’s principles and links it to the prohibition of 
the threat or use of force. Moreover, the principle of territorial integrity is set forth 
in other regional legal and political documents, such as the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States (Articles 1, 12 and 20), the Charter of the Organization of 
African Union (Preamble), the Helsinki Final Act (Principles I, II, IV and VIII), and 
the Charter of Paris (Principle III: Friendly Relations among Participating States). 
Further, the principle of territorial integrity is included in the Friendly Relations Dec-
laration (Principle I, Principle V, paragraphs 7 and 8, and Principle VI(d)), where it 
is conceived as one of the elements of the principle of sovereign equality. In addition 
to being included in these abovementioned international instruments, the principle of 
territorial integrity has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice on various 
occasions. Already in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, the Court highlighted the value 
of this principle by noting that “[b]etween independent States, respect for territo-
rial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations”.286 In its famous 
case on the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, the Court 
emphasized “the duty of every State to respect the territorial sovereignty of others”.287 
More recently, the International Court of Justice recalled the “central importance in 
international law and relations of State sovereignty over territory and of the stability 
and certainty of that sovereignty”.288 So, the doctrine of the stability of borders also 
reflects the importance which international law attaches to preserving the territorial 
status quo.289 
2.4.1.1. The Content of the Principle of Territorial Integrity
It has already been indicated that the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of 
States is firmly rooted in international law and is often referred to in connection with 
related concepts such as State sovereignty, political independence and the stability of 
borders. To put it even more strongly, the principle of territorial integrity can hardly 
be detached from these notions. Although the territory of a State may be defined as 
“the material elements of the State, namely the physical and demographic resources 
that lie within its territory (land, sea and airspace) and are delimited by the State’s 
frontiers”,290 the principle of respect for the territorial integrity encompasses more 
286 International Court of Justice, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 4, at para. 35.
287 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 213.
288 International Court of Justice, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge (Malaysia v. the Republic of Singapore), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 1, at para. 122.
289 This was also stressed in International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 6, at p. 32.
290 C.L. Rozakis, ‘Territorial Integrity and Political Independence’ in R. Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (Elsevier, Amsterdam 2000) at p. 813. 
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than merely the protection of a State’s possession of these resources situated within 
its borders. In addition to this inviolability of the territory, the principle includes the 
capacity of a State to exercise and control all State functions over its territory, which 
logically implies that no other State may interfere or exercise its power over (part of) 
a territory of another State without the consent of the latter.291 As such, the principle 
of respect for territorial integrity is intertwined with the idea of political independ-
ence. In sum, the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States is generally 
seen to be infringed when a part of a State’s territory is being dismembered or when 
a State forcibly loses control – either directly or indirectly – over its territory or a 
part thereof. For the purpose of upholding its territorial integrity, a State is entitled 
to protect itself from illegal interventions and to preserve the unity of its territory by 
all lawful means.292 
As one of the core elements of statehood and as a corollary of State sovereignty, 
international law attaches great importance to protecting the territorial integrity of 
sovereign States, in particular since it interacts with other principles of international 
law. In this respect, the interrelationship with the prohibition of the use or threat of 
force, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States, the pro-
tection of human rights and the right to self-determination of peoples can be men-
tioned.293 As Antonio Cassese felicitously noted, these principles: 
supplement and support one another and also condition each other’s application. Inter-
national subjects must comply with all of them. Also, in the application of any one of 
the principles, all the others must simultaneously be borne in mind.294
2.4.1.2. The Principle of Territorial Integrity and the Right to Self-Determination
The meaning and content of the principle of territorial integrity as dealt with above 
raise questions as to how this principle and the right to self-determination of peo-
ples relate to each other. At first sight, the right to territorial integrity of States and 
the right to self-determination of peoples seem to sit together uncomfortably when 
it comes to external self-determination by means of unilateral secession.295 For, the 
first concept aims to maintain the territorial status quo, while the latter inevitably 
leads to unwished-for alterations in territory and loss of control over a part thereof. 
In other words, the express acceptance of the principle of territorial integrity and 
291 This capacity to exercise and control all State functions over a territory may be restricted by resolu-
tions adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
292 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 294.
293 See, for instance, W.E. Butler, ‘Territorial Integrity and Secession: The Dialectics of International 
Order’ in J. Dahlitz (ed.) Secession and International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2003) at pp. 
112-113.
294 A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) at p. 112. 
295 See, for instance, Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at p. 42. 
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the express prohibition of the partial or total disruption of the national unity and terri-
torial integrity of a State296 appear to imply the non-recognition of a right to unilateral 
secession. Various writers have noted this (ostensible) tension,297 which is frequently 
seen as one of the principal obstacles for acknowledging unilateral secession. In 
order to paint a more complete picture of the relationship between the principle of ter-
ritorial integrity and the external dimension of the right to self-determination, some 
approaches towards the matter will be dealt with below. 
The question of the addressees of the principle of territorial integrity should be 
touched upon first. While it is beyond question that the principle of territorial integ-
rity generally applies to inter-State relations, in the context of the right to unilateral 
secession, the question has been raised whether the principle is relevant to peoples 
with secessionist ambitions (i.e. sub-State groups) to the same extent. This matter 
was discussed quite extensively in the expert reports prepared for the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s Reference re Secession of Quebec. In general, the experts shared 
the opinion that seceding groups within the State are not bound by the principle of 
territorial integrity. While this argument was presented in various ways and with dif-
fering nuances, the international law specialists involved agreed that the principle of 
territorial integrity does not apply to seceding groups since: 
such groups are not subjects of international law at all, in the way that states are. A 
group does not become a subject of international law simply by expressing its wish to 
secede. Until an advanced stage in the process, secession is a matter within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the affected state.298 
296 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, Para. 7. See also UN Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples), UN Doc. A/Res/1514, 14 December 1960, Para. 6. 
297 See, inter alia, Blay, ‘Territorial Integrity and Political Independence’ at para. 40; L. Brilmayer, 
‘Secession: A Theoretical Interpretation’ (1991) 16 Yale Journal of International Law 177 at p. 178; 
Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination at p. 95; J.C. Duursma, Fragmentation and 
the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-Determination and Statehood (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1996) at pp. 77-79; Emerson, ‘The Logic of Secession’ at p. 809; McCorquodale, 
‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach’ at p. 879; Muharremi, ‘Kosovo’s Declaration of Inde-
pendence: Self-Determination and Sovereignty Revisited’ at p. 403; Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of 
Secession – Reconsidered’ at pp. 22-23, 35; Peters, ‘Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?’ 
at pp. 102-103; M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht 1982) at p. 12; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 293; Shaw, ‘Peoples, 
Territorialism and Boundaries’ at pp. 478-479; Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process” in the Creation of 
States through Secession’ at p. 176; Thürer and Burri, ‘Secession’ at para. 14; Vidmar, ‘Remedial Seces-
sion in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at pp. 37-38.
298 Crawford, ‘Report by James Crawford: “Response to Experts Reports of the Amicus Curiae”’ at p. 
157. See also G. Abi-Saab, ‘Report by George Abi-Saab: “The Effectivity Required of an Entity that 
Declares its Independence in Order for it to be Considered a State in International Law”’ in A.F. Bayefsky 
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Thus, according to the experts, the principle of territorial integrity is generally irrel-
evant in those situations. Yet, two exceptions were made in this respect. First, it fol-
lows from the above that if the attempt to secede would be actively supported by 
another State or even carried out by foreign authorities in the sense that these invade 
a territory with the object of separating it from its parent State, the events would con-
stitute a violation of the principle of territorial integrity. Secondly, it was emphasized 
that the State “is entitled to resist challenges to its territorial integrity, whether these 
challenges are internal (e.g. secession) or external”.299 
More recently, reasoning similar to that of the expert reports for the Reference re 
Secession of Quebec appeared to be applied by the International Court of Justice in 
its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Accord-
ing to the Court, “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the 
sphere of relations between States”.300 The Court’s statement concerned the issuing 
of unilateral declarations of independence, but in view of its general phrasing and 
reasoning by analogy, it may be argued that it also applies to situations of unilat-
eral secession.301 Being non-State actors, seceding groups are thus not bound by the 
principle of territorial integrity, the Court seemed to imply. Therefore, the issuing of 
a unilateral declaration of independence by such an entity by no means violates the 
principle of territorial integrity. In this respect, the Court recalled the inclusion of this 
principle in several provisions which all related to the principle of territorial integ-
rity against the background of the threat or use of force between States rather than 
between States and non-State entities.302 The Court did not provide further founda-
tions for its argument. 
This lack of clarification is unfortunate, since it may be questioned whether the 
outlook of the Court with respect to the principle of territorial integrity and, likewise, 
(ed.) Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague 2000) at pp. 72-73; A. Pellet, ‘Report by Alain Pellet: “Legal Opinion on Certain Ques-
tions of International Law Raised by the Reference”’ in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.) Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000) at para. 19; 
Shaw, ‘Report by Malcolm N. Shaw: “Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30 September 1996”’ at 
paras 39-41. 
299 Crawford, ‘Report by James Crawford: “Response to Experts Reports of the Amicus Curiae”’ at p. 
158. See further T.M. Franck, ‘Report by Thomas M. Franck: “Opinion Directed at Question 2 of the Ref-
erence”’ in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.) Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000) at para. 3.3; Pellet, ‘Report by Alain Pellet: “Legal Opinion 
on Certain Questions of International Law Raised by the Reference”’ at para. 7; Shaw, ‘Report by Mal-
colm N. Shaw: “Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30 September 1996”’ at para. 44. 
300 See International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 403, at para. 80.
301 Ryngaert, ‘The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: A Missed Oppor-
tunity?’ at p. 491.
302 The Court referred to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Principle I of the Friendly Relations Declaration 
and Principle IV of the Helsinki Final Act. 
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the view commonly presented in the expert reports drafted for the Canadian Supreme 
Court in the Reference re Secession of Quebec can actually be maintained. The find-
ing that the actions of sub-State entities are not restricted by the principle of territorial 
integrity seems rather conservative, considering the emerging role of non-State actors 
within contemporary international relations, the belief that not all of these entities 
should and do operate in a legal vacuum, and relevant practice in this regard.303 In 
the present context, it may be illustrative to note that the classical conception that the 
prohibition of the use of force is restricted to the acts of States has been challenged 
over the last decade as well. There is a growing body of opinion arguing that this 
norm extends to terrorists and other non-State actors in addition to the traditional cat-
egory of States.304 As such, reference can be made to national liberation movements, 
which are seen to be subjects of international law to a certain extent.305
What is more, it is to be noted that opinions expressed by the States participat-
ing in the Kosovo advisory proceedings did not reflect consensus as to the issue of 
the applicability of territorial integrity to non-State entities.306 Whereas some States 
held on to the idea that international law remains neutral as to the matter of unilat-
eral secession, implying that the principle of territorial integrity is inapplicable in 
this context, other States maintained that under contemporary international law, non-
State actors as well as States are bound by the principle of territorial integrity. Serbia, 
for instance, alleged that “[t]he classical structure of international law has changed 
and no State or other entity may seek now to cling to it in the face of established 
303 For a comparable observation, see I. Cismas, ‘Secession in Theory and Practice: the Case of Kosovo 
and Beyond’ (2010) 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law 531 at p. 550, footnote 81. See also 
Vashakmadze and Lippold, ‘”Nothing But a Road Towards Secession”? The International Court of Jus-
tice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independ-
ence in Respect of Kosovo’ at p. 632. A brief and general overview of the rising relevance of non-State 
actors is provided by M. Wagner, ‘Non-State Actors’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (fully updated online edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2010). For a 
more encompassing account of this matter, see A. Bianchi (ed.), Non-State Actors and International Law 
(Ashgate, Farnham 2009).
304 See O. Corten, ‘Territorial Integrity Narrowly Interpreted: Reasserting the Classical Inter-State Para-
digm of International Law’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 87 at pp. 90-91. See also O. 
Corten, The Law against War (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) at Chapter 3.
305 On this topic, see M.N. Shaw, ‘The International Status of National Liberation Movements’ (1983) 
5 Liverpool Law Review 19. It is to be noted that the concept of national liberation movements generally 
excludes today’s secessionist entities, since merely three categories of States are considered to be ‘can-
didate States’ for national liberation movements, that is colonial powers, occupying powers and racist 
regimes. See, for instance, D.W. Glazier, ‘Wars of National Liberation’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, New York 2010) at paras 17-19; 
Shaw, International Law at pp. 220-223. 
306 See also Corten, ‘Territorial Integrity Narrowly Interpreted: Reasserting the Classical Inter-State Para-
digm of International Law’ at p. 89, footnote 7; Vashakmadze and Lippold, ‘”Nothing But a Road Towards 
Secession”? The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with International Law 
of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo’ at pp. 631-632, footnote 60. 
Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in International Law?
163
evolution” and that “recent practice has shown a number of examples where non-
State entities within an existing State are directly addressed in the context of inter-
nal conflict and with regard to territorial integrity”.307 In this respect, reference was 
made to a number of Security Council resolutions reaffirming the significance of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of States which were confronted with situations 
of internal conflict and secessionist attempts, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Georgia, Somalia and Sudan.308 Further, some international and regional instruments 
dealing with the protection of minorities and indigenous peoples were recalled, such 
as the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These docu-
ments emphasize that the rights of these groups are to be achieved in accordance 
with the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States, 
which seems to imply that these non-State actors are also bound by this principle.309 
Most recently, this outlook was acknowledged by the Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, a body established by the Council of the 
European Union.310 In its Report, it was noted that the argument that the principle of 
respect for the territorial integrity of States is not directed against sub-State groups 
is “not fully persuasive, especially as international law increasingly addresses situa-
tions within the territory of states”.311 In addition to Serbia, various other States made 
similar arguments, thus extending the scope of the principle of territorial integrity to 
include entities within States.312 
307 See International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Oral Statement of Serbia (Shaw), CR 2009/24, 1 December 2009, at para. 10. For a more detailed 
presentation of this argument, see ibid., Written Statement of Serbia, 17 April 2009, at paras 440-491. 
308 See the Security Council Resolutions recalled in ibid.
309 See International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion), Oral Statement of Serbia (Shaw), CR 2009/24, 1 December 2009, at paras 11-12.
310 The Mission was established by Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP of 2 December 2008. It should be 
noted that this was the first time since its creation that the European Union decided to actively intervene 
in armed conflict. Moreover, it was the first time that the European Union formed a Fact-Finding Mission 
for the purpose of giving a political and diplomatic follow-up to a conflict in which a ceasefire has been 
reached. On 30 September 2009, the Mission presented its Report to the Council of the European Union, 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations, and the conflicting parties. 
See Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report of the Independ-
ent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (2009), available at <http://www.ceiig.
ch/Index.html>. 
311 Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report of the Independ-
ent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia at pp. 136-137.
312 See, for instance, International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for 
Advisory Opinion), Written Statement of Argentina, at paras 75-82, para. 121; ibid., Written Comment of 
Argentina, at para. 39; ibid., Oral Statement of Argentina (Ruiz Cerutti), CR 2009/26, 2 December 2009, 
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Besides these arguments presented during the proceedings, the narrow outlook of 
the Court as regards the principle of territorial integrity does not seem to be justified 
when carefully reading the Friendly Relations Declaration. Not only does it confirm 
a people’s right to self-determination, it does so in connection to the principle of 
respect for the territorial integrity of States and emphasizes that the right to self-
determination may not be construed as “authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereign and independent States”.313 Thus, in addition to addressing the relation-
ships between States, the Declaration encompasses what may be called an intra-State 
dimension of the principle of territorial integrity, as it prohibits peoples from infring-
ing the territorial integrity of the State.314 The safeguard clause of the Declaration also 
seems to indicate that the principle of territorial integrity does have an intra-State 
dimension as well.315 In this connection, one commentator observed that the Friendly 
Relations Declaration “confers some measure of international legal personality on 
non-state actors active within a state”.316 This outlook seems to be confirmed by the 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which the Canadian Supreme Court considered 
the question of secession against the backdrop of the principle of territorial integrity 
of States,317 and by the Western Sahara case, where it was observed that territorial 
integrity could affect the implementation of the right to self-determination.318
Considering the above, it appears that opinions are divided on whether or not the 
principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States is applicable to non-State 
actors in the context of attempts at unilateral secession. Strong arguments support-
ing the thesis that these non-State entities are also bound by this principle have been 
presented. As a result, one may at least question whether the thesis that respect for 
the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between 
States does justice to the fundamental character which international law attributes to 
territorial integrity and the purpose of this principle, which seems to be to provide 
at paras 18-20; ibid., Written Statement of Azerbaijan, paras 26-27; ibid., Oral Statement of Azerbaijan 
(Mehdiyev), CR 2009/27, 3 December 2009, at paras 20-27; ibid., Oral Statement of Bolivia (Calzadilla 
Sarmiento), CR 2009/28, 4 December 2009, paras 6-7; ibid., Oral Statement of China (Xue), CR 2009/29, 
7 December 2009, at paras 14-17; ibid., Written Statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran, paras 3.1-3.6; 
ibid., Written Comments of Cyprus, at para. 18; ibid., Written Statement of Spain, at paras 29-34; ibid., 
Written Comments of Spain, at paras 4-5; ibid., Oral Statement of Venezuela (Fleming), CR 2009/33, 11 
December 2009, at paras 18-19.
313 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, Para. 7.
314 Ryngaert, ‘The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: A Missed Oppor-
tunity?’ at p. 491.
315 See ibid. at pp. 491-492.
316 Ibid. at p. 491 (emphasis original).
317 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 122.
318 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at para. 162.
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protection against challenges of the State’s territory, whether or not these are initiated 
externally or internally. What is more, it seems that at present, secessionist groups 
can indeed be regarded as (additional) addressees of the principle of territorial integ-
rity. Viewed at from that perspective, an attempt at unilateral secession may consti-
tute a violation of this principle. In this respect, a second differentiation concerning 
the relationship between the principle of territorial integrity and the (external dimen-
sion of the) right to self-determination should be addressed at this point. 
2.4.1.3. A Balancing Approach
This second line bears upon the absolute character or otherwise of the norms of ter-
ritorial integrity and self-determination. It is contended that there is an interaction 
between the right to self-determination of peoples and the principle of territorial 
integrity of States. This mutual relationship will be expounded below. As was seen 
elsewhere in the present Chapter, the relevant instruments on the right to self-deter-
mination link this right to the principle of territorial integrity in the sense that they 
prohibit the partial or total disruption of the territorial integrity of independent States 
in the exercise of the right to self-determination.319 An illustrative example in this 
respect is the Charter of Paris, which noted that the participating States: 
reaffirm the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conform-
ity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of interna-
tional law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of States.320 
In view of this, the scope of application and implementation of the right to (external) 
self-determination are to be interpreted in light of the principle of territorial integ-
rity of States.321 Such an interpretation implies upholding the territorial integrity of 
States, thus logically eliminating the idea of self-determination as encompassing an 
unconditional entitlement to unilateral secession, i.e. a right applicable to all peoples, 
under all circumstances.322 At the same time, however, it should be emphasized that 
319 Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ at p. 482. See also Section 4.1 of the present Chapter.
320 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 21 
November 1990, available at <http://www.osce.org/mc/39516>, last consulted on 20 September 2012.
321 See, inter alia, Cassese, International Law at p. 112; Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition 
in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at pp. 105-106; Duursma, Fragmentation and the Inter-
national Relations of Micro-States: Self-Determination and Statehood at pp. 80-81; Murswiek, ‘The 
Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 35; Peters, ‘Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of 
Freedom?’ at pp. 102-103; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 296. 
322 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 322-323. See also Butler, ‘Secession and 
International Law’ at pp. 112-113; Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 35; 
A. Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (Collins, London 1969) at p. 138; Raič, 
Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 312.
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in exercising their right to territorial integrity, States are not immune to the applica-
tion of other legal obligations under international law either. It is generally agreed 
that today, the right to territorial integrity may be limited by other international legal 
norms, such as the fundamental rules and principles of human rights law, the basic 
norms of international humanitarian law, and the (external dimension of the) right 
to self-determination.323 To put it even more strongly, without external self-determi-
nation as an ultimum remedium, practically nothing would be left of peoples’ right 
to self-determination.324 Considering the above, it may be concluded that neither 
self-determination nor territorial integrity is an absolute norm, but rather a principle 
which can be applied to a greater or lesser extent. Accordingly, the ostensible conflict 
existing between these norms can be resolved through what may be called a balanc-
ing approach.325 As one commentator pertinently noted, 
[b]alancing requires the jurist to assess the importance of the conflicting legally pro-
tected interests and to strike a fair balance according to their respective weight. One of 
the objectives of balancing is to reconcile these interests to the largest extent possible 
by defining a compromise solution.326
Such an approach appears to leave the door open to a right of remedial secession, as 
the balance may be tilted towards the (external dimension of the) right to self-deter-
mination in extreme situations if separation of the mother State is the only remedy 
to the persistent denial of internal self-determination and other gross human rights 
violations. If such exceptional circumstances do not present themselves, the balance 
will tilt to the preservation of the State’s territorial integrity, for the maintenance of 
the territorial status quo is generally considered to serve peace and stability. This 
then implies that the right to self-determination is to be exercised internally, so within 
the framework of the existing sovereign State. Phrased differently, until the circum-
stances at issue are so grave that the right to internal self-determination converts into 
a right to secession, the scope and implementation of the right to self-determination 
are restricted – or, balanced – by the principle of territorial integrity.327 Whether such 
323 See Blay, ‘Territorial Integrity and Political Independence’ at para. 35; Butler, ‘Secession and Inter-
national Law’ at p. 112; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 295-296; Vidmar, 
‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p 38.
324 See also Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 35.
325 Needless to say, the balancing technique can only be applied when it comes to legal norms which are 
not absolute and which are in a non-hierarchical relationship, such as norms having a peremptory char-
acter (jus cogens). Thus, for instance the right to life and the prohibition of torture are excluded from a 
balancing exercise. 
326 Peters, ‘Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?’ at p. 102. For a similar line of reasoning, 
see Murswiek, ‘The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered’ at p. 35.
327 See Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at p. 
104; Peters, ‘Does Kosovo Lie in the Lotus-Land of Freedom?’ at pp. 102-103.
Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in International Law?
167
grave circumstances actually present themselves and which principle deserves prior-
ity is to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
According to some commentators, this balancing approach is implicitly acknowl-
edged in the safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration, which is often 
put forward as implying a conditional right to unilateral secession.328 Further, despite 
the expert opinions presented before it, the Canadian Supreme Court seems to have 
applied the balancing technique as well. It declared that “international law expects 
that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples within the frame-
work of the existing sovereign States and consistently with the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of those States”, but at the same time acknowledged that a right 
to unilateral secession may arise, that is “only in the most extreme of cases and, 
even then, under carefully defined circumstances”.329 Both the a contrario interpre-
tation of the Friendly Relations Declaration’s safeguard clause and the judgment of 
the Canadian Supreme Court have been expounded upon elsewhere in the present 
Chapter.330 
2.4.1.4. Conclusions on the Principle of Territorial Integrity
The foregoing assessment of the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of 
States leads to the conclusion that, despite the ostensible tension between the princi-
ple of territorial integrity on the one hand and attempts at unilateral secession on the 
other, the differentiations set forth above do not necessarily preclude the existence 
of a right to remedial secession. To put it even more strongly, even when regarding 
non-State entities as additional addressees of the principle of territorial integrity – as 
was submitted above – and simultaneously balancing the demands of the concepts of 
territorial integrity and self-determination, some room appears to be left for a right to 
remedial secession. Yet, it would go too far to contend that the principle of respect for 
the territorial integrity of States reveals clear traces of a qualified right to secession. 
All in all, the principle of territorial integrity does not provide for a decisive answer 
to the question of whether or not a right to remedial secession does exist under con-
temporary international law.
328 See, for instance, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 118-120; 
Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at pp. 103-
104, 137; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 321.
329 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217, at paras 122 
and 126.
330 See Sections 3.2 and 3.3.4 of the present Chapter.
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2.4.2. The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris
Against the backdrop of the right to territorial integrity and in relation to the right to 
self-determination of peoples, it is relevant to address the principle of uti possidetis 
juris. While linked to the concept of territorial integrity, the principle of uti possidetis 
juris should not be equated with this notion.331 The principal difference between the 
concepts lies in the time of application. Territorial integrity becomes relevant once a 
territory is established as an independent State in conformity with international law. 
In contrast, the principle of uti possidetis juris only applies at the very moment of 
transition to independence. As such, it is of a temporary character, whereas the right 
to territorial integrity is continuing in nature. This will become clear below. In order 
to answer the question of whether this principle is permissive or prohibitive of a right 
to unilateral secession, its historical development and rationale of the principle must 
be discussed. 
2.4.2.1. The Content of the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris
The principle of uti possidetis juris originates from Roman law, where it served as 
one of a series of edicts that the praetor could issue in disputes concerning owner-
ship of (private) real property.332 Gradually, it developed into a concept applied in 
international law. It appears to have been first invoked and implemented in Latin 
America, where the administrative borders of the Spanish empire were converted into 
borders of the newly established, independent successor States. In these matters, the 
331 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 303; Shaw, ‘Report by Malcolm N. Shaw: 
“Re: Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497 of 30 September 1996”’ at paras 78-79. Conversely, Thomas M. 
Franck has used the concepts of uti possidetis juris and territorial integrity interchangeably; an approach 
which has been criticized by Dame Rosalyn Higgins. See Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right 
to Secession’ at p. 4; R. Higgins, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession. Comments’ in C. 
Brölmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck (eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at p. 34.
332 The edict ‘uti possidetis, ita possidetis’, meaning as much as ‘as you possess, so you may possess’, 
was applied by the praetor when possession of the land was achieved in good faith. The edict was used to 
grant provisional possession to the party possessing the property during the proceedings. As such, appli-
cation of this rule did not simultaneously imply ownership, but rather shifted the burden of proof during 
the litigation. Whether a person could claim ownership as well was decided before the courts of law. See 
J. Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial Pos-
session with Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
2000) at pp. 111-112; E. Hasani, ‘Uti Possidetis Juris: From Rome to Kosovo’ (2003) 27 Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs 85 at p. 86; H. Post, ‘International Law Between Dominium and Imperium: Some Reflec-
tions on the Foundations of the International Law on Territorial Acquisition’ in T.D. Gill and W.P. Heere 
(eds) Reflections on Principles and Practices of International Law Essays in Honour of Leo J Bouchez 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 2000) at pp. 161-172; S.R. Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: 
Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States’ (1996) 90 American Journal of International Law 590 at 
pp. 592-593.
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concept of uti possidetis juris was used in order to preclude gaps in sovereignty, at 
least theoretically. Subsequently, after the Organization of African Unity had adopted 
the concept, it became a well-established principle which was generally applied on 
the African continent during the decolonization period.333 Essentially, the concept of 
uti possidetis juris determined that new independent States would come into exist-
ence with the same borders as they had when they were units under colonial rule, 
“no matter how arbitrarily those boundaries may have been drawn”.334 More specifi-
cally, as a consequence of this principle, the administrative boundaries created under 
colonial power were transformed into external frontiers protected by international 
law.335 In effect, uti possidetis juris produced a “photograph of the territory”, thus 
freezing the borders as they were at the moment independence was achieved.336 As 
already mentioned, it is important to stress that despite its linkages with the concept 
of territorial integrity, the principle of uti possidetis juris should not be equated with 
the former notion. In the previous Section, it was seen that territorial integrity is 
applicable once a territory is established as an independent State in conformity with 
international law. In contrast with this continuing character, the principle of uti pos-
sidetis juris is of a temporary nature, being merely applicable at the moment of the 
changeover to independence.337 The rationale of the principle of uti possidetis juris 
333 According to Christian Tomuschat, the principle of uti possidetis juris had even become “the lead-
ing maxim for the territorial delimitation of Africa”. See Tomuschat, ‘Secession and Self-Determina-
tion’ at p. 27. For an overview of the historical roots of the concept of uti possidetis juris and its 
modern-day application, see Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the 
Politics of Territorial Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity at pp. 114-144; 
Hasani, ‘Uti Possidetis Juris: From Rome to Kosovo’; Klabbers and Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost Between 
Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’ at pp. 54-65; P. Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and Inter-
national Law (Routledge, London/New York 2002) at pp. 69-134; Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti 
Possidetis and the Boders of New States’ at pp. 592-601; Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ 
at pp. 492-496. 
334 Klabbers and Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis’ at p. 54. This 
problem has led Joshua Castellino to conclude that the principle of uti possidetis juris appears to “allow 
stronger [colonial] powers to use force and then legitimise it by preventing retaliation”. See Castellino, 
International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial Possession with 
Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity at p. 132.
335 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic 
of Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, at para. 23. For a description of the distinction between 
administrative or internal boundaries and international frontiers, see Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and 
Boundaries’ at p. 490. According to Shaw, international frontiers “fix permanent lines, both geographi-
cally and legally, with full effect within the international system, and can only be changed through the 
consent of the relevant states”. In contrast, internal borders possess none of these characteristics.
336 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of 
Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, para. 30.
337 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 303. Conversely, Thomas M. Franck has 
used the concepts of uti possidetis juris and territorial integrity interchangeably; an approach which has 
been criticized by Dame Rosalyn Higgins. See Franck, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Seces-
sion’ at p. 4; Higgins, ‘Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession. Comments’ at p. 34.
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was twofold. First, it served as a tool to prevent (internal) conflicts over borders, thus 
protecting stability; secondly, implementation of the principle avoided the creation of 
terra nullius, which frequently served as an alleged reason for Western occupation.338 
2.4.2.2. The Applicability of the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris
In the 1964 Cairo Declaration, the Heads of States and Governments of the Organi-
zation of African Unity implicitly adopted the principle of uti possidetis juris by 
stipulating that “all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders exist-
ing on their achievement of their national independence”.339 This political docu-
ment, however, did not alter the legal status of the principle of uti possidetis juris, 
of which its legally binding character had long been subject to a specific stipulation 
concerning the resolution of border disputes in a treaty between the relevant States. 
In the absence of such an explicit reference, the principle was not applicable in the 
conflict at issue.340 It was not before 1986 that specific treaty provisions on uti pos-
sidetis juris were no longer needed for that principle to apply to a certain case. In the 
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute,341 a Chamber of the ICJ342 not only referred 
to the principle of uti possidetis juris’ “exceptional importance for the African 
338 See Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial 
Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity at p. 115; Hasani, ‘Uti Possidetis Juris: 
From Rome to Kosovo’ at pp. 89-90; Klabbers and Lefeber, ‘Africa: Lost Between Self-Determination 
and Uti Possidetis’ at p. 55.
339 Organization of African Unity, Resolution adopted by the first ordinary session of the Assembly of 
the Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, U.A.R., from 17 to 21 July 1964, AHG Res. 1 – AHG. 
Res. 24 (1).
340 P. Radan, ‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter 
Arbitration Commission’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 50 at pp. 59-60.
341 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of 
Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554. This case addressed a frontier dispute between Burkina Faso 
and Mali. The Chamber of the ICJ was asked to indicate the line of the frontier between the two States 
in a disputed area. Subsequent to serious incidents between the armed forces of both States late 1985, 
both Burkina Faso and Mali submitted a request to the Chamber of the ICJ for the indication of interim 
protective measures. The Chamber, in its judgment, first determined the source of the rights claimed by 
Burkina Faso and Mali. In this respect, it stated that the applicable principles were that of the intangibility 
of frontiers inherited from colonization (para. 19), the principle of uti possidetis juris (paras 20-26), and 
the principle of equity infra legem (paras 27-28). Burkina Faso and Mali had put forward several types 
of evidence in support of their positions, such as French legislative and regulative texts, administrative 
documents, and cartographic materials (paras 51-111). After having considered these sources of evidence, 
the Chamber fixed the boundary between the two States in the disputed area (paras 112-174). 
342 The ICJ has dealt with the principle of uti possidetis juris in numerous contentious cases. For a list of 
cases, see J. Castellino, ‘Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination: An Examination of 
the Conceptual Tools’ (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 503 at pp. 509-510 (footnote 34).
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continent”, but also emphasized that it was “a firmly established principle of inter-
national law where decolonization is concerned”.343 According to the Chamber, 
[t]he principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of 
international law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected with the phe-
nomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose 
is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered by frat-
ricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal 
of the administering power. […] The fact that the new African States have respected 
the administrative boundaries and frontiers established by the colonial powers must 
be seen not as a mere practice contributing to the gradual emergence of a principle 
of customary international law, limited in its impact to the African continent as it had 
previously been to Spanish America, but as the application in Africa of a rule of gen-
eral scope.344
When considering the principle of uti possidetis juris as a norm of “general scope” 
– as the Chamber suggested – a question which naturally follows is whether it may 
be argued that it is a principle with universal application. Phrased differently, is the 
principle of uti possidetis juris – by analogy – applicable to all situations involving 
the establishment of new, independent States? This question was addressed by the 
Badinter Arbitration Committee against the backdrop of the dissolution of the SFRY. 
In response to the questions of whether the internal boundaries between Croatia and 
Serbia and between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia could be regarded as frontiers in 
terms of public international law, the Committee contended that the issue of borders 
in the SFRY should be resolved in accordance with the principle of, inter alia, territo-
rial integrity. It took the view that:
[e]xcept where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected 
by international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the ter-
ritorial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis 
[…] is today recognized as a general principle, as stated by the International Court of 
Justice in its Judgment of 22 December 1986 in the case between Burkina Faso and 
Mali […].345
This ruling, referred to as the Badinter Borders Principle and reflecting the notion of 
respect for the territorial status quo, seems to accept the applicability of the principle 
343 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of 
Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, at para. 20.
344 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of 
Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, at paras 20-21.
345 See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Opinions No. 1-3 of the Arbitration Com-
mission of the International Conference on Yugoslavia’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 
182 at pp. 184-185.
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of uti possidetis juris beyond decolonization. In addition, it assumed that territorial 
conflicts among newly established independent States arising from the SFRY could 
be prevented by transforming former administrative borders into international fron-
tiers which are protected under international law. It has been contended that the Com-
mittee’s ruling reflected political aims of European leaders who insisted that only the 
constituent (federal) republics of the SFRY could claim a right to self-determination 
in the form of full independence.346 
The opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Committee has been challenged by vari-
ous legal scholars.347 At this stage, it is worth noting two principal objections. First, 
it may be questioned whether the interpretation of Chamber’s decision in the Case 
Concerning the Frontier Dispute can actually be maintained, for the Badinter Arbitra-
tion Committee quoted only selectively from the Chamber’s decision. More than that, 
the omitted phrase and other parts of the judgment clearly indicate that the Cham-
ber considered the principle of uti possidetis juris to be applicable in the context of 
decolonization. The Chamber’s reference to the general scope of the principle seems 
to be intended to state that uti possidetis juris is not confined to application in “one 
specific system of international law”, that is that of Latin America only, but rather 
that it applied to cases of decolonization wherever it occurs, including on the African 
and Asian continents. In addition, it may be noted that nothing in the Chamber’s deci-
sion is suggestive of the principle of uti possidetis juris applying to cases concern-
ing the dissolution of or secession from independent States, so beyond the context 
346 As such, Enver Hasani argued, the ruling of the Committee “reflected ‘balance of power’ politics and 
the desire to balance forces within multinational republics that existed at the time of independence.” See 
Hasani, ‘Uti Possidetis Juris: From Rome to Kosovo’ at p. 92. See also Chapter III, Section 4.1.4 of this 
study. 
347 See, inter alia, Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’ at p. 55; Radan, ‘Post-Secession Interna-
tional Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission’ at pp. 61-62; 
Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Boders of New States’ at pp. 613-615. Malcolm N. 
Shaw offers an opposing view, as he supports the opinion of the Badinter Arbitration Committee concern-
ing the applicability of the principle of uti possidetis juris beyond the context of decolonization. Accord-
ing to Shaw, when carefully reading the reasoning of the Chamber in the Case Concerning the Frontier 
Dispute and paying particular attention to the wording used, it seems “that the Chamber was seeking to 
underline that behind the application of uti possidetis [juris] to all decolonization situations lay a more 
general principle which relates to all independence processes”. See Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and 
Boundaries’ at pp. 496-498. See also T.M. Franck and others, ‘Expert Opinion Prepared in 1992 by T.M. 
Franck, R. Higgins, A. Pellet, M.N. Shaw and C. Tomuschat, “The Territorial Integrity of Québec in the 
Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty”’ in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.) Self-Determinaiton in International Law. 
Quebec and Lessons Learned (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1992), at paras 2.44-2.50 and para. 
4.01. For disproof of Shaw’s point of view, see Radan, ‘Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical 
Analysis of the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission’ at pp. 62-65. More in general, Jochen 
A. Frowein has expressed his astonishment about the conciseness and “boldness with which very difficult 
issues of public international law are being decided [by the Badinter Arbitration Committee] in a clear-
cut manner without much argument”. See Frowein, ‘Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations Under 
International Law’ at p. 216.
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of decolonization. The second important objection to the opinion of the Badinter 
Arbitration Committee as reflected in literature concerns the argument that accept-
ance of uti possidetis juris as a principle of general applicability would offend other 
principles of international law. This objection to the expansion of the principle of uti 
possidetis juris as a general principle of international law, to which the Badinter Arbi-
tration Committee took the first step, is related to the (ostensible) tension between 
that concept and the right to self-determination of peoples. Implementation of the 
right to self-determination requires that new frontiers in one way or another reflect 
the will of the people at issue, rather than being created pursuant to former inter-
nal boundaries, so in accordance with the principle of uti possidetis juris. In this 
respect, Steven Ratner noted that “when a new state is formed, its territory ought not 
to be irretrievably predetermined but should form an element in the goal of maximal 
internal self-determination”. In contrast, the principle of uti possidetis juris presup-
poses that any changes in borders for the purpose of furthering self-determination 
are always counterbalanced by the risk of conflict.348 Considering this tension, it has 
been argued that (external) self-determination and the principle of uti possidetis juris 
are irreconcilable.349 
Despite these (theoretical) objections, admittedly, practice does seem to sup-
port the view that the principle of uti possidetis juris applies beyond the decoloni-
zation context, at least to a certain extent. In addition to the ruling by the Badinter 
Arbitration Committee which deemed the principle applicable to the collapse of 
Yugoslavia,350 the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, adopted by the European Community (now European Union) and 
its Member States, applied uti possidetis juris to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
as well. It required, inter alia, “respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can 
only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement”.351 Moreover, with 
348 Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Boders of New States’ at p. 612.
349 See, for instance, Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics 
of Territorial Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity at pp. 132-133; V. Epps, 
Evolving Concepts of Self-Determination and Autonomy in International Law: The Legal Status of Tibet 
(Suffolk University Law School 2008) at p. 8; Ratner, ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the 
Boders of New States’ at pp. 614-615. Shaw terms this as the contrast between the “self-determination 
and the ‘Peoples’ approach” on the one hand and the “territorialist approach” on the other hand. See 
Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ at pp. 479, 501-503.
350 Joshua Castellino emphasizes two important differences in the application of the principle of uit pos-
sidetis juris between this case and the decolonization process. First, the people of Yugoslavia were strictly 
speaking not under colonial rule and, secondly, the internal borders of the State did have “a certain his-
torical legitimacy (pre-1918)”, whereas this element was absent in most (African) decolonizations. See 
Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial Posses-
sion with Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity at p. 118.
351 European Community, ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”’, 16 
December 1991, 31 International Legal Materials 1485 (1992).
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the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the signatory States agreed 
to preserve the internal borders of the republics as they existed at the time that they 
were part of the Soviet Union.352 This reasoning on the basis of the principle of uti 
possidetis juris was furthermore applied in the case of the dissolution of Czechoslo-
vakia in 1993, since the two republics involved agreed that the administrative bound-
ary between the Czech and the Slovak parts of the former State would become an 
international frontier.353 In addition to this practice, it is noteworthy that the principle 
of uti possidetis juris is included in various national constitutions.354 From this prac-
tice, it may thus be derived that uti possidetis juris does apply beyond the context 
of decolonization, at least to the extent that it concerns situations of the break-up of 
federal States and situations where the application of the principle is constitution-
ally established or mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned. It remains to be 
determined, however, whether the principle applies to all scenarios of independence. 
2.4.2.3. The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris and the Right to Self-Determination
The perceived tension between the principle of uti possidetis juris and the right to 
self-determination may be refuted as well. For, it should be recalled that in the Case 
Concerning the Frontier Dispute, the Chamber noted “to take account of [uti pos-
sidetis juris] in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples”, 
except where the parties concerned agree otherwise.355 Thus, when using the princi-
ple as a mode of interpreting the external dimension of the right to self-determination, 
in the end, the conflict between the two norms would be counterbalanced. As such, 
applying the principle of uti possidetis juris in this context would entail “that a col-
lectivity which constitutes a majority within a certain administrative unit of a State 
and which is entitled to external self-determination […] has the right to exercise its 
right to external self-determination with regard to that administrative unit”, to the 
effect that the borders of that administrative unit become frontiers protected by inter-
national law.356 Put differently, uti possidetis juris imposes geographical restrictions 
to the scope of implementation of the right to self-determination.357 
352 Commonwealth of Independent States, Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 22 June 
1993. 
353 See Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ at p. 500.
354 See Castellino, International Law and Self-Determination: The Interplay of the Politics of Territorial 
Possession with Formulations of Post-Colonial ‘National’ Identity at p. 122.
355 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of 
Mali), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 554, at para. 25.
356 Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 303-304 (original emphasis omitted).
357 See ibid. at p. 304. See also Franck, ‘Report by Thomas M. Franck: “Opinion Directed at Question 2 
of the Reference”’ at p. 84.
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2.4.2.4. Conclusions on the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris
From the above, it follows that the principle of uti possidetis juris does not generally 
preclude the acknowledgement or exercise of a right to external self-determination 
by means of unilateral secession. First and foremost, it remains questionable whether 
the principle actually pertains to situations other than those pointed out above, for 
instance situations in which an ethnic minority attempting to secede does not cor-
relate to internal borders or administrative lines of the State.358 In addition, in cases 
where the principle is relevant, it was seen that it sets the geographical conditions 
under which independence – by means of exercising the right to external self-deter-
mination – may be achieved, rather than prohibiting it. 
2.4.3. The Principle of Self-Determination
Finally, reference must be made to self-determination, which not only plays a part in 
international law as a fully fledged right of peoples, but also as a more general prin-
ciple.359 This was already demonstrated in outlining the historical development of the 
concept of self-determination.360 So far, this study has primarily focused on the con-
cept of self-determination as a legal entitlement under modern international law. At 
this stage, however, its contemporary manifestation and content as a general principle 
merit some elaboration.
The concept of self-determination was included in the UN Charter and has been 
confirmed on various occasions since. For instance, it was embodied in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration as one of the seven basic principles of international law and 
recognized by the International Court of Justice on various occasions with reference 
to the principle’s elementary and special character.361 In the East Timor case, for one, 
358 See Crawford, ‘Report by James Crawford: “Response to Experts Reports of the Amicus Curiae”’ at 
p. 169.
359 See, for instance, Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at pp. 122-128; Gaja, ‘Gen-
eral Principles of Law’ at paras 1-6; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at 
p. 48; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at pp. 130-132. See also Cassese, Self-Determination 
of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 126-127 and the references made in that respect. It may be inter-
esting to note that self-determination of peoples has also been regarded as a ‘global value’. In this respect, 
see O. Spijkers, The United Nations, the Evolution of Global Values and International Law (School of 
Human Rights Research Series, Intersentia, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland 2011) at pp. 355-445.
360 See Chapter II of the present study.
361 See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 31, at para. 53; International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at paras 54-59; International Court of Justice, East Timor (Portugal 
v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90, at para. 29; International Court of Justice, Legal Con-
sequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 2004, p. 136 at paras 155-156. 
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the Court emphasized that “[t]he principle of self-determination […] is one of the 
essential principles of contemporary international law”.362 This principle appears to 
encompass the core meaning of self-determination, i.e. the “need to pay regard to 
the freely expressed will of peoples” each time the interests of peoples are at stake, 
as was expressed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion in the 
Western Sahara case.363 It expounds a rather general yet fundamental norm for the 
performance of governments, requiring them to enable peoples to freely express their 
wishes whenever their interests may be affected. As such, it may be seen as implicitly 
protecting peoples from oppression in the broadest sense of the word. However, as 
Antonio Cassese observed, 
this principle poses a very loose standard; it does not define either the units of self-
determination or areas or matters to which it applies, or the means or methods of its 
implementation. In particular, it does not specify whether self-determination should 
have an internal or external dimension, nor does it point to the objective of self-
determination (independent statehood, integration or association with another State, 
self-government, secession form an existing State, etc.). The principle simply sets out 
general guidelines for State behaviour and therefore acts as a sort of overarching stand-
ard for international relations.364
Those issues not defined or specified by the principle have – at least to a certain 
extent – been explicated in other sources of international law, such as treaties, judicial 
decisions and custom.365 It was seen previously in the present study that these rules 
set forth the scope of application, modes of implementation, and the subjects (or: 
units) of self-determination. This may explain why, despite its recognition as a gen-
eral principle of (international) law, only little reference is made to self-determination 
in this capacity, and the concept of self-determination mainly operates as a right in 
contemporary international law. It is in this latter capacity that the concept of self-
determination and, more specifically, its external dimension, has been invoked as the 
root from which a (remedial) right to unilateral secession may be derived. Against 
this background, Antonio Cassese found the principle of self-determination to play 
a threefold role. First, it may indicate the method of exercising self-determination, 
i.e. through the free and genuine expression of the will of the people. This means it 
pertains to both internal and external self-determination. Secondly, the principle of 
self-determination may serve as a basic standard of interpretation in cases where the 
362 International Court of Justice, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90, 
at para. 29.
363 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at para. 
59. See also Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 128.
364 Ibid. at p. 128.
365 Ibid. at p. 129.
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treaty rule or customary norm is unclear or ambiguous. Thirdly and finally, it may be 
of use in those cases which are not covered by specific rules at all.366 
In this connection, the question arises as to whether self-determination as a gen-
eral principle of (international) law can prove helpful in determining whether or not 
a right to remedial secession exists. The general meaning of this principle as was 
phrased above does not seem to preclude the acknowledgement of a right to remedial 
secession, as long as secession is in conformity with the will of the people. Yet, since 
the principle of self-determination entails a positive obligation for States, a kind of 
reversed reading would be needed to interpret it as encompassing (traces of) a right 
to remedial secession. Whether that would be appropriate is highly questionable, par-
ticularly in view of the very role which the principle of self-determination plays in 
international law. As noted above, the principle should be seen as a rather flexible, 
coordinating standard, while further interpretation is provided for by other sources 
of international law. Therefore, it is submitted that no drastic conclusions as regards 
an extensive interpretation of the concept of self-determination, its scope of applica-
tion, modes of application, subjects and preconditions should be drawn on the basis 
of this principle. Thus, in its capacity as general principle of international law, self-
determination is of little use to resolving the question of a right to remedial secession.
2.4.4. Conclusions on General Principles of (International) Law
What can be concluded at this stage is that general principles of international law 
do not provide for a conclusive answer as regards the question of whether a right to 
unilateral secession exists under international law. They neither reveal clear traces of 
a right to unilateral secession nor an unambiguous prohibition thereof either. First, 
it was argued that general principles common in municipal laws can play a subsidi-
ary role only, since they may be used in the interpretation of existing rules of inter-
national law. Subsequently, some general principles relevant under international law 
were considered. It was seen that, although there is an ostensible tension between the 
principles of respect for the territorial integrity of States and uti possidetis juris on the 
one hand and the exercise of the external dimension of the right to self-determination 
by means of unilateral secession on the other, these concepts do not appear to be 
irreconcilable. 
More than that, on a couple of occasions, it has been contended that non-State 
entities are not bound by the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States 
in the first place. In this line of reasoning, this latter principle would be irrelevant in 
the situation of secessionist groups attempting to break away from a sovereign State. 
However, this assertion does not seem tenable today. It appears that secessionist enti-
ties should indeed be viewed as (additional) addressees of the principle of territorial 
366 See ibid. at pp. 131-132.
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integrity. If an attempt at unilateral secession does constitute a violation of this princi-
ple, then it becomes relevant to note that both territorial integrity and the right to self-
determination are not absolute. The principle of territorial integrity is to be taken into 
account in the interpretation of the scope and implementation of the right to (external) 
self-determination, and vice versa. Such a balancing exercise appears to leave room 
for the acceptance of a right to unilateral secession under exceptional circumstances. 
This involves a delicate process, however, in which not only the territorial integrity 
of the State and the right to self-determination of the people are weighed, but also the 
importance of international or regional peace, security and stability. 
With respect to the principle of uti possidetis juris, it remains questionable 
whether it is applicable to all situations of independence, including cases where the 
sub-State entity attempting to secede is not connected to a territory which is demar-
cated by internal borders or administrative lines. In situations in which the principle 
is clearly applicable, however, it was found that uti possidetis juris determines the 
geographical restrictions of the implementation of the right to (external) self-deter-
mination rather than restricting the actual exercise of this right. Thus, the principle of 
uti possidetis juris does not preclude the recognition of a qualified right to unilateral 
secession either. 
Although the principle of self-determination of peoples encompasses the very 
essence of self-determination, it was contended that its role as a general principle 
is distinct from rules concerning this concept. The principle merely operates as a 
loose and overarching standard, as a result of which only modest significance is to be 
attached to the principle of self-determination when it comes to sweeping questions 
such as that of a right to remedial secession. In this connection as well, it remains 
pertinent to assess whether contemporary customary international law acknowledges 
such a right as a corollary of the concept of self-determination. This will be carried 
out in the following Chapter. 
2.5. Traces of a (Remedial) Right to Unilateral Secession in Other Possible 
Sources of International Law
The enumeration of sources of international law in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice suggests that this list is exhaustive. Although this 
was most probably true for the time the Statute was drafted, in addition to these 
sources listed, over time, some other (quasi-)sources of international law have been 
suggested.367 In this respect, unilateral acts of States and acts of international organi-
zations will be considered.368
367 See, generally, Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at pp. 52-56; Shaw, 
International Law at pp. 107-115; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at pp. 138-142.
368 In addition to these supplementary sources of international law, some authors also mention equity. 
Although a clear definition of this notion is lacking, in the present context, equity is often used in 
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2.5.1. Unilateral Acts of States
First, unilateral acts of States need to be addressed. Such acts might cover, for 
instance, international recognition of newly established States and objections aiming 
to limit or prevent the formation of new customary international law. For a long time, 
unilateral acts were generally viewed as playing a very confined role only within the 
system of international law. This perception, however, seems to have changed with 
the Nuclear Tests cases,369 in which the International Court of Justice noticed the 
connection with considerations of fairness, reasonableness and justness. As such, the concept is closely 
linked to general principles of international law. It is nevertheless highly questionable whether equity in 
itself can be considered as a formal source of international law today. See, for instance, Brownlie, Princi-
ples of Public International Law at pp. 25-26; F. Francioni, ‘Equity in International Law’ in R. Wolfrum 
(ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated online edn, Oxford University 
Press, New York 2010) at para. 4; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at 
p. 55; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at p. 140. Admittedly, equity may be an important 
factor in judgments and advisory opinions of international judicial bodies such as the International Court 
of Justice. It may introduce some concerns of fairness and justice into the general structure of the law, 
in order to accommodate the general rules of international law to the circumstances of a specific case. 
Moreover, equity may be used to fill the gaps in international law by means of invoking general principles 
of law as referred to in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In addition, 
equity may function as a catalyst for the alteration and modernization of the law, as it may supplement 
or support the transformation of custom. See Francioni, ‘Equity in International Law’ at paras 5-7, 26. 
Nonetheless, as the Court acknowledged, equity is “not in itself a source of obligation where none would 
otherwise exist”. See International Court of Justice, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua 
v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1988, p. 12, at para. 94. Rather, as 
Hugh Thirlway noted, equity may probably best be regarded as “one of the basic principles governing the 
creation and performance of legal obligations”. See Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at p. 
140. In view of this, the present study will not consider equity in the context of finding traces of a right to 
unilateral secession within the sources of international law. 
369 International Court of Justice, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 
253. This is one of a pair of cases in which a dispute with France concerning the conduct of nuclear tests 
was brought before the Court. Being a State possessing nuclear weapons, France performed periodical 
nuclear weapons tests. From 1966 to 1972, France carried out such tests on the territory of French Poly-
nesia. Conducting nuclear tests above ground (i.e. atmospheric testing), however involves a high risk of 
radioactive material being dispersed in the atmosphere, which would eventually fall to the surface. Situ-
ated in the South Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand considered themselves to be vulnerable to 
the dangers of this possible radioactive fall-out resulting from the French nuclear tests. Consequently, 
Australia and New Zealand instituted proceedings before the Court against France, claiming that carry-
ing out further atmospheric nuclear weapons tests is inconsistent with international law (para. 11). From 
the applications and from further statements, the Court concluded that both Australia and New Zealand 
aimed at obtaining an assurance from the French government that no further nuclear tests would be con-
ducted above ground (para. 30). The Court made reference to, inter alia, several statements made by 
the French government, which displayed the intention to unconditionally cease the atmospheric nuclear 
testing following the conclusion of the 1974 series of tests (paras 31-41). In this connection, the Court 
held that legal obligations may arise from unilateral acts in case the State making the statement intends 
to become bound by it (para. 43). For a more elaborate description of the two Nuclear Tests cases, see 
for instance, A. Watts QC, ‘Nuclear Tests Cases’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (fully updated online edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2010).
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‘strictly unilateral nature’ of certain legal acts.370 As a general rule, the Court stipu-
lated the following: 
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal 
or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. […] When 
it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound 
according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal 
undertaking, the State being henceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct 
consistent with the declaration.371 
Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that not all unilateral acts constitute interna-
tional obligations. Two elements are of vital importance for the binding force of a 
unilateral act. First, the State making the declaration should express the intention to 
be bound. Secondly, the declaration is to be brought to the notice of the international 
legal subject at issue. The first element has to be determined on the basis of the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, thereby considering the place, type, manner and 
form of the declaration.372 Yet, when statements are made which limit the State’s free-
dom of action, a restrictive interpretation is called for.373 In this connection, it is to be 
noted that unilateral acts are closely connected to another source of international law, 
namely general principles of (international) law. It may be argued that in accepting a 
unilateral act as creating a legally binding obligation, the Court has applied the prin-
ciple of good faith. For, it would be contrary to this principle if a State would be able 
to retract a declaration which was clearly intended to be binding and which would 
cause harm to a third party.374 In view of this strong relationship with one of the gen-
eral principles as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, some authors have rejected the argument that unilateral acts are to be treated 
as a new source of law.375 
Having touched upon the concept of unilateral acts of States, the question as to 
their effects arises. As Wilfried Fiedler aptly noted,
370 Notwithstanding this pronouncement, a uniform and accurate definition of unilateral acts is lacking. 
See W. Fiedler, ‘Unilateral Acts in International Law’ in R. Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopedia of Public Inter-
national Law (Elsevier, Amsterdam 2000) at pp. 1018-1019. 
371 International Court of Justice, Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 
253, at para. 43. 
372 See V. Rodriguez Cedeno and M.I. Torres Cazorla, ‘Unilateral Acts of States in International Law’ 
in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully updated online edn, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2010) at paras 25-27.
373 See Fiedler, ‘Unilateral Acts in International Law’ at pp. 1021-1022; Shaw, International Law at 
p. 115.
374 See, for instance, Rodriguez Cedeno and Torres Cazorla, ‘Unilateral Acts of States in International 
Law’ at paras 34-39.
375 See, for example, Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at pp. 139-140.
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[t]hrough the binding force of the declaration the declaring subject of international 
law undertakes a unilateral obligation to act in compliance with its declaration. The 
individual State is therefore in a position to unilaterally create law under certain cir-
cumstances and on the basis of valid customary law.376
As such, unilateral acts may contribute to the development of international law and 
the limitation or prevention of new norms of customary international law. Moreover, 
by means of corresponding State practice, unilateral acts may even alter the interpre-
tation of international treaties which already exist, hence affecting and complement-
ing international law.377 
In search of traces of a right to unilateral secession, unilateral acts seem to be pri-
marily relevant as a possible source of international law when done as declarations 
concerning the recognition (or non-recognition) of newly proclaimed States follow-
ing an attempt to secede. Such declarations, however, will be dealt with elsewhere in 
the present study, in the context of opinio juris and State practice as the preconditions 
for customary international law.378 For, unilateral declarations of recognition or non-
recognition and possibly corresponding State practice may show how States perceive 
the right to self-determination and whether they acknowledge a right to unilateral 
secession under certain circumstances. As such, unilateral acts may indeed influence 
the interpretation of international law.
2.5.2. Acts of International Organizations
Having touched upon unilateral acts as possible sources of international law, the acts 
of international organizations are to be addressed. The increasing number of inter-
national organizations following the First World War has led to suggestions that the 
acts of these organizations should be regarded as a source of international law as 
well. In this respect, it should be mentioned that despite this emergence, States have 
exercised restraint in allotting bodies of international organizations the competence 
to issue decisions which are binding upon all member States. Only in a very limited 
number of cases have States been willing to grant such extensive competences to an 
international organization. The principal example in this regard is that of the Euro-
pean Union.379 The only example arising from the Charter of the United Nations is the 
376 Fiedler, ‘Unilateral Acts in International Law’ at p. 1022.
377 See ibid.
378 See Chapter VI of this study.
379 Initially, competences were attributed to the European Economic Community (EEC). With the 1993 
Treaty of Maastricht, the EEC as an organization merged into the European Union and turned into one 
of its three pillars. With the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the pillar 
structure was dissolved. Hence, a single European Union was established, which has both replaced and 
succeeded the EEC. See, for instance, J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (8th edn, Pearson, Harlow 
2010) at pp. 3-55.
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UN Security Council, which is empowered to issue orders which are binding upon 
all UN member States in the context of its competence to deal with threats to inter-
national peace and security.380 
On the international plane, decisions and resolutions of the UN General Assembly 
have particularly been suggested as a formal source of international law.381 This might 
seem striking, as the General Assembly is a political organ which is competent to 
issue decisions and resolutions that are recommendatory in nature rather than legally 
binding, apart from a few exceptions.382 Yet, when these ‘recommendations’ are con-
cerned with substantive questions of international law, they may have great legal 
value as well, since an interplay exists between these decisions and resolutions on the 
one hand and customary international law on the other. When they claim to articulate 
binding rules – either explicitly or impliedly – the decisions and resolutions of the 
General Assembly may be seen as ‘legal pronouncements’ which can be relevant in 
the sense of customary law. Such pronouncements may, for instance, declare what 
is existing customary international law (i.e. lex lata). In addition to evidencing the 
law, decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly may also state legal wishes 
or aspirations (i.e. lex ferenda). When adopted unanimously or by a vast majority, 
the latter category of pronouncements may contribute to opinio juris on a certain 
matter. If this opinio juris is in turn reiterated and reflected within State practice as 
well, General Assembly resolutions may even give rise to the emergence of a new 
norm of customary international law, binding upon all States.383 This outlook seems 
to be affirmed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons as well.384 Further, it may be observed that the decisions and 
resolutions of the General Assembly raise the political pressure on States. As Martin 
380 Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at pp. 52-53; Shaw, International 
Law at p. 108.
381 See, for example, Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at pp. 52-54; 
Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at p. 141, who only addresses General Assembly resolu-
tions in the context of acts of international organizations. It is to be noted, however, that other interna-
tional organizations may also issue decisions and resolutions which may have a similar effect. Examples 
in this respect are the Organization of American States and the Organization of African Unity, as well 
as some specialized organizations such as the International Labour Organization and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. See Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 49.
382 The main exception in this respect is that General Assembly resolutions which concern the internal 
working of the United Nations are legally binding for all members of the organization. See Dixon, Text-
book on International Law at p. 48.
383 See, for instance, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at p. 15; Dixon, Textbook on 
International Law at pp. 48-49; International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Cus-
tomary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, London Conference (2000), at pp. 55-65; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law at pp. 52-53; Shaw, International Law at pp. 108-109; Thirlway, ‘The 
Sources of International Law’ at p. 141.
384 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Rep. 1996, p. 226, at paras 70-73.
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Dixon aptly noted, “the political expectation raised by a positive vote will have con-
siderable impact on the behaviour of states and, therefore, on the development of 
customary law”.385 In connection to the above, however, it is to be emphasized that 
the mere acceptance of a decision or resolution during a meeting of an international 
organization ipso facto is insufficient for those acts being legally binding upon all 
States. Rather, the legally binding character of such acts may merely ensue from the 
fact that they meet the requirements of customary international law, i.e. at least in the 
conventional view, the existence of State practice and opinio juris. As will be submit-
ted in the following Chapter of this study,386 both constituents should not be assumed 
too easily.387 
A similar effect as was outlined in the context of General Assembly resolutions 
may be attributed to the conclusions of international intergovernmental conferences, 
for instance so-called final acts. When adopted unanimously or by a substantial 
majority, such conclusions may evidence the existence of opinio juris on the subject 
matter concerned and may, as such, contribute to the creation of a customary norm, 
which is legally binding upon all States.388 Moreover, these documents may – due to 
their political significance – also have considerable impact on the practice of States, 
thus adding to the development of custom.389 
Although the foregoing explicates why some acts of international organizations 
have been suggested as an independent source of law and are sometimes referred to 
as generating “soft law”,390 the interplay with customary international law reveals 
why some authors remain hesitant in accepting such a position.391 For the sake of 
completeness, however, both resolutions issued by the UN General Assembly and the 
conclusions of international conferences deserve consideration when seeking traces 
of a right to unilateral secession. As has been demonstrated previously in this study, 
385 Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 49.
386 See Chapter V, in particular Sections 3 and 4.
387 In this respect, an observation by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons is illustrative. The Court found that in view of the 
“substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions” with which the resolutions under consideration 
had been adopted, “they still fall short of establishing the existence of an opinio juris”. See International 
Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1996, p. 
226, at para. 71. See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel attached to the case.
388 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at pp. 14-15; International Law Association, Com-
mittee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable 
to the Formation of General Customary International Law, London Conference (2000), at pp. 65-66.
389 Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 49.
390 As observed by Martin Dixon, the term ‘soft law’ is used to refer to two phenomena in international 
law. First, it is used to denote norms of international law which do not prescribe clear rights or obliga-
tions to the addressees, due to the flexibility or ambiguity of its content. In this respect, one may think of 
Article 2 ICESCR. Secondly, the term ‘soft law’ is used to indicate those principles which may grow into 
international legal rules, but have not yet achieved this status. Put differently, the concept of ‘soft law’ 
may be used to refer to lex ferenda. See ibid. at p. 50. 
391 See, for example, Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at p. 141.
Chapter IV
184
in the context of the historical development of the notion of self-determination, the 
General Assembly has promulgated a number of resolutions which have been impor-
tant for the evolution of the notion of self-determination against the backdrop of 
decolonization.392 It was shown already that in the context of the question of a unilat-
eral right to secession, the Friendly Relations Declaration is considered to be crucial. 
For proponents of a (qualified) right to unilateral secession, the safeguard clause of 
this document has been at the basis of their thesis.393 That said, questions may arise 
as regards the legal status of the most prominent sources providing an argument for 
existence of a qualified right to unilateral secession as discussed above. 
As far as the Friendly Relations Declaration is concerned, it is to be emphasized 
that this document was adopted by the General Assembly with no opposition.394 
Therefore, this document can be said to reflect at least strong opinio juris.395 That the 
Friendly Relations Declaration mirrors substantial opinio juris was also suggested by 
the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, as it stated that: 
[t]he effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely 
that of a ‘reiteration or elucidation’ of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Char-
ter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or 
set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves.396
Whether this has indeed led to the existence of a customary norm regarding a right 
to unilateral secession will be scrutinized in the following Chapter. In addition, as 
has been demonstrated previously in this Chapter, the Friendly Relations Declaration 
has been frequently used by both the International Court of Justice397 and national 
courts398 when analysing the condition of international law.399 
392 The principle of self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter evolved into a right to self-deter-
mination for colonial peoples by means of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and Resolution 
1541 (XV). See Chapter II, Section 4.2 of the present study. 
393 See Section 2.2 of the present Chapter.
394 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) was adopted without vote.
395 Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In 
Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 19.
396 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 188.
397 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, at para. 58; 
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nica-
ragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at paras 188, 
191; International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, at paras 87-88, 156. 
398 See, for instance, Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217; 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. No. 
75/92, 1995 (not dated). 
399 See Summers, Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination Shape a 
Contemporary Law of Nations at pp. 255-317; Suski, ‘Keeping the Lid on the Secession Kettle: A Review 
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The same line of reasoning may hold for the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action, which contains a significant reaffirmation of the safeguard clause from 
the Friendly Relations Declaration. In June 1993, the Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action was adopted by consensus of 171 States during the UN World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. Subsequently, the General Assembly 
adopted the Declaration as part of General Assembly Resolution 48/121.400 As one 
commentator noted, the reaffirmation of the safeguard clause in the Vienna Dec-
laration and Programme of Action “arguably strengthens any argument that it has 
come to form part of customary international law”.401 Nonetheless, restraint is to be 
exercised with regard to the legal value attributed to resolutions emanating from the 
General Assembly and conclusions resulting from international conferences. As Mal-
colm N. Shaw rightly pointed out, these documents “are often the result of political 
compromises and arrangements and, comprehended in that sense, never intended to 
constitute binding norms”.402 One must therefore be prudent when identifying legal 
norms from opinio juris and State practice in connection to these acts of international 
organizations. Although the relevant General Assembly resolutions and final acts can 
certainly be said to have legal value, before drawing far reaching conclusions as to 
the existence of a right to unilateral secession ensuing from an a contrario interpre-
tation of those instruments, State practice needs to be scrutinized first. This will be 
done in Chapter VI.
2.5.3. Conclusions on Other Possible Sources of International Law 
After having scrutinized the sources of international law as listed in Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, this section considered some addi-
tional sources, i.e. unilateral acts of States and acts of international organizations. It 
was found that when seeking traces of a right to unilateral secession, unilateral acts 
are mainly of interest in their manifestation as declarations regarding the (non-)rec-
ognition of new States which are proclaimed after an attempted secession. As such, 
unilateral acts of States will be addressed elsewhere in the present study, against the 
background of opinio juris and State practice being the materials of customary inter-
national law. 
Also with respect to the acts of international organizations, an important connec-
tion with custom as a formal source of international law may be established. It was 
noted that General Assembly resolutions which are adopted unanimously or by a vast 
of Legal Interpretations Concerning Claims of Self-Determination by Minority Peoples’ at pp. 205-226.
400 See World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted on 
25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, at para. 2. 
401 See Wilson, ‘Self-Determination, Recognition and the Problem of Kosovo’ at p. 467.
402 Shaw, International Law at p. 110. That the Friendly Relations Declaration was created as a result of 
political compromises has been demonstrated in Section 2.2 of the present Chapter. 
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majority and final acts of international conferences may constitute a source of inter-
national law as well. For attaining this status, however, these acts are first to fulfil 
the conditions of customary international law. That is to say that they need to reflect 
opinio juris on the matter and that equivalent State practice should be present. So, 
although it has been determined previously that some acts of international organiza-
tions are highly relevant when searching for traces of a (qualified) right to unilateral 
secession, State practice should be examined before one may conclude that a per-
ceived right to unilateral secession follows from these acts.
3. concluSionS
This Chapter has addressed the questions of whether contemporary international law 
recognizes a right to unilateral secession for subgroups constituting peoples within 
sovereign States, and if so, whether this right is absolute or conditional in character. 
For the purpose of addressing that matter, the sources of international law other than 
custom were scrutinized one by one. First, international treaties were examined in 
search of traces of a right to unilateral secession. The UN Charter, the 1966 Inter-
national Covenants, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect 
of Treaties, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination were considered, but no conclusive evidence of such a right 
was found in conventional treaty law. Secondly, a close look was taken at scholarly 
literature. It seems that as a result of the writings of Lee C. Buchheit and Anto-
nio Cassese, a remedial right to unilateral secession became accepted by many legal 
scholars. Yet, the caveat was made that scholarship is not decisive on the matter. This 
was most prominently reflected in scholarly writings following Kosovo’s unilater-
ally proclaimed independence. In that context, most authors were rather reticent in 
providing conclusive answers as to the existence of a (qualified) right to unilateral 
secession under modern international law. Thirdly, decisions and opinions from both 
national and international judicial bodies were dealt with in order to find elements 
of such a right. It was demonstrated that although the theory of remedial secession 
has some support in jurisprudence, to date, no judicial body has accepted a (quali-
fied) right to unilateral secession as an entitlement of a particular people in a specific 
case. Also in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independ-
ence, the International Court of Justice refused to take a clear position on this matter. 
Fourthly, some general principles of law were considered. While general principles 
common in municipal laws, such as good faith and proportionality, may indeed be 
taken into account when arguing in favour of the existence of a right to unilateral 
secession, it was found that general principles which are merely relevant under inter-
national law do not seem to reveal clear traces of such a right. More than that, the 
principles of respect for the territorial integrity of States and uti possidetis juris osten-
sibly conflict with the thesis that a (qualified) right to unilateral secession does exist 
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under contemporary international law. Close scrutiny of those principles, however, 
has demonstrated that these concepts are not irreconcilable. Thus, although general 
principles of international law do not support the existence of a qualified right to uni-
lateral secession, they do not preclude it either and seem to leave some scope for the 
acknowledgement of such a right. Fifthly and finally, some possible sources of inter-
national law beyond the scope of Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ were addressed, 
namely unilateral acts of States and acts of international organizations. Both types of 
acts will be further considered hereinafter in the context of customary international 
law. 
From the analysis in the present Chapter, it may be inferred that (theoretical) sup-
port for the existence of a right to remedial secession is mainly found in doctrinal 
writings and, to a limited extent, in jurisprudence. In this respect, it is important to 
bear in mind that it is particularly these sources which Article 38(1)(d) of the Stat-
ute of the ICJ lists as “subsidiary means for the determination of law”, as a result of 
which they should be seen to have supplementary value rather than principal impor-
tance. Moreover, it seems that both scholars and judicial bodies primarily base the 
thesis of such a right on a progressive, a contrario reading of the safeguard clause 
of the Friendly Relations Declaration. As was demonstrated, however, such an inter-
pretation is not uncontested. Not only since it concerns an indeterminate clause, but 
also considering the rather vacillating relationship with a principle which is firmly 
rooted in international law, i.e. that of territorial integrity. In sum, it may even be 
said, as Daniel Thürer and Thomas Burri aptly observed, that deducing a qualified 
right to secession from the safeguard clause is “on the fringes of legal analysis and 
is strongly inspired by legitimacy considerations”.403 While the doctrine of remedial 
secession might indeed be attractive, it may be concluded here that its theoretical 
foundations are rather fragile and it remains to be seen whether international practice 
shows sufficient and compelling support for it. To shed some light on this latter issue, 
the following Chapter will present some preliminary remarks for the ascertainment of 
customary international law, after which Chapter VI will scrutinize State practice and 
opinio juris as being the classical elements of international customary law.




cuStomaRy inteRnational law: 
pReliminaRy RemaRkS on aSSeSSing 
the exiStence of a cuStomaRy Right 
to Remedial SeceSSion
“[M]ost of what we perversely persist in calling customary international law is not 
only not customary law: it does not even faintly resemble a customary law.”
Sir Robert Y. Jennings*
1. intRoduction
Examining the sources of international law other than custom has led to the conclu-
sion that (theoretical) support for the existence of a right to remedial secession can 
be found in doctrinal writings and, to a limited extent, in jurisprudence. It seems that 
both scholars and judicial bodies primarily base the thesis of such a right on a pro-
gressive, a contrario reading of the safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Decla-
ration. In this regard, the lack of a representative government, serious and widespread 
violations of fundamental human rights, structural discriminatory treatment and the 
exhaustion of peaceful remedies have generally been adduced as indicia for a right 
to remedial secession. However, as was demonstrated, such an interpretation is not 
uncontested. It was contended that, while the doctrine of remedial secession might 
indeed be attractive from a moral perspective, its theoretical foundations are rather 
fragile and it remains to be seen whether it has a sufficient and compelling empirical 
basis. As was observed previously, the development of the law of self-determina-
tion is to a large extent determined by the realities of practice.1 Therefore, it should 
be assessed whether the theoretical concept and its specific interpretation are being 
reflected in practice. Put differently, it is to be scrutinized to what extent a customary 
*  R.Y. Jennings, ‘The Identification of International Law’ in B. Cheng (ed.) International Law: Teach-
ing and Practice (Stevens, London 1982) at p. 5.
1 See Chapter IV, Section 1.
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right to unilateral secession has emerged under contemporary international law. 
Before proceeding to such exercise, first, the present Chapter will introduce the con-
cept of customary international law. 
While this Chapter will elaborate on customary international law in detail, it 
should be emphasized that this Chapter does not intend to substantially contribute 
to the development of theories with respect to the formation of customary interna-
tional law. Such a comprehensive approach would go beyond the scope of the present 
research, which in essence focuses on the question of the emergence of a right to uni-
lateral secession under modern international law. Rather, the purpose of this Chapter 
is primarily instrumental. In this regard, it will first present the two well-known ele-
ments of customary international law, i.e. State practice and opinio juris sive neces-
sitatis, and elaborate on how these have been interpreted by the International Court 
of Justice and in doctrine. Secondly, the present Chapter will map out and appraise 
some relevant models of ascertaining customary norms. In this respect, conventional 
approaches towards this subject matter as well as some – more or less – progressive 
views will be discussed and criticized. Thirdly and finally, based on the foregoing, 
this Chapter will present the approach towards customary international law – by no 
means an unambiguous or comprehensive checklist – which will be utilized in the 
assessment regarding a customary right to unilateral secession. All in all, the pre-
sent Chapter will serve as an important starting point and account for the subsequent 
exercise, as the theory of custom one adheres to will determine the approach of and 
possibly even the answer to the question of whether or not a customary norm with 
respect to a right to unilateral secession actually does exist today. 
2. the two conventional elementS of cuStomaRy inteRnational 
law
The previous Chapter took Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice as a point of departure for examining the sources of international law, as this 
provision is frequently seen as a (non-exhaustive) catalogue of these sources. Like-
wise, this provision serves as the starting point for describing the notion of custom-
ary international law.2 In sub-paragraph (b), it prescribes that the Court shall apply 
2 The term ‘customary international law’ is often used to address different notions. One the one hand, 
it refers to a complex and often obscure process through which particular norms of international law are 
created. On the other hand, it concerns the substantive rules which have been materialized through this 
process and which are binding upon all States (see, for instance, T. Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ 
in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International law (fully updated online edn, 
Oxford University Press, New York 2010) at para. 1). Moreover, the expression ‘customary international 
law’ is sometimes used to denote the principles governing the process of creating or finding law, which 
can be applied on the specific process of determining customary law as well and may be part of custom-
ary law on their own, rather than merely being general principles of law (see N.J. Arajärvi, The Changing 
Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International 
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“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. As such, 
the formation process of customary international law is an ongoing process which 
“enables international law to develop in line with the needs of the time”.3 In addition 
to its flexible nature, customary law has other advantages. For example, even where 
norms have been restated in international legal instruments, customary rules have 
added value as they also bind States which are not party to the instrument at hand. 
Moreover, State parties cannot terminate their obligations stemming from customary 
international law by withdrawal.4 Customary norms may also provide for a clarifica-
tion or elaboration of the rules included in treaty provisions and, as such, contribute 
to the evolution of international legal norms.5 This again emphasizes the flexibility of 
customary international law. 
From the wording of Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, it is possible to discern two elements in the materialization of a norm of 
customary international law: an objective element referring to the actual behaviour 
of States (State practice) and a subjective, psychological element which concerns the 
belief of States that such behaviour – either by action or omission – is a legal obliga-
tion (opinio juris sive necessitatis,6 generally abbreviated as opinio juris).7 As will 
be expounded elsewhere in this Chapter, the conventional view holds that both these 
constituents are required for the creation of customary international law. In 1929, the 
two-element theory was reflected by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
the Lotus case, as it noted that only if certain conduct was based on the conscious-
ness of States of a legal obligation to act accordingly would it be possible to speak of 
Criminal Tribunals (European University Institute 2011) at p. 20). For the purpose of the present study, 
the term ‘customary international law’ will be used to refer to substantive rules of international law which 
are customary in nature, except where explicitly noted otherwise.
3 M. Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) at pp. 
30-31.
4 See International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at paras 113-114.
5 T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 
2006) at pp. 357-358. 
6 Despite the Latin phraseology, the concept does not find its origin in Roman law. According to Mau-
rice H. Mendelson, François Gény was the first author who used the phrase opinio juris sive necessitatis 
in 1919 in the context of municipal law. See M.H. Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary Inter-
national Law’ (1998) 272 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Recueil des 
Cours) 155 at p. 268. 
7 See, for instance, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) at p. 6; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th 
revised edn, Routledge, London/New York 1997) at p. 44; M.N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) at p. 70; H. Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in 
M.D. Evans (ed.) International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) at p. 125; Treves, ‘Custom-
ary International Law’ at para. 8.
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customary international law.8 Consequently, in the absence of this subjective belief 
of obligation, the State practice concerned was considered to be nothing more than 
usage. The International Court of Justice further developed this approach of custom-
ary law in the well-known North Sea Continental Shelf case, in which it considered 
the process by which a treaty provision could generate a customary norm. In this 
respect, the Court discerned the two elements required for the creation of customary 
international law more explicitly:
[I]n order to achieve this result, two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the 
acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried 
out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obliga-
tory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the 
existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation.9
Throughout its decision, the Court clearly considered State practice to be the core 
element in the formation of a customary norm, which is to be confirmed by the reflec-
tion of opinio juris. In addition to the landmark decision in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf case, the Nicaragua case has become an important decision concerning the 
two-element theory and is frequently quoted by scholars and judges in the context 
of determining and interpreting customary international law. Here, the Court stated 
– inter alia – that “[f]or a new customary norm to be formed not only must the acts 
concerned ‘amount to settled practice’ but they must be accompanied by the opinio 
juris sive necessitatis”.10 While the two-element theory is confirmed in this passage 
of the ruling, other parts of this decision are generally seen as reflecting a differen-
tiation of the rule flowing from the North Sea Continental Shelf case. This will be 
demonstrated hereafter.
Numerous scholars have also endorsed the two-element theory of customary 
international law. Today, it is still considered to be the dominant view.11 It should be 
8 Permanent Court of International Justice, The Case of the SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, 
PCIJ Series A No. 10 (1927), at p. 28.
9 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, at para. 77.
10 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicara-
gua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 207. See also para. 
183, where the Court referred to one of its considerations in the Libya/Malta case (International Court of 
Justice, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 13, at para. 27).
11 See, for instance, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at pp. 7-10; J.-M. Henckaerts and 
L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (International Committee of the Red Cross/
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) at pp. xxxvii-xxxviii; International Law Association, Com-
mittee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to 
the Formation of General Customary International Law, London Conference (2000) at pp. 6-7; F.L. Kirgis 
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emphasized, however, that the concept of customary international law is not as unam-
biguous as it might ostensibly seem in view of the above. Therefore, the generally 
accepted understanding of the elements of State practice and opinio juris should be 
specified, thereby highlighting the complexity of the matter and revealing the subtle 
shades and increased interrelatedness of the two elements, as a result of which the 
strict distinction between the two elements has become theoretical to a certain extent. 
2.1. State Practice
As has become clear from the above, State practice is one of the two elements of cus-
tomary international law. Even more so, it is traditionally considered to be the key 
component in the formation process of customary law. In this respect, it needs to be 
emphasized that not all behaviour of States automatically leads to the establishment 
of such norms. The question thus arises as to which activities do constitute practice 
for the purpose of contributing to the creation of customary international law. When 
conceived narrowly, as Anthony A. D’Amato did, merely the physical acts of States 
(i.e. what States actually do and omit to do) in the international sphere are covered.12 
Examples in this respect are the establishment of international relations, battlefield 
conduct, the use of military means either collectively or unilaterally, the seizure of 
property, the arresting of individuals and economic measures or otherwise taken by 
way of countermeasures.13 However, merely focusing on these physical acts as was 
traditionally done appears to be a view that has been superseded. Today, the notion of 
State practice is generally considered to be much more inclusive.14 Judicial opinions15 
Jr, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 146 at p. 146; Malanc-
zuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at p. 39; A. Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation 
of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) at pp. 79-80; Shaw, 
International Law at pp. 70-71; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at pp. 125-127; Treves, ‘Cus-
tomary International Law’ at para. 8. However, as will be demonstrated in Section 3 of the present Chapter, 
more progressive approaches towards ascertaining customary international law are on the rise.
12 According to Anthony A. D’Amato, State practice is established by acts and omissions, whereas 
opinio juris is materialized by statements. See A.A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International 
Law (Cornell University Press, London 1971) at pp. 89-90.
13 See, for instance, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at 
p. xxxviii; International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) Inter-
national Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International 
Law, London Conference (2000) at p. 14; Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ at para. 27.
14 See, for instance, M. Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules. International Relations and 
Customary International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999) at p. 134; Dixon, Textbook 
on International Law at p. 31; Meron, The Humanization of International Law at p. 361.
15 See, for instance, International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 
190, in which the Court acknowledged the customary nature of the prohibition of the use of force on the 
basis of, inter alia, the fact that it was “frequently referred to in statements by State representatives”. 
See also International International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
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and the reports of authoritative legal bodies such as the International Law Associa-
tion16 have demonstrated that evidence of what a State does can also be derived from 
verbal acts.17 These acts are more common manifestations of State practice than the 
physical behaviour of States. On the domestic level, governmental declarations made 
in parliament are examples of relevant sources from which evidence of State practice 
may be deduced, as well as inter alia internal memoranda, official manuals concerning 
legal issues, diplomatic correspondence, national legislation and decisions of national 
courts and executive authorities. At the international stage, official statements, reac-
tions or declarations presented by the delegates of States in international organizations 
or conferences are seen to reflect State practice,18 as well as pleadings before and sub-
missions to international courts and tribunals. In particular, governmental positions 
vis-à-vis written texts, such as draft proposals of treaties and other international legal 
instruments are viewed to be significant, for “they may contribute to the formation of 
precise and detailed customary international rules”.19 For those verbal acts to count as 
State practice, however, they need to be public. That is to say that these pronounce-
ments are to be communicated to at least one other State.20 Maurice H. Mendelson 
refers to this as the “claim and response” element of practice.21
Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, ICTY-IT-94-AR72, 2 October 
1995, at para. 99, where it was noted that in determining customary norms of international humanitarian 
law, “reliance must primarily be placed on such elements as official pronouncements of States, military 
manuals and judicial decisions.” 
16 See International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) Interna-
tional Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International 
Law, London Conference (2000) at pp. 14-15. See also International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, Vol. II, Part 2, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2), 29 February, 10 and 19 June 1980, pp. 34-52. The ILC scrutinized 
the concept of ‘state of necessity’ and in this connection, referred to and heavily relied on the statements 
of government representatives and scholars.
17 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at pp. xxxviii-xl; 
Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at pp. 204-207; Shaw, International Law at 
pp. 77-78. 
18 In his separate opinion attached to the Barcelona Traction case, Judge Ammoun noted that “it cannot 
be denied, with regard to the resolutions which emerge therefrom, or better, with regard to the votes 
expressed therein in the name of States, that these amount to precedents contributing to the formation 
of custom”. See International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, at pp. 302-303. 
19 Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ at para. 26. See also Brownlie, Principles of Public Inter-
national Law at pp. 6-7; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at 
p. xxxviii; Shaw, International Law at p. 78.
20 International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at p. 15.
21 M.H. Mendelson, ‘The Subjective Element in Customary International Law’ (1996) 66 British Year-




This inclusive approach towards identifying State practice seems to soften the 
distinction traditionally made between State practice and opinio juris. Not merely 
what States actually do, but also what States say is considered to contribute to the 
establishment of State practice. Yet, such verbal State practice may include subjec-
tive elements and does not always correspond with the physical actions of States. The 
classical example in this respect concerns States which formally uphold the prohibi-
tion of torture and deny that they are involved in such malpractices, while in fact, 
they do engage in torture. What is more, verbal State practice is closely linked to 
the notion of opinio juris, since the content of such verbal acts often simultaneously 
expresses the legal conviction of the State.22 Consequently, it is “often difficult or 
even impossible to disentangle the two elements”,23 as a result of which it is “largely 
theoretical to strictly separate elements of practice and legal conviction”.24 This posi-
tion will be elaborated upon in the context of the subjective element of custom.25
In the context of the above, it should be emphasized that although the behav-
iour of actors other than States – that is to say their legislative, executive and judi-
cial branches26 – cannot be regarded as practice which directly contributes to the 
crystallization of customary norms,27 indirectly, international organizations and other 
22 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. xlvi; Mendelson, 
‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at p. 206.
23 International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at p. 7.
24 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. xlvi.
25 See Section 2.2 of the present Chapter.
26 On this topic, see Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at pp. 198-200.
27 However, given that international law increasingly regulates the rights and obligations of actors 
other than States, several authors have suggested to reformulate understandings of customary interna-
tional law so as allow non-State actors to contribute more directly to the formation of customary norms. 
Anthea E. Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, for instance, have proposed a theory of “quasi-custom” in 
this respect. See A.E. Roberts and S. Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed 
Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 
107, at pp. 149-151. By taking the example of armed groups and their influence on the creation of cus-
tomary international humanitarian law, Roberts and Sivakumaran suggest “to develop a theory of quasi-
customary international law that would be based on the practices and views of states plus actors other 
than states” (p. 150). This does neither imply that non-State actors acting alone would have the power 
to create new customary norms, nor that they are in the position to amend existing customary norms. 
According to Roberts and Sivakumaran, the actions and views of State should also be weighted and 
should even be given more weight in order to safeguard the vital role of States in the formation or chang-
ing of customary international law. Moreover, they stress that non-State actors should remain bound by 
existing customary international law (p. 151). Similar proposals have been made by other authors, inter 
alia, by Robert McCorquodale. See R. McCorquodale, ‘An Inclusive International Legal System’ (2004) 
17 Leiden Journal of International Law 477, at pp. 498-499. While it is beyond the scope of the present 
study to elaborate on these theories and critically consider them, it deserves to be emphasized that at pre-
sent, suggestions to allow non-State actors to play a role in the creation of customary international law 
are by no means generally accepted.
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non-State actors (e.g. political movements and armed opposition groups) have become 
progressively more involved in this process. Not only may the perceptions of these 
entities influence the practice of States at both the national and international level,28 
over recent decades, international organizations have provided a forum for States to 
deliberate and to act. As such, international organizations may even be viewed as 
“instrumental” in the formation process of custom.29 For, as the International Law 
Commission has noted, “records of the cumulative practice of international organiza-
tions may be regarded as evidence of customary international law with reference to 
States’ relations to the organizations”.30
Having addressed the manifestations of State practice, questions arise as to the 
interpretation of this objective constituent of customary international law. State prac-
tice is generally seen to be based on three factors determining its ‘denseness’: uni-
formity (ratione materiae), extensiveness and representativeness (ratione loci), and 
duration (ratione temporis).31 These factors merit some clarification.
2.1.1. Uniformity
It is commonly accepted that relevant practice need not be absolutely consistent in 
order to contribute to the formation of a customary norm. Rather, as the International 
Court of Justice held in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, practice is to be “virtu-
ally uniform”.32 This basically means that the States involved must not have engaged 
in significantly different behaviour.33 Nevertheless, in the Fisheries case, the Court 
held that in assessing State practice, one need not attach too much value to “a few 
uncertainties or contradictions, real or apparent”.34 The practice at hand merely needs 
to be sufficiently similar, so it seems. From this case, it also follows that the degree 
of consistency that is required may depend upon the subject matter of the norm at 
issue. More specifically, positive obligations for the State call for a greater degree of 
28 Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ at para. 33. See also Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Cus-
tomary International Law: Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International Criminal 
Tribunals at p. 23.
29 See Shaw, International Law at p. 78.
30 International Law Commission, ‘Ways and means for making the evidence of customary interna-
tional law more readily available’, Yearbook of the ILC, 1950, vol. II, pp. 367-374, at para. 78.
31 See, for instance, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. 
xlii; International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at p. 20.
32 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, at para. 74. 
33 See, for instance, International Court of Justice, Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
1950, p. 266, at p. 15.
34 International Court of Justice, Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951, 
p. 116, at p. 138.
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uniformity than negative obligations. The same goes for proposed customary rules 
which affect the sovereign rights of States rather than confirm or even increase those 
privileges. Yet, modifying a customary norm which has a jus cogens character does 
require the presence of almost absolute uniform State practice before it may be effec-
tuated, “at least where it is claimed that the ‘new’ rule now allows that which was 
previously prohibited”.35 While contrary practice ostensibly challenges the uniformity 
of State practice, it does not necessarily preclude the materialization of a customary 
norm, as Court stressed in the Nicaragua case: 
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the cor-
responding practice must be in absolute rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to 
deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct 
of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches 
of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way 
prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing 
to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the 
State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to 
confirm rather than to weaken the rule.36
Thus, if the contrary conduct is condemned by third States or denied by the government 
of the acting State as being its official practice, the rule at hand may be seen to be con-
firmed. The same goes for State practice which appears inconsistent with a rule, but is 
upheld by the State by invoking exceptions or justifications which are part of that rule. 
This finding is particularly relevant for some human rights and international humanitar-
ian norms, which are strongly confirmed by verbal State practice, yet simultaneously 
contradicted by violations of the rule at issue. In sum, due to the ambiguity of this 
requirement, opinions still differ as to the precise extent of uniformity that is required.37
2.1.2. Extensiveness and Representativeness
With regard to the need for extensiveness and representativeness, it is important to 
note that the State practice does not need to be universal. Rather, ‘general’ practice is 
sufficient.38 There is no precise number of States which should be involved in order 
35 See Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 39. See also pp. 31-32.
36 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 186.
37 See A.T. Guzman, ‘Saving Customary International Law’ (2005) 27 Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law 115 at p. 124.
38 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. xliv; International 
Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of 
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, London Conference 
(2000) at p. 24.
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to classify practice as such for the purpose of creating customary international law. 
Neither is a certain degree of consensus or majority voting required in this respect. 
According to some commentators, a possible explanation for this is that the require-
ment of extensiveness is “qualitative rather than quantitative”. Put differently, it is not 
merely a matter of the number of States that are involved in the practice at hand, but in 
addition and perhaps even more importantly, which States.39 As the Court expressed 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, it must at least include the practice of “States 
whose interests are specially affected”.40 Which States are ‘specially affected’ by the 
subject matter of the rule will, of course, depend on the circumstances. For example, 
to determine the existence of a customary rule concerning the law of the sea, the 
relevant State practice of the principal maritime powers seems indispensable. Con-
versely, it may be concluded that the lack of practice by some less involved States 
does not necessarily stand in the way of ascertaining State practice in a certain field.41 
Thus, the above does not necessarily imply that some States are more important or 
more powerful than others, but rather, that the practice of some States is considered to 
be more relevant as these States are directly affected by a certain norm.42At the same 
time, however, it should be noted that particularly those States which are ‘specially 
affected’ may have an interest in securing certain outcomes in the formation process 
of customary international law. As such, it seems appropriate to critically consider the 
role of ‘specially affected States’ on a case-by-case basis.43 In addition to the crite-
rion of extensiveness, the accompanying element of representativeness is qualitative 
in character as well. It calls for taking into account the practice a variety of States, 
including non-Western States and preferably representing a broad range of cultures, 
social and economic systems, as a result of which the practice at hand can at least be 
presumed to be representative for the community of States as a whole.44 If practice 
merely involves a particular region, this may point at the emergence or existence of 
rules of customary regional law rather than customary international law.45
Since no universal practice is required for the crystallization of customary norms, 
it follows that a State can be bound by the general practice of other States even 
against its will. The only exception to this could be a situation in which a State has 
39 Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 32; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law at p. xliv (emphasis in original); International Law Association, Committee 
on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the 
Formation of General Customary International Law, London Conference (2000) at p. 26.
40 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, at para. 74. 
41 See Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ at para. 36.
42 See Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 32.
43 See B.D. Lepard, Customary International Law. A New Theory with Practical Applications (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 2010) at p. 28, citing W. Michael Reisman.
44 See ibid. at pp. 153-154.
45 See, for instance, Shaw, International Law at pp. 87-88.
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explicitly expressed its opposition to the development of the customary rule at issue 
from the outset and persistently continues to do so after its crystallization.46 Put dif-
ferently, “initial and sustained objection”47 may prevent a State from being bound by 
a new or changed norm of customary international law. This is generally referred to 
as the ‘persistent objector’ rule. In connection to the required involvement of ‘spe-
cially affected States’, it is interesting to note that:
while it is generally true that an objection from one state will not prevent the forma-
tion of customary law for other, non-objecting states, in some cases it may be that the 
persistent objector is such an important operator in a particular field that its continued 
objection prevents customary law developing for all states.48
The acceptance of the persistent objector exception, however, remains disputed, par-
ticularly when it comes to fundamental principles of international (human rights) 
law.49 Moreover, practice has shown that objecting States generally do not manage to 
remain unaffected by the new customary norm for very long, due to (peer) pressure 
to act in conformity with this newly established standard and disadvantages of acting 
contrary to the accepted view.50
2.1.3. Duration
In addition to the above, the duration of practice has sometimes been mentioned as a 
relevant factor in the creation of custom (ratione temporis).51 The time factor, how-
ever, should not be seen in isolation, but rather in connection with the requirements 
concerning the uniformity, extensiveness and representativeness of the practice. On 
the one hand, some passage of time is usually needed in order to satisfy these crite-
ria.52 On the other, as the International Court of Justice held in the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf case:
46 On the (disputed) acceptance of this rule, see Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International 
Law’ at pp. 227-244.
47 Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 33.
48 Ibid. at p. 33.
49 See, for instance, International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (Gen-
eral) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary Inter-
national Law, London Conference (2000) at pp. 27-29; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to 
International Law at pp. 47-48; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at pp. 128-130.
50 See Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 33.
51 As noted by Maurice H. Mendelson, the time factor was particularly important for the formation of 
customary law for the Romans and in the English common law system. See Mendelson, ‘The Formation 
of Customary International Law’ at p. 209.
52 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. xlv.
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Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, as of itself, a bar 
to the formation of a new rule of customary international law […], an indispensable 
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State 
practice […] should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the 
provision invoked.53 
Thus, it is basically a matter of establishing a dense practice: as long as uniformity, 
extensiveness and representativeness are manifested, no specific duration of the rel-
evant State practice is demanded.54 What is more, it has become generally accepted 
that customary norms may emerge rapidly. In response to new technological devel-
opments and accompanying new legal subject matters, Bin Cheng was the first to 
propose the notion of ‘instant custom’ already in 1965. He argued that a rule could 
emerge into customary law in the absence of protracted State practice provided that 
general and representative opinio juris would be present as regards the existence of 
such a norm. Subsequent practice would then only be necessary to confirm the exist-
ence of this customary rule. As such, Cheng advanced that customary norms can – in 
appropriate circumstances – be deduced from General Assembly resolutions, as these 
may reflect evidence of opinio juris and State practice simultaneously.55 Cheng’s 
theory on this matter, however, has never been fully endorsed and may even be said 
to have been rejected by the International Court of Justice, as it considers General 
Assembly resolutions as reflecting opinio juris, but not as acts providing evidence of 
State practice.56 As one author concluded from the Court’s reasoning, “[t]he position 
appears to be that in a field of activity in which there has not yet been an opportu-
nity for State practice, there is no customary law in existence”.57 Admittedly, some 
developments have indeed contributed to the acceleration of the materialization of 
customary norms. For example, the increased role of international organizations and 
conferences within international society and the augmented conclusion of multilat-
eral treaties have brought about the increased involvement of States in the formation 
process of customary international law, as a result of which verbal State practice and 
opinio juris can be manifested more swiftly.58 This is not to say, however, that the 
traditional model considers the presence of physical State practice to be redundant. 
53 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, at para. 74.
54 International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at p. 20.
55 See B. Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?’ 
(1965) 5 Indian Journal of International Law 23. 
56 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at paras 184, 188.
57 Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at p. 127.
58 Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ at para. 25.
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Rather, in this view, proof of the objective element of custom is still essential to deter-
mine the existence of a norm of customary international law. 
2.1.4. The Interrelationship of the Three Factors
With regard to the three factors addressed – uniformity, extensiveness and repre-
sentativeness, and duration – it should be emphasized that they should be consid-
ered in connection with each other, as inadequacies with respect to one factor may 
be counterbalanced by the strength of the other two. Such interplay not only exists 
concerning the requirement of duration on the one hand, and those of uniformity, 
extensiveness and representativeness on the other. Such interrelationship may also 
exist between the latter factors: “a more pronounced generality of the practice could 
cure some weaknesses in its uniformity, or vice versa”.59 Yet, even when all three 
factors are sufficiently present, usage does not necessarily lead to the crystallization 
of a norm of customary international law. As the International Court of Justice aptly 
expressed in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, actions by States can also be dic-
tated “only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any 
sense of legal duty”.60 This is where the subjective or psychological element of opinio 
juris, which will be discussed below, becomes relevant.61 
2.2. Opinio Juris
When seeking to determine the existence of norms of customary international law, 
it is conventionally contended that examining the physical actions of States is insuf-
ficient. As the International Court of Justice explained:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be 
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such 
a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the 
opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.62
59 R. Kolb, ‘Selected Problems in the Theory of Customary International Law’ (2003) 50 Netherlands 
International Law Review 119 at p. 133.
60 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, at para. 77.
61 See also International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) Inter-
national Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International 
Law, London Conference (2000) at p. 34: “It is for the purpose of distinguishing practices which generate 
customary rules from those that do not that opinio juris is most useful.”
62 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 




Put differently, in addition to how States act, it is important to see why States act in 
a certain way. It is this subjective element rising from an internal belief and usually 
referred to as opinio juris, which is traditionally seen to mark the distinction between 
mere usage and practice contributing to the crystallization of a binding norm of cus-
tomary international law and therefore is traditionally seen as indispensable for the 
establishment of custom.63 
In addition to the phrase from the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the necessity 
of this psychological element in the formation of customary international law has 
been emphasized in other judgments of the Permanent Court of Justice and the Inter-
national Court of Justice.64 Moreover, commentators have sought to explain why the 
element of opinio juris is generally considered to be essential for the transformation 
from usage to customary international law. Generally speaking, two approaches may 
be discerned in this respect. Some scholars have taken the position that opinio juris is 
principally an expression of State consent to a certain norm, just like the signing and 
ratification of treaties are written expressions of the State’s will to obey a set of rules. 
This position, which reflects the consensual or voluntary character of international 
law, seems to be supported by, for instance, Anthony A. D’Amato. For him, opinio 
juris is the articulation of the legal character of the practice at hand, which is a pre-
condition for a norm of customary international law to arise: 65
The articulation of a rule of international law […] in advance of or concurrently with 
a positive act (or omission) of a state gives a state notice that its action or decision 
will have legal implications. In other words, given such notice, statesman will be able 
freely to decide whether or not to pursue various policies, knowing that their acts may 
create or modify international law.66 
Most commentators, however, adhere to the opposite approach, contending that 
the legally binding force of custom simply ensues from the belief of States that the 
63 See, for instance, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at p. 6; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s 
Modern Introduction to International Law at p. 44; Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary Inter-
national Law’ at p. 245; Meron, The Humanization of International Law at p. 366; Orakhelashvili, The 
Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law at pp. 79-80; Shaw, International Law at pp. 
70, 80; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at p. 125; Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ at 
para. 8.
64 See, for instance, Permanent Court of International Justice, The Case of the SS Lotus (France v. 
Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Series A No. 10, at p. 28; International Court of Justice, Military and Paramili-
tary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1986, p. 14, at paras 183-185. 
65 D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law at p. 74. For a more contemporary plea for 
the consensualist approach, see Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public Inter-
national Law at pp. 71-75.
66 D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law at p. 75.
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behaviour at issue is called for by a legal norm.67 As Maurice H. Mendelson submit-
ted, the consensualist approach is unable to provide for a cogent reason why States 
which have not participated in the formation process of a customary norm are legally 
bound by it, while it is beyond dispute that they are.68 
The question now arises as to how to determine opinio juris or, put differently, 
how this element of custom manifests itself.69 Since opinio juris concerns a state of 
mind, obvious difficulties occur in this respect. First, it may be noted that “[t]here is 
clearly something artificial about trying to analyse the psychology of collective enti-
ties such as states”.70 As States are institutions, it is submitted that one cannot know 
what States truly believe, but merely what States claim to believe.71 Secondly, and 
even more importantly, it is hard to ascertain whether a State acted because it consid-
ered itself bound by a rule of customary international law, or whether the State would 
have acted similarly in the absence of such an alleged norm. Irrespective of these diffi-
culties, the traditional view holds that this psychological component of custom can be 
detected from official pronouncements by various ‘agents’ of the State, such a heads 
of States, heads of government, members of government, members of parliament and 
national judicial bodies. Their pronouncements on both the national and international 
level, for instance governmental statements made in parliament, declarations pre-
sented by the representatives of States in international organizations, governmental 
positions concerning draft proposals of treaties and resolutions, and judicial deci-
sions, can be seen as sources of opinio juris.72 Moreover, it should be recalled that 
(legally non-binding) resolutions of the UN General Assembly resolutions may under 
67 See Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at p. 246 (and the references men-
tioned there). In this connection, it may be noted that some scholars have proposed a slightly different 
definition of opinio juris, including the belief that the practice is required by a norm which should become 
law. A definition of this kind differs from the traditional understanding of the concept and has not (yet) 
been generally accepted, but seems more appropriate for explaining how new norms of custom can come 
into existence, while simultaneously avoiding the so-called paradox connected with opinio juris. This 
paradox refers to the chronological problem that the generally accepted understanding of opinio juris 
seems to require a State to believe that a norm is law for it to become law. Put differently, how can a rule 
of customary international law be created if in order to create such a rule, States need to act from the 
belief that the law already necessitates that behaviour? See Lepard, Customary International Law. A New 
Theory with Practical Applications at pp. 22-23 and pp. 118-121. See also Kolb, ‘Selected Problems in 
the Theory of Customary International Law’ at pp. 137-141. 
68 Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at p. 292.
69 See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at p. 8; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Intro-
duction to International Law at p. 44.
70 Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at p. 44. See also Thirlway, ‘The 
Sources of International Law’ at p. 126.
71 See Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at p. 269. 
72 See, for instance, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at pp. 6-7. 
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certain circumstances be seen to reflect opinio juris. This subject has been expounded 
elsewhere in the present study.73 
As was already pointed out in the previous section, however, the pronouncements 
reflecting opinio juris may often be seen as the evidence of verbal State practice 
as well. In this connection, Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert have noted that “[a]
n analysis of such statements may kill two birds with one stone: it may satisfy the 
requirement of opinio juris and the requirement of State practice at the same time”.74 
Consequently, strictly distinguishing between (verbal) State practice and opinio juris 
becomes problematic. Taking this entanglement of the two elements of customary 
international law one step further is to infer opinio juris indirectly from what States 
actually do or omit to do and, in addition, how other States react to this. In this 
respect, it is sometimes argued that the general practice of States may constitute the 
principal evidence of opinio juris. Put differently, when there is a sufficiently dense 
practice of States on a certain issue (as was explained in the previous section), it may 
be assumed that opinio juris does exist. As a consequence of this trend, in many cases 
it would become superfluous to distinctly demonstrate the existence of opinio juris.75 
Provided that it can be shown that State practice is sufficiently dense and unequivo-
cal, and no precedential value of this conduct is precluded by the States involved,76
it is not necessary to prove the existence of an opinio juris. It may often be pre-
sent, or it may be possible to infer it; but it is not a requirement that its existence be 
demonstrated.77
Such a view, allegedly blurring a strict distinction between the two traditional ele-
ments of customary international law,78 was reflected by for instance Judge Lachs 
73 This was discussed already in the context of the acts of international organizations as a possible 
source of international law. See Chapter III, Section 3.5.2.
74 J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International 
Law’ in M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds) The Impact of Human Rights Law on General Inter-
national Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) at p. 115.
75 See, for instance, Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. 
xlvi; International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at pp. 30-32; Kirgis Jr, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ at p. 148; H. Lauter-
pacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1982) at p. 380; Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law at p. 44; 
Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at pp. 289-290.
76 It is to be noted that when there is a settled State practice, but the States involved emphasize that their 
conduct does not have any precedential value, no opinio juris can be ascertained.
77 International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at p. 31.
78 According to the International Law Association, it may well be that the statements of the Inter-
national Court of Justice concerning the two constituents of custom have been taken out of their context: 
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in his dissenting opinion attached to the North Sea Continental Shelf case.79 The 
international criminal tribunals tend to take a similarly loose approach towards 
determining opinio juris, as they often assume its existence on the basis of exten-
sive State practice, general agreement in doctrine, or previous assessments of inter-
national tribunals.80 The International Court of Justice has been willing to adopt such 
an approach in various cases as well.81 Yet, in some cases, the International Court of 
Justice has applied a more rigorous and strict method, requiring isolated evidence for 
the existence of opinio juris rather than presuming this from the practice of States. 
The first example in this respect was the judgment in the Lotus case, in which the 
Court’s predecessor held that:
[e]ven if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the reported cases 
were sufficient to prove in point of fact the circumstances alleged by the Agent for the 
French Government, it would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained 
from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as 
being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious 
of a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom. The 
alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such 
a duty; on the other hand […] there are other circumstances calculated to show that the 
contrary is true.82
A similar view was expressed by the majority of the Court in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf case, where it was noted that the “frequency, or even habitual character” of 
State practice is insufficient to determine the presence of opinio juris.83 This stance 
appears to imply that opinio juris cannot be inferred from the availability of State 
practice.
“[t]he Court has not in fact said in so may words that just because there are (allegedly) distinct elements 
in customary law the same conduct cannot manifest both”. See ibid. at p. 7.
79 See International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Den-
mark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 219, at pp. 
231-232, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs. 
80 On this topic, see Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Inter-
preting the Concept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals.
81 See, for instance, International Court of Justice, Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 1951, p. 116, at p. 128; International Court of Justice, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, at para. 70; International Court 
of Justice, Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 13, at 
para. 34. See also Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at pp. 8-9; Mendelson, ‘The Forma-
tion of Customary International Law’ at pp. 289-290.
82 Permanent Court of International Justice, The Case of the SS Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgment, 
PCIJ Series A, No. 10, at p. 28. 
83 International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3, at para. 77. 
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As suggested by, for instance, Maurice H. Mendelson, it seems that the choice 
of methodology in this respect partly depends upon the presence of unequivocal and 
dense State practice. When such practice is available, no separate proof for the exist-
ence of opinio juris may be needed. But when uncertainties as regards the practice 
present themselves, opinio juris serves as a “necessary tool in resolving the uncer-
tainty”. 84 What is more, the subject matter of the alleged customary norm appears to 
be relevant for the choice of approach towards opinio juris. As was likewise noted 
in the context of the objective constituent of customary international law, where the 
rule involves a positive obligation for States, where the sovereign rights of States 
are affected, or where a jus cogens norm is concerned, a high degree of proof will 
be required. In such circumstances, simply inferring opinio juris from the availabil-
ity of State practice will not suffice, but rather, clear and distinct evidence of opinio 
juris will be required.85 This line of reasoning also applies to situations in which 
States omit to act.86 All in all, it appears that there is no exclusive methodology for 
the determination of opinio juris. It may even be contended that “[i]n essence, the 
matter is one of judgment”, since “international law might require different levels of 
opinio juris and different degrees of proof for different substantive rules of customary 
law”.87
3. cuStomaRy inteRnational law beyond the conventional model?
Above, the two classical constituents of customary international law have been con-
sidered. At first sight, the elements of State practice and opinio juris seemed to be 
two clearly distinctive concepts which are both required for ascertaining customary 
international law but have different features: the former being an objective constitu-
ent which is reflected in what States actually do, while the latter concerns a subjective 
constituent covering the legal convictions of States. In the previous section, how-
ever, the necessary differentiations were made, thereby revealing the intricacy of the 
matter and demonstrating that in the contemporary formation process of customary 
84 See Mendelson, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ at pp. 285-286. See also Henck-
aerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. xlvi.
85 See Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 35. See also Ian Brownlie, who noted that the choice 
of approach depends “upon the nature of the issues (that is, the state of the law may be a primary point 
in contention)”. In addition, Brownlie found that it also depends upon the “discretion of the Court”. See 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at p. 9.
86 See Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. xlvi, recalling 
an example from the Lotus case, in which the Court refused to qualify the absence of certain prosecutions 
as evidence of a customary prohibition to prosecute. The Court stated that is remained unclear whether 
States had refrained from prosecutions because of the belief that it was unlawful to do so, or whether their 
omissions were due to other reasons. According to the Court, there was no proof of any “conscious[ness] 
of having a duty to abstain”. See Permanent Court of International Justice, The Case of the SS Lotus 
(France v. Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Series A, No. 10, at p. 28.
87 Dixon, Textbook on International Law at p. 35.
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international law, State practice and opinio juris have increasingly grown towards 
one another and even overlap to a certain extent.
Against this background, it was already obliquely noted that the conventional 
approach towards custom, which is generally set forth in reference books on inter-
national law, consistently requires the presence of both State practice and opinio juris 
for the creation of customary norms.88 This is not to say, however, that this traditional 
model considers both elements to be equally important. Rather, it views State practice 
to be the key element of custom, while opinio juris is deemed necessary as it reflects 
the belief of the legally binding nature of the practice. This might explain why the 
conventional approach – even though it has become generally accepted that in addi-
tion to the physical acts of States, verbal acts may also reflect evidence of the objec-
tive element of custom – still emphasizes physical State practice over verbal acts of 
States, as the latter category seems to include some subjective elements as well.89
When considering the (relative) importance of the elements of State practice and 
opinio juris in the formation process of customary international law, more progressive 
– yet more contentious – approaches towards the matter have also been suggested. 
Particularly in those fields of international law where State practice is generally scant 
or sometimes even lacking, innovative methodologies regarding custom have been 
proposed so as to meet the changing concerns and demands of the international com-
munity. Whether or not one of the classical elements of custom is to be prioritized 
over the other and whether one of these constituents may be glossed over under cir-
cumstances are prominent questions within these approaches. While it is beyond the 
scope of this research to analyse and categorize the whole spectrum of theoretical 
positions on the matter, the two models or approaches are relevant in the context of 
the quest for a customary right to unilateral secession, since the question of whether 
one adheres to the conventional or progressive model might be of influence in the 
outcome of this assessment due to different approaches towards the elements which 
are required for the ascertainment of customary rules and how those elements may 
be evidenced.90 The following sections will therefore expound and appraise some 
88 See, for instance, Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at p. 6; Dixon, Textbook on Inter-
national Law at p. 31; Dixon, Textbook on International Law Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction 
to International Law at p. 44; Shaw, International Law at p. 70; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International 
Law’ at p. 125; Treves, ‘Customary International Law’ at para. 8. 
89 The traditional model is generally viewed to be reflected in the writings of, for instance, Anthony 
A. D’Amato (although his definition of opinio juris is slightly different). See D’Amato, The Concept of 
Custom in International Law.
90 For example, Cedric Ryngaert and Christine Griffioen alleged that a right to remedial secession 
does exist on the basis of a progressive interpretation of customary international law. See C. Ryngaert 
and C.W. Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Par-




progressive approaches towards customary international law, eventually enabling to 
take a position on the matter to be taken.
3.1. Progressive Approaches towards Customary International Law
Besides the conventional model of customary international law some more progres-
sive approaches towards the matter have been proposed over time. The judgment of 
the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case is widely referred to as the 
basis for these rather progressive approaches, since in that particular case the Court 
stressed opinio juris to the detriment of State practice when considering norms of 
customary law on the use of force. More specifically, the Court noted that existence 
of a certain rule “in the opinio juris of States” is to be confirmed by practice91 and 
subsequently did not pay much attention to discrepancies as regards State practice.92 
It considered the inconsistent conduct of States as the violation of an established 
norm, rather than as evidence of a newly emerging customary rule. As such, the Court 
conveyed the impression that provided that strong opinio juris is present, defects in 
the physical practice of States may be overlooked, possibly resulting in the materiali-
zation of a norm of customary international law. This method seems to be contradic-
tory to the conventional approach to customary law, which prioritizes (physical) State 
practice over opinio juris.93  
The approach taken in the Nicaragua case has arguably been endorsed by sev-
eral other authoritative international legal bodies as well. For instance, the Tadić 
case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
is considered to be relevant in this respect. In this case, the ICTY strongly mitigated 
the importance of (battlefield) practice in the formation process of customary inter-
national law due to untrustworthiness and held that emphasis is to be put on verbal 
State practice: 
not only is access to the theatre of military operations normally refused to independent 
observers (often even to the ICRC) but what is worse, often recourse is had to misin-
formation with a view to misleading the enemy as well as public opinion and foreign 
Governments. In appraising the formation of customary rules or general principles 
91 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 184.
92 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nica-
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 186.
93 It should be noted, however, that the Court itself did not refer to its approach as being innovative. 
Rather, it alleged that it was applying the standard method of ascertaining customary international law. 
International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at paras 97-98. See also A.E. 
Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (2001) 
95 American Journal of International Law 757 at p. 768.
Customary International Law
209
one should therefore be aware that, on account of the inherent nature of this subject-
matter, reliance must be primarily placed on such elements as official pronouncements 
of States, military manuals and judicial decisions.94
As a consequence of the line of reasoning in the Tadić case, the existence of custom-
ary international humanitarian norms will be accepted more easily, since (often inhu-
mane) battlefield practice is overlooked or even deemed completely irrelevant due to 
untrustworthiness.95 A similar approach was taken by the ICTY in the Kupreškić case, 
in which it held that scant or inconsistent State practice does not bar the emergence 
of norms of customary international humanitarian law when “the demands of human-
ity or the dictates of public conscience” demand the materialization of such norms.96 
These approaches may be said to be reflected as well by the International Law 
Association’s Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, as it held that “a substantial manifestation of acceptance (consent or belief) by 
States that a customary rule exists may compensate for a relative lack of practice, and 
vice versa”.97 In this respect, a caveat was made requiring that opinio juris must be 
“clear-cut and unequivocal” before it can be considered as the principal constituent of 
a new norm of customary international law.98 In its study on customary international 
humanitarian law, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appears to 
have endorsed a similar method of ascertaining customary international law. It was 
noted that international courts and tribunals occasionally hold that a customary norm 
does exist if that particular norm is desirable in view of international peace and secu-
rity or the protection of humanity, on condition that there are no significant indica-
tions of contrary opinio juris.99 Moreover, the ICRC identified a vast amount of rules 
of customary humanitarian international law primarily on the basis of opinio juris 
combined with verbal acts rather than physical (battlefield) practice.100 
It should be mentioned, however, that in response to the study of the ICRC, the 
United States’ Government raised its concerns about the methodology applied by 
the authors. Several serious objections were lodged in an open letter to the President 
94 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the 
defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, ICTY-IT-94-AR72, 2 October 1995, at para. 99.
95 Wouters and Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’ at 
p. 116. See also Meron, The Humanization of International Law at p. 367.
96 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, ICTY-IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, at para. 527.
97 International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at p. 40.
98 See ibid. at p. 42. 
99 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law at p. xlviii.
100 See, for instance, Rule 157 on universal jurisdiction over war crimes. See J.B. Bellinger and W.J. 
Haynes, ‘A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross study Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 443 at pp. 465-471.
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of the ICRC. The US Government argued, inter alia, that the State practice which 
was cited by the ICRC was “insufficiently dense to meet the ‘extensive and virtually 
uniform’ standard generally required to demonstrate the existence of a customary 
rule”.101 It further found that the ICRC attributed too much weight to verbal acts, 
such as military manuals, UN General Assembly Resolutions and statements of non-
governmental organizations (including the ICRC itself), while disregarding the actual 
practice of ‘specially affected States’ during armed conflicts.102 The US Government 
contended that no opinio juris was to be determined if a State’s legal conviction is 
reflected in military manuals for the most part and expressed its concern regarding 
the merger of the two elements of State practice and opinio juris into one single 
element.103 Although the content of the letter obviously aimed to serve the national 
interests of the United States,104 this response to the study of the ICRC does demon-
strate that the human rights methodology is debatable and may be seen as an indica-
tion that the conventional approach towards customary international law cannot be 
abandoned. 
Following the allegedly innovative approach of the Court in the Nicaragua case 
and subsequent developments, various scholars have proposed – more or less – pro-
gressive views on the formation of customary international law.105 As a result, the 
spectrum of theoretical positions on this process has broadened significantly, rang-
ing from the strictly traditional model of custom on the one extreme to the modern 
approach as ostensibly applied the Nicaragua case on the other. Some scholars have 
advanced what may be labelled as an intermediate conception, bringing together 
those divergent lines as outlined above. In 1987, Frederic Kirgis was one of the first 
scholars – if not the very first – who sought to reconcile the two extreme models 
101 Ibid. at pp. 444-445. See also Wouters and Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of 
Customary International Law’ at p. 117. 
102 Bellinger and Haynes, ‘A US Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
Study Customary International Humanitarian Law’ at pp. 445-446.
103 See ibid. at pp. 446-447.
104 Not only the methodology applied, but also some specific rules ascertained by the ICRC were criti-
cized in the letter. For instance, the existence of a customary rule on universal jurisdiction over war 
crimes (referred to as Rule 157) was questioned because of lack of sufficient physical State practice. See 
ibid. at pp. 465-471.
105 See, for instance, Guzman, ‘Saving Customary International Law’; Kirgis Jr, ‘Custom on a Slid-
ing Scale’; Lepard, Customary International Law. A New Theory with Practical Applications; Meron, 
The Humanization of International Law; Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation’; O. Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty and Custom’ in Y. Dinstein (ed.) 
International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, Dordrecht 1989); J. Tasioulas, ‘Customary International Law and the Quest for Global Justice’ in 
A. Perreau-Saussine and J.B. Murphy (eds) The Nature of Customary Law: Philosophical, Historical and 
Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007); C Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising 
for States Without or Against their Will’ (1993) 241 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of Inter-
national Law (Recueil des Cours).
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of customary international law.106 According to Kirgis, such reconciliation becomes 
possible “if one views the elements of custom not as fixed and mutually exclusive, 
but as interchangeable along a sliding scale”.107 Customary international law based 
on highly consistent State practice but with scant opinio juris is positioned at the 
one extreme of the sliding scale, whereas custom based on strong opinio juris in the 
absence of consistent State practice is positioned at the other extreme. As the avail-
ability of consistent State practice declines, the need for evidence of opinio juris 
increases in order to ascertain a norm of customary international law and vice versa. 
For Kirgis, the relative importance of the constituents of customary international law 
depends on the activity at issue and the desirability of the norm asserted. Involving 
considerations of, for instance, humanity, peace and security, this premise enables the 
materialization of customary norms even when one of the two constituents is scant or 
even absent. In essence, Kirgis’ sliding scale theory reflects the idea that “the more 
destabilizing or morally distasteful the activity”, the more easily one element of cus-
tomary international law will be substituted for the other.108 
Other scholars have advanced even more progressive ideas, contending that the 
methodology of determining custom in some fields of international law, such as 
human rights law and humanitarian law, necessitates an approach which is different 
from the conventional approach towards customary international law. In this respect, 
their conceptions demonstrate a clear relationship between the substantive signifi-
cance of the norm on the one hand and the willingness to overlook inadequacies in 
the traditional elements for the establishment of custom – primarily physical State 
practice – on the other.109 As such, the progressive approaches seem to be strongly 
inspired by considerations of morality and may even be said to aim at “the strength-
ening of norms with moral impact”, since the official pronouncements of States and 
their practice on the ground often do not correspond in the field of human rights law 
106 Building upon the work of Kirgis and some other authors, Anthea E. Roberts has also attempted to 
combine both methods of ascertaining customary international law by proposing a ‘reflective interpretive 
approach’. This theory does not exclude either State practice or opinio juris. Rather, Roberts proposed 
two dimensions which are linked to the traditional constituents of customary international law and are to 
be balanced against one another in order to achieve a ‘reflective equilibrium’. First, the dimension of ‘fit’ 
provides for descriptive accuracy based on State practice. Secondly, a dimension of ‘substance’ is intro-
duced, referring to both substantive and procedural normativity based on moral and political ideals. These 
ideals can often be found in pronouncements of opinio juris. According to Roberts, the balancing of ‘fit’ 
and ‘substance’ allows for the creation of customary norms with strong moral footings, while avoiding 
the materialization of laws which appear utopian as they are incapable of regulating reality. Although this 
model may be attractive in theory, it has not (yet) been implemented in practice. See Roberts, ‘Traditional 
and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ at pp. 774-781. 
107 Kirgis Jr, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’ at p. 149.
108 See ibid. at p. 149. 
109 See Meron, The Humanization of International Law at p. 369.
Chapter V
212
and humanitarian law.110 Oscar Schachter, for example, has noted that international 
(Courts and) tribunals as well as States do not contest the customary nature of norms 
which “express deeply-held and widely shared convictions about the unacceptabil-
ity of the proscribed conduct” because of inconsistent or even scarce State practice. 
Although his observation was initially made in the context of rules on the use of force, 
Schachter has argued that his conclusion also applies to “rules that have outlawed 
genocide, the killing of prisoners of war, torture, and large-scale discrimination”.111 
Christian Tomuschat, for his part, has distinguished different classes or categories 
of customary international law, including a class encompassing constitutional foun-
dations of the international community and a class covering rules stemming from 
these foundations and common values of mankind. With respect to the first class, 
he refers to the core principle of sovereign equality.112 The second class comprises 
those rules which flow from this principle, as sovereign equality imposes certain 
duties and responsibilities on States and other subjects of international law.113 In this 
respect, the ban on the use of force, principles of environmental law, and humanitar-
ian law are mentioned. According to Tomuschat, the customary principles of these 
two categories can be ascertained through a deductive process, thus departing from 
the traditional method by deriving custom primarily from the articulation of opinio 
juris while assigning a secondary role only to general State practice.114 In a similar 
vein, Brian D. Lepard has advanced a theory which, in essence, reduces the two ele-
ments of custom to one constituent only, i.e. opinio juris. As such, opinio juris is 
interpreted as the belief of States “that it is desirable now or in the near future to have 
an authoritative legal principle or rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain 
state conduct”.115 Accordingly, State practice is no longer viewed as a necessary ele-
ment, but rather serves as evidence for this belief.116 
Since these progressive approaches towards customary international law have 
particularly been proposed in the field of human rights law and humanitarian law, 
they are sometimes referred to as the ‘human rights method’. 117 As Jan Wouters and 
Cedric Ryngaert recapitulated, the ‘human rights method’ implies that:
110 See N. Petersen, ‘Customary International Law. A New Theory with Practical Applications’ (2010) 
21 European Journal of International Law 795 at p. 795. 
111 Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty and Custom’ at p. 734.
112 C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will’ (1993) 241 Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Recueil des Cours) at pp. 292-293.
113 Ibid. at p. 293.
114 Ibid. at pp. 293-303.
115 Lepard, Customary International Law. A New Theory with Practical Applications at pp. 97-98.
116 See ibid. at p. 98.
117 Alexander Orakhelashvili has identified a similar tendency which he calls the ‘sociological approach’ 
and noting that “the mere social interest behind the rule can justify its binding force at the expense of 
the formal elements of law-making”. See Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public 
International Law at p. 85 (emphasis added).
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the more important the common interests of the states or humanity are, the greater the 
weight that might be attached to opinio juris as opposed to state practice. If the stakes 
are high, inconsistent state practice may be glossed over, and a high premium may be 
put on states’s statements and declarations, inter alia in multilateral fora, in identifying 
customary international law combined with general principles of law.118
It should be noted that, even under this approach, opinio juris is still to be confirmed 
by State practice. Yet, as in the field of human rights law and humanitarian law,119 
as the physical acts of States with respect to a particular norm are often inconsist-
ent, untrustworthy, or even lacking at all (due to the involvement of a prohibitive 
norm), the focus may be on verbal State practice.120 In this connection, the difficulty 
of distinguishing verbal State practice from evidence of opinio juris is to be recalled. 
Consequently, if verbal State practice is consistently emphasized over the physical 
actions of States, establishing State practice as an indispensable constituent of cus-
tomary international law seems to become redundant.121 
3.2. A Critical Appraisal 
From the various perspectives outlined above, it follows that there is an apparent 
trend to progressively reinterpret the notion of customary international law. When 
viewed from a moral perspective and bearing in mind the development which is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘humanization of international law’,122 the idea that a 
substantial manifestation of opinio juris on the existence of a certain customary norm 
may compensate for deficiencies in the actual practice of States or the complete lack 
thereof is highly attractive indeed. Since this methodology lowers the burden of proof 
which is required for the establishment of norms with a generally binding, customary 
status it has the capacity to widen the ‘protective net’ which positive international law 
provides to human beings.123 As such, more progressive methods may be said to be 
118 Wouters and Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’ at 
p. 112.
119 For the presentation and application of this method for ascertaining customary norms in the field of 
humanitarian law, see the influential International Committee of the Red Cross study on customary inter-
national humanitarian law: Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
in particular at pp. xxxi-li. 
120 Wouters and Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’ at 
p. 115.
121 Ibid.
122 In brief, this development encompasses a shift of focus from a State-centred system to a system in 
which human beings are at the forefront. On this topic, see, for instance, A.A. Cançado Trindade, Inter-
national Law for Humankind. Towards a New Jus Gentium (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2010); 
Meron, The Humanization of International Law.




better able to protect and promote human rights and other significant moral concerns 
compared to the traditional method of ascertaining customary international law.124 
Focusing on these benevolent results, the (primarily scholarly) inclination to adhere 
to a progressive interpretation of custom is understandable, as was also observed by 
Bruno Simma and Philip Alston: 
Given the fundamental importance of the human rights component of a just world 
order, the temptation to adapt or re-interpret the concept of customary law in such a 
way as to ensure that it provides the ‘right’ answers is strong, and at least to some, irre-
sistible. It is thus unsurprising that some of the recent literature in this field, especially 
but not exclusively coming out of the United States, is moving with increasing enthu-
siasm in that direction. But while largely endorsing the result that is thereby sought to 
be achieved, we have considerable misgivings about the means being used.125 
Indeed, a critical appraisal is needed. In addition to the response by the US Gov-
ernment to the study of the ICRC as touched upon above, the progressive methods 
of ascertaining customary international law have been disputed on various grounds 
– conceptual, methodological and substantive – in scholarly literature as well.126 It 
should be emphasized that those objections particularly hold for those approaches 
which completely overlook the element of State practice and, thus, are situated at the 
extreme end of the spectrum of progressive models, such as the human rights method. 
The most prominent critiques in this respect will be addressed below. 
A conceptual objection which has been raised is that customary international law 
cannot exist in absence of custom, as that would be a contradictio in terminis.127 In 
view of the definition provided in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, a general prac-
tice of States constitutes the core root of this source of international law, as it is con-
duct which brings about custom. Ascertaining customary international law in absence 
of State practice thus “counteracts the very essence of custom”.128 
124 Ibid. at p. 118. See also Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International 
Law: A Reconciliation’ at p. 766: “The reduced focus on state practice in the modern approach is 
explained by its use to create generally binding laws on important moral issues”. 
125 B. Simma and P. Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
Principles’ (1988-1989) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law at p. 83.
126 This is not to say, however, that the traditional methodology is immune to criticism. Anthea E. Rob-
erts, for instance, has argued that traditional custom suffers from a democratic deficit as it is often based 
on the practice of a selection of (Western) States only, while all States are considered to be bound by it. 
See Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ at 
pp. 767-768. 
127 International Law Association, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International 
Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 
London Conference (2000) at p. 41. 
128 N.J. Arajärvi, ‘The Lines Begin to Blur? Opinio Juris and the Moralisation of Customary Inter-
national Law’ (2011) SSRN Working Paper Series at p. 19.
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More importantly, several methodological weaknesses of very progressive 
approaches have been noted as well. First, it is to be emphasized that no clear and 
detailed criteria for the formation of customary international law under the progres-
sive view have been stipulated in the case law of the International Criminal Court. 
To put it even more strongly, in the Nicaragua case, the Court first recalled the con-
ventional outlook,129 before focusing on opinio juris and only cursorily considering 
State practice – thus arguably applying the modern methodology.130 So although this 
judgment is now considered by many as the foundation of progressive approaches 
towards custom, this basis remains questionable.131 Moreover, adopting a methodol-
ogy for establishing customary international law which leaves such a broad margin of 
appreciation for considerations of humanity and morality does raise some concerns. 
Considering the absence of a central authority within the international system, one 
may wonder who is to determine the ‘moral distastefulness’ of a certain conduct or 
the ‘common interests of humankind’ which may justify ignoring inconsistent State 
practice and establishing a customary rule on the mere basis of opinio juris. It thus 
appears that the progressive approaches allow more subjectivity to seep into the for-
mation process of customary international law,132 which arguably erodes the integ-
rity of custom as one of the two principal sources of international law. In the words 
of J. Patrick Kelly, customary international law may become “indeterminate and 
manipulable”, simply “a matter of taste”.133 A further methodological critique is that 
it implies the involvement of normative elements in the creation of customary inter-
national law. This objection merits some explanation. The conventional methodology 
of ascertaining custom is to a large extent descriptive, as it is first and foremost based 
on State practice. In contrast, progressive approaches rely heavily on opinio juris, 
which is more ambiguous as the pronouncements evidencing this psychological ele-
ment may represent lex lata (what is the law) or lex ferenda (what should be the law), 
the latter being a normative characteristic rather than a descriptive one.134 It has even 
129 See International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, at para. 183: “to 
consider what are the rules of customary international law applicable to the present dispute [the Court] 
has to direct its attention to the practice and opinio juris of States.”
130 Ibid., at paras 184-186.
131 See, for instance, Meron, The Humanization of International Law at p. 362; Roberts, ‘Traditional and 
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ at p. 768. 
132 See, for instance, Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Inter-
preting the Concept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals at p. 30; Mendelson, ‘The Forma-
tion of Customary International Law’ at p. 385. Whether this approach is actually less rigorous and less 
objective is questioned by Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert. See Wouters and Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the 
Process of the Formation of Customary International Law’ at p. 119.
133 J.P. Kelly, ‘The Twilight of Customary International Law’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 448 at p. 451.
134 Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ at 
pp. 762-763, citing Martti Koskenniemi. 
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been alleged that “modern custom seems to be based on normative statements of lex 
ferenda cloaked as lex lata”.135 Considering the fundamental difference in nature as 
stipulated above, opinio juris cannot simply be used as a substitute for State practice. 
The normative nature of the most progressive approaches towards customary 
international law leads to significant objections on the more substantive level as well, 
which may even be said to constitute the principal criticism of this method. It is 
argued that the very progressive approaches to customary international law may pro-
duce morally or politically desired outcomes instead of reflecting contemporary social 
realities. Such approaches may even be viewed as an escape if the conventional track 
does not lead to the determination of customary norms as wished for.136 As Anthea 
E. Roberts observed, they appear to formulate “aspirational aims rather than realis-
tic requirements about action”.137 In the same vein, Bruno Simma and Philip Alston 
perceptively remarked that the formation process of customary international law has 
“thus turned into a self-contained exercise in rhetoric”.138 Consequently, these most 
progressive approaches would create a gap between what is claimed to be custom on 
the one hand and the practice of States on the other. This would be a highly unde-
sirable development, as it undermines the consistency and foreseeability and, thus, 
the authority of new norms of customary international law.139 As such, it would pose 
problems as regards the acceptability and the regulatory function of these norms. 
Considering the above, despite the manifestations of support for the human rights 
methodology and other very progressive approaches towards ascertaining custom-
ary international law and its morally attractive outcomes, it is emphasized here that 
the traditional model still prevails and that international legal norms do not arise 
simply whenever that is considered to be desirable.140 To put it even more strongly, 
it is argued here with Anthony A. D’Amato that legal norms are distinct from purely 
“moral requirements”.141 With respect to customary law in particular, Sir Robert Y. 
Jennings observed that “most of what we perversely persist in calling customary 
international law is not only not customary law: it does not even faintly resemble a 
135 Ibid. at p. 763. 
136 See Simma and Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Prin-
ciples’ at p. 83: “Caution is far from being a characteristic of much of the contemporary human rights lit-
erature. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that ‘human rights lawyers are notoriously wishful thinkers’, 
as John Humphrey once observed” (p. 84).
137 Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ at 
p. 769.
138 Ibid. at p. 89.
139 In the field of international criminal law, there seems to be a (conceptual) tension between the pro-
gressive approaches towards customary international law and the principle of legality as well. On this 
topic, see Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Interpreting the 
Concept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals at pp. 151-196 (Chapter 4: Principle of Legality, 
Customary International Law and Individual Criminal Responsibility – Conceptual Tensions).
140 See ibid. at p. 32.
141 D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law at p. 76.
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customary law”.142 Such a state of affairs, however, is highly objectionable. Some 
caution is thus required in assuming the existence of new customary norms, as these 
are binding upon all States (apart from persistent objectors) and custom is considered 
to be one of the two principal sources of international law. 
The objections lodged with respect to the most progressive approaches towards 
determining customary international law are not to say, however, that moral norms 
bear no legal value at all. Admittedly, non-legal considerations may influence the 
international law-making process143 and morality may on occasion call for the expan-
sion of the scope of protection which international legal norms offer, particularly 
when it comes to human rights and humanitarian law. If such development is not (yet) 
reflected in the legal practice of States, however, it is questionable whether stretch-
ing the nature of customary international law through the progressive human rights 
method is the appropriate means of accommodating these ends.144
4. pReliminaRy RemaRkS on aSSeSSing the exiStence of a cuStomaRy 
Right to Remedial SeceSSion
Before proceeding to an analysis of State practice and opinio juris for the purpose 
of assessing the existence of a customary right to remedial secession, it should be 
explained which method of ascertaining customary international law will be applied 
142 Jennings, ‘The Identification of International Law’ at p. 5.
143 See Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law at p. 85.
144 In view of the reservations expressed above, some fundamental questions concerning the sources of 
international law arise. While it is beyond the scope of the present study to consider these issues, two rele-
vant theoretical approaches may be briefly noted. First, one may wonder whether sources of international 
law other than custom may be exerted for the purpose of giving legal expression to moral considerations. 
For instance, Bruno Simma and Philip Alston have proposed the use of general principles as sources of 
fundamental human rights. They put forward the idea that such general principles would emerge as a 
result of the general acceptance or recognition of fundamental human rights norms by States – i.e. opinio 
juris, for instance as expressed in resolutions of the UN General Assembly – notwithstanding the lack of 
State practice. According to these scholars, such principles seem “to conform more closely than the con-
cept of custom to the situation where a norm invested with strong inherent authority is widely accepted 
even though widely violated”. See Simma and Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles’ at pp. 102-106. For a similar argument, see T. Meron, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989) at pp. 88-89. A further relevant 
question against the backdrop of the foregoing is whether contemporary international law is perhaps 
moving towards the acceptance of another new source of international law beyond the (non-exhaustive) 
catalogue from Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. These questions touch 
upon a fundamental and lively debate on the need for revising the traditional doctrine of sources. Several 
writers have scrutinized this issue and even proposed new theories in this respect. For discussions and 
suggestions, see for instance, Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods 
of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals at pp. 218-222; H.E. Chodosh, 
‘Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law’ (1991) 26 Texas Inter-
national Law Journal 87; H.G. Cohen, ‘Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources’ 
(2007) 93 Iowa Law Review 65; Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’ at pp. 138-142.
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for this purpose and which framework is relevant in this respect. In view of the cri-
tique on the very progressive approaches as discussed above, yet simultaneously 
bearing in mind the evolution which the traditional model has seen, the present study 
will give priority to what may be called a contemporary interpretation of the conven-
tional approach towards customary international law.  
It has been explained before that this approach first and foremost requires the 
presence of both State practice and opinio juris for the creation of traditional cus-
tomary international law. Whereas the traditional approach prioritizes State practice 
over opinio juris, the contemporary interpretation of this approach generally consid-
ers both constituents to be equally important. Further, the contemporary interpreta-
tion involves an inclusive understanding of the objective element of custom, which 
encompasses both physical and verbal acts of States. As such, the importance of these 
two manifestations of practice may be seen as relative, meaning that a shortage with 
regard to the one manifestation may be counterbalanced by the strength of the other. 
To be specific, in instances in which there is little activity by States in a certain matter 
– for instance due to the character or subject matter of the alleged norm at issue – the 
weight attributed to verbal acts compared to physical acts may increase. This is, how-
ever, not to say that the physical and verbal manifestations of State practice are fully 
interchangeable as a consequence of which physical acts may be completely absent. 
As contended before, such interpretation would allow customary international law to 
materialize without the presence of any actual practice whatsoever and would lead 
to a situation in which norms of customary international law may become purely 
theoretical. Rather, the importance of physical and verbal practice is to be seen in 
relation to the level of activity in the matter. In addition to this understanding of the 
objective constituent of custom, the contemporary interpretation implies that where 
sufficiently unequivocal and dense State practice is present and depending upon the 
subject matter of the norm, opinio juris might be seen to be contained within that 
practice, as a result of which it is not always necessary to provide for separate proof 
of the existence of this subjective element of custom. 
One might find the approach presented here too strict and orthodox because of its 
allegiance to both the objective and the subjective constituents of customary inter-
national law. Yet, it is submitted here that it is the strength of the contemporary inter-
pretation of the conventional approach that it does not purposively lower the burden 
for the creation of customary norms, simply because those norms are attractive. By 
requiring the availability of State practice as well as opinio juris, this model seeks 
to uphold the distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda and assure that customary 
international law continues to reflect legal realities rather than producing outcomes 
which are particularly morally or politically attractive. As was contended before, this 
is important for maintaining the acceptance and regulatory function of customary 
international law. At the same time, the present interpretation allows for a certain 
degree of flexibility so as to enable the materialization of customary norms in those 
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branches of international law where – due to the character or subject matter of these 
norms – there is relatively little activity by States in the phenomenon. Furthermore, 
the approach prioritized here has kept up with the times as a result of the contempo-
rary interpretation of the objective element of custom, i.e. State practice. As such, the 
contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach reflects well the interrela-
tionship between State practice – particularly its verbal manifestation – and opinio 
juris. 
Bearing in mind the question of a remedial right to unilateral secession, it now 
becomes possible to enunciate the approach to assessing the existence of a customary 
norm in this respect. As to the interpretation of the element of State practice, it has 
been explained that the denseness of the practice may be determined on the basis of 
the factors of uniformity, extensiveness and representativeness, and possibly dura-
tion. It was emphasized that these factors should be considered in connection to each 
other, as a strong manifestation of the one factor may compensate deficiencies as 
regards the other. Further, it was observed that the threshold for meeting these fac-
tors may depend upon the subject matter of the alleged customary norm. For exam-
ple, rules which involve a positive obligation for States will require a higher degree 
of uniformity and extensiveness of the practice at hand than rules encompassing a 
negative obligation for States. With respect to an alleged customary right to remedial 
secession, it seems that a high threshold is set. Given the fact that such a right would 
restrict the sovereign rights of States, such as territorial integrity, it can be argued 
that a high level of uniformity, extensiveness and representativeness will be needed 
for State practice to be sufficiently dense to contribute to the creation of a custom-
ary norm on this matter. Moreover, when considering the right to self-determination 
in the context of decolonization to be a customary norm with a jus cogens character, 
the bar for amending this rule and stretching it to cover a right to remedial secession 
– thus a right beyond decolonization – will be high as well. As such, almost uniform 
and universal practice would be required accompanied by strong and clear opinio 
juris. At the same time, however, in view of the nature of the alleged norm, it is 
likely that there is relatively little activity by States in the matter.145 While this obser-
vation justifies attaching more weight to verbal State practice, this is expressly not 
to say that a customary norm may be established in the complete absence of physi-
cal actions. Overall, it is to be concluded that under the contemporary interpretation 
of the conventional approach, the materialization of a customary right to remedial 
secession will not be assumed too easily. 
Having outlined the contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach 
towards customary international law, the question arises as to the basis of which acts, 
expressions or otherwise the constituents of State practice – either physical or verbal 
– and opinio juris may be determined for the purposes of the present study. When 
145 This will be discussed in Chapter VI.
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assessing the existence of a customary right to remedial secession, the presence of 
opinio juris will be derived from statements of States regarding the lawfulness of 
unilateral secession as a remedy in general. Such statements thus concern a general 
legal opinion, which is not aimed at a specific situation. When statements are issued 
by States concerning the legality of specific cases of unilateral secession as a remedy, 
these pronouncements will be regarded as verbal State practice. The content of such 
pronouncements often contain the general legal conviction of States – i.e. opinio juris 
– at the same time. In other words, the same act may provide evidence of both verbal 
State practice and opinio juris when reference is made to both general opinion and a 
specific case. As such, it may be difficult to disentangle these two elements. Finally, 
successful attempts at unilateral secession as a remedy will be considered as exam-
ples of physical State practice. In this connection, the close interrelationship between 
physical practice and verbal practice may be noted, as the success or otherwise of an 
attempt to secede unilaterally may to a certain extent depend upon the responses of 
already existing States to that particular effort, i.e. verbal practice.
Whatever the guidance which the approach set forth above can provide in assess-
ing the existence of a norm of customary international law, it should be emphasized 
that the formation of custom is an ongoing process, lacking a clear starting point, as 
well as a clear tipping point at which a non-legal norm converts into a customary 
norm. As a result, the issue of crystallization of customary international law remains 
obscure to a certain extent. In this connection, the analogy with a path in the forest 
has been made: “there is no clear benchmark when the route transcends into a path, 
but viewing it at a given moment it is possible to note that it has become to exist as 
one”.146 Similarly, like a path in the forest may shift, transform, or even fade over 
time, customary norms may be amended or abandoned through developments in 
practice and opinio juris. As such, it may be argued that a clear end point is lacking 
in the formation process of customary international law as well.147 
To conclude, while a contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach 
as outlined above will be guiding in the following analysis, the more progressive 
human rights approach with its emphasis on opinio juris over (physical) State prac-
tice and weight attached to considerations of morality or humanity has been and will 
be contemplated on a more subsidiary level. For, it may be interesting to see whether 
adherence to the conventional or progressive model will lead to diverging outcomes 
146 Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Interpreting the Con-
cept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals at p. 21, citing the references made in the work by 
Karol Wolfke. See K. Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (2nd revised edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht 1993) at pp. 54-55.
147 See Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: Methods of Interpreting the 
Concept of Custom in International Criminal Tribunals at p. 21. It should be noted, however, that the lack 
of a clear end point is by no means an exclusive attribute of customary international law. Other sources 
of international law may also develop over time, albeit in a different fashion than custom.
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as to the question of whether a remedial right to unilateral secession does exist under 
contemporary international law.
5. concluSionS 
The present Chapter has provided an introduction to the concept of customary inter-
national law for the purpose of enunciating the approach which will be utilized in 
the subsequent assessment of the existence of a customary right to remedial seces-
sion. In this respect, first, the two constituents of custom have been expounded, i.e. 
State practice and opinio juris. The first constituent is traditionally considered to be 
the core element for the materialization of customary international law, whereas the 
second serves as evidence of the belief that this practice is required by law. It was 
explained that, for the behaviour of States to contribute to the formation of custom, 
the resulting practice is to be sufficiently dense. In this connection, the factors of 
uniformity, extensiveness and representativeness, and duration have been elaborated 
upon as these may determine the density of the practice. In the context of explicating 
their role in the creation of customary international law, the contemporary interre-
latedness of the two constituents of custom was revealed as well. As such, the close 
connection between the manifestations of verbal State practice and opinio juris and 
the trend to deduce opinio juris from the availability of general State practice under 
certain circumstances were addressed. These developments may be seen as a broadly 
accepted, contemporary interpretation of the conventional model. 
Having discussed the traditional model, some progressive yet more contentious 
approaches towards ascertaining customary international law, such as the so-called 
sliding scale theory and the very liberal human rights approach, were elaborated upon. 
It was demonstrated that these progressive models reflect a different interpretation 
of the value attached to the two constituents of custom, as they generally prioritize 
opinio juris over State practice rather than vice versa. What is more, the progressive 
views clearly show a connection between the substantive importance of the norm and 
the readiness to balance or even neglect shortcomings in the traditional components 
of custom, in particular deficiencies as regards physical State practice. In this respect, 
under the progressive models, considerations of morality or humanity are assigned an 
important part in the formation process of customary international law. 
In sum, this Chapter has shown that the concept of customary international law 
is an ambiguous one on which a great variety of views are presented and on which 
the final decision has not yet been taken. Accordingly, it appears that the particular 
model one adheres to may influence the approach to and outcome of an assessment 
of whether a customary right on a particular matter does exist. Since this remark 
also applies regarding the question of a (customary) right to unilateral secession, 
it was necessary to explicate which approach towards ascertaining norms of cus-
tomary international law will be applied in the present study. While the progressive 
models admittedly hold great (moral and humanitarian) attraction, they do entail a 
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number of serious objections on a conceptual, methodological and rather substantive 
level. Considering the most prominent critiques, it was submitted that the progressive 
approaches such as the human rights methodology stretch the nature of customary 
international law too far as they are able to find new customary norms whenever that 
is desirable from a moral or humanitarian point of view. As such, these approaches 
seem to confuse what international law is at present with what international law 
should ideally be. However, prudence is called for when presuming the existence of 
new customary norms, so it was argued. This Chapter therefore led to the conclusion 
that a contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach towards customary 
international law should be applied when assessing the existence of a customary right 
to remedial secession. In short, this approach still requires the presence of both State 
practice and opinio juris for a customary norm to emerge. While, according to this 
approach, State practice includes verbal practice, it was emphasized that some physi-
cal practice is also needed to establish a norm of customary international law so as 
to uphold the distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda. Using this approach, the 
following Chapter will be devoted to examining the existence of a customary right to 
remedial secession under contemporary international law. 
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chapteR vi
a cuStomaRy Right to  
Remedial SeceSSion?
“While the claim that there is a ‘right of secession of last resort’ has been supported by 
some writers and by a contrario reasoning […], it is without support in State practice. 
It has not emerged as a rule of customary law. It is not found in any treaty. And it has 
no support from the practice of the UN.”
The Republic of Cyprus*
1. intRoduction
The previous Chapter provided an introduction to the concept of customary interna-
tional law and, in this respect, outlined a basic model for assessing whether a custom-
ary norm has emerged regarding the concept of remedial secession. A contemporary 
interpretation of the conventional approach was put forward. 
The present Chapter will involve a review of international responses to claims 
of unilateral secession outside the context of decolonization, in order to determine 
to what extent the indispensable elements of customary international law are pre-
sent with respect to the concept of remedial secession. In doing so, the recognition 
(or, non-recognition) of newly proclaimed States will be considered, as recognition 
by the international community constitutes a significant element of State practice in 
response to the exercise of a right to external self-determination by means of uni-
lateral secession.1 While it should be noted with the Supreme Court of Canada that 
recognition does not “provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession”,2 
it may positively give some insight in the international community’s acceptance (or 
*  International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Written Statement of the Republic of Cyprus, 3 April 2009, at para. 143.
1 See C.W. Griffioen, Self-Determination as a Human Right. The Emergency Exit of Remedial Seces-
sion (Master’s Thesis, Utrecht University 2009) at p. 108; D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Deter-
mination (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) at pp. 426-427.
2 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 155.
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otherwise) of unilateral secession as a remedy in response to exceptional humanitar-
ian circumstances.3 In order to better understand the role of recognition in this con-
text, this Chapter will commence with a brief introduction to the theory and practice 
of recognition. 
In the analysis of this Chapter, Kosovo’s attempt to secede from Serbia in 2008 
will play a prominent part. As will be further explained below, the example of Kosovo 
may not only be seen as the test case for the present-day existence of an alleged reme-
dial right to secession considering the circumstances giving cause to the declaration 
of independence, but also provides a meaningful insight into the contemporary views 
of States regarding a right to remedial secession. Alongside the case of Kosovo, a 
number of other attempts to secede will be addressed which have been invoked as 
demonstrating support for the existence of a right to remedial secession. The inter-
national responses to the various cases will be considered, thereby seeking to disclose 
the existence or otherwise of a customary right to remedial secession. 
This Chapter will therefore end with a legal appraisal of the international practice 
assessed in view of the elements of customary international law. In this respect, first, 
a contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach towards customary inter-
national law will be used as framework for this assessment. On a subsidiary level, 
the more progressive human rights approach will be considered, which emphasizes 
opinio juris over (physical) State practice and takes review of arguments of moral-
ity or humanity. Finally, the question will be answered as to what extent a custom-
ary right to unilateral secession has emerged under contemporary international law. 
What is more, the twofold approach noted above will disclose whether adherence to 
the conventional or progressive model leads to different result with respect to this 
question.
2. the Recognition of StateS: a bRief intRoduction
When examining the practice of unilateral secession, it is vital to consider the concept 
of recognition as well, since the two are closely related. By granting (or withhold-
ing) international recognition, existing States may respond to attempts at unilateral 
secession, which aim at establishing a new, independent State. According to Shaw, 
the recognition of aspirant States by third States may be classified as “a method of 
accepting factual situations and endowing them with legal significance, but this rela-
tionship is a complicated one”.4 Indeed, as will be explained below, while the act of 
recognition is often based on non-legal considerations, it may positively have legal 
consequences on the international level.5 Recognition involves more than a mere 
3 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 88.
4 M.N. Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003) at p. 185.
5 See J. Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’ (2012) 61 International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly 361 at p. 381.
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precondition for the formal establishment of international relations between States. It 
will be contended hereafter that, in addition to this, individual recognition statements 
may reveal opinio juris or verbal State practice with respect to unilateral secession 
and an alleged right to remedial secession. For opinio juris or verbal State practice to 
be discerned, the explicit acknowledgement of such an entitlement is required. More-
over, (virtually) universal recognition practice may reflect the acceptance of a claim 
to unilateral secession and, in some disputed situations, it may even determine the 
ultimate success of such an attempt. It will also be stressed, however, that prudence 
is called for when deducing positive entitlements from recognition practice. In the 
context of the present Chapter, the granting of recognition to or withholding it from 
an aspirant State will therefore not be regarded as presenting conclusive evidence for 
the (non-)existence of a right to remedial secession. Rather, recognition practice may 
reflect the acceptance or otherwise of a claim to unilateral secession – that is not nec-
essarily implying the existence of a legal right in this respect – which is important for 
assessing the value of cases which have sometimes been adduced as providing sup-
port for the acceptance of a right to remedial secession. In this connection, the line of 
argument presented in the present Chapter will be that merely instances of unilateral 
secession which have been broadly recognized by the international community as 
such may potentially constitute relevant (physical) State practice with respect to the 
existence of a right to remedial secession. If there is no unilateral secession, neither 
can there be remedial secession. 
Although an elaborate assessment of the theory and practice regarding recogni-
tion is not required for the purpose of this study,6 a concise review in this respect is 
indispensable in order to explain the relevance of recognition for the present pur-
poses. Therefore, this Section will address the two main schools of thought regarding 
recognition, and, in doing so, touch upon the criteria for statehood. Subsequently, 
bearing in mind the objectives and consequences of recognition, its importance with 
respect to attempts to unilateral secession will be highlighted. 
6 For a more elaborate and in-depth discussion of this matter, see, for instance, I. Brownlie, Principles 
of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) at pp. 85-102; M.C.R. 
Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition’ in M.D. Evans (ed.) International Law (3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) at pp. 203-251; J.R. Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law (2nd revised edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006) at pp. 3-36; J. Dugard and D. Raič, 
‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession 
International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) at pp. 94-137; M. Fabry, 
Recognizing States. International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York 2010); T.D. Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and 
Evolution (Praeger, Westport/London 1999); H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 1963); Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 
28-48; Shaw, International Law at pp. 367-408; C. Warbrick, ‘Recognition of States’ (1999) 41 Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 473.
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2.1. The Constitutive and Declaratory Approach
The question of the purpose and legal effect of recognition is much debated, as dif-
ferent approaches exist on this topic. In this discussion, often labelled as the ‘great 
debate’,7 two approaches can be discerned: the constitutive and the declaratory.8 These 
approaches towards recognition reflect the two main schools of thought concerning 
the establishment of States. In short, the constitutive approach contends that recogni-
tion is a conditio sine qua non for statehood. Put differently, recognition establishes 
or constitutes a State and grants it legal personality. Without recognition, an entity 
cannot be considered as a State under international law. The declaratory model, on the 
other hand, maintains that States may emerge independent of recognition. According 
to this view, an entity will become a State as a subject of international law as soon as 
it meets the criteria of statehood, while recognition merely formally acknowledges 
or declares this situation. In other words, under the declaratory view, “[r]ecognition 
is evidence that a state has come into being, but it is in no way an instrument of that 
creation”.9 The criteria determining whether an entity actually is a State are stipulated 
in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (hereafter: 
Montevideo Convention). Article 1 of this Convention lists four requirements for an 
entity to acquire statehood, which are generally seen to constitute customary interna-
tional law:10 a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government and 
the capacity to enter into relations with other States.11 In addition, a number of other 
requirements have been suggested over time.12 As will be further explained hereaf-
ter in the context of the emergence of the successor States to the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union, which were drafted by the European Community in 
1991, intended to make the recognition of States subject to inter alia their democratic 
establishment, respect for the right to self-determination, human rights, minority 
7 See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 19.
8 See, for instance, Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition’ at pp. 241-243; Dugard 
and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at p. 97; Grant, The 
Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution at p. xx; Raič, Statehood and the Law 
of Self-Determination at pp. 28-33; Shaw, International Law at p. 369. 
9 Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution at p. xx. 
10 See, for instance, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 24; C. Ryngaert and S. 
Sobrie, ‘Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the 
Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 467 at p. 
470. Despite their customary nature, these criteria have frequently been criticized, for instance for not 
being accurate and for lacking clarity. For a critical view in this respect, see for instance, Craven, ‘State-
hood, Self-Determination, and Recognition’ at pp. 221-229.
11 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19.
12 For a more elaborate analysis of this development, see Ryngaert and Sobrie, ‘Recognition of States: 
International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and 
Abkhazia’ at pp. 474-484.
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rights and the inviolability of frontiers.13 As such, it may be said that the normative 
framework for recognition involves factual elements (enshrined in the Montevideo 
Convention) as well as moral considerations (stemming from the EC Guidelines).14 
While it is beyond the scope of the present study to extensively discuss the advan-
tages and flaws of both aforementioned approaches towards recognition, for the sake 
of clarity, some remarks deserve to be made here. The constitutive approach has 
been mainly criticized for leading to uncertainty. First, this conception of recogni-
tion grants a broad discretionary competence to States in their decision to recognize 
or not to recognize, which arguably involves the risk of arbitrariness. Secondly, and 
in connection to this, when an entity is recognized by some States, but not by others, 
the status of that particular entity remains obscure under the constitutive view, as it 
would be a State and a non-State at the same time.15 The question thus arises as to 
how many and which States need to recognize an entity before it actually emerges 
as a State.16 Needless to say, such uncertainty would be highly inexpedient. What is 
more, it cannot be denied that in practice, the decision to recognize or not to recog-
nize may be strongly influenced by non-legal considerations.17 In fact, “[t]he real-
ity is that in many cases recognition is applied to demonstrate political approval or 
disapproval”.18
13 European Community, ‘Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”’, 16 
December 1991, 31 International Legal Materials 1485 (1992). See also Section 3.2.4 of the present 
Chapter.
14 It should be noted, however, that the precise relationship between the criteria from the Montevi-
deo Convention and those of the EC Guidelines remains uncertain. An important question which has 
remained unanswered to date is whether the latter set of requirements is an addition to or a replacement 
of the traditional criteria. See Ryngaert and Sobrie, ‘Recognition of States: International Law or Realpo-
litik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ at pp. 477-478. 
Notwithstanding this question, it may be interesting to note that similar moral considerations as included 
in the EC Guidelines have been reflected in what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen criteria, 
which enunciate standards for European Union membership. In addition to geographic and economic cri-
teria, these standards involve political and moral requirements which need to be met before a State may 
accede to the European Union: “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minor-
ities […]”. See European Council, Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 
1993, SN 180/1/93 REV 1, 22 June 1993, at para. 7(1)(iii). 
15 Shaw, International Law at p. 369. 
16 See Ryngaert and Sobrie, ‘Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of 
Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ at p. 469; J. Vidmar, ‘Remedial Seces-
sion in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ (2010) 6 St Antony’s International Review 37 at 
pp. 378-381.
17 Shaw, International Law at pp. 373-374. See also Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination, and Rec-
ognition’ at pp. 243-244.
18 See Shaw, International Law at p. 373. The United States, for example, refused to extend recogni-
tion to both North Korea and the People’s Republic of China for years. This refusal was not because it 
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In view of the political nature of the recognition process, the declaratory approach 
appears to be more in conformity with reality, as an entity which fulfils the criteria of 
statehood may become a State notwithstanding the act of recognition.19 This outlook 
was endorsed by the Badinter Arbitration Committee in one of its opinions as well, 
since it stated that “the existence or disappearance of the State is a question of fact; 
[and] that the effects of recognition by other States are purely declaratory”.20 More 
specifically, it held that: 
such recognition, along with membership of international organizations, bears witness 
to these state’s conviction that the political entity so recognized is a reality and confers 
on it certain rights and obligations under international law.21
Support for the declaratory view may be also found in the Montevideo Convention, 
as Article 3 provides that “[t]he political existence of the State is independent of rec-
ognition by the other States” and Article 6 stipulates that “[t]he recognition of a State 
merely signifies that the State which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other 
with all the rights and duties determined by international law”.22 
Even though today, the declaratory approach towards recognition predominates 
both in practice and in literature,23 a problem with this view is that it disregards the 
circumstances under which an entity has met the criteria for statehood. Consequently, 
it would be possible for an entity to become a State through serious breaches of inter-
national law. This possibility under the declaratory theory does not correspond to 
international practice, as States generally respond to such events with non-recogni-
tion, either on their own record or by order of the UN Security Council after having 
condemned the situation.24 An example in this respect is the non-recognition in the 
considered those entities lacking the criteria for statehood, but rather because the United States did not 
wish the (legal) consequences of recognition to follow. See Shaw, International Law at p. 368.
19 Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at p. 98. 
See also Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law p. 88; Shaw, International Law at p. 369.
20 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, reprinted as: 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Opinions No. 1-3 of the Arbitration Commission of 
the International Conference on Yugoslavia’ (1992) 3 European Journal of International Law 182 at pp. 
182-183, para. 1a.
21 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 8, 4 July 1992, reprinted as: Inter-
national Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Opinions No. 4-10 of the Arbitration Commission of 
the International Conference on Yugoslavia’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 74 at pp. 
87-88, para. 2.
22 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19.
23 See Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition’ at p. 243; Crawford, The Creation of 
States in International Law at p. 25; Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Prac-
tice of Self-Determination’ at pp. 98-99; Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and 
(Lack of) Practice’ at p. 41.
24 An obligation of non-recognition may be seen to be included in Article 41(2) of the Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which reads as follows: “No State shall 
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case of Southern Rhodesia, which was created in violation of the right to self-deter-
mination.25 Another drawback of the declaratory approach is that controversy exists 
on the question of whether an entity which has been recognized by none or very few 
States only can actually claim statehood. On the one hand, Malcolm N. Shaw has 
argued that while entities remaining completely unrecognized by other States will 
probably have difficulties in exercising their rights and duties, this does not neces-
sarily prevent them from claiming statehood.26 On the other hand, it has been argued 
that the question phrased above must be answered in the negative, as entities which 
remain unrecognized are unable to demonstrate their capacity to enter into inter-
national relations with other States, therefore failing to meet one of the traditional 
criteria for statehood.27 In a similar vein, the Canadian Supreme Court has observed 
that even when assuming that recognition is not a prerequisite for statehood, “the 
viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, as a practical 
matter, upon recognition by other states”.28 If one accepts this view, the recognition 
by existing States does play a certain part in the creation of new States even under 
the declaratory theory, thus introducing some sort of constitutive dimension to this 
approach.29 This will be further explained hereafter.
Whatever the ongoing debate on the adequacy of the two approaches towards rec-
ognition, it is clear from the above that the recognition of aspirant States is – to say the 
least – significant for their viability within the international community, as the abil-
ity to enter into international relations with other States as well as the acknowledge-
ment of various rights and duties will depend upon it. Practice has demonstrated that 
neither of the two theories on recognition is applied absolutely, but rather, that prac-
tice seems to have adopted a middle course.30 The strict distinction between the two 
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining 
that situation.” On non-recognition following the creation of States in violation of international law, see, 
for instance, Ryngaert and Sobrie, ‘Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice 
of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ at p. 473; Crawford, The Creation 
of States in International Law at pp. 128-131.
25 See UN Security Council Resolution 216 (1965) (Southern Rhodesia), UN Doc. S/Res/216 (1965), 
12 November 1965, at para. 2. On the example of Southern Rhodesia, see also Crawford, The Creation of 
States in International Law at pp. 129-131.
26 Shaw, International Law at p. 371.
27 See, for instance, Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Deter-
mination’ at p. 98.
28 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 155.
29 M.C.R. Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of 
Statehood’ (1995) 16 Australian Year Book of International Law 199 at p. 208; Dugard and Raič, ‘The 
Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at p. 99.
30 For a similar conclusion, see Shaw, International Law at p. 369. See also Ryngaert and Sobrie, ‘Rec-
ognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, 
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ at p. 471.
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approaches thus can be said to be of limited importance for practical purposes.31 As 
Ian Brownlie noted, “to reduce, or to seem to reduce, the issues to a choice between 
the two opposing theories is to greatly oversimplify the legal situation”.32
2.2. Recognition and Unilateral Secession
Although the debate on the exact nature and consequences of recognition appears 
to be ongoing,33 the relevance of recognition in the context of attempts to unilat-
eral secession should not be underestimated. In general, recognition is regarded as 
a precondition for formally establishing international relations with other States.34 
Through recognition, States express their willingness to enter into international rela-
tions with the claimant State. As such, it may be said that recognition is a political 
act which primarily attaches practical significance to the concept of statehood. In 
the context of unilateral secession, however, the importance of recognition is more 
comprehensive. For the present purposes, this significance may be said to be twofold. 
First, the individual recognition statements may disclose the motives – both legal 
and non-legal – for States to recognize. Where these motives are legal in nature, the 
presence of verbal State practice or opinio juris with respect to the permissibility of 
unilateral secession and, possibly, with respect to a right to remedial secession under 
international law might be discerned. Yet, to find verbal State practice or opinio juris 
supporting the thesis that a right to remedial secession does exist under contemporary 
international law, explicit reference to such an entitlement is to be made. This will be 
seen in the analysis hereafter.35 
Secondly, as will be explained below, the recognition practice of the international 
community as a whole may impact the process of the creation of States, as it may 
shed light on the general acceptance of a claim to unilateral secession and, in some 
cases, even determine the success of such an attempt. This is explicitly not to say that 
recognition generally creates or constitutes States. Obviously, that would be irrecon-
cilable with the predominance of the idea that recognition is declaratory rather than 
constitutive as was explained previously. Indeed, in situations in which the proclama-
tion of a new, independent State is uncontested – that is when the criteria for state-
hood are met and the parent State does not oppose the proclamation by claiming, for 
instance, territorial integrity – recognition is to be viewed as a primarily declaratory 
31 See Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of State-
hood’ at p. 208; Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 28.
32 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law at p. 88.
33 See, for instance, Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’.
34 See Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of State-
hood’ at p. 208.
35 See Section 3.1.1. of the present Chapter.
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act,36 thus formally acknowledging that the entity meets the conditions for statehood. 
However, as was noted by Matthew Craven, particularly in situations in which the 
status of an entity is disputed or remains ambiguous, acts of recognition “can have 
the effect of providing crucial evidence of an entity’s status”.37 In this regard, wide-
spread recognition may be said to have a ‘corrective effect’ in the sense that it may 
contribute to the success of a claim to independent statehood, even when the criteria 
in this respect – in particular the requirement of an effective government – may not 
have been met (yet).38 The view that widespread recognition may actually resolve 
uncertainties regarding the status of claimant State seems to have been supported by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, as it observed in its Reference re Secession of Quebec 
that “[t]he ultimate success of [an attempt at] secession would be dependent on rec-
ognition by the international community”.39 For the present purposes, it should be 
noted that the significance of recognition as stipulated above especially holds for 
attempts to secede in which the consent of the parent State is lacking, i.e. cases of 
unilateral secession. In those circumstances, the virtually universal recognition of 
the aspirant State by already existing States may be said to comprise compelling evi-
dence for the statehood of the former, notwithstanding the opposition of the parent 
State.40 Conversely, the failure of attempts to unilateral secession may be “evidenced 
by the absence of recognition on the part of a sufficient number of States”.41 As such, 
the corrective or constitutive effect of widespread recognition may have a bearing on 
the emergence of State practice on the matter. For, it was contended in the previous 
Chapter that successful attempts to unilateral secession may constitute relevant State 
practice for the present purposes.42
Some caveats are called for in this respect. It was already noted that the corrective 
or constitutive effect outlined above is not to say that widespread recognition actu-
ally creates States. In addition, it should be emphasized that such recognition does 
not simultaneously imply the recognition of a (remedial) right to unilateral secession, 
36 See Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 41; 
Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’ at p. 370.
37 Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Issues of Statehood’ 
at p. 208. 
38 See A. Nollkaemper, Kern van het internationaal publiekrecht (5th edn, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 
Den Haag 2011) at p. 94. See also Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 93.
39 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 155.
40 For an elaborate discussion of this issue, see in particular Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of 
Recognition’ at pp. 374-381. When accepting that virtually universal recognition following attempts at 
unilateral secession may have constitutive effects, an inevitable yet unanswered question, again, is “how 
many and whose recognitions are necessary for collective recognition to be seen as a State creation” 
(p. 378). 
41 Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Determination’ at p. 111. 
For a similar position, see Craven, ‘What’s in a Name? The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Issues of Statehood’ at p. 208, and Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 27.
42 See Chapter V, Section 4.
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even though that has sometimes been suggested.43 In view of the role which non-
legal considerations may play in the decision to recognize or not to recognize, it 
would go too far to contend that, as a rule, the mere recognition or non-recognition 
of a claimant State implies the acknowledgement or rejection of an entitlement to 
unilateral secession. As will be seen hereafter in the context of Kosovo, it may very 
well be that recognition is prompted by (geo-)political or other reasons rather than 
by the purported existence of an enforceable right to independence through unilateral 
secession.44 For similar reasons, the existence of a right to remedial secession cannot 
simply be inferred from recognition practice. It would be particularly incorrect to 
deduce such existence from the absence or lack of recognition in a particular case, 
for instance by arguing that recognition remained forthcoming since the criteria for a 
right to remedial secession were not met.45 Such a line of reasoning already presup-
poses the acceptance of such a right in general, while this matter is still open to ques-
tion. Thus, while acts of recognition may in some situations determine the success of 
an attempt to secede in the absence of the consent of the parent State, and as such, be 
relevant for State practice, it should be emphasized that restraint is called for when 
inferring positive entitlements from recognition practice if no clear reference is made 
to the acceptance thereof. 
Having explained the relevance of recognition in the context of attempts at uni-
lateral secession, the following Section will now turn to an assessment of the actual 
responses of States to attempts at unilateral secession beyond decolonization. 
3. acknowledgement of a Right to Remedial SeceSSion in pRactice?
Beyond the context of decolonization, there have been various cases in which the 
right to external self-determination has been exercised by means of secession. Most 
of these instances, however, have occurred with the (ultimate) approval of the parent 
State. As was explained earlier in this study, such cases of consensual secession are 
generally seen to be unproblematic under international law.46 Nevertheless, a number 
of attempts to secede in the post-colonial era have been unilateral and may arguably 
be regarded as supporting the doctrine of remedial secession. 
The present Section will seek to disclose the contemporary stance of States 
towards the existence or otherwise of a right to remedial secession. As such, it will 
examine whether practice indeed evidences the elements of customary international 
law – i.e. opinio juris and State practice – on this issue. Two questions will be guid-
ing in this respect. First, has the attempt to secede unilaterally from the parent State 
43 See, for instance, Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 426-427.
44 See Section 3.1.1. of the present Chapter.
45 Such argument seems to be made by David Raič. See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determi-
nation at pp. pp. 426-427.
46 See Chapter III, Section 4.1.3. 
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been generally recognized as such by the international community of States? And 
secondly, which arguments did States advance for either supporting or opposing the 
attempt at unilateral secession? 
In this analysis, a key role will be granted to Kosovo’s attempt to secede from 
Serbia through the issuing of its unilateral declaration of independence on 17 Febru-
ary 2008 and the international responses thereto. As has been observed by commen-
tators and was also pointed out by some States, in view of the specific circumstances 
preceding the 2008 declaration, the case of Kosovo may be regarded as the test case 
or experimental plot for the present-day validity of a perceived right to remedial 
secession.47 What is more, many States have reacted to Kosovo’s unilateral declar-
ation of independence, both in general and in the context of the advisory proceed-
ings before the International Court of Justice.48 The case of Kosovo consequently 
provides a unique opportunity to gain an insight in the contemporary stance of the 
international community as to attempts at unilateral secession and, more specifically, 
the concept of remedial secession. Put differently, it may reflect opinio juris and 
(verbal) State practice on the matter. For these reasons, the international responses to 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence will constitute the pith of the analysis below. 
In addition to the case of Kosovo, a number of other situations will be addressed. 
These are the cases of Bangladesh, Eritrea, the Baltic Republics (and other successor 
States to the USSR) and, finally, Croatia and Slovenia (and the other successor States 
to the SFRY). This selection of cases is justified by the reference of some of these 
instances in the advisory proceedings on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of inde-
pendence, as these attempts at unilateral secession were put forward in the context 
of substantiating arguments regarding the existence of a right to remedial secession. 
Moreover, these examples have been invoked in literature as supporting the doctrine 
of remedial secession and therefore merit closer analysis below.
3.1. The Case of Kosovo
As was noted before, Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence of 17 Febru-
ary 2008 combined with the territory’s history of oppression, gross human rights 
violations and international administration, have led a considerable number of com-
mentators to contend that Kosovo was an eligible candidate for a right to remedial 
47 See, for instance, A. Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process” in the Creation of States through Seces-
sion’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2006) at pp. 187-188.
48 See UN General Assembly Resolution 63/3 (Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on Whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with 
International Law), UN Doc. A/Res/63/3, 8 October 2008; International Court of Justice Press Release, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion). Public hearings to be held 
from 1 December 2009, No. 2009/27, 29 July 2009.
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secession. The background of Kosovo’s attempt to secede from Serbia has already 
been dealt with previously in the context of a discussion of the International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilat-
eral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
of Kosovo.49 Therefore, the background of the case will not be expounded here again. 
What should be examined here, however, are the international responses to Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence for the purposes of assessing the existence of 
a customary right to remedial secession. To this end, the general responses to Koso-
vo’s unilateral declaration of independence will be addressed first. These responses 
include statements presented during the relevant debates in the UN Security Council 
and General Assembly, as well as recognition statements. Subsequently, this section 
will turn to the submissions by States during the written and oral proceedings before 
the International Court of Justice. 
3.1.1. General Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence
Being two of the most prominent bodies of the United Nations, the Security Council 
and the General Assembly have acted as important fora for discussing the situation 
regarding Kosovo. One day after Kosovo issued its unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence, the Security Council convened in response to the requests of the perma-
nent representatives of Serbia and Russia to bring the recent developments in Kosovo 
to the attention of the Security Council.50 In 2008, five further meetings were held in 
order to discuss the developments in Kosovo and its future.51 Moreover, the General 
Assembly convened early October 2008 to vote on the request for an advisory opin-
ion of the International Court of Justice, which was initiated by Serbia.52 During these 
debates, the Members of both the Security Council and the General Assembly put 
forward their views with respect to Kosovo’s attempt at unilateral secession through 
the issuing of its declaration of independence. The records of the debates show that 
while States did not make explicit reference to the questions of external self-determi-
nation, unilateral secession and remedial secession, the statements do provide useful 
insights in the views of States with respect to these matters. Broadly speaking, three 
49 See Chapter IV, Section 3.3.6.1.
50 See UN Security Council, Letter dated 17 February 2008 from the Permanent Representative of 
Serbia to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2008/103, 17 February 
2008; UN Security Council, Letter dated 17 February 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the 
Russian Federation to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2008/104, 
17 February 2008; Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008.
51 UN Security Council, 5850th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5850, 11 March 2008; UN Security Council, 
5871st meeting (closed), UN Doc. S/PV.5871, 21 April 2008; UN Security Council, 5917th meeting, 
UN Doc. S/PV.5917, 20 June 2008; UN Security Council, 5944th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5944, 25 July 
2008; UN Security Council, 6025th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6025, 26 November 2008. 
52 UN General Assembly, 22nd plenary meeting, UN Doc. A/63/PV. 22, 8 October 2008. 
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categories may be discerned in the international responses of States: the first includes 
States which argued that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence constituted 
a violation of international law, the second class of States took the position that the 
parties involved should recommence their political negotiations to resolve the con-
flict, and finally, the third group responded to the declaration by formally recognizing 
Kosovo as a sovereign and independent State.53 These categories will be addressed 
below. Arguably, a fourth category may be added to this in the sense that some States 
wished to remain neutral on the matter. Ultimately, some of these States could be 
classified under one of the first three categories as they did take a stance in the end. 
Examples in this respect are Burkina Faso and Panama, both of which did not take 
a clear position during the first Security Council debates, but nonetheless decided to 
recognize Kosovo after a while.54 A number of other States from across the globe, 
however, have refrained from taking a position to date.55 Since one may only specu-
late on the reasons for this silence,56 this possible fourth category is of less relevance 
for the present purposes and will not be expounded upon below.
As noted above, the first category of responses comprises those States which 
contended that Kosovo’s declaration of independence violated international law, 
as a consequence of which formal recognition was out of the question. The States 
involved primarily argued that the attempt to secede constituted a violation of the 
principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States as enshrined in the UN Char-
ter. In addition to this, independence of Kosovo was considered to be a violation of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) as well. Serbia, for instance, declared 
that it would “not accept the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity” and 
noted that respect for these principles was called for by Security Council Resolution 
53 This categorization was also suggested by Helen Quane. See H. Quane, ‘Self-Determination and 
Minority Protection after Kosovo’ in J. Summers (ed.) Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2011) at pp. 198-199.
54 See UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Kafando, 
Burkina Faso); UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S.PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (The Presi-
dent, on behalf of Panama). For their recognition statements, see Burkina Faso, Declaration de Recon-
naissance de l’Etat du Kosovo, 24 April 2008, retrieved via ‘Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent 
State?’, available at <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com>; Panama, Comunicado de Prensa sobre Recon-
ocimiento de la República de Kosovo, 16 January 2009, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/independ-
ence/Panama.pdf >. Both websites last consulted on 24 September 2012.
55 This category includes States from the African continent, as well as Latin America and Asia, includ-
ing Bhutan, Botswana, Cambodia, Guyana, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Suriname and 
Tajikistan.
56 For possible explanations, see J. Almqvist, The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and International 
Law (Working Paper, Real Instituto Elcano 2009) at pp. 11-12. It appears that a number of States which 
have not taken a position on the matter fear negative consequences for their domestic or regional situation 
or for the relationships with their allies.
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1244 (1999).57 Being one of the two States having requested the Security Council to 
meet the day after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Russia likewise held that:
[t]he 17 February declaration by the local assembly of the Serbian province of Kosovo 
is a blatant breach of the norms and principles of international law – above all of the 
Charter of the United Nations – which undermines the foundations of the system of 
international relations. That illegal act is an open violation of the Republic of Serbia’s 
sovereignty, the high-level Contact Group accords, Kosovo’s Constitutional Frame-
work, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) – which is the basic document for the 
Kosovo settlement – and other relevant decisions of the Security Council.58 
In somewhat more prudent wording, South Africa expressed its regret that Kosovo’s 
unilateral decision was “not taken in conformity with a legal and political process 
envisaged by Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)”.59 Even though the presence 
of legal considerations in these views is significant, this is certainly not to say that 
the opposition to Kosovo’s declaration of independence should be seen as merely 
prompted by international law. In addition to the abovementioned arguments, the 
view was also presented that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence would con-
stitute a dangerous precedent, which would threaten regional and international peace, 
and stability. Serbia, for example, repeatedly adduced that:
there are dozens of other Kosovo’s in the world, and all of them are lying in wait for 
Kosovo’s act of secession to become a reality and to be established as an acceptable 
norm. I warn Council members most seriously of the danger of the escalation of many 
existing conflicts, the flaring up of frozen conflicts and the instigation of new ones.60
Similar concerns were expressed by the Russian Federation61 and Vietnam.62 While 
not explicitly noted, it may be derived from the various statements that the States in 
this category did not consider a right to unilateral secession to exist. Rather, for this 
group of States, fundamental principles of international law such as State sovereignty 
57 UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (President Tadić, 
Serbia). See also UN Security Council, 5917th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5917, 20 June 2008 (President 
Tadić, Serbia).
58 UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Churkin, Rus-
sian Federation). See also UN Security Council, 5917th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5917, 20 June 2008 (Mr 
Churkin, Russian Federation).
59 UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Kumalo, South 
Africa).
60 Ibid., (President Tadić, Serbia). See also UN Security Council, 5850th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5850, 
11 March 2008. 
61 See UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Churkin, 
Russian Federation).
62 See ibid. (Mr Le Luong Minh, Vietnam).
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and territorial integrity (combined with the fear for negative effects on peace and sta-
bility) were seen to exclude the acknowledgement of a right to unilateral secession.63 
The second category of responses towards Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence involved the view that Kosovo and Serbia should resume negotiations 
on Kosovo’s final status. One of the States stressing the necessity of further dialogue 
was Vietnam. It urged the parties concerned:
to engage […] in good-faith dialogue and peaceful negotiations to resolve their differ-
ences and arrive at a durable comprehensive solution conforming to the fundamental 
principles of international law, the United Nations Charter and the provisions of Secu-
rity Council resolution 1244 (1999), in the interest of peace and stability, not only in 
Kosovo, but also in the rest of the Balkans, in Europe and throughout the world.64
In similar terms, China expressed the hope that:
all parties concerned will keep in mind the long-term interests of peace and security in 
the Balkan region, Europe and the world at large, and conduct candid negotiations and 
discussions for a constructive solution to the issue of Kosovo’s status.65 
In this connection, it also emphasized the need for a “mutually acceptable solution 
through political and diplomatic means”.66 Likewise, notwithstanding the declaration 
of independence, Indonesia called for a continued “dialogue and a negotiated solu-
tion”, as that would “better guarantee peace and stability in the region”.67 This line 
of reasoning appears to be consistent with the conventional approach to the right 
to self-determination, which prioritizes the achievement of internal self-determina-
tion and excludes the option of secession as long as the consent of the parent State 
remains forthcoming. On a more practical level, the position that negotiations should 
be resumed would also reduce the risk of Kosovo serving as a precedent for entities 
with secessionist ambitions elsewhere in the world.68 
Finally, the third class of responses towards Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence concerns the formal recognition of Kosovo. The day after Kosovo’s 
63 See Quane, ‘Self-Determination and Minority Protection after Kosovo’ at p. 198.
64 UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Le Luong Minh, 
Vietnam). See also UN Security Council, 5917th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5917, 20 June 2008 (Mr Le 
Luong Minh, Vietnam).
65 UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Wang Guangya, 
China).
66 Ibid. See also UN Security Council, 6025th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6025, 26 November 2008 (Mr 
Li Kexin, China).
67 UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Natalegawa, 
Indonesia). See also UN Security Council, 6025th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.6025, 26 November 2008 (Mr 
Kleib, Indonesia).
68 See Quane, ‘Self-Determination and Minority Protection after Kosovo’ at p. 198.
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declaration, during the 5839th Security Council meeting, several States announced 
that they had already recognized Kosovo or expressed their intension to do so in 
due course.69 Since, Kosovo has been recognized as an independent State by 96 out 
of 193 UN Member States. These recognizing States include 22 EU Member States 
and three out of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, including 
the United States.70 While this significant number of formal recognitions obviously 
cannot be ignored, it leaves the present-day legal status of Kosovo open to question. 
Previously in this Chapter, it was explained that although recognition is generally 
viewed as declaratory, it may be seen to have some constitutive effects in the case 
of attempts at unilateral secession. It was contended that if the parent State does not 
consent to the secession of part of its territory, virtually universal recognition by the 
international community of States may effectuate a successful secession. Kosovo has 
been recognized by a considerable number of States, but it arguably goes too far to 
contend that its recognition has been virtually universal. What is more, it has neither 
been admitted to the European Union nor the United Nations. As a consequence, it 
remains questionable whether Kosovo’s attempt to secede from Serbia and create an 
independent, sovereign State has actually been successful. Put differently, the legal 
status of Kosovo remains ambiguous to date.71 Despite these uncertainties, it is rel-
evant to take a closer look at the recognition texts to see the justifications that States 
have adduced for granting recognition to Kosovo.72 For the present purposes, it is 
of particular significance to assess whether the remedial secession doctrine – or ele-
ments thereof – has been invoked by recognizing States. In this respect, however, it 
should be noted that not all States have published their recognition statements and 
various States have not substantiated their decision to recognize, i.e. they merely 
noted that they formally recognized Kosovo as a sovereign and independent State.73 
Of the States which gave reasons for the decision to recognize, it appears that most 
adduced political considerations, such as the need for stability, peace and security in 
69 See UN Security Council, 5839th meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008 (Mr Verbeke, 
Belgium); ibid. (Mr Urbina, Costa Rica); ibid. (Mr Ripert, France); ibid. (Mr Mantovani, Italy); ibid. (Sir 
John Sawers, United Kingdom); ibid. (Mr Khalilzad, United States of America).
70 This was the state of affairs on 31 December 2012. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Repub-
lic of Kosova, Countries that have recognized the Republic of Kosova, available at <www.mfa-ks.
net/?page=2,33>, last consulted on 31 December 2012. 
71 See also Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’ at pp. 378-381.
72 Of the 96 States which have recognized Kosovo, the recognition statements of 49 States have been 
examined. That includes all recognition statements issued before 29 March 2008. After this date, state-
ments were only considered occasionally, due to problems with the traceability of the documents. More-
over, some of the recognition statements concerned verbal acts, as a result of which no texts are available. 
73 See, for instance, Belgium, Koninklijk besluit betreffende de erkenning van de Republiek Kosovo, 24 
February 2008, retrieved via ‘Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?’, available at <http://
www.kosovothanksyou.com>; Malaysia, Letter of Dr Rais Yatim to His Excellency Mr Skender Hyseni, 
30 October 2008, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/independence/Malaysia.pdf>. Both websites were 
last consulted on 24 September 2012.
A Customary Right to Remedial Secession?
239
the Balkans and beyond. It was frequently expected that the recognition of an inde-
pendent Kosovo would have a positive effect on the situation in the region.74 Turkey, 
for instance, emphasized in its recognition statement that it: 
attaches importance to advance the understanding of lasting peace in the Balkans 
which has suffered immensely in recent years and hopes that the independence of 
Kosovo will present an opportunity for the enhancement of stability and confidence 
among the countries in the region.75 
Likewise, it was noted by another State that the recognition of an independent Kosovo 
would be “the only sustainable solution in the current situation which will provide 
the perspective of safety and stability in the region”.76 In a similar vein, the failure of 
protracted efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Kosovo and Serbia led 
74 See, for instance, Austria, Plassnik: Letter on Kosovo’s Recognition Signed, 27 February 2008, avail-
able at <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/news/press-releases/2008>; Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Croatia, Joint Statement by the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia about the announcement 
of the recognition of Kosovo, 19 March 2008, available at <http://www.mfa.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1640&
tr=recognition+Kosovo>; Burkina Faso, Declaration de Reconnaissance de l’Etat du Kosovo, 24 April 
2008, retrieved via ‘Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?’, available at <http://www.koso-
vothanksyou.com>; Canada, Canada Joins International Recognition of Kosovo, Press Release No. 59, 
18 March 2008, available at <http://news.gc.ca> (archived content); Finland, Finland Recognised the 
Republic of Kosovo, 7 March 2008, available at <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=
123797&nodeid=15146&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>; France, Lettre du President de la Republique, 
M. Nicholas Sarkozy, Addressee sur President du Kosovo, M. Fatmir Sejdiu, 18 February 2008, available 
at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/3/0318.html>; Germany, Cabinet Approves Recog-
nition of Kosovo as Independent State under International Law, 20 February 2008, available at <http://
www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/daparchive/anzeige.php?zaehler=11196>; Japan, Statement by Foreign 
Minister Masahiko Koumura on the Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo, 18 March 2008, available 
at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/3/0318.html>; Korea, Recognition of the Republic 
of Kosovo, 28 March 2008, available at <http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/main/index.jsp>; Saudi Arabia, 
Saudi Arabia Announces Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo, 20 April 2008, available at <http://www.
spa.gov.sa/English/print.php?id=656348>; Senegal, Dakar reconnaît le nouvel Etat, 19 February 2008, 
available at <http://www.aps.sn/articles.php?id_article=40531>; United States of America, U.S. Recog-
nizes Kosovo as Independent State, Statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 18 February 2008, 
available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm>. All websites last consulted 
on 24 September 2012. See also Almqvist, The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and International Law 
at p. 8; G. Bolton and G. Visoka, ‘Recognizing Kosovo’s Independence: Remedial Secession or Earned 
Sovereignty?’ (2010) St Antony’s College, University of Oxford (Occasional Paper No. 11/10) at p. 20.
75 Turkey, Statement of H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 
Regarding the Recognition of Kosovo by Turkey, 18 February 2008, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.
tr>, last consulted on 24 September 2012. 
76 Lithuania, Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution on the Recognition of the Republic of 
Kosovo, No. X-1520, 6 May 2008, retrieved via ‘Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?’, 
available at <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com>, last consulted on 24 September 2012.
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some States to conclude that there was “no other alternative but to recognize [an inde-
pendent] Kosovo”.77 Another example in this respect is Germany, which stated that: 
[a]lthough no stone was left unturned in attempts to negotiate a settlement between 
Kosovo Albanians and Serbians, all such efforts remained in vain. The German gov-
ernment is convinced that after so many years, further negotiations would not have 
resulted in a breakthrough.78 
Various other States also made reference to failed negotiations on the final status of 
Kosovo, which may be read as support for independence as a last resort option or 
remedy.79 At the same time, many States granting recognition emphasized the sui 
generis nature of the case of Kosovo, thus seeking to limit its potential precedential 
value.80 An illustrative example in this respect is the statement of the United States, 
which contended that: 
the unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation – including the 
context of Yugoslavia’s break-up, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration – are not found 
elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as a prec-
edent for any other situation in the world today.81
77 Malta, Malta Recognizes Kosovo as an Independent State, 22 August 2008, available at <http://www.
foreign.gov.mt/default.aspx?MDIS=21&NWID=68>, last consulted on 24 September 2012.
78 Germany, Cabinet Approves Recognition of Kosovo as Independent State under International 
Law, 20 February 2008, available at <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/daparchive/anzeige.
php?zaehler=11196>, last consulted on 24 September 2012. 
79 See, for instance, Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia, Joint Statement by the Governments of Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Croatia about the announcement of the recognition of Kosovo, 19 March 2008, available 
at <http://www.mfa.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1640&tr=recognition+Kosovo>; Canada, Canada Joins Inter-
national Recognition of Kosovo, Press Release No. 59, 18 March 2008, available at <http://news.gc.ca> 
(archived content); Costa Rica, Costa Rica se pronuncia por la independencia de Kósovo, Comunicación 
Institucional (Costa Rica Kósovo-1143), 17 February 2008, available at <www.rree.go.cr>; Iceland, The 
Government of Iceland formally Recognizes Kosovo, 5 March 2008, available at <http://www.mfa.is/
news-and-publications/nr/4135>; Luxembourg, Le Luxembourg reconnaît formellement le Kosovo, 21 
February 2008, available at <http://www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/actualite/2008/02-fevrier/20-
asselborn-kosovo/index.html>; Macedonia, Macedonia Recognizes Kosovo, 9 October 2008, available at 
<http://www.mia.com.mk/default.aspx?vId=57722300&lId=2>; Slovenia, Slovenia Recognizes Kosovo, 
5 March 2008, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/independence/Slowenien.pdf>. All websites last con-
sulted on 24 September 2012.
80 For a similar observation, see Quane, ‘Self-Determination and Minority Protection after Kosovo’ at 
p. 199; Ryngaert and Sobrie, ‘Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of 
Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ at pp. 480-481. 
81 United States of America, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, Statement of Secre-
tary of State Condoleezza Rice, 18 February 2008, available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2008/02/100973.htm>, last consulted on 24 September 2012.
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Positions of the same kind were expressed by various other States.82 Ryngaert and 
Sobrie noted that such “emphasis on the sui generis character of the recognition of 
Kosovo diminishes the international-law relevance of such a recognition”.83 Indeed, 
stressing the uniqueness of the case of Kosovo as a justification for the decision to 
recognize its independence rather than adducing legal arguments in this respect pre-
vents entitlements from being deduced from the recognition statements as well as 
limits the precedential value of the events regarding Kosovo. 
It is striking that in their decision to recognize Kosovo, only few States appear to 
have relied upon international law – at least to a certain extent. While some States 
made mention of the fulfilment of the normative criteria for statehood,84 the human 
rights violations on the territory,85 and the legal framework created by Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999), the Rambouillet Accords and the Ahtisaari Plan,86 
82 See, for instance, Canada, Canada Joins International Recognition of Kosovo, Press Release No. 
59, 18 March 2008, available at <http://news.gc.ca> (archived content); UN General Assembly, Request 
for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on whether the unilateral declaration of 
independence of Kosovo is in accordance with international law, UN Doc. A/63/PV.22, 8 October 2008, 
(Mr Ripert, France); Latvia, Announcement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Latvia on Rec-
ognition of Kosovo’s Independence, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/press-releases/2008/
february/20-february/>; Peru, Perú decide reconocer independencia de Kósovo, Comunicado Oficial 
002-08, 22 February 2008, retrieved through <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/>; Poland Govern-
ment has Recognized the Independence of Kosovo, 26 February 2008, available at <http://www.premier.
gov.pl/en/press_centre/news/government_has_recognised_the_,2220/>; Slovenia, Slovenia Recognizes 
Kosovo, 5 March 2008, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/independence/Slowenien.pdf>; Sweden, 
Sweden Recognises the Republic of Kosovo, 4 March 2008, available at <http://www.sweden.gov.se/
sb/d/10358/a/99714>; Switzerland, Statement by the President of the Swiss Confederation, 27 February 
2008, available at <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/10358/a/99714>. All websites last consulted on 24 
September 2012.
83 Ryngaert and Sobrie, ‘Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Rec-
ognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ at p. 481.
84 See, for instance, Burkina Faso, Declaration de Reconnaissance de l’Etat du Kosovo, 24 April 
2008, retrieved via ‘Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?’, available at <http://www.koso-
vothanksyou.com>; Canada, Canada Joins International Recognition of Kosovo, Press Release No. 59, 
18 March 2008, available at <http://news.gc.ca> (archived content); Costa Rica, Costa Rica se pronuncia 
por la independencia de Kósovo, Comunicación Institucional (Costa Rica Kósovo-1143), 17 February 
2008, available at <www.rree.go.cr>; Dominican Republic, Posición de la Republica Dominicana sobre 
Kosovo, 11 July 2009, retrieved via ‘Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?’, available at 
<http://kosovothanksyou.com>; United States of America, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, 
Statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 18 February 2008, available at <http://2001-2009.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm>. All websites last consulted on 24 September 2012. 
85 See, for instance, Canada, Canada Joins International Recognition of Kosovo, Press Release No. 59, 
18 March 2008, available at <http://news.gc.ca> (archived content); Costa Rica, Costa Rica se pronuncia 
por la independencia de Kósovo, Comunicación Institucional (Costa Rica Kósovo-1143), 17 February 
2008, available at <www.rree.go.cr>; Ireland, Minister for Foreign Affairs Dermot Ahern TD Announces 
Ireland’s Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo, 29 February 2008, available at <http://foreignaffairs.
gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=42938>. 
86 See, for instance, Costa Rica, Costa Rica se pronuncia por la independencia de Kósovo, Comu-
nicación Institucional (Costa Rica Kósovo-1143), 17 February 2008, available at <www.rree.go.cr>; 
Chapter VI
242
they generally did so without giving much detail. More significant for the present 
purposes is that a mere handful of States noted the will of the people87 and the 
right to – or principle of – self-determination, yet again without further elucidation. 
Albania, for example, merely noted that “[t]he Government of Albania considers 
the creation of the State of Kosovo as a historical event, sanctioning the right of 
Kosovo citizens for self-determination”.88 In a similar vein, Burkina Faso reaffirmed 
“l’importance de l’égalité entre les peuples et de leur droit naturel a disposer d’eux-
mêmes”89 and the United Arab Emirates found that the recognition of Kosovo as an 
independent and sovereign State was “[i]n accordance with its firm support for the 
principle of the legitimate right of people to self-determination”.90 It is important to 
note that none of these States elaborated on these arguments and none of them actu-
ally made such reference in the context of a presumed right to remedial secession 
or external self-determination otherwise. Rather, they made mention of the right to 
self-determination in conjunction with various other considerations primarily being 
non-legal in nature. The recognition statement issued by Slovenia exemplifies this. 
In this declaration, it was explained that the decision to recognize Kosovo was based 
on, inter alia, the: 
Denmark, Denmark Recognizes Kosovo as an Independent State, 21 February 2008, available at <http://
kosova.org/docs/independence/Denmark.pdf>; Estonia, Estonia Recognizes Republic of Kosovo, 21 Feb-
ruary 2008, available at <http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/682>; Finland, Finland Recognised the Repub-
lic of Kosovo, 7 March 2008, available at <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=12379
7&nodeid=15146&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>; United States of America, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo 
as Independent State, Statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, 18 February 2008, available at 
<http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm>. 
87 See, for instance, Afghanistan, The Statement of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Recogni-
tion of Independence of Kosovo, 18 February 2008, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/independence/
Afghanistan.pdf>; Australia, Australia Recognises the Republic of Kosovo, 19 February 2008, available at 
<http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2008/fa-s034_08.html>; Costa Rica, Costa Rica se pronun-
cia por la independencia de Kósovo, Comunicación Institucional (Costa Rica Kósovo-1143), 17 February 
2008, available at <www.rree.go.cr>; Ireland, Minister for Foreign Affairs Dermot Ahern TD Announces 
Ireland’s Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo, 29 February 2008, available at <http://foreignaffairs.
gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=42938>; Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia Announces Recognition of the Repub-
lic of Kosovo, 20 April 2008, available at <http://www.spa.gov.sa/English/print.php?id=656348>; Slo-
venia, Slovenia Recognizes Kosovo, 5 March 2008, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/independence/
Slowenien.pdf>. All websites last consulted on 24 September 2012. 
88 Albania, Statement of Prime Minister of Albania Mr. Sali Berisha on Recognition of Independence of 
Kosova, 18 February 2008, available at <http://keshilliministrave.al/index.php?fq=brenda&m=news&lid
=7323&gj=gj2>.
89 Burkina Faso, Declaration de Reconnaissance de l’Etat du Kosovo, 24 April 2008, retrieved via 
‘Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?’, available at <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com>.
90 United Arab Emirates, UAE Recognises Kosovo, 14 October 2008, retrieved via ‘Who Recognized 
Kosova as an Independent State?’, available at <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com>, last consulted on 24 
September 2012.
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specific historical circumstances, such as the status of an autonomous province within 
Yugoslavia given to Kosovo by the 1974 constitution, the systematic repression of 
Kosovo Albanians and the years of international administration of Kosovo. 
Moreover, it took into consideration that the protracted negotiations between Kosovo 
and Serbia on Kosovo’s final status had remained fruitless. For Slovenia, these “were 
circumstances that made Kosovo a ‘unique’ case” and […] suggested that ‘no alter-
native solutions were possible or realistic’”. In addition, Slovenia’s decision was 
also guided by the fact that the declaration of independence was adopted by the 
Kosovo Assembly “as a legitimate expression of the will of the majority of Kosovo’s 
population”91 and in view of: 
the right of peoples to self-determination, the concern for the stability of Kosovo and 
the region, as well as the conclusions of the February EU General Affairs and External 
Relations Council meeting.92
Having regard to this conjunction of factors other than self-determination, it seems 
legitimate to raise the question as to whether the States concerned would have con-
sidered the right to self-determination an sich to constitute a sufficient basis warrant-
ing Kosovo’s secession from Serbia.93 
In sum, it appears that States generally did not deem international law to be a 
determining factor in their decision to formally recognize Kosovo, not to mention 
that they presumed a right to remedial secession to underlie this choice. Rather, it 
seems that States first and foremost felt “the need to assess the case in light of politi-
cal considerations”,94 thus confirming the political nature of recognition practice.
3.1.1.1. Recapitulation
Having considered the general responses of States to Kosovo’s unilateral declar-
ation of independence, involving both statements issued during the debates in the 
Security Council and General Assembly and recognition statements, three common 
approaches towards the matter have been disclosed. First, various States opposed 
91 Slovenia, Slovenia Recognizes Kosovo, 5 March 2008, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/inde-
pendence/Slowenien.pdf >, last consulted 24 September 2012. For a similar reference to the will of the 
majority, see the recognition statement of Ireland, in which it was noted that “more than 90% of Kosovo’s 
population wants independence”. See Ireland, Minister for Foreign Affairs Dermot Ahern TD Announces 
Ireland’s Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo, 29 February 2008, available at <http://foreignaffairs.
gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=42938>, last consulted 24 September 2012.
92 Slovenia, Slovenia Recognizes Kosovo, 5 March 2008, available at <http://kosova.org/docs/inde-
pendence/Slowenien.pdf >, last consulted on 24 September 2012.
93 See also Quane, ‘Self-Determination and Minority Protection after Kosovo’ at p. 204.
94 Almqvist, The Politics of Recognition, Kosovo and International Law at p. 9.
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Kosovo’s attempt to secede from Serbia by designating the declaration of independ-
ence as a violation of international law. In doing so, reference was generally made 
to the principles of State sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of States 
as stipulated in the UN Charter and to the (legal) framework created by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999). Secondly, a group of States repudiated the issu-
ing of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence by calling for the resump-
tion of political negotiations on the final status of Kosovo. It was observed that both 
approaches towards Kosovo’s proclamation of independence arguably reflect the 
conventional view on the right to self-determination, with respect for State sover-
eignty and territorial integrity being prioritized and external self-determination being 
ruled out as long as the consent of the parent State is absent. 
Finally, a third group of States responded to the declaration of independence more 
positively by formally recognizing Kosovo as an independent State. From the vari-
ous recognition texts, however, it followed that legal considerations seem to have 
played only a very marginal role in the decision to grant recognition to Kosovo. The 
traditional (normative) criteria for statehood and the right to self-determination were 
scarcely referred to, and even where States did so, this clearly did not constitute their 
principal argument for recognition. Instead, it was seen that States appeared to be 
primarily guided by political considerations, such as the promotion and preservation 
of peace and stability in the region and the fact that sustained negotiations to reach a 
peaceful settlement between the parties continued to be to no avail. In view of this, 
it may not come as a surprise that references to the notion of remedial secession – or 
an entitlement to unilateral secession otherwise – were not made in the various state-
ments. Nevertheless, it was seen that some States did consider the grave human rights 
abuses on the territory and the failed negotiations on the final status of Kosovo in 
their decision to recognize, both of which may be linked to attributes of the remedial 
secession doctrine.95 It may be questioned, however, whether these grounds actually 
stemmed from the acceptance of a right to remedial secession, or merely arose from 
concerns pertaining to peace and stability in the region. Considering the lack of other 
clear references to the concept of remedial secession or elements thereof, and in view 
of the emphasis on other (non-legal) factors, one may argue that the latter line of rea-
soning seems more likely. Moreover, bearing in mind the fact that many recognizing 
States stressed the sui generis nature of the case of Kosovo, thereby arguing that it 
could thus not be regarded as a precedent, may also be seen as an indication that these 
States did not consider a legal entitlement to be applicable to Kosovo. 
95 For the right to remedial secession in doctrine, see Chapter IV, Section 2.2.
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3.1.2. The Advisory Proceedings before the International Court of Justice
In contrast to the general responses to Kosovo’s declaration of independence as 
addressed above, reference to the concept of remedial secession was made during the 
advisory proceedings before the Court. As the statements submitted during the advi-
sory proceedings dealt with legal issues more elaborately, they provide for valuable 
insights on the contemporary stance of States regarding the existence of an entitlement 
to remedial secession. In this respect, a number of positions become apparent when 
studying the submissions of States. Broadly speaking, the submissions can be classi-
fied in two categories. The first category comprises those States which expressed sup-
port for the existence of a right to remedial secession in their statements. In contrast, 
the second class includes a greater number of States, which opposed the existence of 
a right to remedial secession. The views of States categorized under these classes will 
be discussed below in the abovementioned order.96
3.1.2.1. Support for the Existence of a Right to Remedial Secession
During the proceedings before the Court and against the backdrop of the specific 
case of Kosovo, a number of States expressed their support for the existence of a 
right to remedial secession under contemporary international law in general as well. 
In addition to the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Kosovo), 
these States were Albania, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Jordan, the Neth-
erlands, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland and the Russian Federation. Some of these 
States merely touched upon the acknowledgement of such a right or even accepted 
it rather implicitly, but most commented on the matter at length. Bearing in mind the 
question of the existence of a customary right to remedial secession, these views and 
arguments deserve to be considered here one by one.97 In doing so, where possible, 
particular attention will be paid to the sources the States adduced for the existence of 
a right to remedial secession and the conditions listed for the lawful exercise of such 
an entitlement.
3.1.2.1.1. Views and Arguments Supporting a Right to Remedial Secession
As it might seem self-evident that the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence (Kosovo) (hereafter: the Authors) claimed a right to remedial secession for 
the purpose of justifying the issuing of their declaration, it is worth noting that it was 
96 It should be noted that since the aim of the present Chapter is to examine the existence of a customary 
norm, it would be beyond the scope of the present analysis to critically consider the different arguments 
presented by the States participating in the advisory proceedings and comment upon the accuracy of their 
position from other angles. 
97 The State submissions will be addressed in alphabetical order.
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not before the Written Comments that this concept was (implicitly) put forward and 
claimed to be applicable in the case at hand “given the massive human rights viola-
tions perpetrated and the systematical denial of the right to self-determination by 
the FRY/Serbia”.98 Initially, the Authors held the view that the question which was 
put before the Court in Resolution 63/3 could be answered “without passing upon 
whether the people of Kosovo were authorized by international law to exercise a right 
of self-determination by seeking independence”.99 It was only due to the many States 
which had touched upon this question that the Authors felt compelled to briefly deal 
with this issue as well, while in essence, they still considered it unnecessary.100 The 
Authors submitted that the Friendly Relations Declaration’s safeguard clause clearly:
recognizes that independence may be an appropriate choice in the case where a State 
does not conduct itself in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples. In those particular circumstances, the State concerned not only 
forfeits the benefit of the safeguard clause […], but also the right to invoke its sov-
ereignty against the will of a people deprived of its right of self-determination. As 
Professor Tomuschat put it: “Within a context where the individual citizen is more 
regarded as a simple object, international law must allow the members of a community 
suffering structural discrimination – amounting to grave prejudice affecting their lives 
– to strive for secession as a measure of last resort after all other methods employed to 
bring about change have failed.”101
In addition to these references to the Friendly Relations Declaration and an eminent 
scholar, the Authors briefly adduced the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
the Reference re Secession of Quebec, before they linked this support to the specific 
case of Kosovo.102 Considering the “decade of deliberate exclusion from governing 
institutions and violation of basic human rights, culminating, in 1998-1999, in mas-
sive crimes against humanity and war crimes”, it was concluded that the people of 
Kosovo were entitled to exercise their right to self-determination through declaring 
98 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion), Further Written Contribution of the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
(Kosovo), 17 July 2009, at para. 4.33.
99 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Written Contribution of the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Kosovo), 17 
April 2009, at para. 8.41. See also International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo 
(Request for Advisory Opinion), Further Written Contribution of the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence (Kosovo), 17 July 2009, at para. 4.31.
100 Ibid., at para. 4.32.
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independence form Serbia.103 The fact that there have been various developments on 
the territory from 1999 onwards does not alter this entitlement, as the new situation 
did not involve a substantial improvement as regards the right to self-determination 
for the people of Kosovo, so the Authors contended.104 In view of this and considering 
the “long but ultimately fruitless” negotiation process, they deemed the declaration of 
independence to be “a last recourse to effectively exercise their right”.105 
Being the kin-State of the Kosovo Albanian population, it may not come as a 
surprise that Albania claimed the existence of a right to remedial secession and its 
applicability in the case of Kosovo. In this respect, it observed that declarations of 
independence have traditionally been justified following oppression by the parent 
State.106 More specifically, Albania acknowledged a right to remedial secession by 
reference to the safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration and empha-
sized that: 
this paragraph clearly recognizes secession where no government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour 
exists.107 
Albania subsequently referred to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
and the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in the Reference re Secession of Quebec, 
in which a right of secession in case of oppression was clearly recognized, so it 
said.108 In its Written Comments, Albania additionally argued that legal literature con-
tains “strong support” for the existence of such a right to remedial secession, “though 
applicable under exceptional circumstances”.109 With respect to a right to remedial 
secession, Albania regarded Kosovo as a case in point in view of what it called the 
“institutionalized policy of repression and gross and widespread human rights vio-
lations against Kosovar Albanians”110 by the Serb authorities and the fact that “[a]ll 
possible means were used before the Kosovar authorities declared the independence 
103 Ibid., at para. 4.40. For an account of these past injustices, see also paras 3.29-3.58.
104 Ibid., at paras 4.50-4.52.
105 Ibid., at para. 4.52.
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107 Ibid., at para. 81.
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of the country”.111 From this, it follows that Albania recognized two general precondi-
tions for the exercise of an entitlement to remedial secession, i.e. a policy of repres-
sion and gross and widespread violations of human rights and the exhaustion of all 
options for a negotiated solution. 
Estonia also contended that “the application of the principle of self-determina-
tion can under certain circumstances lead to declaration of independence and to 
secession”.112 It clearly did not consider the right to self-determination to involve 
an unconditional right to secede unilaterally. Rather, Estonia stressed the point 
that “secession should normally not be considered and self-determination should 
be enjoyed inside the existing States. In some cases, however, self-determination 
may exceptionally legitimize secession”.113 According to Estonia, international law 
accepts an entitlement to unilateral secession for a subjugated group when two cumu-
lative conditions are fulfilled. First, there must be “suffering from a severe and long-
lasting refusal of internal self-determination by the State in which a group is living”, 
and secondly, all “other possible ways to resolve the situation must be exhausted”.114 
In other words, secession is seen as an ultima ratio means. While it found that the 
events in Kosovo met both conditions for the exercise of a right to secession, Estonia 
subsequently observed that the option to exercise such a right ceases to exist when 
the requirements are no longer satisfied. In this respect, it noted that one may contend 
“that since for several years in Kosovo there was no violence from the side of the Ser-
bian government, in 2008 the time had lapsed to make use of the right to secession”.115 
Nonetheless, Estonia submitted that following the oppression and atrocities, a pro-
tracted negotiation process was started, which sought to find a solution acceptable for 
both parties. Only when that process proved to be unsuccessful, could the possibility 
to use secession be considered as an ultima ratio means.116 Finally, Estonia found that 
the sui generis character of the case of Kosovo ultimately determined the legality of 
its unilateral secession.117 
While Finland acknowledged that “[i]n post-1945 law, self-determination 
is accompanied by a strong rule in favour of the territorial integrity of existing 
States”,118 it also argued that this latter principle is not absolute and may be pushed 
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aside under exceptional circumstances. In the opinion of Finland, this option was 
already expressed in the Åland Islands case and was subsequently reflected by the 
safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the decision of the Cana-
dian Supreme Court on the right of Quebec to secede unilaterally from Canada.119 In 
this respect, Finland observed:
The rationale invoked in these cases points to a distinction between normal situations 
and those of abnormality, or rupture, situations of revolution, war, alien subjugation 
or the absence of a meaningful prospect for a functioning internal self-determination 
regime.120
According to Finland, the situation of Kosovo could be regarded as ‘abnormal’ due to 
the concurrence of five factors: the violent break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, the unilateral changes in Kosovo’s constitutional status, the perse-
cution of the Kosovo Albanians in 1989-1999, the international recognition of the 
special nature of the situation through UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), 
and the failure by the Serb authorities to provide a credible framework for internal 
self-determination.121 Against this background, the legality of Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence was to be determined, Finland held. In this connection, it recalled 
the observation of the Commission of Rapporteurs in the Åland Islands case:
The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incorpora-
tion in another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a 
last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and 
effective guarantees.122
In the opinion of Finland, such a right to remedial secession applied to the situation 
of Kosovo. From its reasoning in the specific case of Kosovo, it follows that Finland 
considered two criteria to be relevant for the exercise of such a right in general, that 
is, the suppression of the right to (internal) self-determination and the absence of 
other realistic solutions.123 
Germany discussed its position concerning the legality of declarations of inde-
pendence, the right to self-determination and remedial secession at length. It first 
noted that: 
119 Ibid., at paras 7-8.
120 Ibid., at para. 9.
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[t]here is considerable authority for the proposition that a declaration of independence 
leading to a secession and secession itself are of an entirely factual nature and that 
international law in general is silent as to their legality.124
Germany referred to various expert opinions for the Supreme Court of Canada’s Ref-
erence re Secession of Quebec, such as those of James R. Crawford, Thomas M. 
Franck and Malcolm N. Shaw, to underpin this argument.125 Alternatively, Germany 
held that “given the very special situation of Kosovo, international law would not 
object to Kosovo’s independence”. Aware of the importance of the principle of ter-
ritorial integrity in this context and its vexed relationship with self-determination, 
Germany noted the relevance of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Helsinki 
Final Act. It asserted that: 
[i]t clearly emerges from both these documents that the principle of self-determination 
is recognized as being on the same level as, and by no means subservient to, the prin-
ciple of sovereignty, the sovereign equality and the territorial integrity of States.126
Against the backdrop of the distinction between the internal and external dimen-
sion of the right to self-determination, Germany argued in favour of a right to exter-
nal self-determination outside the colonial context. It found that the denial of such 
an entitlement would even render the right to internal self-determination futile in 
practice:
There would be no remedy for a group which is not granted self-determination that 
may be due to it under international law. The majority in the State could easily and with 
impunity oppress the minority, without any recourse being open to that minority.127
This is not to say, however, that Germany considered a right to secession to be a broad 
right which can be invoked by any group at any time. Without making reference to 
any specific sources, Germany concluded that while the right to self-determination 
should as a rule be exercised internally, the same right “may exceptionally legitimize 
secession if this can be shown to be the only remedy against a prolonged and rigor-
ous refusal of internal self-determination”.128 Thus, such an entitlement to remedial 
secession would merely come into play under the two criteria that were also stated 
in the submissions addressed above. Germany explained that although the condition 
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of “exceptionally severe and long-lasting refusal of internal self-determination” will 
usually go hand in hand with gross violations of human rights, it is the lack of inter-
nal self-determination which is decisive for the legality of secession, in combina-
tion with the requirement of ultimum remedium.129 As regards this latter condition, 
Germany stressed that although time has lapsed since the oppression and atrocities 
suffered by the Kosovo Albanian population, it would “be both illogic and unjust” to 
hold “that this lapse of time made the right of external self-determination disappear 
before it could even be used”. Thus, it seems that for Germany, there is no time factor 
involved in the requirement of unilateral secession being an ultimum remedium. The 
fact that the “very legacy of the conflict” makes other (less far-reaching) solutions 
of the conflict impossible would be sufficient to stand this test.130 All in all, Germany 
found that the case of Kosovo met the threshold for the lawful secession from Serbia. 
First, it held that the history of Kosovo represents an obvious example of “prolonged 
and severe repression and denial of all internal self-determination” and secondly, it 
considered it to be clear that “there have been negotiations in several formats over 
a considerable period of time”, but all remained fruitless. In consequence, Germany 
alleged that the route to external self-determination was open.131
Ireland commenced its submission by noting “that international law contains nei-
ther a general right nor a general prohibition on unilateral declarations of independ-
ence”. It adduced the writings of several authors and the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in its Reference re Secession of Quebec as providing support for this 
view.132 Despite the alleged neutrality, Ireland recognized that an attempt to secede 
unilaterally may be illegal in the case that the action constitutes a violation of per-
emptory norms of international law or when the UN Security Council declares the 
action illegal.133 Since both exceptions were not applicable to the case of Kosovo, its 
unilateral declaration of independence was not in violation of international law, Ire-
land submitted.134 Further or alternatively, Ireland asserted that Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence was not contrary to international law as it concerned the exercise 
of the right to self-determination following gross human rights violations. While it 
rejected the existence of a “unilateral right of secession by constituent parts of exist-
ing States”,135 Ireland contended that by way of an exception, a right to secession may 
be warranted under extreme circumstances. In this respect, reference was made to 
129 Ibid., at para. VI.2 (p. 35).
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the Åland Islands case and the judgment in the Reference re Secession of Quebec.136 
Ireland shared the view uttered in this latter ruling that such a qualified right to seces-
sion in the event of gross human rights violations “arises in only the most extreme of 
cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances” and as a remedy of last 
resort.137 More specifically, Ireland considered a right to secession: 
to arise “only when a people had been subject to such repression by the majority within 
a State that separation was the only feasible alternative”, or where a people is “dis-
criminated against in such a way that remaining in the State cannot be demanded any 
longer”.138 
According to Ireland, these elements are cumulative, thus requiring serious human 
rights violations to involve “an element of discrimination” and the absence of other 
remedies or feasible alternatives before a right to secession may arise.139 With respect 
to the case of Kosovo, Ireland found five factors to be of particular importance for 
judging the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence: the with-
drawal of Kosovo’s autonomy by the regime in Belgrade, the sustained period of 
international administration of the territory, the grave and extensive human rights 
violations by the Serb authorities, the desire for independence of 90 per cent of Kos-
ovo’s population and the non-existence of other remedies and realistic alternatives in 
view of the extensive international negotiation process.140 Considering these circum-
stances, Ireland concluded that the case of Kosovo constituted a “sui generis case 
representing an exercise of self-determination in the context of gross or fundamental 
human rights abuses”.141  
Being the first non-Western State expressing its support for the existence of a right 
to remedial secession, Jordan opposed the argument that the principle of territorial 
integrity is absolute and constitutes a barrier to external self-determination.142 Adduc-
ing the Friendly Relations Declaration’s safeguard clause, Jordan asserted that this 
paragraph implies that a State’s territorial integrity ceases to exist if a State violates 
the right to self-determination of its population. According to Jordan, this applied to 
the case of Kosovo: 
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When a State revokes the status of a territory as autonomous, denies its people their 
acquired right under such autonomy, engages in a policy of ethnic cleansing against 
such people, and commits grave breaches of international humanitarian law, systematic 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity against them, then such people’s 
right to self-determination has been violated by the State. And in such circumstances, 
that State can no longer claim a right of territorial integrity.143
Jordan found additional support for this restriction of the scope of territorial integrity 
in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and the ruling of the Canadian 
Supreme Court in the Reference re Secession of Quebec.144 This latter judgment ulti-
mately led Jordan to voice its support for a right to secession following the “total 
frustration of internal self-determination or blocking [of] its meaningful exercise” 
and “after all negotiating avenues were exhausted”.145 In view of the “consistent 
denial and revocation of the Kosovo’s people’s right to self-determination” and con-
sidering the exhaustion of “all negotiating avenues”, Jordan contended that in the 
case of Kosovo, this high threshold was certainly met.146
The Netherlands also expressed strong support for the right to remedial secession, 
but did so on grounds which deviate somewhat from the lines of reasoning presented 
above. Therefore, these pleadings will be dealt with at greater length. The Nether-
lands first submitted that “the right to political self-determination may evolve into a 
right to external self-determination in exceptional circumstances”.147 In this respect, 
it adduced an a contrario interpretation of the safeguard clause of the Friendly Rela-
tions Declaration as most of the other States also did. Yet, it is noteworthy that the 
Netherlands subsequently remarked that while “there is an abundance of literature on 
the law of self-determination” which certainly is informative, it did not consider it 
to be authoritative as “[t]he divergence of views in doctrine prevents, in our view, its 
use as a source of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the Court”.148 
Therefore, it asserted that in addition to treaty provisions, legal opinions and State 
practice on the matter needed to be examined.149 In this connection, the Netherlands 
explained why there are only few examples of lawful attempts at unilateral secession 
beyond situations concerning non-self-governing territories or foreign occupation. A 
first explanation is that the right to external self-determination beyond decolonization 
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developed only relatively recently, namely in the second half of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Secondly, since the conditions for the exercise of a right to secession are strict, 
situations in which such a right was claimed often failed to meet the threshold and 
therefore could not lawfully exercise a right to external self-determination. Yet, in the 
opinion of the Netherlands, the creation of Bangladesh and Croatia are examples of 
situations in which the international community has accepted the exercise of such a 
right.150 Furthermore, it is striking that the Netherlands founded part of its argument in 
favour of an entitlement to remedial secession on the doctrine of State responsibility 
and the definitions proposed in the respect by the International Law Commission.151 
More specifically, in the submissions of the Netherlands, it was argued that a denial 
of fundamental human rights and the absence of a government representing the whole 
population belonging to the territory amount to a violation of the right to self-deter-
mination, which constitutes a peremptory norm of international law.152 As the Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts prescribe, a “serious 
breach” of such a peremptory norm has particular consequences.153 According to the 
Netherlands, unilateral secession may be seen as such a consequence, provided that 
“all effective remedies […] have been exhausted to achieve a settlement”.154 Con-
sidering the events in Kosovo, it was argued that these two cumulative criteria were 
met in this specific case.155 First, a government representing the whole people of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was lacking and fundamental human 
rights in Kosovo were systematically denied.156 According to the Netherlands, this 
amounted to a “serious breach of the obligation to refrain from any forcible action 
which deprives peoples of their right to self-determination in Kosovo”.157 Secondly, 
it was submitted that all options to achieve a negotiated solution on Kosovo’s status 
were exhausted.158 In this connection, the Netherlands expressly noted that Kosovo’s 
right to remedial secession had not ceased as a result of the passage of time since the 
serious breach of the right to self-determination. Rather, 
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the time has been used to satisfy the procedural condition for the exercise of the right to 
external self-determination, namely the exhaustion of all effective remedies to achieve 
a settlement on the status of Kosovo.159
Finally, while acknowledging the controversy surrounding the right to external self-
determination and its application to the case of Kosovo, the Netherlands made a firm 
stand and submitted that Kosovo’s proclamation of independence was justified on the 
basis of the right to external self-determination.160
On the basis of the Friendly Relations Declaration, Poland discerned four groups 
of peoples entitled to the right to self-determination, including: 
people inhabiting states that infringe the right to self-determination and, thereby, being 
prevented form effective exercise of that right (which could, in particular, take the form 
of those people being represented in the host state’s government that would reflect, in a 
not discriminatory manner, the whole of a given state population).161
With respect to this category, Poland adduced that their right to self-determination 
may under particular circumstances be lawfully exercised through secession.162 As 
such, it accepted the existence of a remedial right to secession in situations of a State 
gravely violating the international human rights of the people inhabiting its terri-
tory, for instance by committing “genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and other massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law”.163 Moreover, 
Poland emphasized that an entitlement to remedial secession may only arise as an 
option of last resort to protect a people from the “wrongful acts” committed by the 
authorities of the State in which they live.164 In this connection, reference was made 
to the Friendly Relations Declaration, which, according to Poland reflected the idea 
that in certain circumstances, the right to self-determination is not subordinated by 
the principle of territorial integrity.165 While Poland did not further substantiate its 
claim for a right to remedial secession with references to other sources, it did deem 
Kosovo to be entitled to exercise such a right in view of the specific circumstances.166 
It emphasized that: 
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the exercise of the right to self-determination of Kosovo’s people in Serbia was not 
longer possible and unattainable. That conclusion is validated by the scale of violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law by Serbia. In such a situation Kosovo could 
legitimately exercise its remedial right of secession from Serbia in order to protect and 
preserve most fundamental rights and interests of its people. Therefore, the territorial 
integrity of Serbia – in the consequence of its own wrongful acts against Kosovo – 
eroded and was undermined already in 1999.167
Consequently, Poland argued that Serbia could no longer invoke the principle of 
respect for the territorial integrity of States as a shield against the exercise of a right 
to remedial secession by the people of Kosovo.168
The Russian Federation also voiced support for the existence of a right to reme-
dial secession. It noted that an attempt at secession, such as in the case of Kosovo, is 
“prima facie, contrary to the requirement of preserving the territorial integrity” of the 
parent State.169 In this context, the Russian Federation contended: 
that the principles of international law are to be applied in the light of each other, in a 
way that would produce a most harmonious interpretation of the various principles in 
a given situation.170
With regard to the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, it there-
fore adduced the safeguard clauses of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which, according to the Russian Fed-
eration, suggests that a State respecting the rights of the peoples on its territory enjoys 
the prerogative of territorial integrity. Moreover, by reference to the Supreme Court 
of Canada, it noted that the right to self-determination “has evolved within a frame-
work of respect for the territorial integrity of States” and that the internal exercise 
of this right is preferred.171 Nevertheless, the Russian Federation raised the question 
of whether the possibility of secession exists under particular circumstances.172 It 
acknowledged the existence of a right to remedial secession, albeit in extreme situa-
tions only, as was phrased by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Reference re Seces-
sion of Quebec.173 The Russian Federation therefore emphasized that it:
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is of the view that the primary purpose of the “safeguard clause” is to serve as a guar-
antee of territorial integrity of States. It is also true that the clause may be construed as 
authorizing secession under certain conditions. However, those conditions should be 
limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright attack by the parent State, 
threatening the very existence of the people in question. Otherwise, all efforts should 
be taken in order to settle the tension between the parent State and the ethnic commu-
nity concerned within the framework of the existing State.174 
Thus, while acknowledging that secession may only be warranted in exceptional situ-
ations and that it is a remedy of last resort, it is to be noted that the Russian Federation 
did not consider the denial of internal self-determination to be a precondition for the 
exercise of a right to remedial secession. On the basis of the criteria adduced to the 
case of Kosovo, it was concluded that no right to remedial secession was warranted 
at the moment Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was issued. Although 
the Russian Federation even questioned whether such an entitlement had emerged 
in the 1990s, it assertively found that the situation in 2008 had improved to such an 
extent that it could by no means be qualified as ‘extreme circumstances’ triggering a 
right to remedial secession.175
Slovenia accepted the existence of a right to remedial secession rather implic-
itly. Not only did it refrain from naming the concept of remedial secession, it also 
remained obscure which conditions Slovenia considered to be applicable in this 
respect and on which particular sources or developments in practice it founded its 
argument. In its submissions, Slovenia primarily focused on the correlation between 
the peoples’ right to self-determination on the one hand, and the principle of respect 
for the territorial integrity of States on the other. In doing so, it contended that the 
latter principle is not absolute and must even be earned by the State. Slovenia recalled 
that over recent decades, the right to self-determination has evolved and “has been 
given precedence over the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States”.176 
More specifically, it held that: 
[i]f a State does not respect the right to self-determination and its government does 
not enjoy representativity or if the latter is lost, it cannot count on having its territorial 
integrity assured. In such circumstances, demand for independent statehood to the dis-
advantage of territorial integrity of a common State might be the only way to realize 
the right to free determination of political status of people forming part of the popula-
tion of the common State […].177
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For these reasons, Slovenia stressed the importance of the specific circumstances of 
each case in considering whether a right to external self-determination may arise.178 
As such, it might be argued that Slovenia acknowledged the existence of a right to 
remedial secession, albeit in not so many words. Nevertheless, it did not consider the 
possible applicability of such an entitlement with respect to the situation in Kosovo, 
as a result of which Slovenia’s true intentions may be questioned. 
Being the last State uttering its support for the existence of a right to remedial 
secession under contemporary international law, Switzerland first observed that 
“[t]he actual extent of the right to self-determination remains a matter of dispute”.179 
In this connection, it plainly posed that: 
a States territorial integrity is not protected to an unlimited extent if its government 
does not represent the whole population, arbitrarily practices discrimination against 
certain groups, and thus clearly violates the right of peoples to self-determination.180 
According to Switzerland, in such situations, an attempt at unilateral secession by a 
people comprising a part of the population of the territory may be in conformity with 
the principle of territorial integrity and international law in general.181 Switzerland 
substantiated its argument by referring to the Åland Islands case and the ruling of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in its Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which the right 
of a people to secede unilaterally was not ruled out.182 Moreover, Switzerland noted 
that “prevailing doctrine” also acknowledged such an entitlement by way of excep-
tion and shared this view.183 In sum, it voiced the following opinion:
respect for territorial integrity is undoubtedly an important principle of international 
law. However, it is not isolated from other fundamental principles of international law, 
and in particular it cannot be called on for the purpose of excluding a right to seces-
sion under all circumstances. A right to secession based on the right of peoples to 
self-determination can exist, but may only be exercised in exceptional circumstances, 
when all other means of exercising the right to self-determination have failed or have 
to be regarded as futile due to grave and systematic violations of human rights. In 
other words, the proclamation of an independent State distinct form the former must 
remain a solution of last resort in order for a population to be able to exercise its right 
to self-determination internally, and enjoy the human rights and the rights of members 
Opinion), Written Comments of Slovenia, 17 July 2009, at para. 8.
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of minorities that are guaranteed by international law. In such extreme situations, the 
right of a people to separate itself from a State through a unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence has to be defined as an ultima ratio solution.184
Thus, Switzerland accepted the existence of a right to remedial secession under excep-
tional circumstances and only “after the exhaustion of all possible avenues aiming to 
restore a situation in which human rights are respected, including the right to inter-
nal self-determination”.185 Based on these theoretical views, Switzerland concluded 
that the strict conditions for a right to remedial secession were fulfilled in the case of 
Kosovo: the people of Kosovo had a right to self-determination, it had suffered from 
grave and systematic violations of human rights, and independent statehood through 
unilateral secession was the last resort option for this people to exercise its right to 
self-determination.186 In this respect, Switzerland did not consider the lapse of time 
and the improved circumstances on the territory to raise a barrier for a right to reme-
dial secession. For, the declaration of independence was issued “once it had become 
clear that the process that had been pursued since 10 June 1999 […] could not come 
to a consensual solution”.187
3.1.2.1.2. Recapitulation
All in all, it can be concluded that, in addition to the Authors of the declaration of 
independence, eleven States have expressed their support for the existence of a reme-
dial right to unilateral secession under contemporary international law and its appli-
cability to the case of Kosovo. Most of them have done so by actually naming the 
concept of remedial secession. Moreover, the States concerned generally substanti-
ated their claims by adducing the safeguard clauses of the Friendly Relations Dec-
laration and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the decisions in the 
Åland Islands case and the relevant paragraphs of the ruling of the Canadian Supreme 
Court in its Reference re Secession of Quebec. The interpretations by the various 
States of these particular sources were, on the whole, similar. In addition, a few States 
also referred to scholarly literature, albeit generally without specifying which writ-
ings they deemed relevant in this respect. What is also striking is that virtually no 
184 Ibid., at para. 67 (emphasis original).
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State claimed that the existence of a right to remedial secession is rooted in practice. 
Even where this was asserted, the validity of this claim was hardly underpinned. For 
example, in the submissions of the Netherlands, it was held that the establishment of 
Bangladesh and Croatia can be seen as cases in point, yet without further explanation. 
From the very limited number of references to practice, it may be deduced that States 
do not consider international practice to provide for strong support for the existence 
of a right to remedial secession, possibly even due to the (presumed) absence of State 
practice which is both relevant and sound in this respect. 
Whatever the accuracy of the arguments addressed above, from the written and 
oral pleadings of States supporting a right to remedial secession, it further becomes 
clear that a general or automatic right to secession for peoples is out of the question. 
Rather, this concept is commonly regarded as a qualified right which may emerge 
under exceptional circumstances only. While the (number of) conditions for the exer-
cise of this right and the formulations put forward in the State submissions differ to 
a certain extent, they may be reduced to at least two cumulative prerequisites – one 
being substantive and the other being procedural. The substantive requirement is that 
the people at issue suffer from a persistent refusal of internal self-determination by 
the central authorities of the State in which the group is living. The presence of gross 
human rights violations is viewed either as an expression – if not the ultimate expres-
sion – of this denial of internal self-determination, or as an additional requirement. 
Once it is established that the substantive prerequisite is met, the procedural element 
requires that any other viable peaceful options to resolve the situation are absent, i.e. 
remedial secession operates as an ultimum remedium. 
There appears to be disagreement, however, on whether there would be a kind of 
time factor included in the prerequisites for remedial secession. On the one hand, a 
couple of States seemed to imply that the passage of time may have a negative effect 
on the existence of a right to remedial secession in a particular case: the possibility 
of unilateral secession would be excluded as soon as the human rights violations and 
oppression of the people concerned has ended, as that would arguably mean that the 
criteria for a right to remedial secession are no longer fulfilled. On the other hand, 
some other States did not consider the elapse of time to be problematic in this respect. 
To put it even more strongly, it was argued by the Netherlands that the passage of 
time may contribute to the fulfilment of the procedural condition for the exercise of a 
right to remedial secession, which is the requirement of the exhaustion of all effective 
and realistic remedies to settle the conflict. Put differently, it may be contended that 
a certain period of time needs to go by before one can conclude that all effective and 
realistic remedies have indeed been exhausted and there is no prospect for a negoti-
ated settlement. All in all, it seems that there is too much divergence on the question 
of a time factor to draw clear conclusions in this respect. 
The conditions outlined above and the specific circumstances in Kosovo up to 
the adoption of its declaration of independence has led most States under the present 
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category to conclude that the case of Kosovo meets the requirements of a right to 
remedial secession. They generally contended that the oppression of the Kosovo 
Albanian population during the 1990s combined with the absence of any prospect to 
the exercise of meaningful self-determination within the framework of the existing 
State – despite sustained negotiations on the international level – gave rise to such a 
right. In this respect, Estonia, Finland and Ireland referred to the exceptional nature 
of the situation as being ‘abnormal’ or ‘sui generis’. Only two States, i.e. Russia and 
Slovenia, concluded that the conditions for a right to remedial secession were not met 
in the specific circumstances of the case of Kosovo. 
The support for the existence of a right to remedial secession as discussed above 
needs to be weighed against the submissions of States which did not hold the same 
opinion on this matter. For this purpose, the following sub-section will address the 
opposition to the existence of an entitlement to remedial secession as voiced during 
the advisory proceedings.
3.1.2.2. Opposition to the Existence of a Right to Remedial Secession
While there has been a non-negligible body of support for the existence of a right 
to remedial secession under contemporary law, the majority of State submissions 
did oppose this outlook during the advisory proceedings before the Court, including 
the submissions of Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, China, 
Cyprus, Egypt, France, Iran, Japan, Libya, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela and Vietnam. In general, 
it is possible to discern two broad lines of arguments explicitly opposing a right to 
remedial secession: the alleged lack of evidence for the existence of such a right 
under positive international law, and the prioritization of the principle of respect for 
the territorial integrity of States over the exercise of the peoples’ right to self-deter-
mination. Some States have concentrated on either of these two lines of reasoning, 
while others have combined both arguments in their pleadings. Besides these two 
broad lines of argument, a third yet minor reasoning may be discerned which touches 
upon the perceived neutrality of international law as regards attempts to secede. The 
observations which are most illuminating for the various lines of argument will be 
discussed below. 
3.1.2.2.1. Views and Arguments Opposing the Existence of a Right to Remedial 
Secession
Argentina’s submissions may be addressed here first, as they combine both lines of 
arguments opposing the existence of a right to remedial secession: they prioritized 
the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States and argued that there is no 
support for an entitlement to remedial secession under positive international law. As 
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to the first argument, Argentina alleged that the principle of respect for the territorial 
integrity of States is a principle firmly founded in international law, which is essen-
tial for upholding the international legal system.188 In this regard, Argentina consid-
ered the principle of territorial integrity to apply “not only to States and international 
organisations, but also to other international actors, particularly those involved in 
internal conflict threatening international peace and security”.189 It asserted that vari-
ous UN Security Council resolutions in the context of internal conflicts or attempts at 
secession show evidence of this broad scope of application of the principle of respect 
for territorial integrity. For, these resolutions – for instance concerning the situa-
tions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Georgia and Sudan – call upon 
both State and non-State entities to comply with this principle.190 With respect to the 
second line of reasoning, Argentina submitted that the theory of remedial secession 
“is nothing more than an argument made in doctrine, and which has not received 
any legal consecration”. In this respect, it recalled the Supreme Court of Canada, 
which had noted that it remains questionable whether the concept of remedial seces-
sion “actually reflects an established international law standard”.191 Argentina sub-
sequently held that while the safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration 
has been interpreted a contrario as legitimizing unilateral secession where the State 
lacks a government representing the whole people of the territory, “[i]t has never 
been interpreted in such a way by any competent body”. Moreover, Argentina found 
that neither the travaux préparatoires nor practice permits such an inverted interpre-
tation.192 It therefore concluded that this doctrinal interpretation is flawed and that 
the right to self-determination of peoples does not provide support for an entitlement 
to unilateral secession.193 Unfortunately, Argentina did not further elaborate on this 
argument. Based on inter alia the views expounded above and having considered the 
specific circumstances in the case of Kosovo, Argentina concluded that Kosovo’s uni-
lateral declaration of independence was not in accordance with international law.194
In a similar vein, China combined two lines of reasoning. China commenced 
its plea by stressing the point that the “right of self-determination recognized by 
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international law has its specially defined content and scope of application”. It 
observed that the situations in which the right to self-determination was exercised 
either involved situations concerning the colonial context, alien subjugation or for-
eign occupation, or were endorsed by the General Assembly, Security Council or 
International Court of Justice.195 Beyond such situations, the exercise of a right to 
(external) self-determination is more controversial. While some States have invoked 
a right to remedial secession, China pointed out that it did “not believe there is such 
a right under international law”.196 Three arguments were presented to substantiate 
this position. China’s first and third arguments concerned the lack of proof for the 
existence of a right to remedial secession. China first held that the travaux prépara-
toires of the Friendly Relations Declaration disclose that the purpose of the safeguard 
clause was to ensure the respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States 
rather than granting a “remedial right” to ethnic groups thus encouraging those sub-
State entities to attempt to secede unilaterally.197 Further, China argued that the a con-
trario interpretation of the Friendly Relations Declaration’s safeguard clause: 
contravenes the objective and purpose of the Friendly Relations Declaration. Up to this 
day, no authoritative international legal bodies have ever adopted such a reading. No 
support can be found either in State practice or opinio juris for such an alleged right 
under customary international law.198
In essence, China’s second argument involved the prevalence of the principle of ter-
ritorial integrity over the right to self-determination. It contended that an entitlement 
to remedial secession is incompatible with the principles of State sovereignty and 
respect for territorial integrity. In this respect, it found that “if such a claim were 
permitted under international law, as it concerns the fundamental interests of States, 
there should have been positive and explicit provisions to that effect”.199 Since such 
a provision is lacking under international law, the principles of sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity prevail over a purported right to unilateral secession. Bearing this 
in mind, and having assessed UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999),200 China 
was of the opinion that the unilateral declaration of Kosovo was not in accordance 
with international law.
Cyprus adduced similar arguments, contending that there is insufficient proof for 
the present-day acknowledgement of a right to remedial secession. In this respect, it 
195 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
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first noted that an alleged right to remedial secession is sometimes inferred from an 
inverted reading of the safeguard clauses of the Friendly Relations Declaration and 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.201 Cyprus made out a case against 
this interpretation:
First, such a major right as this would require a positive source, rather than a mere a 
contrario reasoning. Second, the overwhelming majority of States participating in the 
drafting of the Declaration did not agree that peoples might have a right of secession 
from an existing State. Third, the provision refers back to the right of self-determina-
tion as set out in the 1960 Declaration, which, as we have noted, largely to colonial 
situations and does not refer to minorities within a State. Fourth, even if the provision 
does not rule out secession there are plenty of international principles that do […]. In 
short, the provision does not recognize a right to secession. On the contrary, and at the 
most, it affirms the right of internal self-determination.202
While acknowledging that the claim that a remedial right to secession does exist has 
found some support in scholarly writings and in the abovementioned a contrario 
interpretation, Cyprus contended that such a claim is not reflected in State practice.203 
In this regard, it made reference to the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which it was concluded that it remains ques-
tionable whether the concept of remedial secession “actually reflects an established 
international law standard”.204 Moreover, it recalled the attempted secessions from 
Georgia by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were generally criticized as being 
violations of the principle of territorial integrity rather than viewed as examples of 
the lawful exercise of an entitlement to secession.205 Further, Cyprus rejected the 
case of Bangladesh as supporting a claim of remedial secession.206 All in all, Cyprus 
concluded that there is no right to secession as a last resort under contemporary inter-
national law. Having considered the relevant circumstances and applicable lex spe-
cialis, Cyprus accordingly submitted that the declaration of independence of Kosovo 
was inconsistent with international law.207 
Romania’s arguments opposing the existence of a right to remedial secession are 
illustrative for the present purposes as well. In its pleadings, it recognized that:
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there is a constant need and endless search for a balanced solution between the princi-
ples of sovereignty and territorial integrity, on the one hand, and the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, on the other.208
Bearing in mind this balancing exercise, Romania observed that doctrine has formu-
lated the concept of remedial secession, which applies to “parts of existing States in 
exceptional circumstances, in case those specific parts are denied a meaningful exer-
cise of the right to self-determination”.209 In this respect, it noted that various sources 
have been adduced as supporting the theory of remedial secession, such as the safe-
guard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the case on the secession of Quebec. Nevertheless, Romania 
argued that the theory of remedial secession “is not yet fully established in interna-
tional law and is still wanting of meaningful State practice”.210 During its oral plead-
ings before the Court, Romania reiterated this position and adduced the: 
continuing uncertainty in doctrine and case law as to the existence and scope of an 
exception to the rule concerning application of the principle of self-determination in 
the case of existing States.211
According to Romania, most authors still hold that a right to remedial secession “does 
not form part of international law as it stands”.212 It is noteworthy that, despite its 
rejection of the present-day existence of an entitlement to remedial secession, Roma-
nia subsequently set out the theory as formulated in literature and applied this to the 
case of Kosovo. In this respect, it came to the conclusion that Kosovo did not meet the 
requirements of the theory of remedial secession when it declared independence.213 
Unsurprisingly, Serbia opposed the existence of a right to remedial secession in its 
submissions before the Court, as this position is obviously tailored to its own interests 
and aimed at self-preservation. Nevertheless, the arguments it set out to explain what 
it called “the flawed character of the purported justification of so-called ‘remedial 
secession’” deserve to be addressed here due to their specificity. First, Serbia sought 
to demonstrate that the safeguard clause “is part of a firm practice of guaranteeing the 
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preservation of the political unity and territorial integrity of independent States”.214 
For this purpose, it referred to paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 (XV) and analysed the 
safeguard clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration. Serbia held that the inclusion 
of this clause stemmed from the wish of various States to make explicit reference 
to the respect for the territorial integrity of States in connection to the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.215 Moreover, it advanced that both the 
safeguard clause and the relevant paragraph of Resolution 1514 (XV) exemplify an 
established practice of emphasizing the territorial integrity of States. In this respect, 
it referred to the international responses to the secessionist attempts by Katanga and 
Biafra.216 Apart from the argument set out above, Serbia adduced a second argument, 
contending that an a contrario interpretation of the Friendly Relations Declaration’s 
safeguard clause is not corroborated by “the terms of the paragraph, its context, its 
object and purpose, the travaux préparatoires and subsequent practice”.217 As Serbia 
alleged, 
[t]hose who read the safeguard clause as recognizing “remedial secession” adopt an 
erroneous interpretation of General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) by reading the 
paragraph backwards and implying a meaning that is not present in the text. The Dec-
laration on Principles of International Law contains a positive statement: that there 
must be respect for the political unity and the territorial integrity of “States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples”. It does not say that “States that do not conduct themselves in compliance 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples could be the object 
of an action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, their territorial integrity 
or political unity”.218
An inverted reading of the safeguard clause is not only incompatible with a good faith 
interpretation of that paragraph, in addition, such reading conflicts with what follows 
from the travaux préparatoires, so Serbia stated. From these preparatory works, it 
follows that the safeguard clause was not intended to amend the scope of the princi-
ple. Rather, its purpose was “to expressly state or reaffirm something clearly, in order 
to avoid confusion or an incorrect interpretation of this right at issue”.219 Put differ-
ently, according to Serbia, the safeguard clause was intended to safeguard the territo-
rial integrity and political unity of States in relation to the principle of equal rights 
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and self-determination of peoples, and not to provide for an entitlement to secession 
under circumstances.220 In addition, Serbia argued that an a contrario interpretation 
of the Friendly Relations Declaration’s safeguard clause is not supported by State 
practice either:
To date there has not been a single instance where a State has been successfully created 
by the secession of territory from an existing State in circumstances where the seces-
sion was officially justified on the basis of the exercise of the right to self-determina-
tion by “remedial secession”.221 
While the cases of Bangladesh and Eritrea are sometimes adduced as successful 
examples of remedial secession, Serbia held that these cannot be regarded as such 
due to the consent of the parent States.222 In its Written Comments, Serbia subse-
quently sought to refute the arguments adduced by those States supporting a right to 
remedial secession.223 In sum, Serbia was of the firm opinion that: 
[t]hose States advancing the “remedial secession” doctrine have been unable to justify 
their position in legal terms, and have simply taken the doctrine for granted and have 
failed to explain how this doctrine forms part of positive international law. The simple 
reason for this is that it does not.224
Yet, even when assuming that a right to remedial secession does exist under inter-
national law, it would not be applicable to the case of Kosovo since the alleged 
requirements for such a right were no met, so it was argued. First, Serbia viewed 
the Kosovo Albanians not to constitute a ‘people’ entitled to self-determination.225 
Secondly, Serbia found that as the Kosovo Albanian population decided to create its 
own governmental institutions within Serbia, parallel to the apparatus at the central 
level, their right to internal self-determination could not be considered to have been 
violated by Serbia.226 
A similar view regarding the lack of evidence for a right to remedial secession 
under positive international law was – albeit less extensively – presented by Azerbai-
jan. This State adduced that there is no evidence that contemporary international law 
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acknowledges a right to secession by way of sanction or remedy. It held that support 
for this stance was found in “both the textual analysis of the existing provisions on 
territorial integrity and self-determination and [in] State practice demonstrating the 
absence of any successful application of the so-called ‘remedial secession’”.227 While 
it did not refer to the Friendly Relations Declaration explicitly, it seems that Azerbai-
jan rejected an a contrario interpretation of the safeguard clause in this document. 
In view of this, Azerbaijan noted that “one should be seriously concerned about the 
attempted unilateral solution of the Kosovo problem through the declaration of inde-
pendence by its Provisional Institutions of Self-Government”.228 
A number of other States have principally focused on the argument concerning 
the incompatibility of an entitlement to secession – whether remedial or not – with 
the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States. While this argument was 
generally substantiated less extensively in the submissions before the Court than the 
argument concerning the lack of evidence for a right to remedial secession under 
positive international law, some States have elaborated on this particular position as 
well. Spain, for instance, asserted that “international law has not recognized a general 
right of peoples unilaterally to declare secession from a State”229 and emphasized the 
fundamental and absolute character of the principle of respect for State sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. After an analysis of the relevant provisions of the UN Charter 
and the Friendly Relations Declaration, Spain stated that this principle is part of what 
it called the “essential, non-derogable core of the basic principles of international 
law” as recorded in these documents.230 In addition, Spain recalled the acknowledge-
ment of sovereignty and territorial integrity as fundamental principles of the inter-
national system as stated in other international instruments, such as the Helsinki Final 
Act, the Charter of Paris and the Treaty of the European Union.231 Subsequently, it 
made reference to the practice of the Security Council, in the context of internal 
armed conflicts during which serious breaches of human rights and humanitarian 
law were committed by the parties involved.232 Spain found that “the Security Coun-
cil has repeatedly and constantly maintained a position of unequivocal support and 
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respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State”.233 In this connection, 
it emphasized that: 
secessionist tensions, the ethnic and religious dimension of some of the serious viola-
tions of human rights against the civilian population committed during the mentioned 
conflicts, or even the intervention of the International Criminal Court and other inter-
national tribunals in these internal armed conflicts, all these have not altered the firm 
practice of the Security Council aimed at preserving the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the States concerned.234
In view of the strong support for the principle of respect for sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity of States, both in theory and in practice, Spain held that this principle 
cannot be “subservient to the exercise of an alleged right to self-determination exer-
cised via a unilateral act”.235 In its Written Comments, Spain further elaborated on its 
position regarding the right to self-determination of peoples. In this respect, it noted 
that this right can be exercised through a variety of ways and should not simply be 
equated with independence.236 In the specific case of Kosovo, Spain considered the 
right to self-determination to have been guaranteed internally, i.e. through the estab-
lishment of the international administration regime on the territory which guarantees 
a system of self-governance for Kosovo. Therefore, 
[b]earing in mind this remedy fashioned by the international community in 1999, 
Spain considers that no other form of reaction or remedy is legally defensible, much 
less so through the secession-as-sanction or secession-as-remedy formulas, which […] 
have no proper basis in international law, this being of particular bearing on the case 
of Kosovo.237
Strongly emphasizing the principle of territorial integrity, Iran argued that even in the 
case of large-scale violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the territorial 
integrity of States is to be observed and has always been observed in comparable situ-
ations. In this connection, Iran made reference to several resolutions of the UN Secu-
rity Council in which the principle of territorial integrity was upheld. Thus, for Iran, 
the right to self-determination for minorities is an internal one and means their entitle-
ment to democracy and human rights and does not involve any right to secession. This 
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means that the right of self-determination is not a principle of exclusion or separation 
but a principle of inclusion.238 
From this, it may be deduced that Iran considered the unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence of Kosovo to infringe the territorial integrity of Serbia rather than to be 
an expression of the right to self-determination of the Kosovo Albanian popula-
tion.  
Likewise, in the opinion of Venezuela, the principle of respect for the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of States is absolute. It asserted that it is clear from the 
Friendly Relations Declaration “that the right of peoples to self-determination cannot 
go against the territorial integrity of sovereign States”.239 Therefore, minorities within 
a State can merely exercise their right to self-determination internally, not externally 
through unilateral secession.240 According to Venezuela, such external self-determi-
nation may only be exercised by territories which have been “subject to a regime of 
colonization” or are independent republics. Obviously, these conditions were not met 
in the case of Kosovo.241 Thus, as the right to self-determination could not provide for 
a lawful basis for Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and this attempt at 
secession violated Serbia’s territorial integrity, Venezuela considered it to constitute 
a breach of international law.242 
In addition to the two (principal) lines of argument set forth above, a third line 
of argument may be discerned. A few States expressed their opposition to the exist-
ence of a legal entitlement to remedial secession in less unequivocal terms, adducing 
what may be called the ‘legal neutrality argument’. In this context, the submissions 
of Burundi, the Czech Republic, France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
may be mentioned. According to these States, international law remains ‘neutral’ as 
regards the issue of secession as it does neither explicitly permit, nor explicitly pro-
hibit it. Under this view, an attempt to secede through a declaration of independence 
is considered to be a matter of fact rather than of law. As the Czech Republic aptly 
summarized this line of argument:
[i]t is widely recognized in doctrine that contemporary international law does not know 
any rule prohibiting a declaration of independence or, more generally, a secession. 
International law neither prohibits nor promotes secession; it does, however, take new 
238 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Written Statement of Iran, 17 April 2009, at para. 4.1.
239 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Oral Statement of Venezuela (Fleming), CR 2009/33, 11 December 2009, at para. 22.
240 Ibid., at para. 25.
241 Ibid., at para. 26.
242 Ibid., at paras 38-40.
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factual situations into account and accepts the political reality of a successful seces-
sion. In that sense, secession is considered “a legally neutral act the consequences of 
which are regulated internationally”.243
Similar views were presented by Burundi,244 France245 and the United Kingdom.246 
The United States likewise referred to the neutrality of international law towards situ-
ations concerning attempts to secede through declarations of independence. It noted 
that international law does not regulate those situations,247 save those cases in which 
international law becomes relevant due to the specific circumstances which amount 
to a violation of a peremptory norm of jus cogens. Examples in this respect are the 
establishment of an apartheid regime through the declaration of independence, or 
cases in which the attempt at secession involves the threat or use of armed force by 
a third State.248 While sharing the viewpoint that international law “does not regu-
late the creation of states as regards the exercise of the right to self-determination”, 
Burundi went one step further and argued that violations of peremptory norms still 
have: 
243 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Written Statement of the Czech Republic, 14 April 2009, at p. 7 (emphasis added).
244 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Oral Statement of Burundi (Barankitse), CR 2009/28, 4 December 2009, at para. 2.1.2: “The crea-
tion of a State is a matter of fact and cannot be the object of a judgment of validity”.
245 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Written Statement of France, 7 April 2009, at para. 2.8: “[W]hile is entirely clear that there is no 
right to secession in international law, it is equally apparent that international law does not prohibit seces-
sion, nor, consequently, a declaration of independence by part of a State’s population”.
246 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion), Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 17 April 2009, at para. 5.13: “It is not surpris-
ing that existing States have generally felt an aversion to secession. This aversion has sometimes led 
them to adopt language suggesting the unlawfulness of secession as a matter of international law. Of 
course attempts at secession may well – as already noted – be contrary to the municipal law of the State 
concerned. […] But, from the standpoint of international law there was, and is, no prohibition per se of 
secession”.
247 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion), Written Comments of the United States of America, 17 July 2009, at p. 13: “It is true that the 
international community is very cautious about secessionist attempts, especially when the situation is 
such that threats to international peace and security are manifest. Nevertheless, as a matter of law the 
international system neither authorises nor condemns such attempts, but rather stands neutral. Secession 




no consequence as regards validity, only as regards responsibility, for example with 
respect to the obligation not to recognize […]. This is confirmed by practice, as the 
case of Rhodesia illustrates. Moreover, it is because international law does not validate 
the creation of States that secessions are almost always regarded, in doctrine, as pure 
questions of fact which are not subject to any judgment of validity as regards inter-
national law.249
Notwithstanding their subtle distinctions, as in the views of the aforementioned 
States, international law is considered to neither authorize nor proscribe secession, 
their ‘legal neutrality argument’ is tantamount to the implicit rejection of the exist-
ence of a positive right to remedial secession. Therefore, it is classified under this 
heading. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in contrast to the States which had explic-
itly opposed such a right, these States eventually concluded that Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence and accompanying attempt to secede was not in violation of inter-
national law.250 For, viewed at from this perspective, international law is generally 
considered to stand aloof in this respect.
3.1.2.2.2. Recapitulation
To sum up, two principal lines of argument were presented in the submissions oppos-
ing a right to remedial secession. With respect to the argument concerning the pur-
ported shortage of proof for the existence of a right to remedial secession under 
positive international law, the a contrario interpretation of the Friendly Relations 
Declaration’s safeguard clause was primarily criticized on the basis of various well-
established interpretation methods, thus considering the terms of the clause, its con-
text, object and purpose, and drafting history. Moreover, the absence of State practice 
supporting the theory of remedial secession was put forward as an argument for repu-
diating the existence of such an entitlement. It was contended that there have been 
no instances in which a State was either successfully established through unilateral 
249 International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opin-
ion), Oral Statement of Burundi (Barankitse), CR 2009/28, 4 December 2009, at para. 2.1.2.
250 See International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declar-
ation of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advi-
sory Opinion), Written Statement of the Czech Republic, 14 April 2009, at p. 12; International Court of 
Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provi-
sional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), Written Statement of 
France, 7 April 2009, at para. 2.82; International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo 
(Request for Advisory Opinion), Written Statement of the United Kingdom, 17 April 2009, at para. 6.72; 
International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), 
Written Statement of the United States of America, 17 April 2009, at p. 90.
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secession which was justified on the basis of a right to remedial secession, or attempts 
at unilateral secession which remained unsuccessful due to the fact that the situation 
did not meet the requirements of a (perceived) right to remedial secession. 
The argument regarding the prevalence or even absolute character of the prin-
ciple of respect for the territorial integrity of States over the right to self-determi-
nation of peoples was generally substantiated less extensively. Nevertheless, those 
States which explained their argument did so by reference to the various documents 
in which the principle of territorial integrity is firmly established (e.g. the UN Char-
ter and the Friendly Relations Declaration) and the fundamental nature and status of 
the principle within the international (legal) system. Moreover, a couple of States 
adduced the practice of the UN Security Council, which has clearly and consistently 
established and preserved the territorial integrity of States so far, even in the context 
of internal and secessionist conflicts. As such, the view that the principle of respect 
for the territorial integrity is merely applicable to the relationships between States 
was brushed aside. Argentina, for example, expressly argued that this fundamental 
principle is also applicable to international actors other than States. 
In addition, a distinct yet minor line of argument was presented by a few States 
claiming the neutrality of international law vis-à-vis attempts to secede. Since inter-
national law neither expressly prohibits nor expressly permits secession, these States 
contended that international law remains ‘neutral’ towards the matter. This argument 
boils down to the implied denial of any right to remedial secession under contempo-
rary international law. 
On a general level, the arguments presented by the States in the present (i.e. 
second) category provided for a substantial counterweight against the position that a 
right to remedial secession does exist. With respect to the specific case of Kosovo, the 
arguments rejecting the existence of a right to remedial secession as set out above led 
most States in this class to designate Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
and its attempt to secede as a violation of international law. 
3.1.3. Conclusions on the International Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence
This sub-section was devoted to a study of the international responses to Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence with a view to examining the emergence of a 
customary right to remedial secession. To this end, the general responses of States 
were explored first. It was seen that the debates in the UN Security Council and Gen-
eral Assembly as well as the recognition texts overall did not disclose support for the 
existence of a right to remedial secession. Hardly any reference to the right to (exter-
nal) self-determination was made and where this was done, it was done so only very 
summarily. Rather, the statements presented generally reflected an unaltered strong 
adherence to the traditional prerogatives of States, such as State sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity, and stressed the need for a negotiated solution, thereby ruling out 
Chapter VI
274
attempts at unilateral secession. Moreover, it was seen that States were primarily gov-
erned by political considerations rather than legal motives. Most States expected (the 
recognition of) a sovereign and independent Kosovo to promote and preserve peace 
and stability in the Balkans, and did not adduce an alleged right to self-determination 
or remedial secession as justification for their decision to recognize Kosovo. Thus, 
instead of revealing the acknowledgement of a right to remedial secession, the gen-
eral responses to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence seem to reflect the 
traditional interpretation of the right to self-determination, within which the West-
phalian concepts of State sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of States 
take precedence and the consent of the parent State is needed for secession to become 
permissible. 
In contrast to these general responses, the written and oral proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
demonstrated that there actually is some support for the thesis of remedial secession 
amongst States. Such a right has been clearly advocated by the Authors of the declar-
ation of independence and by eleven States. They contended that contemporary inter-
national law acknowledges an entitlement to remedial secession on the basis of an a 
contrario interpretation of the safeguard clauses included in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration and Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Åland Islands 
case and the ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court in its well-known Reference re 
Secession of Quebec, and some support in scholarly literature. These States argued 
that it follows from these sources that such a right to unilateral secession is warranted 
as ultimum remedium in cases where the central authorities of the State deny a people 
their right to internal self-determination. By contrast, other States rejected the pres-
ence of a right to remedial secession under positive international law. They generally 
did so on the basis of a purported lack of evidence for such a right and/or the sup-
posed predominance of the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States. 
Only a few States implicitly opposed the existence of a right to remedial secession by 
claiming the neutrality of international law towards the issue of secession.
Whatever the appraisal of the lines of arguments set out above, it should be noted 
that the positions of some States may be motivated by their own (geo-political) inter-
ests. A considerable number of States opposing the existence of a right to remedial 
secession were States which are dealing with secessionist entities on their respec-
tive territories as well. Examples in this respect are Argentina (Falkland Islands), 
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabach), China (Taiwan, Tibet), Cyprus (Northern Cyprus) 
and Spain (Basque Country, Catalonia). As such, it may well be that their positions 
are motivated by self-interest rather than by true rejection of a legal entitlement to 
remedial secession.251 Other States have special ties with sub-State groups aiming 
251 This was also observed by K. Caluwaert, De toekomst van onafhankelijkheidsbewegingen en het 
recht op zelfbeschikking (Master’s Thesis, Ghent University 2010) at para. 128.
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to secede and therefore may be more inclined to support such an entitlement. An 
example in this respect is the Russian Federation, maintaining strong ties with the 
secessionist movements in Georgia, or Albania, being the kin-State of the Kosovo 
Albanian population. While these national interests may well explain the responses 
of States to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, they do neither dimin-
ish nor increase the weight which is to be attached to these particular responses when 
examining the existence of a customary norm. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the 43 States which participated in the written 
and oral proceedings before the Court predominantly concerned Western (or even: 
European) States. Only a limited number of States which had submitted their views 
were of Asian, African or Latin-American origin and only one non-Western State 
(i.e. Jordan) adduced a right to remedial secession.252 A greater participation from 
non-Western States would most likely have increased the opposition to the existence 
of an entitlement to remedial secession.253 This deficit in the representativeness of the 
submissions in the advisory proceedings and the supposed effect thereof may also 
play a role in considering the views of States and weighing them for the purpose of 
determining a norm of customary international law. 
3.2. Other Cases
As has been explained before, the case of Kosovo is of importance for the present 
study in different respects. In addition to the case of Kosovo, some other instances 
beyond the context of post-colonial State creation might be seen to be relevant with 
respect to the question of the emergence of a customary right to remedial seces-
sion. A few cases have sometimes been suggested as disclosing State practice on this 
matter, in particular the creations of Bangladesh and Croatia.254 These instances were 
252 The participating States were: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burundi, China, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Libya, Luxembourg, Maldives, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela and Vietnam. In addition to these 
States, the Authors of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Kosovo) participated in the proceed-
ings. While Bahrain and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic had expressed their intention to partici-
pate in the proceedings as well, they did not present their position before the Court.
253 See also J. Summers, ‘Kosovo: From Yugoslav Province to Disputed Independence’ in J. Summers 
(ed.) Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion and Implications for 
Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2011) 
at p. 44.
254 See, for instance, Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-Deter-
mination’ at pp. 120-130; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 332-333; C. Ryn-
gaert and C.W. Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In 




also mentioned during the advisory proceedings on Kosovo’s declaration of inde-
pendence, albeit without any further elaboration.255 Some other examples which have 
occasionally been referred to as situations endorsing the doctrine of remedial seces-
sion are the emergence of Eritrea and the successor States of the former Soviet Union 
(USSR) and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). While these cases 
may ostensibly seem relevant for the present purposes, these latter instances will not 
be further considered here, as they are not sound examples of successful unilateral 
secession in the first place. This will be contended below.256
3.2.1. Bangladesh
The separation of Bangladesh (otherwise known as East Pakistan) from Pakistan 
(West Pakistan) in 1971 is frequently mentioned as an example of remedial seces-
sion and is sometimes even regarded as evidence for the existence of a right in this 
respect.257 This case therefore merits closer examination. In 1947, the State of Paki-
stan was created out of the provinces which had previously belonged to British India 
and the Indian States with a majority Muslim population.258 Geographically, Paki-
stan’s territory was divided into two parts, with India situated in between. Moreover, 
East Pakistan and West Pakistan were worlds apart in historical, ethnic, cultural and 
linguistic respects as well. As Pavković and Radan aptly put it, “[t]he only aspect 
of social life which the two populations shared was that of Islam”.259 Further, in the 
decades following the creation of Pakistan, the East experienced an increasing domi-
nation of its politics and economy by the central government in the West.260 As East 
Pakistan “suffered relatively severe and systematic discrimination” from the authori-
ties in Islamabad,261 tensions between both parts of Pakistan built up. The elections 
for the National Assembly of Pakistan held in December 1970 led to an overwhelm-
ing victory of the Bengali Awami League in East Pakistan, while the Pakistan Peo-
ple’s Party won in the West. The election programme of the Awami League aimed at 
255 See International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for Advisory 
Opinion), Oral Statement of the Netherlands (Lijnzaad), CR 2009/32, 10 December 2009, at para. 10. 
256 The cases will be addressed in chronological order.
257 See, for instance, Dugard and Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of Self-
Determination’ at pp. 120-123; Griffioen, Self-Determination as a Human Right. The Emergency Exit of 
Remedial Secession at pp. 123-124; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at pp. 340-342; 
Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Par-
tial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 24. 
258 A. Pavković and P. Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession (Ashgate Publish-
ing, Aldershot 2007) at p. 103.
259 Ibid. at p. 104.
260 V.P. Nanda, ‘Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of Bangladesh in Retro-
spect’ (1979) 1 Houston Journal of International Law 71 at p. 72.
261 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 140.
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introducing a federal structure in Pakistan, thus granting full autonomy to the East. 
However, due to fear of a majority in the National Assembly and the federalization 
of Pakistan, the central government suspended the National Assembly’s inaugural 
session in March 1971. Mass demonstrations from the side of the Bengali population 
in the East followed and soon the wish for mere autonomy converted into a desire of 
full independence.262 The central authorities subsequently responded with large-scale 
military actions to crush the resistance and “initiated a reign of terror throughout East 
Pakistan”,263 which according to some even culminated in (selective) genocide.264 
On 10 April 1971, the Awami League proclaimed the independence of East Pakistan 
while still being in armed conflict with the military forces of the central government. 
As the violence and repression of the Bengalis continued and about ten million refu-
gees crossed the border with neighbouring India, India eventually intervened early 
December 1971 to fight the forces of Pakistan’s central government in both East and 
West Pakistan. The UN General Assembly soon adopted Resolution 2793 (XXVI), 
which inter alia called for the withdrawal of Indian forces, but did not make any ref-
erence to the right to self-determination or an entitlement to secession of the East.265 
After two weeks of war, the Pakistani forces in the East surrendered and India pro-
claimed a ceasefire in the West.266 Meanwhile, India and Bhutan had already recog-
nized the new State of Bangladesh. As soon as it became clear that the governmental 
forces were defeated, more States expressed the recognition of Bangladesh, even 
though the Indian military did not leave the territory until the end of March 1972. 
Most States, however, only recognized Bangladesh after Pakistan had granted its rec-
ognition on 22 February 1974.267 Bangladesh was admitted to the UN in September 
of that same year.268
262 See Nanda, ‘Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of Bangladesh in Retro-
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Review 23 at pp. 26-41.
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national Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 43.
267 Pavković and Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession at p. 108.
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In view of the events outlined above, it appears that the breakaway of Bangladesh 
from Pakistan initially constituted a case of unilateral secession as the consent of 
the parent State was obviously lacking. But while the circumstances leading to the 
declaration of independence involved oppression and gross human rights violations, 
it remains open to question whether it can actually be classified as a case in which a 
right to remedial secession was accepted. Several arguments may be adduced in this 
respect. First, it has been argued that the Indian army’s defeat of Pakistan “merely 
produced a fait accompli, which in the circumstances other States had not alternative 
but to accept”.269 Put differently, had the Indian military not intervened and ousted 
the forces of Pakistan’s central government from the territory of Bangladesh, it is 
unlikely that other States would have recognized it.270 In a similar vein, it should be 
noted that although the human rights violations in East Pakistan and the news reports 
of genocide may be said to have led to international sympathy for the declaration 
of independence, it did not lead to recognition.271 In fact, most States only appeared 
willing to grant recognition to the newly proclaimed State after Pakistan had eventu-
ally recognized it. 
In view of this and considering the silence as regards the existence of any legal 
entitlement to unilateral secession, it appears that the resignation and acknowledge-
ment of the situation by the parent State were decisive for the international commu-
nity’s decision to recognize instead of the mere fact of oppression and gross human 
rights violations taking place on the territory. Thus, while in view of the circum-
stances, the case of Bangladesh arguably had the potential of becoming an example 
of remedial secession,272 it was not recognized as a case of unilateral secession by the 
international community and does not provide for unequivocal support for the thesis 
that a right to remedial secession does indeed exist. Rather, the case of Bangladesh 
seems to suggest that the international community did not consider such an entitle-
ment to exist at that time.273 
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3.2.2. Eritrea
The secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, to start with, presented an example 
of consensual secession rather than unilateral secession. Eritrea’s struggle for inde-
pendence is to be seen against the backdrop of a colonial history.274 Eritrea had been 
a colony of Italy since 1890, after which Eritrea was administered by the United 
Kingdom under a trusteeship. After World War II, the victors were to decide on the 
disposition of the colonies of the defeated powers. As they could not come to an 
agreement, the matter was referred to the United Nations, which therefore created an 
Ethiopian/Eritrean federation in 1952 as an attempt to meet Eritrea’s demand for self-
determination.275 However, Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally dissolved 
the federal structure after a decade and annexed Eritrea. In response to this act, the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 
were formed.276 When in 1974 Emperor Haile Selassie was ousted during a coup, a 
Marxist military regime came to power in Ethiopia, led by Menghistu Haile Mariam. 
The ELF and the EPLF continued their struggle for independence, yet international 
recognition remained absent.277 As Menghistu’s regime was unable to control these 
movements, armed forces were sent into the country to terrify the population. Vil-
lages were burnt down or bombed, major offensives were initiated against the inde-
pendence movements, and even incendiary devices were used during the conflict.278 
In 1991, however, the EPLF assisted an Ethiopian movement in overpowering the 
forces of Menghistu’s regime in Eritrea. The Ethiopian transitional government which 
was established after the fall of Menghistu’s regime acknowledged that the people 
of Ethiopia were entitled to self-determination and consented to the organization of 
a referendum on Eritrea’s independence. The referendum, which was held in April 
1993, was monitored by the UN and resulted in an overwhelming majority of 99.8 
per cent of the Eritrean population opting for independence.279 Consequently, Eri-
trea proclaimed its independence from Ethiopia without opposition by the Ethiopian 
274 For an in-depth discussion of the creation of Eritrea and its preceding struggle for independent State-
hood, see R. Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 1941-
1993 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York 1995).
275 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, 
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276 See Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at p. 315, footnote 31.
277 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 402.
278 See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: “Mengistu has Decided to Burn us Like Wood” – 
Bombing of Civilians and Civilian Targets by the Airforce, 24 July 1990, available at <http://www.hrw.
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279 See Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 402; Raič, Statehood and the Law of 
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authorities. Within about a month, Eritrea was admitted to the United Nations with 
the support of Ethiopia’s government.280 
As such, the secession of Eritrea in 1993 cannot be seen as an example of unilat-
eral secession, but rather as a case of secession with the consent of the parent State.281 
Accordingly, the concept of remedial secession cannot be seen to be applicable to the 
present case, even though the Eritrea’s claim of independence was preceded by the 
oppression of and atrocities towards the Eritrean population and serious human rights 
violations on the territory. 
3.2.3. The Baltic Republics (and the Other Successor States to the USSR)
As was noted elsewhere in the present study, the disintegration of the former Soviet 
Union in 1991 is generally regarded as a case of dissolution rather than secession. 
While some of the events leading to the break-up of the Soviet Union have been 
addressed previously,282 it may be worth briefly recalling and emphasizing some fea-
tures for the present purposes.283 The disintegration of the Soviet Union can be seen 
as a two-phase process.284 
The first phase involved the regaining of independence of the Baltic republics, 
which had been sovereign States during the inter-war period and, in that capacity, 
had been members of the League of Nations. However, as a consequence of the 
secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly occu-
pied and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940.285 While the annexation was never 
recognized de jure, most Western States accepted the Baltic republics as de facto con-
stitutive republics of the Soviet Union.286 In 1990, Lithuania unilaterally proclaimed 
independence, asserting a constitutional right to secede.287 In early 1991, the Soviet 
Union attempted to force Lithuania to withdraw its declaration of independence, but 
280 See UN General Assembly Resolution 47/230 (Admission of Eritrea to membership in the United 
Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/47/230, 28 May 1993.
281 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 218-222; Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Law at p. 402; Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination at 
p. 315, footnote 31.
282 See Chapter III, Section 4.1.1, footnote 214.
283 See, for instance, Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 258-268; 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at pp. 393-395; Raič, Statehood and the Law of 
Self-Determination at pp. 290-291 (footnote 261); Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: 
Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at pp. 43-45. 
284 See Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 43. 
285 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at pp. 393-394. For background information 
on the situation in the Baltic republics and the run-up to their proclamations of independence, see for 
instance, Pavković and Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession at pp. 131-135.
286 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 262.
287 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted on 7 October 1977, Article 72. See 
also Chapter III, Section 4.1.4.
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to no avail: in a (retrospective) referendum held in February 1991, an overwhelming 
majority of more than 90 per cent of the votes were cast in support of independence 
from the Soviet Union.288 Following a period of negotiations with the Soviet Union 
and referenda held amongst their respective populations, Estonia and Latvia declared 
independence in August 1991.289 On 6 September of that same year, the State Council 
of the Soviet Union voted unanimously for the recognition of the three Baltic States. 
It may be observed that while this recognition was granted almost immediately after 
the declarations of independence of Estonia and Latvia, this recognition was only 
received eighteen months after Lithuania had proclaimed independence.290 Be that as 
it may, the UN Security Council subsequently recommended the admission of these 
States to the UN.291 In this respect, it was emphasized that their restoration of inde-
pendence on the one hand, and the consent of the parties involved on the other:
The independence of the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the Repub-
lic of Lithuania was regained peacefully, by means of dialogue, with the consent of 
the parties concerned, and in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the three 
peoples. We can only welcome this development, which obviously represents progress 
in respecting the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in attaining its 
objectives.292
According to James R. Crawford, the consent of the parent State was deemed crucial 
in this respect, as the admission of the Baltic States to the UN was not considered 
before the Soviet Union recognized them, even though the States had been illegally 
occupied and annexed.293 Admittedly, a few States had recognized the independence 
of the Baltic States before the Soviet Union did so.294 Likewise, the European Com-
munity collectively recognized the three States on 27 August 1991.295 With regard 
to the responses of individual States, it was generally emphasized that “since the 
independence of the Baltic States had been unlawfully suppressed, they had the right 
288 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 394.
289 See ibid. at p. 394.
290 See Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 44.
291 See UN Security Council Resolution 709 (1991) (New member: Estonia), UN Doc. S/Res/709 
(1991), 12 September 1991; UN Security Council Resolution 710 (1991) (New member: Latvia), UN 
Doc. S/Res/710 (1991), 12 September 1991; UN Security Council Resolution 711 (1991) (New member: 
Lithuania), UN Doc. S/Res/711 (1991), 12 September 1991. 
292 See the statement of the President of the Security Council on behalf of the Member States: Security 
Council Official Records, UN Doc. S/PV/3007, 12 September 1991.
293 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 394.
294 However, most States were reluctant to do so. According to Antonio Cassese, “[t]he reluctance on 
the part of Western States to [immediately] provide strong support for the Baltics undoubtedly stemmed 
from the widely held belief that a unified democratic Soviet Union was in the interest of the international 
community”. See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 264.
295 See Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 44. 
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of self-determination”.296 However, this right was not regarded as an entitlement to 
unilateral secession, but rather as a right “to resolve their future status through free 
negotiation with the Soviet authorities”, thereby taking into consideration the rights 
and interests of both parties involved.297 All in all, while this first phase of the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union might indeed be seen as a series of secessions – which 
ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the USSR – and while the unlawful suppres-
sion involved arguably raises the question of remedial secession, the independence 
of the Baltic States cannot be regarded as separate instances of successful unilateral 
secession. Such a conclusion is precluded by the fact that the Baltic States were 
not recognized by the international community until the Soviet Union consented to 
the independence of all three States.298 Accordingly, this initial stage of the Soviet 
Union’s disintegration does not show situations of successful unilateral secession 
which provide support for the existence of an entitlement to remedial secession. 
The second phase of the disintegration of the Soviet Union concerned the breaka-
way of the twelve remaining (constituent) republics, which was motivated by the 
political crisis at the central level of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.299 For this 
reason, it has been suggested that it should be regarded as a primarily political pro-
cess, rather than a process inspired by legal grounds such as a right to self-deter-
mination.300 Before proclaiming independence, most of the twelve republics held 
referenda to consult their respective populations on the question of whether or not to 
separate from the Soviet Union.301 Subsequently, the republics – Georgia excluded 
– held a couple of meetings during which declarations were adopted with the pur-
pose of forming a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and discontinuing the 
USSR.302 The first meeting in this respect was the tripartite meeting of the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine and Belarus, held in Minsk on 8 December 1991 and result-
ing in the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.303 This so-called Minsk Agreement was supplemented with the 
adoption of a protocol on 21 December 1991, by which the remaining republics of 
the Soviet Union (except for Georgia, which joined in 1993) accepted the extension 
of the CIS to their territories.304 Later that day, the eleven republics adopted the Alma 
296 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 394.
297 See ibid. at pp. 394-395.
298 See also Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 44. 
299 See, for instance, Pavković and Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession at pp. 
138-141.
300 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at p. 266.
301 See ibid. at p. 266.
302 See Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 45.
303 ‘Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States’, 8 December 1991, 
(1992) 31 International Leal Materials: Current Documents 143.
304 ‘Protocol to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States’, 21 
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Ata Declaration, which stated that “[w]ith the establishment of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist”. More-
over, it was declared that the eleven newly established States would support the Rus-
sian Federation taking over the membership of the Soviet Union within the United 
Nations.305 Accordingly, the continuity of the legal personality of the State was recog-
nized and it is in view of this that it has sometimes been argued that the eleven repub-
lics had seceded from the Soviet Union rather than the latter having dissolved.306 
More importantly however, the course of events as outlined above demonstrates that 
the break-up of the Soviet Union and the creation of the various successor States 
were, first and foremost, the result of a consensual process. What is more, it appears 
that the international community of States found this consensual element to be of 
fundamental importance, as it readily recognized both the newly established States 
and the Russian Federation as continuing the Soviet Union’s legal personality.307 The 
European Community responded to the events by the prompt issuing of a Declaration 
on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union”,308 which made reference to the principle of self-determination and 
formulated five conditions for recognition.309 With these criteria – stressing inter alia 
commitment to the rule of law, democracy, human rights and guarantees for minority 
rights – it may be said that international recognition of the newly established States 
was made contingent upon the presence of internal self-determination.310 
In sum, even though different conclusions might be drawn from a political per-
spective, when seen through a legal lens, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was 
305 ‘Alma Ata Declaration’, 21 December 1991, (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 148. See also 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 395, footnote 8. 
306 See Chapter III, Section 4.1.1.
307 It is to be noted that the view that the Russian Federation is the ‘continuator State’ of the Soviet Union 
is generally accepted, albeit not unanimously. On this issue, see A. Nussberger, ‘Russia’ in R. Wolfrum 
(ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International law (Oxford University Press, New York 2009) at 
paras 89-108. 
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ultimately a consensual process.311 As such, it cannot be regarded as a (successful) 
example of unilateral secession – not to mention remedial secession.
3.2.4. Croatia and Slovenia (and the Other Successor States to the SFRY)
The fragmentation of the SFRY is regularly noted in the context of the doctrine of 
remedial secession. The complexity of this multifaceted and violent process merits a 
more elaborate discussion of the events involved. In doing so, two important points 
will be made. First, it will be demonstrated that in the context of the collapse of the 
SFRY, merely the independence of Croatia and potentially also Slovenia may be seen 
to have constituted examples of unilateral secession. Secondly, it will be contended 
that while these cases of secession may have been remedial in character in view of 
the context in which they took place, they have not unequivocally been recognized 
as such by the international community. Therefore, they cannot be considered as 
cases providing conclusive support for the existence of a customary right to remedial 
secession. 
The demise of the SFRY is generally seen to have started in 1990 and may be said 
to have ended with the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement of 14 December 1995. While 
the background and context of these events are too complex to put in a nutshell, it 
should be observed that the break-up of the SFRY should be seen against the back-
drop of economic decline and changes in power relations on the one hand, and an 
increased sense of nationalism and separatism by the population on the other. Hatred 
between three major ethnic groups within the SFRY – i.e. Muslims, Serbs, and Croats 
– grew stronger and turned into a bloody civil war involving gross human rights vio-
lations. Ultimately, these events culminated in the collapse of the SFRY.312 
The first phase of the process of disintegration may be seen to involve the declara-
tions of independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 25 June 1991. The withdrawal of 
the constitutional autonomy of both Kosovo and Vojvodina by the Milošević govern-
ment in Serbia in 1989 combined with the establishment of a pro-Serb government 
in Montenegro led to an increasingly strong position of Serbia within the federation. 
In fact, this position made it possible for Serbia to outvote Croatia and Slovenia, 
as well as Macedonia in decision-making processes on the federal level. Combined 
with other factors, such as the “over-representation of Serbs in the federal civil ser-
vice and army”, and the “exploitation of the more wealthy republics of Croatia and 
311 See Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’ at p. 45.
312 See Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal at pp. 268-269; S. Oeter, ‘Disso-
lution of Yugoslavia’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (fully 
updated online edn, Oxford University Press, New York 2011) at paras 10-33; Pavković and Radan, 
Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession at pp. 133-153; Raič, Statehood and the Law of 
Self-Determination at pp. 342-356.
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Slovenia for the purpose of providing welfare benefits for Serbia”,313 this resulted in 
a call by Croatia and Slovenia for more autonomy within the federal structure of the 
SFRY.314 This call met with fierce opposition on the part of Serbia, whose Communist 
government aimed at centralizing the federation rather than decentralizing it. Serbia 
and Montenegro’s refusal to install the Croatian candidate for the post of federal 
President in May 1991 induced both Croatia and Slovenia to proclaim independence. 
Subsequently, aiming to put down the uprising, the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) 
invaded the two insurgent territories. The YNA withdrew from Slovenia shortly after, 
which may arguably be interpreted as the acquiescence in the emergence of an inde-
pendent Slovenian republic.315 In Croatia, however, troops remained active to sup-
port the Serb minority there. Extensive diplomatic efforts on the part of the European 
Community eventually led to the conclusion of the so-called Brioni Accord on 7 July 
1991.316 This provisional agreement involved a cease-fire, suspended the proclama-
tions of independence of both Croatia and Slovenia for a period of three months, and 
included a commitment to start negotiations on the future of the Federation during 
this period. These undertakings were to be supervised by EC observers.317 In spite 
of the conclusion of the Brioni Accord, the situation in Croatia soon escalated and 
developed into a full-scale civil war with the YNA and the Serb minority on Cro-
atian territory fighting against the Croatians.318 Consequently, serious crimes were 
reported, such as:
widespread violations of human rights, including denial of the right to life, the destruc-
tion of towns and villages as well as of cultural and religious objects, and the ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ of Croats and other nationalities inhabiting the areas of Croatia in which 
Serbs constituted a majority or a substantial minority.319
Furthermore, in the autumn of 1991, YNA started bombarding the city of Dubrovnik. 
Due to the culmination of events, approximately 600,000 people in Croatia were 
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displaced.320 In early October 1991, Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo con-
ducted a coup against the collective Presidency, as a result of which decisions within 
the Presidency would be taken on the basis of the votes of these four republics only 
and certain tasks were transferred from the Federal Parliament to the Presidency. 
In practice, this implied that the other republics were excluded from political par-
ticipation within the Federation and virtually all power was usurped by Serbia and 
Montenegro. In response to these developments, practically immediately after the 
moratorium enshrined in the Brioni Accord had lapsed, Croatia reissued its declar-
ation of independence on 8 October 1991.321 
The proclamations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia and the subsequent 
ferocious war may be seen to have triggered the second phase of the process of dis-
integration as other constituent republics proclaimed their independence as well. 
In mid-October 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared itself a sovereign State and in 
November of that year, Macedonia adopted a new constitution in which it claimed 
independence, thus bringing about the break-up of the SFRY.322 
Having explained the two-phased collapse of the SFRY, the question arises as to 
how to evaluate these events in terms of the concept of remedial secession. For this 
purpose, it is important to consider international responses to the events outlined 
above. The international community primarily responded to the crisis on the territory 
through the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, which was founded by the European 
Community (EC) on 27 August 1991 and chaired by Lord Carrington. The principal 
aim of this Conference was to draft a comprehensive treaty amongst the constituent 
republics of the SFRY for the purpose of terminating the conflict. This also implied 
the objective of seeking an accord on the “constitutional re-design of Yugoslavia”.323 
Additionally, as part of the Conference, an arbitration committee presided by Robert 
Badinter was established for the purpose of giving advice on legal issues in connec-
tion with the Yugoslav crisis.324 It is important to note that the reports of this so-called 
Badinter Arbitration Committee appear to have guided the stance of both the Member 
States of the European Community as regards the emergence of the successor States 
of the SFRY and, in the end, also of many Member States of the United Nations.325 
In its first report, Opinion No. 1, the Badinter Arbitration Committee was asked to 
answer the question of whether the declarations of independence by the Yugoslav 
republics which had already been issued or which would be issued in the future, 
should be regarded as States established as a consequence of secession or dissolution. 
The Badinter Arbitration Committee responded by concluding that the SFRY was “in 
320 Ibid. at p. 125.
321 Ibid.
322 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 396.
323 Pavković and Radan, Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession at p. 148.
324 See also Chapter III, Section 4.1.4.
325 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 401.
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the process of dissolution”.326 As has been contended previously in the present study, 
however, the contention that the SFRY had dissolved does not necessarily imply that 
the notion of secession is out of the question. Rather, it has been argued that as they 
did not involve consensual acts, the declaration of Croatia and possibly also Slovenia 
may be viewed as attempts at unilateral secession, which eventually led to the disso-
lution of the SFRY.327 In this respect, it should be noted, however, that the unilateral 
character of the secession of Slovenia is more equivocal, as the SFRY may be said to 
have acquiesced in its separation. Moreover, the arguments the Badinter Arbitration 
Committee adduced for the view that the SFRY was dissolving were twofold: first, 
the Commission noted that four of the six constitutive republics had declared their 
independence, and secondly, that “[t]he composition and workings of the essential 
organs of the Federation […] no longer met the criteria of participation and repre-
sentatives inherent in a federal state”.328 This latter argument appears to refer to a lack 
of internal self-determination, as a consequence of which one might argue that the 
Badinter Arbitration Committee implicitly deemed the concept of remedial secession 
applicable to the situation at hand. In this context, however, it is to be emphasized 
that the Badinter Arbitration Committee had not acknowledged a prior right to inde-
pendence for the constituent republics, for instance on the basis of a right to (external) 
self-determination. More correctly, from the arguments presented, it is to be deduced 
that the Badinter Arbitration Committee considered the break-up of the SFRY to be 
an irreversible process, as a consequence of which various independent republics 
emerged. The early recognition of these republics should be seen against the back-
drop of the (political) facts on the ground rather than on the basis of a legal right to 
secession for each of the constituent republics.329 This will be explained below.
Following Opinion No. 1 of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, the EC adopted 
the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union on 16 December 1991.330 These Guidelines stipulated several requirements 
for the recognition of the successor States of the SFRY and USSR, so as to ensure a 
326 Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, reprinted as: 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ‘Opinions No. 1-3 of the Arbitration Commission of 
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coordinated process of recognition. Not only did the Guidelines make reference to “the 
normal standards of international practice” on State recognition, the document also 
introduced respect for the principle of self-determination, minority rights and existing 
boundaries as relevant criteria in this respect.331 The newly proclaimed States were 
subsequently invited to submit an application for recognition in conformity with the 
terms of the Guidelines,332 and with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, all four 
constituent republics did do so.333 Accordingly, these applications were forwarded to 
the Badinter Arbitration Committee, which issued opinions so as to advise the EC 
Member States on the question of whether or not to extend recognition to the newly 
declared States. After the Guidelines were issued, however, Germany announced 
that it would recognize both Croatia and Slovenia, notwithstanding whether or not 
the Badinter Arbitration Committee would recommend doing so. Yet, the Badinter 
Arbitration Committee was of the opinion that Croatia did not meet all requirements 
enshrined in the Guidelines.334 It nonetheless decided – most likely influenced by 
the decision of Germany – to advise positively on recognition, provided that Croatia 
would take the necessary steps.335 As a consequence, the European Community collec-
tively recognized both Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992,336 leading to the sub-
sequent recognition by many other States and, ultimately, the admission to the United 
Nations.337 It has often been contended that the recognition of Croatia was premature 
since its government arguably did not exercise effective control over the whole terri-
tory, hence failing to meet the ‘traditional’ criteria for statehood as stipulated in the 
Montevideo Convention.338 
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What may be deduced from the above is that Croatia’s attempt to secede indeed 
constituted an example of unilateral secession and may be seen to have been reme-
dial in character due to the gross human rights violations committed on the territory 
by the parent State. Whether Slovenia’s attempt may also be qualified as such is less 
obvious due to the SFRY’s acquiescence in the situation. As noted before, if there is 
no unilateral secession, there can be no remedial secession either. In any event, the 
subsequent emergence of Croatia and Slovenia as independent States, however, was 
not accepted by the international community because of their remedial character and, 
thus, the acknowledgement of a right to remedial secession. Rather, it appears that 
both States were primarily recognized since their respective secessions and the disin-
tegration of the SFRY as a whole were considered as a fait accompli and the criteria 
for statehood and recognition as incorporated in the Montevideo Convention and 
the EC Guidelines were met.339 In sum, it is clear that these cases do not constitute 
conclusive evidence for the existence of a customary norm on remedial secession.340
3.2.5. Conclusions on the International Responses to Other Cases
While at times, the emergence of some particular States has been suggested as sup-
porting the thesis of a right to remedial secession, the above review has demonstrated 
that State practice beyond decolonization does not disclose unequivocal support in 
this respect. Several points were made in this regard. First, a number of instances of 
State creation have been rejected as being accurate examples of unilateral secession. 
This includes the creations of Eritrea and the Baltic Republics and the other succes-
sor States to the USSR. The argument runs that if there is no situation of unilateral 
secession in the first place, there can be no case of remedial secession either,341 these 
cases cannot be seen as providing support for the existence of a right to remedial 
secession. Secondly, the creation of Bangladesh and that of Croatia and Slovenia 
were considered more elaborately. It was found that it is questionable whether Slo-
venia could qualify as an example of unilateral secession in the first place, because 
of the central authorities’ acquiescence in the situation. In contrast, both Bangladesh 
and Croatia positively constituted examples of unilateral secession, for the consent 
of the respective parent States was clearly lacking. While both had suffered from 
gross human rights violations committed by the parent State, and as such may be said 
to have been ‘remedial’ in character, it appeared that these claimant States were not 
accepted by the international community for this reason. Thus, although the emer-
339 See also Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law at p. 401.
340 For a similar conclusion, see Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack 
of) Practice’ at p. 47. For a contrasting view, see, for instance, Griffioen, Self-Determination as a Human 
Right. The Emergency Exit of Remedial Secession at p. 126. 
341 For a similar observation, see Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack 
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Chapter VI
290
gence of both Bangladesh and Croatia may potentially be understood on the basis 
of the doctrine of remedial secession, it would be going too far to contend that these 
cases present convincing evidence for the existence of an entitlement to remedial 
secession. In sum, it is to be concluded that – also beyond the case of Kosovo – the 
post-decolonization practice of State creation does not reflect obvious support for a 
right to remedial secession being rooted in State practice. 
4. legal appRaiSal of inteRnational ReSponSeS to attemptS at 
unilateRal SeceSSion: State pRactice and OpiniO Juris
Having explored the international responses to attempts at unilateral secession, it 
now becomes possible to assess to what extent a customary right to remedial seces-
sion has emerged. First and foremost, this will be done on the basis of the contem-
porary interpretation of the conventional approach towards customary international 
law as outlined previously in this respect. Subsequently, on a more subsidiary level, 
the human rights approach will be briefly considered in order to demonstrate whether 
adherence to this more progressive model will lead to a different conclusion regard-
ing the existence of a customary norm. As was contended before, the essence of the 
contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach towards customary inter-
national law is that both State practice and opinio juris are required for the creation 
of a customary norm and that both elements are, in principle, considered to be equally 
important. Both constituents will be considered below, starting with State practice 
and subsequently addressing opinio juris. 
4.1. State Practice
As was explained in the previous Chapter, both physical and verbal acts are generally 
acknowledged as manifestations of State practice. It was also noted that while these 
two manifestations are by no means completely interchangeable, the relative shortage 
with respect to the one manifestation may be counterbalanced by the strength of the 
other. How much weight is to be attributed to each of these is to be considered against 
the backdrop of the level of activity in the matter at hand.342 In the present context, 
successful attempts at unilateral secession (as a remedy) are considered to consti-
tute physical State practice, while verbal State practice is seen to include statements 
issued by States regarding the lawfulness of specific attempts at unilateral seces-
sion.343 As such, physical and verbal acts are strongly related. It may even be argued 
that with respect to the practice of unilateral secession, verbal acts are a precondition 
342 See Chapter V, Section 2.1.
343 By contrast, the existence of opinio juris may be derived from statements reflecting a general opinion 
on the lawfulness of unilateral secession.
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for the emergence of physical acts. The significance of verbal State practice in this 
regard may also be seen to be confirmed by the fact that although there are dozens 
of secessionist movements worldwide, attempts – either successful or unsuccessful 
– to actually break away do not occur on a very regular basis. Therefore, since there 
is relatively little physical activity by States in the issue of unilateral secession, it is 
justified to attach more weight to verbal acts than to physical acts of States. The core 
question which needs to be answered now is whether this State practice is sufficiently 
dense for contributing to the establishment of a norm of customary international law. 
Put differently, is the available practice of States – both physical and verbal – virtu-
ally uniform as well as extensive and representative?344 In view of the fact that a right 
to remedial secession would affect the sovereign prerogatives of States, it was argued 
that a high threshold is set in this respect.345 
As was seen before, the creation of a number of States has sometimes been 
adduced as providing support for the thesis of a right to remedial secession: Bangla-
desh, Eritrea, the Baltic Republics, Croatia and Slovenia, and, most recently, Kosovo. 
It was found, however, that only three of these instances of State creation could be 
considered as sound examples of unilateral secession in the first place. These con-
cerned the cases of Bangladesh, Croatia, and Kosovo. In addition to being unilateral, 
the secession of these entities could arguably be considered as ‘remedial’ in character 
due to their respective backgrounds of oppression and gross human rights violations 
which had taken place on their territories. By this line of reasoning, it may be con-
tended that these instances constitute relevant physical State practice in the context 
of assessing the existence of a right to remedial secession. 
It was also observed, however, that it could not be conclusively inferred from the 
responses of the international community that the success of these attempts to secede 
was actually a result of the acceptance and perceived applicability of an entitlement 
to remedial secession. Indeed, the international responses of States to Kosovo’s uni-
lateral declaration of independence have disclosed a certain body of verbal State 
practice in support of such a positive right to remedial secession. It was found that 
eight States contended that Kosovo’s attempt to secede from Serbia was lawful on 
the basis of a right to secession as a remedy of last resort to the oppression and gross 
human rights violations to which the Kosovo Albanian population had been submit-
ted under the regime of President Milošević.346 Such verbal State practice, however, 
is very limited and has merely been reflected with respect to the case of Kosovo. In 
the context of other cases, no similar statements regarding the lawfulness of these 
attempts at unilateral secession were expressed. Rather, the international responses 
to the secessions of Bangladesh and Croatia appear to suggest that the international 
344 See Chapter V, Sections 2.1.1-2.1.4.
345 See Chapter V, Section 4.
346 These States comprised Albania, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Poland and 
Switzerland. See Section 3.1.2.1 of the present Chapter.
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community of States sought to justify their recognition on different grounds than the 
existence of a right to remedial secession. As a consequence, it remains questionable 
whether there are any successful cases of remedial secession in practice to date.347 
In view of the above, and considering the high threshold set in this respect due to 
the subject matter of the norm, it is evident that the practice of State creation beyond 
decolonization cannot be said to constitute dense State practice in support of a right 
to remedial secession. There is clearly too little convincing practice – both physical 
and verbal – to label it as being virtually uniform, extensive and representative. The 
shortage of relevant physical practice cannot be counterbalanced by the availability 
of verbal State practice on the matter either, as the latter is both insufficiently present 
and inconclusive as well. Thus, in sum, it is to be concluded that the available State 
practice does not meet the threshold of the contemporary interpretation of the con-
ventional approach towards customary international law.
4.2. Opinio Juris
While it was seen there is no dense State practice in support of a right to remedial 
secession, it has sometimes been argued that “there is a substantial opinio juris on 
the lawfulness of remedial secession in the international community”.348 Opinio juris, 
being the general legal conviction of States, may in the present context be derived 
from the pronouncements of States regarding the lawfulness of remedial secession in 
general.349 And indeed, the international responses by States to attempts at unilateral 
secession have reflected the belief of a number of States that present-day interna-
tional law covers a right to unilateral secession as a remedy to persistent oppression 
and gross human rights violations. This observation particularly followed from the 
written and oral submissions of States during the advisory proceedings before the 
International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, 
which did not merely disclose the views of States with respect to the specific case 
of Kosovo – i.e. constituting verbal State practice – but also elaborated on the more 
general state of the law, or at least the state of the law as they perceived it. Against 
the background of the events regarding Kosovo, eleven States350 (and the Authors of 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, i.e. Kosovo) expressed their support for 
the existence of a right to remedial secession under contemporary international law in 
general. Most of these States elaborated on the matter by explaining their arguments 
347 This is notwithstanding the question of whether Kosovo can, at present, be regarded as a State under 
international law in the first place. See Section 3.1 of the present Chapter.
348 See, for instance, Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the 
Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 27.
349 See Chapter V, Section 2.2.
350 The States concerned were Albania, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland and the Russian Federation. 
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in this respect, but Slovenia seemed to accept the existence of a right to remedial 
secession rather implicitly and refrained from underpinning its position.351 As such, 
the value of Slovenia’s opinion may be questioned.
The question subsequently presents itself as to whether the views of these States 
actually constitute sufficiently strong and unequivocal opinio juris for the purpose 
of the creation of a customary norm on the lawfulness of remedial secession. Given 
the subject matter of such a norm – affecting the sovereign rights of states – a high 
degree of proof is required for determining opinio juris. In this regard, it is important 
to recall that despite the body of support for the acceptance of a legal entitlement to 
remedial secession, the majority of States participating in the advisory proceedings 
held the opposite view. Eighteen States explicitly rejected the existence of a right to 
remedial secession under positive international law, thereby clearly reacting against 
those States contending that such a right can be discerned at present.352 As has been 
expounded previously, two broad lines of argument were frequently adduced by this 
group of 18 States. The first line of argument concerned the perceived lack of evi-
dence for the present-day acceptance of such a right, while the second line of argu-
ment involved the prevalence of the principle of respect for the territorial integrity 
of States.353 Moreover, a third yet minor line of reasoning concerned the perceived 
neutrality of international law towards attempts to secede – an argument which is 
tantamount to the (implicit) rejection of a right to remedial secession.354 
In this connection, reference may also be made to various other sources, such as 
the statements made during the debates on Kosovo in the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly, the texts formally recognizing Kosovo as an independent State, 
and the international reactions – or perhaps the lack thereof – to other attempts at uni-
lateral secession as discussed in the present Chapter. Although these responses have 
not indisputably expressed opinio juris opposing the existence of a right to remedial 
secession, they have by no means disclosed traces of a general legal conviction sup-
porting a right of remedial secession either. Rather, it may be argued that most of 
these responses even appear to reflect a traditional outlook on the right to self-deter-
mination, strongly reinforcing Westphalian principles and excluding the possibility 
of secession absent the approval of the parent State. 
When considering the above, it may be admitted that amongst States, there is 
indeed some support for the thesis that remedial secession currently exists as a 
legal entitlement. At the same time, however, it is to be concluded no strong and 
351 See Section 3.1.2.1 of the present Chapter.
352 These States were Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Japan, 
Libya, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Venezuela and Vietnam. See Section 3.1.2.2 of the 
present Chapter.
353 See Section 3.1.2.2.1 of the present Chapter.




unequivocal opinio juris can be determined in this respect. Particularly the submis-
sions of States during the advisory proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice on Kosovo have demonstrated that opinions on the matter are mixed and most 
States even have expressed the contrary view, i.e. that such a right does not exist 
under contemporary international law. In sum, there can be no other conclusion than 
that, at present, no substantial manifestation of opinio juris on the existence of a right 
to remedial secession under international law can be found.
4.3. Taking Stock: A Customary Right to Remedial Secession?
The preceding sections have demonstrated that the practice of post-decolonization 
State creation neither discloses sufficiently dense State practice for ascertaining a 
customary right to remedial secession, nor a body of strong and unequivocal opinio 
juris in this respect. As was contended previously, the contemporary interpretation 
of the conventional approach towards customary international law requires the pres-
ence of the objective as well as the subjective constituent of custom and considers 
both elements to be equally important. Moreover, while it acknowledges that the 
importance of physical and verbal State practice is to be seen in relation to the level 
of activity in the issue, it emphasizes that physical actions may not be completely 
absent. In view of this and the serious shortcomings of both State practice and opinio 
juris with respect to an alleged right to remedial secession, it is to be concluded that, 
so far, no such right has materialized under customary international law. 
It has been argued by some authors, however, that support for the existence of 
such a customary norm can be found when adopting a more progressive approach 
towards customary international law.355 Therefore, it may be interesting to see whether 
adherence to the liberal yet contentious human rights method towards custom would 
indeed lead to different conclusions on the issue of remedial secession. As explained 
in the previous Chapter,356 the human rights approach entails the more important the 
interests of morality and humanity, the more weight may be attached to the subjec-
tive constituent when ascertaining norms of customary international law. In essence, 
this implies that when strong and unequivocal opinio juris is present, some discrep-
ancies in State practice may be overlooked.357 It was noted, however, that under 
this approach as well, opinio juris is to be confirmed by the availability of a certain 
amount of State practice. As the physical practice of States in the field of human 
355 See, for instance, Ryngaert and Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the 
Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’ at para. 14.
356 See Chapter V, Section 3.1.
357 See J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert, ‘Impact on the Process of the Formation of Customary International 
Law’ in M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds) The Impact of Human Rights Law on General Inter-
national Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) at p. 112.
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rights and humanitarian law is often incoherent, unreliable or completely absent, the 
focus in this respect may be on verbal rather than physical State practice.358 
Bearing this in mind, and considering the findings of the present Chapter so far, it 
is to be concluded that even under the human rights method of ascertaining custom-
ary international law, the existence of a customary norm of remedial secession cannot 
be determined. It was seen that there is an apparent shortage of physical State prac-
tice on the matter and although the focus may be on the verbal acts of States, it was 
demonstrated that verbal practice is limited as well and has only been reflected with 
regard to the case of Kosovo. No similar statements on the lawfulness of attempts at 
unilateral secession were found with respect to other cases. The principal obstacle for 
ascertaining the materialization of a customary norm, however, involves the element 
of opinio juris. Although some opinio juris on the existence of a remedial right to 
unilateral secession was found, it was also seen that this is by no means substantial, 
strong and unequivocal, and that a significant body of opposition to this view was 
revealed. Hence, the available opinio juris is insufficient for compensating for the 
relative lack of State practice on this matter, as a result of which no customary norm 
of remedial secession can be said to have crystallized under the human rights method 
either.
5. concluSionS
This Chapter has dealt with the international responses to attempts at unilateral seces-
sion, most prominently with respect to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independ-
ence. In doing so, general responses to Kosovo’s attempt to secede from Serbia were 
considered first, involving debates in the UN Security Council and General Assembly 
as well as recognition texts. It was seen that reference to the right to (external) self-
determination was scarcely made, not to mention the existence of a remedial right to 
unilateral secession. In contrast, strong support for the Westphalian principles of sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity was expressed and the need for a mutually consented 
solution was highlighted. What is more, it was seen that political considerations, 
including questions of peace and stability, were guiding for most States. Secondly, 
the submissions of States before the International Court of Justice in the advisory 
proceedings were scrutinized. While it was seen that a number of States explicitly 
contended that a right to remedial secession is part and parcel of contemporary inter-
national law, most States explicitly opposed the existence of such an entitlement, 
arguing that there is no evidence in this respect and emphasizing the dominance of 
the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States. As such, it was held that 
the case of Kosovo did not constitute an indisputable example of remedial secession. 
The creation of Bangladesh, Eritrea, the Baltic Republics (and the other successor 
358 See ibid. at p. 115.
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States to the USSR), and Croatia and Slovenia (and the other successor States to the 
SFRY) demonstrated that international practice before Kosovo’s attempt to secede 
does not reveal conclusive evidence for the existence of a right to remedial secession 
either. 
The second part of the present Chapter was devoted to assessing the existence 
of a customary right to remedial secession on the basis of the aforementioned find-
ings. For this purpose, the contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach 
towards customary international law as outlined in the previous Chapter was utilized. 
Considering the relevant State practice and opinio juris with respect to an alleged 
right to remedial secession, it was concluded that no such right currently exists under 
customary international law. Neither sufficiently dense State practice nor a body of 
strong and unequivocal opinio juris in support of a right to remedial secession was 
found. Even under the more liberal human rights approach, the constituents of cus-
tomary international law were insufficiently present to ascertain a customary norm in 
this respect. In view of the state of the art, it seems that there is still a long way to go 
before a fully fledged customary right to remedial secession will materialize under 
international law – if ever.359  
359 See Chapter VII, Section 3.2 for some reflections on the possible future development of a right to 
remedial secession against the background of the humanization of the international legal order.
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chapteR vii
Recapitulation, concluSionS,  
and final ReflectionS
“The transformation from international law as a State-centred system to an individual-
centred system has not yet found a definitive new equilibrium”
Christian Tomuschat*
1. intRoduction
The present study has sought to shed light on the contemporary meaning of the peo-
ples’ right to self-determination and, more specifically, the question of external self-
determination after serious injustices. To this end, the following research question 
has been considered: 
To what extent has a legal entitlement to ‘remedial secession’, i.e. a right to exter-
nal self-determination as a remedy to serious injustices, emerged under contemporary 
international law?
The purpose of this closing chapter is twofold. First, it is to offer a recapitulation, 
highlighting the main findings from the previous chapters and culminating into the 
final conclusion of this study. Secondly, the aim of this chapter is to provide some 
final reflections on the concept of remedial secession, its alleged effectuation through 
recognition and possible future development. 
2. a Right to Remedial SeceSSion? 
Having analysed the content and meaning of the right to self-determination and 
having examined the sources of international law, it has been concluded that so far, a 
*  C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: 
General Course on Public International Law’ (1999) 281 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law (Recueil des Cours) 9 at p. 162.
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right to external self-determination as a remedy to serious injustices has not emerged 
under contemporary international law. It was seen that, although some support for 
such a right does exist, its theoretical foundations are rather weak and, even more 
importantly, that its main flaw is the lack of acknowledgement in State practice. This 
section will recapitulate the main findings of this study, which have led to the above-
mentioned conclusion. 
2.1. The Development of the Right to Self-Determination 
With a view to determining the core meaning of the right to self-determination and 
answering the question of its generally accepted, contemporary meaning, the point 
of departure of the present study has been the historical development of the notion 
of self-determination. In Chapter II, it was seen that its roots may be found in the 
theories and ideologies underlying and arising from the American and French revo-
lutions.1 Notwithstanding these early traces, it was not until the aftermath of World 
War I that the concept of self-determination first appeared on the international stage.2 
Most prominently, T. Woodrow Wilson propagated self-determination in his proposal 
for a post-war settlement in 1918. While it had not yet emerged into a legal entitle-
ment, it was seen that, due to Wilson’s efforts, the concept of self-determination had 
evolved into a political principle on the international plane. This development was 
also reflected in the creation of the League of Nations’ Mandate System, which may 
be viewed as being founded on the principle of self-determination. For, its objective 
was to protect the inhabitants of formerly colonized territories and to promote their 
development, thus guiding them towards self-government. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the concept of self-determination was used as a political principle in the after-
math of World War I, it was applied rather randomly. It first gained legal significance 
in the Åland Islands case in 1920, which is often considered as a landmark case in 
the development of the right to self-determination. In this case, the Commission of 
Jurists and the Committee of Rapporteurs denied self-determination by means of the 
separation of part of a territory as being a (general) right under positive international 
law. At the same time, however, the possibility of secession as a last resort option in 
cases of extreme oppression seemed to be recognized. 
Chapter II showed that the concept of self-determination entered the second 
stage of its evolution after World War II, when it was included in the Charter of 
the United Nations.3 As the Charter introduced self-determination as one of its prin-
cipal purposes, this was considered to be an important step in the development of 
self-determination. Yet, while Articles 1(2) and 55 of the Charter explicitly referred 
1 See Chapter II, Section 2.
2 See Chapter II, Section 3.1.
3 See Chapter II, Section 3.2.
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to self-determination, the precise legal status and content of the notion remained 
unclear. Some light was shed on this in the context of decolonization, when self-
determination became a legal entitlement for colonial peoples. UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (XV) is generally regarded as one of the most important contribu-
tions in the decolonization process, as it proclaimed the necessity to end colonialism 
and contended that all (colonial) peoples have the right to self-determination. As 
such, the right to self-determination was seen to involve a right to create an independ-
ent State (or to freely associate or integrate with another State), so as to enable the 
people to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development”. Thus, in the context of decolonization, the right 
to self-determination was mainly considered to be implemented externally, and was 
seen to be realized as soon as a colonial territory became independent from its colo-
nizer. The significance and elementary character of this right was highlighted by the 
International Court of Justice in the East Timor case, as it determined that the right 
to self-determination had evolved into a norm erga omnes, thus involving an obliga-
tion owed towards the international community of States as a whole. In this case, the 
Court did not explicitly note that the right to self-determination constitutes a peremp-
tory norm. Nonetheless, it is often contended that, with respect to dependent terri-
tories, the right to self-determination has attained the status of jus cogens, meaning 
that no derogation from such norm is permitted. It was against the backdrop of the 
decolonization process as well that the International Court of Justice pronounced the 
core meaning of the right to self-determination. In its advisory opinion in the Western 
Sahara case, the Court stressed that the “essential feature of the right of self-deter-
mination” is that its “application requires a free and genuine expression of the will of 
the peoples concerned”.4 Seen in this light, the right to self-determination took on a 
new meaning after the decolonization period. 
2.2. The Contemporary Meaning of the Right to Self-Determination
Beyond the decolonization process, the development of the right to self-determination 
continued. In this respect, as was demonstrated in Chapter III, two important develop-
ments can be discerned.5 The first development concerned the continuing evolution of 
the legal status of self-determination. As a consequence of various new international 
instruments including the right to self-determination, such as common Article 1 of 
the International Human Rights Covenants of 1966 (ICCPR and ICESCR), it evolved 
into a fundamental legal entitlement. The second development involved the crystal-
lization and acknowledgement of the two dimensions of self-determination. While it 
4 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at 
para. 55.
5 See Chapter III, Section 2.
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was seen in Chapter II that, during the decolonization period, the right to self-deter-
mination was primarily considered to be realized externally, over recent decades, an 
internal dimension has emerged in State practice and international legal documents.6 
With the advent of the internal manifestation of the right to self-determination, a 
different mode of implementation became increasingly relevant. Self-determination 
is no longer merely realized through the formation of new States, but in addition, it 
requires a continuous implementation within the framework of existing States, in the 
relationship between a people and its government. Chapter III showed that the core 
meaning of this internal dimension may be defined as “the need to pay regard to the 
freely expressed will of peoples”.7 This translates into two principal requirements, 
i.e. the presence of a government representing the people and popular participation 
in the political decision-making process of the State are required. In addition to this, 
special arrangements such as autonomy, federalism or complex power-sharing may 
sometimes be necessary in order to ensure the internal dimension of the right to self-
determination for all inhabitants of the territory. For, it was seen that not merely entire 
populations of existing States, but also sub-groups within such States and indigenous 
peoples may also be considered as subjects of the right to internal self-determination. 
Notwithstanding the relatively recent emergence of the internal dimension of the 
right to self-determination and the emphasis on this intra-State aspect in contempo-
rary legal and political documents, the more traditional, external dimension of the 
right to self-determination has maintained relevance today.8 As pronounced in the 
UN Friendly Relations Declaration, this external dimension may be implemented 
through the peaceful dissolution of a State, the (re)union or merger of one State with 
another State, or through secession. This latter mode of external self-determination 
was defined as the establishment of a new independent State through the withdrawal 
of an integral part of the territory of an existing State from that State, carried out by 
the resident population of that part of the territory, either with or without prior con-
sent of the parent State or domestic constitutional authorization.9 When exercised by 
the population of a State as a whole, or when it concerns either a consensual or con-
stitutional secession, external self-determination is not considered to be problematic 
under international law. In cases of consensual or constitutional separation, the right 
to secede is even founded on national rather than international law. However, the 
lawfulness of unilateral secession – i.e. the separation of part of a territory by a seg-
ment of the population in the absence of such prior consent or constitutional arrange-
ment – is much more controversial. Chapter III showed that several circumstances 
may explain this controversy. First, international legal documents contain neither an 
6 See Chapter III, Section 3.
7 International Court of Justice, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at 
para. 59.
8 See Chapter III, Section 4.
9 See Chapter I, Section 3.3.1.
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explicit entitlement to unilateral secession, nor an express prohibition thereof. Sec-
ondly, the disruptive effect of this mode of external self-determination may explain 
the debate on the lawfulness of unilateral secession. For, there appears to be a conflict 
between the traditional international legal principles of State sovereignty and respect 
for territorial integrity – aiming at maintaining the territorial status quo – on the one 
hand, and an alleged right to unilateral secession – effectuating territorial change – on 
the other. Not only would a right to unilateral secession disrupt the traditional inter-
national legal system, it might also lead to the excessive fragmentation of States, 
hence possibly threatening international or regional peace and stability. In view of 
this controversy and obscurity, it was found that the state of the art with respect to the 
question of a right to unilateral secession and, more specifically, unilateral secession 
as a remedy to serious injustices, merits closer examination. 
2.3. Traces of a Right to Remedial Secession in Contemporary International Law 
For assessing to what extent a remedial right to unilateral secession has emerged 
under contemporary international law, Chapter IV turned to the classical method of 
examining the sources of international law. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and the sources listed therein provided a starting point in this 
respect. It was explained that customary international law merits separate discussion 
due to the significance of the international practice of States for the development of 
the right to self-determination in general. Moreover, the conclusion that the theoreti-
cal basis of a right to remedial secession is rather fragile made it even more important 
to examine the existence of a customary norm in this respect in detail. 
First, international conventions were considered with a view to finding traces of 
a right to unilateral secession.10 In this respect, it was seen that the UN Charter, the 
1966 International Human Rights Covenants, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Suc-
cession of States in Respect of Treaties and the International Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) offer little guidance with 
respect to the question of the existence of a right to unilateral secession. Neither the 
texts of these international documents, nor the drafting history or context were con-
clusive on this matter.
Subsequently, doctrine was examined.11 It was demonstrated that, following the 
scholarly writings of Lee C. Buchheit and Antonio Cassese, a considerable number 
of authors supported the thesis that a right to unilateral secession does exist under 
exceptional circumstances. The arguments in this respect were primarily founded on 
two international instruments, i.e. the UN Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) and 
10 See Chapter IV, Section 2.1.
11 See Chapter IV, Section 2.2.
Chapter VII
302
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993). Both documents contain a 
so-called safeguard clause, which affirms respect for the territorial integrity of States: 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal right and self-deter-
mination of peoples […] and thus possessed of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.12 
Reading the safeguard clause a contrario, it might suggest that a State lacking a 
representative, non-discriminatory government would forfeit its right to territorial 
integrity. When interpreted as such, a right to unilateral secession would not be ruled 
out or, to put it even more strongly, the denial of a people’s right to internal self-deter-
mination by the State would warrant a right to external self-determination by means 
of unilateral secession. In addition to the lack of internal self-determination, three 
parameters for the exercise of such remedial right to secession were frequently noted 
in literature, i.e. the presence of flagrant violations of fundamental human rights, 
structural discriminatory treatment and the exhaustion of all peaceful remedies. As 
such, unilateral secession is arguably considered to be a last resort remedy for such 
gross injustices committed by the mother State. Notwithstanding the relative consen-
sus in this respect, it was also seen that those authors arguing in favour of a right to 
unilateral secession as a remedy are divided on the question of the subjects of such 
an entitlement. While remedial secession is generally considered to be a right of 
‘peoples’, the detailed interpretation of this notion has remained problematic. In this 
respect, scholarship seems to be particularly divided on the question which minor-
ities – numerical, linguistic, religious, ethnic, etc. – may be regarded as ‘peoples’ as 
the bearers of a right to unilateral secession. Furthermore, it should be recalled that, 
although indeed a substantial body of support for the existence of such a right to 
remedial secession was found in doctrine, it was also demonstrated that scholarship 
was equivocal on the matter. Particularly – though not exclusively – in the context of 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, it was seen that authors were rather 
reticent about claiming the present-day existence of a (remedial) right to unilateral 
secession, both in that specific case and more generally. In fact, various scholars have 
explicitly repudiated the thesis of such a right on a number of grounds. The inverted 
or a contrario reading of the safeguard clause, for instance, was rejected as being an 
inappropriate means of effectuating a fundamental change in the interpretation of one 
of the core principles of international law, i.e. that of territorial integrity. Most promi-
nently, however, they opposed the existence of a right to unilateral or remedial seces-
sion by contending that authors have been unable to adduce adequate and convincing 
practical evidence for such a claim.
12 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations), UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Principle V, Para. 7.
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Having concluded that a right to remedial secession has found significant – but by 
no means conclusive – support in doctrine, Chapter IV turned to an assessment of the 
decisions and opinions from both national and international judicial bodies.13 It was 
demonstrated that, in various cases, reference was made to the acknowledgement of 
a right to remedial secession to a certain extent. Most of these decisions and opin-
ions did not dwell at great length on the precise circumstances under which a right 
to unilateral secession may be lawfully exercised. Yet, some common features were 
discerned in this respect, i.e. the presence of massive human rights violations and the 
denial of the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination. Notwith-
standing the support expressed for the thesis that a right to remedial secession does 
exist under contemporary international law, some important points were made. First, 
it was observed that, in some cases, the judges relied on a tendency they had derived 
from literature instead of expressing their own opinion on the question of whether a 
right to unilateral or remedial secession exists under international law. The judgment 
of the Canadian Supreme Court in its Reference re Secession of Quebec constituted 
a clear example in this respect. Secondly, it was recalled that most courts have used 
very cautious language when claiming the existence of a right to unilateral or reme-
dial secession under contemporary international law. In the Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, for instance, after identifying a trend in scholarly writings on the matter, the 
Canadian Supreme Court noted that it remains uncertain whether this alleged enti-
tlement is actually rooted in positive international law. Restraint was also exercised 
by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence, as it stressed that the opinions of States differed on this 
issue. Moreover, in the case of the Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, it was seen 
that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights did not make explicit 
reference to a right to unilateral or remedial secession. Only when reading the deci-
sion of the African Commission a contrario could its argument possibly be inter-
preted as acknowledging a right to unilateral secession as a remedy to severe human 
rights violations and the denial of internal self-determination. Thirdly and finally, it 
was emphasized that no judicial body has actually granted a people the right to secede 
unilaterally in view of the circumstances at hand. As such, it was contended that the 
judicial acknowledgement of a remedial right to unilateral secession has remained 
theoretical only. In sum, it was concluded that judicial opinions and decisions remain 
rather ambiguous on the matter.
Next, general principles of (international) law were explored.14 In doing so, two 
categories of general principles were discerned. First, general principles which 
appear in the majority of the various systems of municipal law were considered, such 
as the principles of good faith, proportionality and equity. It was contended that such 
13 See Chapter IV, Section 2.3.
14 See Chapter IV, Section 2.4.
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principles are background principles which can merely play a subsidiary role, as they 
are used in interpreting existing norms of international law in a specific situation. 
The second category involved general principles developed in international law and 
applicable to the relationships among States. In this respect, primarily the principles 
of respect for the territorial integrity of States and uti possidetis juris were scruti-
nized, as it is often contended that these fundamental principles of the international 
legal order clash with an alleged right to unilateral secession. Close scrutiny of these 
principles, however, demonstrated that these concepts are not completely irreconcil-
able. As to the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States, it was first 
submitted that secessionist groups may be viewed as (additional) addressees of this 
principle and, thus, are considered to be bound by it. Moreover, it was contended that 
the principle of territorial integrity is by no means absolute. Hence, balancing the 
demands of territorial integrity on the one hand and self-determination on the other 
does leave some scope for the thesis of a remedial right to unilateral secession. As 
regards the principle of uti possidetis juris, it was first seen that it remains open to 
question whether it would bear on all situations involving the establishment of a new, 
independent State, including instances in which the seceding entity is not connected 
to a territory which is delimited by some kind of internal borders. Subsequently, it 
was found that where the principle does indeed apply, uti possidetis juris primarily 
determines the geographical delimitations of the new State rather than prohibiting 
the creation of a new State in general. Put differently, it would merely put geographi-
cal restrictions to the exercise of the right to (external) self-determination, but not 
restrict its general exercise. In addition to the principles of respect for the territorial 
integrity of States and uti possidetis juris, self-determination was briefly addressed 
in its capacity as a general principle of international law. While encompassing the 
core meaning of self-determination, it was argued that the principle merely func-
tions as a very loose and all-embracing standard, which is of only limited value with 
respect to far-reaching questions as that of a right to remedial secession. In sum, it 
was concluded that general principles of (international) law do not provide a conclu-
sive answer to the question of a present-day entitlement to remedial secession: they 
neither disclose clear traces of such a right, nor an unequivocal prohibition thereof. 
Finally, having examined the sources of international law as listed in Article 38(1) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice – with the exception of custom, 
which was dealt with separately in Chapters V and VI – the final part of Chapter 
IV touched upon two supplementary (quasi-)sources of international law, that is the 
unilateral acts of States and acts of international organizations.15 For the larger part, 
however, both sources were considered elsewhere in the present study. Unilateral acts 
of States relevant for the present purposes are formal recognition statements, which 
were addressed in the context of the international responses to attempts at unilateral 
15 See Chapter IV, Section 2.5.
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secession.16 It was seen, however, that the statements recognizing Kosovo as an inde-
pendent State did not disclose support for the existence of an entitlement to reme-
dial secession. Rather, most States recognized Kosovo with a view to contributing to 
peace and stability in the region. The content of relevant acts of international organi-
zations, such as the UN Friendly Relations Declaration and the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, were dealt with in the context of the development of the 
right to self-determination beyond decolonization and its contemporary meaning,17 
and against the backdrop of scholarly writings.18 As such, it was seen that the safe-
guard clauses of these legally non-binding documents have sometimes been inter-
preted a contrario as recognizing a right to unilateral secession as a remedy to the 
denial of internal self-determination. Yet, considering the nature of the acts of inter-
national organizations, it was submitted that restraint is to be exercised in deriving 
legal norms from these acts, as they are frequently the result of political compromises 
and are generally not intended to create legally binding norms.19 
In conclusion, Chapter IV demonstrated that contemporary international law 
shows some (theoretical) support for the existence of a remedial right to unilateral 
secession. It was seen that this support was primarily found in scholarly literature 
and, to a more limited extent, in judicial decisions and opinions. It was emphasized 
that, according to Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, these are subsidiary sources of international law and hence have supplementary 
rather than primary value. In addition, it was seen that the thesis of a right to remedial 
secession was first and foremost founded on an a contrario reading of the safeguard 
clause of the Friendly Relations Declaration and Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action. Such interpretation is not only rather progressive, but also controversial, 
primarily in view of the indeterminacy of the clause and its delicate relationship 
with the fundamental principle of territorial integrity. At this stage, it was concluded 
that the theoretical basis of a right to remedial secession is quite weak, making it 
even more pertinent to scrutinize whether the international practice of States reflects 
adequate and persuasive support for such an entitlement.20 The subsequent Chapters 
were therefore devoted to answering the question as to what extent a remedial right to 
unilateral secession has emerged as a norm of customary international law.
16 See Chapter VI, Section 3.1.1.
17 See Chapter III, Sections 2.2. and 2.3.
18 See Chapter IV, Section 2.2.
19 See Chapter IV, Section 2.5.
20 See Chapter IV, Section 3.
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2.4. Preliminary Remarks on Assessing the Existence of a Customary Right to 
Remedial Secession
Before assessing to what extent a customary right to remedial secession has material-
ized, the concept of customary international law was introduced in Chapter V. This 
Chapter first elaborated on the two traditional constituents of customary international 
law, i.e. State practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis and demonstrated how these 
elements have traditionally been interpreted by the International Court of Justice and 
literature.21 It was seen that the constituent of State practice is traditionally consid-
ered to function as the key element for the creation of norms of customary interna-
tional law, while opinio juris evidences the conviction that such practice is required 
by a legal obligation. Moreover, it was explained that the practice of States merely 
contributes to the materialization of customary international law when this practice is 
sufficiently dense. This density may be determined by three factors: the uniformity, 
the extensiveness and representativeness, and possibly also the duration of the prac-
tice. When explained as such, the two constituents are both clearly distinctive ele-
ments which require separate proof for ascertaining customary law. However, it was 
demonstrated that today, the two constituents have increasingly grown towards one 
another. This is the result of an inclusive approach towards State practice, not merely 
taking into account the physical acts (and omissions) of States, but also their verbal 
acts. These latter acts are closely linked to the subjective constituent of custom, i.e. 
opinio juris, as the content of verbal acts often simultaneously reflects the State’s 
legal conviction. This interrelatedness makes it difficult – and arguably largely theo-
retical – to separate the two elements of custom. In this connection, it was observed 
that there is a general tendency to infer opinio juris from the presence of State prac-
tice, provided that the available practice is sufficiently dense and unequivocal. This 
was labelled as the contemporary interpretation of the conventional approach. 
In addition to the conventional model, Chapter V critically considered some pro-
gressive yet more controversial approaches towards determining customary inter-
national law, such as the sliding scale theory and the human rights approach.22 In 
contrast to the conventional model emphasizing State practice, these progressive the-
ories generally prioritize opinio juris over (physical) State practice. Moreover, these 
conceptions show a relationship between the substantive significance of the norm on 
the one hand, and the willingness to balance or even neglect inadequacies in the tra-
ditional constituents of custom – in particular physical State practice – on the other. 
In this regard, it appeared that the progressive models are strongly inspired by con-
siderations of morality or humanity. While such approaches may indeed be attractive 
from a moral or humanitarian perspective, some serious objections on a conceptual, 
21 See Chapter V, Section 2.
22 See Chapter V, Section 3.
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methodological and more substantive level were raised. Most importantly, it was 
contended that the progressive approaches – primarily the human rights approach – 
stretch the nature of customary international law too far as their methodologies allow 
for ascertaining new customary norms whenever that is considered desirable from 
a moral or humanitarian perspective. In this regard, it appeared that the progressive 
approaches confuse international law as it currently is with what international law 
should ideally look like.
Considering the critique on the very progressive theories on the one hand, and 
given the evolution witnessed by the traditional model of customary international law 
on the other, Chapter V concluded that a contemporary interpretation of the conven-
tional approach deserved to be applied when examining whether a customary right 
to remedial secession does exist.23 With a view to upholding the distinction between 
lex lata and lex ferenda, this approach first and foremost requires the availability of 
State practice as well as opinio juris for ascertaining new norms of customary law. It 
acknowledges that State practice covers both physical and verbal acts of States, and 
that the shortage with respect to the one manifestation may be counterbalanced by 
the strength of the other. However, it was emphasized that the two manifestations of 
practice are not fully interchangeable as a consequence of which physical acts could 
be completely absent. Rather, the contemporary interpretation of the conventional 
approach accepts that the relative importance of physical and verbal practice may be 
seen in relation to the level of activity in the matter at hand, but nevertheless requires 
that physical practice is needed for the formation of customary law. 
2.5. A Customary Right to Remedial Secession?
On the basis of the abovementioned preliminary remarks and the approach enunci-
ated, Chapter VI was devoted to the exercise of assessing the emergence of a right 
to remedial secession under customary international law. Before actually consid-
ering international responses to attempts at unilateral secession, however, the rel-
evance of recognition for the present purposes was explained.24 In this respect, the 
two main schools of thought towards recognition, the constitutive and declaratory 
theories, were addressed.25 Subsequently, the significance of recognition in the con-
text of attempts at unilateral secession was expounded. It was submitted that while 
recognition is generally seen to be declaratory in nature, in cases of unilateral seces-
sion, virtually uniform recognition of the aspirant State by already existing States 
may well determine the ultimate success of the attempt at unilateral secession and 
thus, comprise evidence for statehood. As such, widespread recognition may under 
23 See Chapter V, Section 4.
24 See Chapter VI, Section 2.
25 See Chapter VI, Section 2.1.
Chapter VII
308
certain circumstances have some constitutive effects, thus having a bearing on the 
development of State practice with respect to unilateral secession. Moreover, it was 
explained that individual recognition statements may disclose opinio juris or verbal 
State practice on the existence of a right to remedial secession, provided that such 
reference is made explicitly.26 
Chapter VI then turned to an examination of the international responses to 
attempts at unilateral secession.27 In this analysis, a key role was granted to Kosovo’s 
attempt to secede from Serbia in 2008 and the international responses thereto.28 For, 
Kosovo was not only often referred to as a test case for the present-day existence of 
a remedial right to unilateral secession considering the circumstances preceding its 
declaration of independence, but also provides unique insights in the contemporary 
views of States regarding a right to remedial secession. First, the general responses of 
States to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence were explored. Neither the 
debates in the UN Security Council and General Assembly nor the recognition texts 
of individual States reflected the acknowledgement of a remedial right to unilateral 
secession. Very few references to the right to (external) self-determination were made 
and where such reference was made, this was done very briefly and did not constitute 
the main argument. Instead, the general responses to Kosovo’s attempted secession 
primarily demonstrated strong support for the principles of State sovereignty and 
respect for the territorial integrity of States as enshrined in the UN Charter and the 
(legal) framework created by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). In this 
connection, the statements frequently called for a mutually consented settlement of 
the issue, thereby (implicitly) condemning attempts at unilateral secession. Further-
more, it was observed that first and foremost, the responses of States were guided by 
non-legal considerations. The majority of States expected the creation and recogni-
tion of an independent Kosovo to contribute to the promotion and preservation of 
peace and stability in the region, and did not advance a right to self-determination 
or remedial secession as justification for Kosovo’s independence or the recognition 
thereof.
In addition to these general responses, the written and oral submissions of States 
before the International Court of Justice in the advisory proceedings on Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence were examined. It was demonstrated that the 
submissions in this respect revealed that there is some support for the thesis of a 
remedial right to unilateral secession. Several States unambiguously expressed the 
view that international law acknowledges a right to remedial secession. In gen-
eral, this vision was founded on an a contrario reading of the safeguard clauses of 
the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
26 See Chapter VI, Section 2.2.
27 See Chapter VI, Section 3.
28 See Chapter VI, Section 3.1.
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Action, the Åland Islands case, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, and the support found in doctrine. Given the fact 
that references to practice were virtually absent, it was suggested that States did not 
consider international practice to provide strong proof of the existence of a right to 
remedial secession. Moreover, it was seen that, for most of these States, unilateral 
secession operated as an ultimum remedium in cases where the authorities of the State 
deny a people the exercise of their right to internal self-determination. Gross human 
rights violations were mentioned as well, either as a reflection of the lack of internal 
self-determination, or as a separate and additional precondition. It was found, how-
ever, that the majority of States participating in the advisory proceedings opposed 
the existence of a right to remedial secession. Theses States primarily contended that 
there is insufficient proof for the existence of such a right and/or claimed the preva-
lence of the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of States. A minor line of 
reasoning involved the alleged neutrality of international law as regards secession. 
In addition to the case of Kosovo, Chapter VI considered several other cases 
which are sometimes suggested as upholding the thesis of a right to remedial seces-
sion.29 It was demonstrated that international practice beyond the context of decolo-
nization does not reveal strong and unambiguous support in this regard. First, some 
cases of State creation were repudiated as being sound examples of unilateral seces-
sion in the first place. In this respect, the cases of Eritrea and the Baltic Republics 
(and the other successor States to the USSR) were adduced. It was contended that 
if there is no case of unilateral secession in the first place, the concept of remedial 
secession cannot be seen to be applicable either. Consequently, it was concluded that 
the cases of Eritrea and the Baltic Republics cannot be seen to provide evidence for 
the existence of a right to remedial secession. Secondly, the cases of Bangladesh, 
Croatia and Slovenia were examined. It was argued that the cases of Bangladesh 
and Croatia indeed involved examples of unilateral secession in view of the lack of 
consent by the respective parent States. Moreover, the respective secessions may be 
said to have been ‘remedial’ in character, as they ensued from situations of persis-
tent oppression and gross human rights violations by the parent State. Nonetheless, 
it appeared that both aspirant States were not accepted by the international commu-
nity as a consequence of an alleged right to remedial secession, but rather for other 
reasons. Therefore, the cases of Bangladesh and Croatia cannot be seen to represent 
convincing examples of remedial secession, supporting the thesis that such a legal 
entitlement currently exists. 
Having addressed various attempts at unilateral secession and the international 
responses thereto, it became possible to answer the question as to what extent a reme-
dial right to unilateral secession has emerged under customary international law.30 
29 See Chapter VI, Section 3.2.
30 See Chapter VI, Section 4.
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For this purpose, the elements of State practice and opinio juris with respect to such 
a right were assessed. With regard to the objective constituent of custom, it was con-
tended that only a couple of attempts at unilateral secession may potentially be seen 
to constitute relevant physical State practice on remedial secession and that verbal 
practice on this matter was merely found in the context of the case of Kosovo and 
even there to a only limited extent. It was argued that it remains uncertain whether 
there are any successful cases of remedial secession in practice so far. As to the sub-
jective element of opinio juris, it was submitted that there is some body of opinio 
juris supporting the thesis that a right to remedial secession has emerged. It was con-
cluded, however, that this body of opinio juris was by no means strong and unequivo-
cal. In sum, it was seen that both constituents of custom are insufficiently present for 
ascertaining a customary right to remedial secession under the contemporary inter-
pretation of the conventional approach towards customary international law. Even 
when endorsing the more liberal and progressive (though contested) human rights 
approach, which allows for inconsistencies in State practice to be overlooked when 
strong and unequivocal opinio juris is present, it was found that no customary right 
to remedial secession could be determined either. 
2.6. Conclusions on a Right to Remedial Secession De Lege Lata and De Lege 
Ferenda
On the basis of the analysis in the present study as recapitulated above, general con-
clusions can now be drawn. In doing so, this section will distinguish between a right 
to remedial secession de lege lata on the one hand, and a right to remedial secession 
de lege ferenda on the other.
2.6.1. A Right to Remedial Secession De Lege Lata
Considering all findings of this study, it is to be concluded that the concept of external 
self-determination after serious injustices has not (yet) emerged as a legal entitlement 
under contemporary international law. It was seen that some support for such a right 
is indeed reflected in several sources of international law, most notably in the sub-
sidiary sources of doctrinal writings and judicial decisions and opinions. However, 
this was deemed to be insufficient – in scope, in weight, as well as in persuasion – 
for labelling it as a positive legal entitlement today. The theoretical basis of a right 
to remedial secession is thus relatively weak and seems to be primarily prompted by 
considerations of morality and necessity, while international practice does not evi-
dence convincing support for such a right either. Even when adopting the progressive 
human rights approach towards customary international law, it was seen that insuf-
ficient State practice and opinio juris are available for reaching the conclusion that 
remedial secession has emerged as a customary norm. At present, the right to self-
determination does not allow for unilateral secession, but rather focuses on its internal 
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dimension and is limited by the traditional core principles of international law, such 
as sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. Put differently, self-determination 
claims first and foremost are to be implemented internally, i.e. within the framework 
of the existing State, and based on consent of the parent State. This may be realized 
through, for instance, the introduction of autonomy arrangements or possibly even 
complex power-sharing. Beyond the context of decolonization, self-determination in 
its external manifestation may only be exercised by peaceful dissolution, merger, (re)
union, constitutional secession or consensual secession. 
As such, it may be contended that the present international legal framework does 
not provide for a collective remedy for peoples oppressed and victimized by their 
State – at least not by means of unilateral secession. This is not to say, however, that 
there are no remedies whatsoever available under international law. Affected indi-
viduals may still claim individual human rights as enshrined in various international 
human rights covenants and mechanisms of minority protection may be used for 
enforcing minority rights. But at present, no remedial right to unilateral secession 
can be claimed. 
2.6.2. A Right to Remedial Secession De Lege Ferenda
While it was demonstrated that to date, there is insufficient evidence of the existence 
of a legal entitlement to remedial secession under positive international law, it was 
also seen in this study that several sources of international law do reflect traces of 
such a right. From these traces, it appeared that some consensus exists on the con-
tours of a right to remedial secession de lege ferenda. So while it is to be emphasized 
that this still deserves further discussion, elaboration and, most importantly, wide-
spread support by the international community of States, a tentative framework for 
the possible future development of a right to remedial secession may be drafted on 
the basis of the previous Chapters. The traces of a right to remedial secession found 
in the sources of international law generally involve remedial secession as a mode 
of exercising the right to (external) self-determination. As such, it would operate as 
a qualified right rather than a primary right: it is commonly viewed as a right which 
would only arise in exceptional circumstances and when certain requirements – both 
substantive and procedural – have been met. 
The first substantive requirement concerns the persistent denial of internal self-
determination on the part of the central authorities of the (parent) State. More spe-
cifically, it would at least be required that the State persistently refuses to grant the 
people at hand participatory rights and a representative government before remedial 
secession may be lawful. As such, a strong link between the internal dimension of the 
right to self-determination and its external dimension was demonstrated in doctrine 
as well as judicial opinions and State practice. However, there are strong indications 
that the mere lack of internal self-determination will not suffice for secession to be 
lawful. In addition to this substantive prerequisite, two other factors were frequently 
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noted in the traces of a right to remedial secession as well: the presence of gross 
human rights violations and discriminatory treatment of a people. Both factors are 
related to the requirement of the denial of internal self-determination and, as such, 
some scholars have contended that the fulfilment thereof may be derived from the 
lack of participatory rights and representative government. In general, however, the 
existence of flagrant breaches of fundamental human rights is seen to constitute a 
separate condition, thus raising the bar for activating a right to remedial secession to 
a high level. This additional parameter was broadly reflected in doctrine and judicial 
opinions as well as the statements of States supporting the remedial secession doc-
trine. The essential touchstone for a right to remedial secession, however, is that of 
the denial of internal self-determination. 
In addition to the substantive prerequisites outlined above, a procedural require-
ment is to be met, requiring that remedial secession actually operates as an ultimum 
remedium. Put differently, this procedural element would necessitate the exhaus-
tion of all effective and realistic remedies to settle the conflict peacefully within the 
framework of the existing State, before secession as a remedy may be warranted. 
Obviously, this would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis. In fact, what 
would be considered as a last resort remedy in the one situation might not be consid-
ered as such in the other. In some instances, the special modalities of implementing 
the right to self-determination internally, ranging from autonomy arrangements to 
complex power-sharing,31 would still be seen to offer a realistic and effective alterna-
tive to secession, while in other, more grave and disrupted situations, these modalities 
would no longer be considered to offer a reasonable solution. In any event, given the 
sensitivity of the issue on the one hand, and the high threshold set for remedial seces-
sion on the other, it seems that international involvement in seeking peaceful alterna-
tives to settle the conflict would be required as well, before all effective and realistic 
remedies may be said to be exhausted. In this respect, one may think of international 
involvement in the negotiations between the parent State and the secessionist entity – 
for instance as a facilitator or mediator, as was seen in the case of Kosovo – or in the 
form of recourse to international organizations or (judicial) bodies. Only then would 
the way to unilateral secession be open.
When marking the contours of a right to remedial secession de lege ferenda, it is 
to be recalled that there are some exceptional circumstances preventing the lawful-
ness of the exercise of such a right. Even when the parameters for the exercise of a 
right to remedial secession as set forth above are present, secession may not be lawful 
when violating a norm of jus cogens, such as the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force. In those situations, the UN Security Council may declare a specific attempt at 
31 See Chapter III, Section 3.1.1.
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secession to be illegal in view of the circumstances at issue and call upon the inter-
national community of States for (collective) non-recognition.32 
3. final ReflectionS on Remedial SeceSSion
Having highlighted the main findings of the present study and having presented its 
general conclusions, this Section will offer some final reflections on the concept of 
remedial secession. Elaborating on the previous Chapters, this Section will question 
whether the concept of remedial secession can be effectuated through recognition. 
Subsequently, the possible future development of such a right will be briefly consid-
ered against the backdrop of the process of what is often referred to as the humaniza-
tion of the international legal order. 
3.1. Effectuating Remedial Secession through Recognition?
Although it has been concluded that remedial secession is not rooted as an entitle-
ment in present-day international law, this is not necessarily to say that the concept 
of remedial secession is merely a theoretical construct that is without any merit what-
soever or that the possibility of unilateral secession is by definition excluded under 
all circumstances. Bearing in mind the constitutive effects which extensive recogni-
tion may have with respect to attempts at unilateral secession,33 it may be argued that 
when an entity seeks “to emerge as a State unilaterally, the only way of doing so [suc-
cessfully] is through international recognition”.34 In this line of reasoning, it has been 
suggested by some authors that the concept of remedial secession may be given effect 
through widespread recognition of the aspirant State by already existing States. Put 
differently, while unilateral secession is by no means an entitlement, arguably, it may 
well be that States are willing to grant recognition to entities which have attempted 
to break away considering the sustained oppression of the people concerned and the 
gross human rights violations on the territory and, by doing so on a very large scale, 
determine the success of a claim to independent statehood. Particularly in situations 
in which it is questionable whether the criteria for statehood have been met and, 
thus, whether statehood has been obtained as a matter of fact, widespread recogni-
tion may have significant consequences in this respect.35 A similar line of reason-
32 See Chapter VI, Section 2.1.
33 See Chapter VI, Section 2.2.
34 J. Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 361 at p. 374.
35 See, for instance, J. Dugard and D. Raič, ‘The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of 
Self-Determination’ in M.G. Kohen (ed.) Secession International Law Perspectives (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 2006) at pp. 134-137; M.N. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’ 
(1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 478 at p. 483; Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of 
Recognition’ at pp. 375-376; J. Vidmar, ‘Kosovo: Unilateral Secession and Multilateral State-Making’ 
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ing was presented by the Supreme Court of Canada in its Reference re Secession 
of Quebec, suggesting that, in deciding whether or not to grant recognition, States 
take the parent State’s treatment of the independence-seeking entity into account.36 It 
should be emphasized, however, that this is not to say that recognition may actually 
create an entitlement to remedial secession, but rather that it may determine the suc-
cess of an attempt at unilateral secession. 
Given this largely hypothetical option, it is to be recalled that the international 
responses to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence painted a different pic-
ture. It was seen that States generally did not disclose such a causal link between 
human rights concerns on the one hand and their decision to recognize on the other. 
A few States only made reference to human rights violations on the territory as one 
of the various – primarily non-legal – factors that led to the decision to recognize. 
It thus remains to be seen whether States will actually use the concept of remedial 
secession as some sort of guiding principle when deciding on whether or not to grant 
recognition to a claimant State in the future. In view of the political discretion which 
is left to States in this respect and the political interests that are at stake, political 
considerations will continue to play a prominent – if not decisive – role in this area. 
Moreover, the hypothetical option outlined here raises a more pragmatic question as 
to how many and which States need to recognize an aspirant State before such rec-
ognition may have constitutive effects.37 At present, however, no clear-cut answer to 
this question can be given. As was observed previously, both established recognition 
theories – the constitutive and the declaratory – appear to be inadequate to explain 
and appreciate cases in which the international community of States has remained 
divided and it is questionable whether a State has emerged as a matter of fact, such 
as the example of Kosovo. Needless to say, this is an undesirable situation, as it may 
leave the status of aspirant States uncertain. 
3.2. Remedial Secession and the Humanization of the International Legal Order
The emergence of the doctrine of remedial secession may well be appreciated in the 
context of the process which is often referred to as the humanization of the inter-
national legal order – and so might the possible future materialization of a legal enti-
tlement in this respect.38 This notion refers to the development of international law 
in J. Summers (ed.) Kosovo: A Precedent? The Declaration of Independence, the Advisory Opinion 
and Implications for Statehood, Self-Determination and Minority Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden/Boston 2011) at pp. 156-157; J. Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and 
(Lack of) Practice’ (2010) 6 St Antony’s International Review 37 at pp. 50-51.
36 Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 155.
37 See, for instance, Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’ at pp. 378-381.
38 Sometimes, the term constitutionalization is also used in this context. While both concepts are indeed 
related, it is submitted here that they are not synonymous. Rather, they may be seen as two sides of 
the same coin, as the constitutionalization involves the creation of a system with various institutions, 
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from a primarily State-centred system towards a human-centred system,39 in which 
States are no longer the sole actors and which is increasingly aimed at respecting and 
promoting the interests of human beings – both as individuals and as groups, labelled 
as peoples, minorities and indigenous populations.40 As such, this tendency affects 
some of the fundamental principles of the classical Westphalian system, most promi-
nently the notion of State sovereignty and its corollaries. It was aptly noted by one 
author that the humanization of the international legal order may thus be regarded as 
the quest for a new equilibrium which does not neglect the interests of States, but by 
no means automatically attaches the highest value to these interests either.41 While 
involving a kaleidoscopic process, in essence, the manifestation of this quest may be 
seen to be twofold: the rights and interests of the human being are being strength-
ened, while simultaneously the sacrosanct position of the State is being challenged. 
The gradual transformation of the international legal system outlined above has 
been marked with the codification of international human rights in response to the 
scourges of World War II. Considerations of morality and, more specifically, human-
ity influenced the international agenda more and more. The advent of international 
organizations – most prominently the United Nations – and regional organizations 
documents, and competences which have proven to be of significant importance for the acknowledge-
ment, implementation and enforcement of key norms in the process of the humanization of international 
law. On the constitutionalization of the international legal order, see for instance, J. Klabbers, A. Peters 
and G. Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2009); E. de Wet, The International Constitutional Order (Vossiuspers UvA, Amsterdam 2005).
39 Most writers use the term ‘individual-centred system’. For the present purposes, however, the term 
‘human-centred system’ is preferred, as the humanization of the international legal order does not merely 
focus on the interests of the individual, but on human beings in general, including groups such as peoples, 
minorities, and indigenous populations. Likewise, the term ‘individual’ seems to be avoided by Willem 
van Genugten. See W.J.M. van Genugten, ‘Handhaving van wereldrecht. Een kritische inspectie van 
valkuilen en dilemma’s’ (2010) 85 Nederlands Juristenblad 44 at p. 46. In even more general terms, Anne 
Peters referred to the development towards a ‘humanized system’. See A. Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and 
Ω of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 513 at p. 514.
40 For similar definitions or characterizations, see, for instance, A.A. Cançado Trindade, International 
Law for Humankind. Towards a New Jus Gentium (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2010) at p. 3 
(referring to the development towards a new jus gentium rather than using the term humanization of 
international law); Van Genugten, ‘Handhaving van wereldrecht. Een kritische inspectie van valkuilen en 
dilemma’s’ at p. 46; M.T. Kamminga, De humanisering van het volkenrecht (inaugural lecture) (Univer-
sitaire Pers Maastricht, Maastricht 2001) at p. 7; M.T. Kamminga, ‘Final Report on the Impact of Inter-
national Human Rights Law on General International Law’ in M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds) The 
Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) at p. 
2; T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2006) 
at p. xi (Introduction); Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a 
New Century: General Course on Public International Law’ at p. 162. 
41 See Van Genugten, ‘Handhaving van wereldrecht. Een kritische inspectie van valkuilen en dilem-
ma’s’ at p. 46: “De humanisering van de internationale rechtsorde, als inhaaloperatie op zoek naar een 
nieuw evenwicht waarin de belangen van staten niet worden weggeredeneerd maar ook niet langer per 
definitie het zwaarste wegen”.
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– such as the Council of Europe (CoE) – greatly contributed to this development. In a 
variety of ways, ranging from the framing of authoritative legal and non-legal instru-
ments and the establishment of specialized agencies to the creation of supervisory 
mechanisms and even international courts and tribunals, this stimulated a humanist 
vision of the international legal order. Consequently, recent decades have witnessed 
not only an increasing value attached to human rights and a proliferation of human 
rights instruments and mechanisms, but also a rising impact of human rights law and 
principles of humanity on various branches of general international law. Examples in 
this respect are the influence of the human rights discourse on the law of treaties, the 
law of war, international economic law, the doctrines of State responsibility and the 
immunity of heads of State, and as was seen previously in this study, even (scholarly 
thinking on) the formation process of customary international law.42 While perhaps 
not revolutionary per se, the endorsement of the responsibility to protect – com-
monly referred to as RtoP or R2P – by the UN General Assembly during the 2005 
World Summit43 is generally regarded as a major step in the humanization process, 
as it arguably reflected a new – or at least revisited – outlook on the relationship 
between State sovereignty and human rights.44 Indeed, the responsibility to protect 
is founded on the idea that sovereignty includes a responsibility, meaning that it has 
42 See Chapter V of the present study, critically considering the human rights approach towards cus-
tomary international law. On the impact of human rights law and principles of humanity on the vari-
ous branches of general international law, see Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind. 
Towards a New Jus Gentium; W.J.M. van Genugten, C. Homan, N.J. Schrijver and P.J.I.M. de Waart, 
The United Nations of the Future: Globalization with a Human Face (KIT-Publishers Amsterdam 2006); 
M.T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009); Meron, The Humanization of International Law. 
43 See UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (2005 World Summit Outcome), UN Doc. A/Res/60/1, 16 
September 2005, at paras 138-139: “[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails 
the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement through appropriate and necessary means. We 
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability”. See also, more recently, General Assembly, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/63/677, 12 January 2009. 
44 On the responsibility to protect, see, for instance, J. Genser and I. Cotler (eds), The Responsibility to 
Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (Oxford University Press, Oxford/New 
York 2012); C. Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (2007) 
101 American Journal of International Law 99. In this respect, it should be noted, however, that the 
responsibility to protect as initially envisaged by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) was much more encompassing than the concept as ultimately adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Respon-
sibility to Protect (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001), in particular paras 6.13-
6.40. See also W.W. Burke-White, ‘Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect’ in J. Genser and I. Cotler 
(eds) The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford/New York 2012) at pp. 17-29; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric 
or Emerging Legal Norm?’ at pp. 102-110.
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to be exercised in a responsible way. Since sovereignty and human rights are two 
sides of the same coin, they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, sovereignty is per-
ceived as implying a responsibility towards the inhabitants of the State. As a result 
of this responsibility, sovereignty does not necessarily preclude external interven-
tion – through the UN Security Council – when the State radically fails to meet its 
responsibility and submits its inhabitants to gross human rights violations, or does 
not protect them from other avoidable catastrophe.45 It is to be pointed out, however, 
that the responsibility to protect as adopted by the UN General Assembly is some-
times labelled as old wine in new bottles,46 as it merely allows for external interven-
tion with UN Security Council authorization, which was already permitted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the actual implementation of the respon-
sibility to protect has proved problematic.47 Despite the explicit acknowledgement of 
the concept by the UN General Assembly in 2005, broad and solid support appears to 
be lacking in practice and the fear of misuse of the concept and opening a Pandora’s 
Box generally seems to prevail amongst important players in the international arena. 
Admittedly, the responsibility to protect was applied in the case of Libya48 and Côte 
d’Ivoire.49 Focusing on Libya, the UN Security Council for the first time relied on the 
responsibility to protect to approve a no-fly zone and authorize military intervention 
to protect civilians from a despotic and brutal regime in Resolution 1973 (2011).50 
While both this Resolution and the subsequent NATO-led intervention in Libya can 
be regarded as milestones with respect to the responsibility to protect,51 there has 
been fierce criticism on the implementation of the concept as well. For example, the 
intervention has been criticized for causing many civilian casualties. Moreover, it 
has been contended that NATO interpreted the authorization to use armed force for 
human protection purposes too extensively so as to include the overthrow of the de 
45 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
in particular at paras 2.7-2.15. 
46 See, for instance, Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’; 
S.P. Marks and N. Cooper, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Watershed or Old Wine in a New Bottle?’ 
(2010) 2 Jindal Global Law Review. 
47 See E.C. Luck, ‘From Promise to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ in J. Genser 
and I. Cotler (eds) The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2012), in particular at pp. 97-106; Marks and Cooper, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: Watershed or Old Wine in a New Bottle?’ at pp. 122-126.
48 See A.J. Bellamy and P.D. Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 87 International Affairs 825 at pp. 838-846.
49 See ibid. at pp. 829-838. For the authorization of the use of armed force, see UN Security Council 
Resolution 1975 (2011) (Côte d’Ivoire), UN Doc. S/Res/1975 (2011), 30 March 2011.
50 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) (Libya), UN Doc. S/Res/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, 
at paras 4 and 6. The Resolution was adopted with ten votes in favour and five abstentions.
51 See M.S. Helal, ‘Middle East’ in J. Genser and I. Cotler (eds) The Responsibility to Protect: The 




jure regime. Such interpretation seems to blur the lines between the responsibility to 
protect on the one hand, and (pro-democratic) intervention on the other.52 Arguably, 
the case of Libya underlines: 
the need to further elucidate and elaborate the scope and content of [the responsibility 
to protect], and determine the policies and procedures that best serve the underlying 
purpose of [the responsibility to protect], namely the protection of civilians from egre-
gious violations of their fundamental human rights.53
More generally, the above has illustrated that, notwithstanding the shift in thinking 
that has been realized since its inception and the impact the humanization process 
has had on international legal practice to date, the humanization of the international 
legal order has by no means been accomplished. Rather, it involves a dynamic and 
multifaceted yet arduous process, which is ongoing.54
Whatever the present stage of this transition, it is against the background of the 
humanization of the international legal order that the debate on the question of a right 
to external self-determination after serious injustices and the emergence of the doc-
trine of remedial secession might be appreciated. The suggestion of an ‘emergency 
exit’55 for peoples being submitted to oppression and flagrant human rights abuses by 
their own State arguably fits well in the humanization tendency. With this idea of an 
‘emergency exit’, it is attempted to introduce considerations of humanity as a signifi-
cant counterweight to the rights and interests of the State. The twofold manifestation 
of the humanization process is reflected here as well: first, it is sought to consoli-
date and expand people’s right to (external) self-determination beyond the context 
of decolonization, and secondly, it simultaneously challenges the inviolable position 
of the State by prioritizing the interests of the people over the sovereign preroga-
tives of the State, when they conflict. As such, some parallels with the responsibility 
to protect may be discerned. Similar to the responsibility to protect, the concept of 
remedial secession departs from a relative understanding of the traditional Westphal-
ian legal order, suggesting that in the case of gross injustices, a State may forfeit its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity (thus clearing the way for unilateral secession as 
52 See, for instance, Bellamy and Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and 
the Responsibility to Protect’ at p. 846; Helal, ‘Middle East’ at p. 229.
53 See Helal, ‘Middle East’ at p. 230. For a similar observation with respect to Côte d’Ivoire, see Bel-
lamy and Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Pro-
tect’ at p. 838.
54 See Van Genugten, ‘Handhaving van wereldrecht. Een kritische inspectie van valkuilen en dilem-
ma’s’ at p. 46. By contrast, Anne Peters has contended that the endorsement of the responsibility to 
protect has “definitely ousted the principle of sovereignty from its position as a Letztbegründung (first 
principle) of international law”. See Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ at p. 514.
55 See P.H. Kooijmans, ‘Zelfbeschikkingsrecht. Naar een nieuwe interpretatie?’ in N. Sybesma-Knol 
and J. van Bellingen (eds) Naar een nieuwe interpretatie van het recht op zelfbeschikking? (VUB Press, 
Brussels 1995) at p. 168.
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a remedy). And similar to the rationale behind the responsibility to protect, this boils 
down to the idea of sovereignty (and territorial integrity) as a responsibility of the 
State towards its inhabitants. When viewed in this light, the idea of remedial seces-
sion – once accepted as an international legal norm or principle – may be seen as 
contributing to the gradual transformation from a State-centred system to a human-
centred system. 
However, given that, to date, the concept of remedial secession has not been 
endorsed by the international community of States at large, one may wonder whether 
the contemporary international stance towards unilateral secession demonstrates that 
the limits of the humanization of this particular field of international law have been 
reached. Over recent decades, the position of the human being has been strengthened, 
while simultaneously States (including their highest representatives) have lost their 
inviolable position and influence in various branches of international law. Yet when 
it comes to the right to (external) self-determination, attempts at unilateral secession 
and the success thereof through granting or withholding recognition, States continue 
to be the prime actors, demarcating their own playing field and the applicable rules 
of play. They may be viewed as the ‘gatekeepers’56 of the international legal order, 
deciding who will be admitted to their system. The current shortage of support for 
the concept of remedial secession by States and, for instance, the problematic imple-
mentation of the responsibility to protect are symptomatic of the conclusion that, as 
was observed by Christian Tomuschat, “the transformation from international law 
as a State-centred system to an individual-centred system has not yet found a new 
equilibrium”.57 Nonetheless, the quest for this new balance between the sovereign 
prerogatives of the State on the one hand and the interests of human beings will in all 
probability continue. In view of this ongoing development and the traces of a reme-
dial right to unilateral secession which can be found at present, it is not impossible 
that, one day, such a right will indeed be part and parcel of positive international law. 
56 This term was also used by Cedric Ryngaert and Sven Sobrie. See C. Ryngaert and S. Sobrie, ‘Rec-
ognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, 
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 467 at p. 489.
57 Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: 





1. een Recht op ‘Remedial SeceSSion’?
In dit onderzoek stond de hedendaagse betekenis van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van 
volkeren centraal en, meer in het bijzonder, het vraagstuk betreffende externe zelf-
beschikking als een remedie tegen ernstig onrecht. Daarbij was de volgende onder-
zoeksvraag het uitgangspunt:
In hoeverre is een recht op ‘remedial secession’, dat wil zeggen een recht op externe 
zelfbeschikking als een remedie tegen ernstig onrecht, tot stand gekomen onder het 
hedendaagse internationale recht? 
De belangrijkste conclusie van deze studie is dat een recht op externe zelfbeschik-
king als remedie tegen ernstig onrecht nog niet tot ontwikkeling is gekomen onder 
het hedendaagse internationale recht. Hoewel enige steun voor het bestaan van een 
dergelijk recht bestaat, zijn de theoretische grondslagen hiervan vrij zwak, terwijl 
de voornaamste tekortkoming bestaat uit het gebrek aan erkenning van een recht op 
‘remedial secession’ in de statenpraktijk. Hieronder zullen de belangrijkste bevin-
dingen van deze studie, die hebben geleid tot bovengenoemde conclusie, worden 
samengevat. 
2.  de opkomSt van het zelfbeSchikkingSRecht
Om de kernbetekenis van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht te kunnen vaststellen en de 
vraag naar de algemeen aanvaarde, hedendaagse betekenis van het recht te kunnen 
beantwoorden, is de historische ontwikkeling van het concept zelfbeschikking als 
uitgangspunt genomen. In Hoofdstuk II werd duidelijk dat de basis van het concept 
kan worden teruggeleid tot de theorieën en ideologieën die ten grondslag lagen aan 
en voortkwamen uit de Amerikaanse en Franse Revoluties. Ondanks deze vroege 
sporen, verscheen het concept van zelfbeschikking pas tijdens de nasleep van de 
Eerste Wereldoorlog op het internationale toneel. T. Woodrow Wilson propageerde 
zelfbeschikking in zijn voorstel voor een vredesakkoord in 1918. Hoewel nog niet uit-
gegroeid tot een positief recht, zorgden Wilsons inspanningen ervoor dat het concept 
van zelfbeschikking zich had ontwikkeld tot een politiek beginsel op internationaal 
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niveau. Deze ontwikkeling werd tevens weerspiegeld in de instelling van mandaat-
gebieden door de Volkenbond. Ondanks het feit dat het concept van zelfbeschikking 
vlak na de Eerste Wereldoorlog werd gezien als een politiek beginsel, was de toe-
passing ervan enigszins willekeurig. Het kreeg voor het eerst juridische betekenis 
in de Åland Islands-zaak uit 1920, die over het algemeen wordt beschouwd als een 
mijlpaal in de ontwikkeling van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht. In deze zaak ontkenden 
de Commissie van Juristen en het Comité van Rapporteurs van de Volkenbond het 
bestaan van een (algemeen) recht op zelfbeschikking door middel van de afscheiding 
van een deel van een territoir. Wel leek de mogelijkheid van afscheiding als laatste 
redmiddel in het geval van extreme onderdrukking te worden erkend.  
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog begon de tweede fase in de evolutie van het zelf-
beschikkingsrecht, toen het concept werd opgenomen in het Handvest van de Ver-
enigde Naties (hierna: VN-Handvest). Aangezien het VN-Handvest zelfbeschikking 
als een van de voornaamste doelstellingen van de organisatie introduceerde, werd dit 
beschouwd als een belangrijke stap in de ontwikkeling van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht. 
Hoewel de artikelen 1(2) en 55 van het Handvest expliciet verwijzen naar het concept 
van zelfbeschikking, bleven de precieze juridische status en inhoud van het begrip 
onduidelijk. Dit werd verduidelijkt tegen de achtergrond van het dekolonisatieproces, 
toen zelfbeschikking werd gezien als een recht voor koloniale volkeren. Resolutie 
1514 (XV) van de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties wordt over het 
algemeen gezien als een van de belangrijkste bijdragen aan het dekolonisatieproces, 
aangezien het de noodzaak tot het beëindigen van kolonialisme verkondigde en stelde 
dat alle (koloniale) volkeren het recht op zelfbeschikking hebben. Als zodanig werd 
het zelfbeschikkingsrecht gezien als een recht op een onafhankelijke Staat (of om 
zich te verenigen met of integreren in een andere Staat), zodat het volk vrijelijk zijn 
politieke status kan bepalen en vrijelijk zijn economische, sociale en culturele ont-
wikkeling kan nastreven. In de dekolonisatiecontext werd het zelfbeschikkingsrecht 
dus voornamelijk extern geïmplementeerd en werd het geacht te zijn verwezenlijkt 
zodra een koloniaal gebied onafhankelijk werd van zijn kolonisator. Het belang en 
het fundamentele karakter van dit recht werden benadrukt door het Internationaal 
Gerechtshof in de East Timor-zaak, waarin het Hof vaststelde dat het zelfbeschik-
kingsrecht is uitgegroeid tot een erga omnes norm, en daarmee een verplichting 
betreft ten opzichte van de gehele internationale gemeenschap. Het Hof stelde niet 
expliciet dat het zelfbeschikkingsrecht een norm van dwingend internationaal recht 
vormt. Toch wordt vaak gesteld dat het recht op zelfbeschikking met betrekking tot 
afhankelijke (koloniale) gebieden de status van jus cogens heeft bereikt, hetgeen bete-
kent dat er onder geen enkele omstandigheid van mag worden afgeweken. Het was 
tegen de achtergrond van het dekolonisatieproces dat het Internationaal Gerechtshof 
de kernbetekenis van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht heeft vormgegeven. In zijn advies 
in de Western Sahara-zaak heeft het Hof benadrukt dat het essentiële kenmerk van 
het zelfbeschikkingsrecht is dat de toepassing ervan de vrije en oprechte uiting van 
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de wil van het volk vereist. Als zodanig kreeg het zelfbeschikkingsrecht een nieuwe 
betekenis na de dekolonisatieperiode.
3. de hedendaagSe betekeniS van het zelfbeSchikkingSRecht
Na het dekolonisatieproces zette de ontwikkeling van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht zich 
voort. In dit verband kunnen twee belangrijke ontwikkelingen worden onderschei-
den. De eerste ontwikkeling betrof de (voortdurende) evolutie van de juridische 
status van zelfbeschikking. Als gevolg van de opname van bepalingen in diverse 
nieuwe internationale instrumenten, zoals het gemeenschappelijke Artikel 1 van de 
mensenrechtenverdragen van 1966 (het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Burgerlijke en 
Politieke Rechten en het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Economische, Sociale en Cul-
turele Rechten), ontwikkelde het zelfbeschikkingsrecht zicht tot een fundamenteel, 
positief recht. De tweede ontwikkeling betrof het uitkristalliseren en de erkenning 
van de twee dimensies van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht. In Hoofdstuk II werd duide-
lijk dat het zelfbeschikkingsrecht tijdens de dekolonisatieperiode in de eerste plaats 
geacht werd extern te worden gerealiseerd. In de laatste decennia is in de praktijk en 
in internationaalrechtelijke documenten echter een interne dimensie opgekomen. Met 
de opkomst van deze interne manifestatie van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht werd een 
andere wijze van implementatie meer relevant. Het zelfbeschikkingsrecht wordt niet 
langer slechts gerealiseerd door de vorming van nieuwe, onafhankelijke Staten, maar 
daarnaast vereist het doorlopende implementatie binnen de grenzen van bestaande 
Staten, in de relatie tussen een volk en zijn regering. De kernbetekenis van deze 
interne dimensie kan worden gedefinieerd als de noodzaak om rekening te houden 
met de vrije wil van volkeren. Dit vertaalt zich in twee belangrijke vereisten, name-
lijk de aanwezigheid van een representatieve regering en participatie van de bevol-
king in het politieke besluitvormingsproces binnen de Staat. In aanvulling hierop 
kunnen speciale regelingen, zoals autonomie, federalisme, of ‘complex power-sha-
ring’ soms noodzakelijk zijn om de interne dimensie van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht te 
verzekeren voor alle inwoners van de Staat. Immers, niet alleen de gehele bevolking 
van een Staat, maar ook subgroepen binnen een Staat en inheemse volkeren kunnen 
worden beschouwd als dragers of subjecten van het recht op interne zelfbeschikking. 
Ondanks de vrij recente opkomst van de interne dimensie van het zelfbeschik-
kingsrecht en de nadruk op dit interne aspect in hedendaagse juridische en politieke 
documenten, blijft de meer traditionele, externe dimensie van het zelfbeschikkings-
recht ook vandaag de dag nog relevant. Zoals verklaard in de VN-Verklaring inzake 
Vriendschappelijke Relaties tussen Staten, kan deze externe dimensie worden geïm-
plementeerd door de vreedzame desintegratie van een Staat, de vereniging of fusie 
van een Staat met een andere Staat, of door secessie. Deze laatste modaliteit van 
externe zelfbeschikking kan worden gedefinieerd als de oprichting van een nieuwe, 
onafhankelijke Staat door de afscheiding van een integraal deel van het grondgebied 
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van een bestaande Staat, hetzij met of zonder toestemming van deze staat of een 
constitutionele machtiging. Wanneer uitgeoefend door de bevolking van een Staat 
als geheel of wanneer het gaat om een consensuele of constitutionele secessie, wordt 
externe zelfbeschikking niet als problematisch gezien onder internationaal recht. In 
het geval van een consensuele of constitutionele secessie wordt het recht op afschei-
ding gebaseerd op nationaal in plaats van internationaal recht. De rechtmatigheid van 
unilaterale secessie – dat wil zeggen de afscheiding van een deel van een grondge-
bied door een deel van de bevolking van de Staat zonder toestemming of grondwet-
telijke regeling – is echter meer omstreden. Deze controverse kan verklaard worden 
door een aantal factoren. De eerste factor betreft het feit dat internationaalrechtelijke 
documenten een expliciete erkenning noch een uitdrukkelijk verbod op unilaterale 
secessie bevatten. De tweede factor betreft het risico van de ontwrichtende werking 
die deze modaliteit van externe zelfbeschikking kan hebben. Er lijkt immers een con-
flict te bestaan tussen de traditionele internationaalrechtelijke beginselen van staats-
soevereiniteit en respect voor de territoriale integriteit – gericht op handhaving van 
de territoriale status quo – enerzijds, en een vermeend recht op unilaterale secessie 
– dat territoriale verandering teweegbrengt – anderzijds. Niet alleen zou een derge-
lijk recht op unilaterale secessie de traditionele internationale rechtsorde verstoren, 
het kan ook leiden tot vergaande fragmentatie van Staten en daarmee een mogelijke 
bedreiging vormen voor de internationale of regionale vrede en stabiliteit. Gelet op 
deze controverse en onduidelijkheid over het al dan niet bestaan van een recht op een-
zijdige afscheiding, verdient de stand van het internationale recht met betrekking tot 
de vraag naar een recht op unilaterale secessie en, meer specifiek, unilaterale secessie 
als een remedie tegen ernstig onrecht, ook wel aangeduid als ‘remedial secession’, 
nader onderzoek.      
4. SpoRen van een Recht op ‘Remedial SeceSSion’ in het hedendaagSe 
inteRnationale Recht
Om te toetsen in hoeverre een recht op ‘remedial secession’ tot ontwikkeling is geko-
men onder het hedendaagse internationale recht, werd in Hoofdstuk IV de klassieke 
methode van onderzoek naar de diverse bronnen van het internationale recht toege-
past. Artikel 38(1) van het Statuut van het Internationaal Gerechtshof en de bronnen 
die hierin worden opgesomd vormden het uitgangspunt. Internationaal gewoonte-
recht verdiende separate behandeling vanwege het belang van de internationale prak-
tijk van Staten voor de ontwikkeling van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht in het algemeen. 
De conclusie dat de theoretische basis van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ enigs-
zins zwak is, maakte het bovendien nog belangrijker om het al dan niet bestaan van 
een gewoonterechtelijke norm gedetailleerd onder de loep te nemen. 
Allereerst zijn internationale verdragen onderzocht om te bezien of hierin sporen 
van een recht op unilaterale secessie zijn te vinden. In dit verband werd duidelijk dat 
Samenvatting
325
het VN-Handvest, de mensenrechtenverdragen van 1966, het Verdrag van Wenen 
inzake Statenopvolging met betrekking tot Verdragen (1978), en het Internationaal 
Verdrag inzake de Uitbanning van alle Vormen van Rassendiscriminatie (IVRD) nau-
welijks handvatten bieden met betrekking tot de vraag naar het bestaan van een recht 
op unilaterale secessie. Noch de tekst van deze documenten, noch de ontstaansge-
schiedenis of context boden een overtuigend antwoord op deze vraag. 
Vervolgens is de doctrine onder de loep genomen. Als gevolg van de werken van 
Lee C. Buchheit en Antonio Cassese heeft een aanzienlijk aantal auteurs zich op het 
standpunt gesteld dat een recht op unilaterale secessie in uitzonderlijke omstandig-
heden bestaat. Zij baseren zich voornamelijk op twee internationale instrumenten, 
namelijk de VN-Verklaring inzake Vriendschappelijke Relaties tussen Staten (1970) 
en de Verklaring en het Actieprogramma van Wenen (1993). Beide documenten 
bevatten een clausule (de zogenoemde ‘safeguard clause’), die respect voor de ter-
ritoriale integriteit van Staten die zich gedragen overeenkomstig het beginsel van 
gelijke rechten en zelfbeschikking van volkeren en dus met een regering die repre-
sentatief is voor de gehele bevolking, zonder onderscheid naar ras, geloof, of huids-
kleur, bevestigt. 
Wanneer deze clausule a contrario wordt gelezen, zou deze kunnen suggereren 
dat een Staat zonder een representatieve, niet discriminerende regering geen recht 
op territoriale integriteit heeft. Een dergelijke interpretatie zou een recht op unila-
terale afscheiding niet uitsluiten. Sterker nog, wanneer de Staat een volk het recht 
op interne zelfbeschikking ontzegt, zou dit het ontstaan van een recht op externe 
zelfbeschikking door middel van unilaterale afscheiding rechtvaardigen. Naast het 
gebrek aan interne zelfbeschikking worden drie andere parameters voor de uitoe-
fening van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ veelvuldig genoemd in de literatuur, 
namelijk flagrante schendingen van fundamentele mensenrechten, structurele discri-
minatie en de uitputting van alle vreedzame middelen. Als zodanig wordt unilaterale 
secessie gezien als een laatste redmiddel voor dergelijke ernstig onrecht gepleegd 
door de Staat. Ondanks het feit dat er relatieve overeenstemming lijkt te bestaan 
over de omstandigheden waaronder een recht op ‘remedial secession’ zou ontstaan, 
zijn degenen die hiervoor pleiten verdeeld over de vraag naar de subjecten van een 
dergelijk recht. Al wordt ‘remedial secession’ over het algemeen gezien als een recht 
van ‘volkeren’, de nadere invulling van dit begrip blijft problematisch. Auteurs lijken 
vooral verdeeld over de vraag welke minderheden – numeriek, linguïstisch, religi-
eus, etnisch, etc. – kunnen worden beschouwd als een ‘volk’ dat drager is van een 
recht op unilaterale secessie. Tevens dient te worden benadrukt dat, hoewel een aan-
zienlijk aantal  auteurs heeft betoogd dat een recht op ‘remedial secession’ bestaat, 
de doctrine niet eenduidig is over deze kwestie. Vooral – maar niet uitsluitend – in 
het kader van Kosovo’s eenzijdige onafhankelijkheidsverklaring kon worden vast-
gesteld dat auteurs enigszins terughoudend waren om het bestaan van een recht op 
unilaterale secessie te claimen, zowel in het specifieke geval van Kosovo als meer 
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in het algemeen. Diverse rechtsgeleerden hebben een dergelijke stelling zelfs expli-
ciet verworpen. De a contrario lezing van de zogenoemde ‘safeguard clause’ werd 
bijvoorbeeld afgewezen als een gerechtvaardigd middel om de interpretatie van een 
van de basisbeginselen van internationaal recht, namelijk het principe van territoriale 
integriteit, fundamenteel te wijzigen. Maar bovenal waren deze auteurs van mening 
dat er in de praktijk onvoldoende en overtuigend bewijs is voor het bestaan van een 
recht op ‘remedial secession’.
Nadat was geconcludeerd dat een recht op ‘remedial secession’ aanzienlijke – 
maar zeker niet afdoende – steun geniet in de doctrine, richtte Hoofdstuk IV zich op 
de toetsing van de uitspraken en opinies van zowel nationale als internationale rech-
terlijke organen. Hieruit bleek dat deze organen in diverse gevallen hebben verwezen 
naar de erkenning van een recht op ‘remedial secession’. In de meeste gevallen werd 
echter niet uitvoerig stilgestaan bij de precieze omstandigheden waaronder een recht 
op unilaterale secessie rechtmatig zou kunnen worden uitgeoefend. Toch kan in dit 
opzicht een aantal omstandigheden worden onderscheiden, namelijk het bestaan van 
ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen en het feitelijk ontzeggen van de uitoefening van 
het recht op interne zelfbeschikking. Ondanks de zekere mate van steun voor de stel-
ling dat een recht op ‘remedial secession’ bestaat onder het huidige internationale 
recht, moeten enkele belangrijke kanttekeningen worden gemaakt. In de eerste plaats 
werd opgemerkt dat de rechters zich in sommige gevallen beriepen op een tendens 
die zij uit de literatuur hadden afgeleid en niet op hun eigen mening over de vraag of 
een recht op unilaterale afscheiding of ‘remedial secession’ bestaat onder internatio-
naal recht. Het oordeel van het Canadese Hooggerechtshof in de Reference re Seces-
sion of Quebec is daarvan een duidelijk voorbeeld. Een tweede kanttekening betreft 
de voorzichtige bewoordingen die door de meeste rechterlijke instanties werden 
gebruikt wanneer zij stelden dat een recht unilaterale afscheiding of ‘remedial seces-
sion’ bestaat. In de Reference re Secession of Quebec, bijvoorbeeld, constateerde het 
Canadese Hooggerechtshof een trend in de doctrine wat betreft ‘remedial secession’, 
maar merkte het ook op dat het onzeker blijft of dit vermeende recht daadwerkelijk 
is geworteld in het positieve internationale recht. Ook het Internationaal Gerechtshof 
betrachtte terughoudendheid in zijn advies over Kosovo’s eenzijdige onafhankelijk-
heidsverklaring, waarin het met name benadrukte dat de visies van Staten op dit 
punt uiteenliepen. De Afrikaanse Commissie voor de Rechten van Mensen en Volken 
refereerde in de zaak betreffende Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire niet expliciet 
aan een recht op unilaterale afscheiding of ‘remedial secession’. Slechts wanneer de 
uitspraak a contrario wordt gelezen, zou de redenering van de Afrikaanse Commis-
sie kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd als een erkenning van een recht op unilaterale 
afscheiding als een remedie tegen ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen en het ontzeg-
gen van interne zelfbeschikking. Een derde en laatste kanttekening betreft het feit 
dat geen enkele rechterlijke instantie een volk daadwerkelijk een recht op eenzijdige 
afscheiding heeft toegekend in het licht van de specifieke omstandigheden van het 
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geval. Rechterlijke erkenning van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ is tot op heden 
slechts theoretisch gebleven. Geconcludeerd werd dan ook dat hoewel de uitspraken 
en opinies van rechterlijke organen sporen bevatten van de acceptatie van een recht 
op ‘remedial secession’, zij onvoldoende duidelijkheid bieden over deze materie.     
Vervolgens zijn de algemene rechtsbeginselen bestudeerd. Daarbij werden twee 
categorieën onderscheiden. Ten eerste werden algemene rechtsbeginselen aange-
stipt die in de meerderheid van de nationale rechtssystemen voorkomen, zoals goede 
trouw, proportionaliteit en billijkheid. Gesteld werd dat dergelijke beginselen ach-
tergrondbeginselen zijn die slechts een ondergeschikte rol kunnen spelen, aangezien 
zij gebruikt worden om bestaande internationaalrechtelijke normen in een specifieke 
situatie te interpreteren. De tweede categorie betrof algemene rechtsbeginselen die 
tot ontwikkeling zijn gekomen in het internationale recht en van toepassing zijn op 
de verhoudingen tussen Staten. In dit verband werden allereerst de beginselen van 
respect voor de territoriale integriteit van Staten en uti possidetis juris onder de loep 
genomen, aangezien vaak wordt gesteld dat deze fundamentele beginselen van de 
internationale rechtsorde botsen met een vermeend recht op unilaterale secessie. 
Nadere beschouwing van deze beginselen maakte echter duidelijk dat deze concep-
ten niet volledig onverenigbaar zijn. Met betrekking tot het beginsel van respect voor 
de territoriale integriteit van Staten werd eerst aangevoerd dat separatistische groe-
pen kunnen worden gezien als (additionele) subjecten van dit beginsel en hieraan dus 
gebonden zijn. Daarnaast werd betoogd dat het beginsel van territoriale integriteit 
geenszins absoluut is. Het wegen van het beginsel van territoriale integriteit enerzijds 
en het zelfbeschikkingsrecht anderzijds laat derhalve enige ruimte voor een recht 
op ‘remedial secession’. Wat betreft het beginsel van uti possidetis juris werd eerst 
opgemerkt dat het nog twijfelachtig is of het van toepassing is op alle situaties waarin 
sprake is van de oprichting van een nieuwe, onafhankelijke staat, met inbegrip van 
die situaties waarin de separatistische entiteit niet verbonden is aan een gebied dat 
wordt begrensd door een soort interne grenzen, zoals provinciale of federale gren-
zen. Waar het beginsel wel van toepassing is, zou uti possidetis juris enkel geogra-
fische grenzen stellen aan de uitoefening van het recht op (externe) zelfbeschikking 
en niet de uitoefening van dit recht in zijn algemeenheid beperken. In aanvulling op 
de beginselen van respect voor de territoriale integriteit van Staten en uti possidetis 
juris, werd zelfbeschikking kort aangestipt in de hoedanigheid van een algemeen 
beginsel van internationaal recht. Als zodanig omvat het de kernbetekenis van zelf-
beschikking. Toch functioneert dit beginsel alleen als een zeer losse en overkoepe-
lende standaard, die slechts van beperkte betekenis is als het gaat om verstrekkende 
vragen als die met betrekking tot een recht op ‘remedial secession’. Tot slot werd 
geconcludeerd dat algemene rechtsbeginselen niet voorzien in een sluitend antwoord 
op de vraag of een recht op ‘remedial secession’ vandaag de dag bestaat: de beginse-
len laten noch duidelijke sporen van een dergelijk recht, noch een eenduidig verbod 
daarop zien.  
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Tot slot, na bestudering van de bronnen van het internationale recht zoals opge-
nomen in Artikel 38(1) van het Statuut van het Internationaal Gerechtshof – met uit-
zondering van internationaal gewoonterecht, dat afzonderlijk werd behandeld in de 
Hoofdstukken V en VI – werden twee aanvullende bronnen van internationaal recht 
aangestipt, namelijk de eenzijdige rechtshandelingen van Staten en besluiten van inter-
nationale organisaties. Eenzijdige rechtshandelingen van Staten die met name rele-
vant zijn voor deze studie zijn formele erkenningsverklaringen, die zijn bestudeerd in 
het kader van de internationale reacties op pogingen tot unilaterale secessie. Daarbij 
werd echter duidelijk dat de verklaringen waarin Kosovo als een onafhankelijke Staat 
werd erkend, geen recht op ‘remedial secession’ ondersteunen. Integendeel, de meeste 
Staten erkenden Kosovo met het oog op vrede en stabiliteit in de regio. De inhoud 
van de relevante VN-documenten, zoals de VN-Verklaring inzake Vriendschappelijke 
Relaties tussen Staten en de Verklaring en het Actieprogramma van Wenen, werden 
behandeld in het kader van de ontwikkeling van het recht op zelfbeschikking na de 
dekolonisatieperiode en de hedendaagse betekenis ervan, en tevens tegen de achter-
grond van de doctrine. Daarbij werd vastgesteld dat de zogeheten ‘safeguard clauses’ 
van deze juridisch niet-bindende documenten a contrario zijn uitgelegd als een erken-
ning van een recht op unilaterale secessie als een remedie voor het gebrek aan interne 
zelfbeschikking. Toch werd, gelet op de aard van deze documenten, gesteld dat terug-
houdendheid moet worden betracht bij het afleiden van juridische normen uit deze 
stukken, aangezien zij vaak het resultaat zijn van politieke compromissen en over het 
algemeen niet zijn bedoeld om juridisch bindende normen in het leven te roepen.
Samenvattend werd in Hoofdstuk IV aangetoond dat in het hedendaagse interna-
tionale recht een zekere mate van (theoretische) steun bestaat voor het bestaan van 
een recht op ‘remedial secession’. Deze steun werd in de eerste plaats gevonden in 
wetenschappelijke literatuur en, in beperktere mate, in de uitspraken en opinies van 
rechterlijke organen. Benadrukt werd dat deze bronnen volgens Artikel 38(1) van het 
Statuut van het Internationaal Gerechtshof subsidiaire bronnen zijn en dus slechts van 
aanvullende in plaats van primaire waarde zijn. Daarnaast werd vastgesteld dat het 
bestaan ven een recht op ‘remedial secession’ eerst en vooral is gebaseerd op een a 
contrario lezing van de ‘safeguard clauses’ van de VN Verklaring inzake Vriendschap-
pelijke Relaties tussen Staten en de Verklaring en het Actieprogramma van Wenen. 
Een dergelijke interpretatie is niet alleen vooruitstrevend, maar ook controversieel, 
vooral gelet op de onduidelijkheid van de clausule en de gevoelige verhouding met het 
fundamentele beginsel van respect voor de territoriale integriteit van Staten. Gecon-
cludeerd werd dan ook dat de theoretische basis van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ 
erg zwak is. Met het oog op deze bevindingen is het belangrijk om te onderzoeken 
of de internationale praktijk van Staten wel voldoende en overtuigende steun voor 
een dergelijk recht weerspiegelt, nam hiermee toe. De volgende hoofdstukken waren 
daarom gericht op het beantwoorden van de vraag of een recht op ‘remedial secession’ 
bestaat als een norm van internationaal gewoonterecht.
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5. inleidende opmeRkingen oveR het toetSen van het beStaan 
van een Recht op ‘Remedial SeceSSion’ ondeR inteRnationaal 
gewoonteRecht
Alvorens te toetsen of een recht op ‘remedial secession’ zich heeft ontwikkeld tot 
een gewoonterechtelijke norm, werd het concept van internationaal gewoonterecht, 
inclusief de hedendaagse interpretaties daarvan, uitgewerkt in Hoofdstuk V. Opge-
merkt werd dat praktijk van Staten traditioneel wordt beschouwd als het belangrijk-
ste element voor de totstandkoming van gewoonterechtelijke normen, terwijl opinio 
juris blijk geeft  van de overtuiging dat rechtens zo gehandeld behoort te worden. 
Daarbij werd opgemerkt dat de praktijk van Staten slechts onder voorwaarden bij-
draagt aan de totstandkoming van internationaal gewoonterecht. Drie factoren zijn 
belangrijk in dit opzicht: de uniformiteit, de wijdverbreidheid en representativiteit, 
en mogelijk ook de duur van de praktijk. Tevens werd opgemerkt dat hoewel de beide 
componenten van gewoonterecht twee duidelijk te onderscheiden elementen zijn die 
afzonderlijk bewijs voor de vaststelling van gewoonterecht vereisen, zij steeds verder 
naar elkaar zijn toegegroeid. Dat is het gevolg van een inclusieve benadering van 
Statenpraktijk, waarbij niet alleen de fysieke handelingen (en omissies) van Staten, 
maar ook hun verbale handelingen relevant zijn. Deze verbale handelingen zijn nauw 
verbonden met de subjectieve component van gewoonterecht, opinio juris, aange-
zien de inhoud van verbale handelingen vaak ook de rechtsovertuiging van staten 
weergeeft. Deze verwevenheid maakt het moeilijk – en wellicht zelfs overwegend 
theoretisch – om de twee elementen van gewoonterecht te scheiden. In dit verband 
werd opgemerkt dat er een algemene tendens bestaat om opinio juris af te leiden uit 
de aanwezigheid van Statenpraktijk, mits de aanwezige praktijk voldoende ‘dicht’ en 
duidelijk is. Dit werd aangemerkt als de hedendaagse interpretatie van de traditionele 
benadering.     
In Hoofdstuk V werden bovendien enkele progressieve maar meer controversi-
ele benaderingen van het vaststellen van internationaal gewoonterecht kritisch onder 
de loep genomen, zoals de glijdende schaal-theorie en de mensenrechtenbenadering. 
In tegenstelling tot het conventionele model dat Statenpraktijk benadrukt, verkiezen 
deze benaderingen opinio juris boven de (fysieke) handelingen van Staten. Boven-
dien weerspiegelen deze opvattingen een relatie tussen de inhoudelijke betekenis van 
de norm enerzijds, en de bereidheid om tekortkomingen in de traditionele elementen 
van gewoonterecht tegen elkaar af te wegen of zelfs te negeren anderzijds. In dit 
verband werd gesteld dat de progressieve modellen van internationaal gewoonte-
recht sterk zijn ingegeven door morele of humanitaire overwegingen. Hoewel derge-
lijke benaderingen inderdaad aantrekkelijk kunnen zijn vanuit moreel of humanitair 
perspectief, werd een aantal serieuze bezwaren op zowel conceptueel, methodolo-
gisch en meer inhoudelijk niveau opgeworpen. Zo werd betoogd dat de progressieve 
modellen – voornamelijk de mensenrechtenbenadering – de aard van internationaal 
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gewoonterecht te ver oprekken, omdat deze methoden het mogelijk maken om 
nieuwe gewoonterechtelijke normen vast te stellen wanneer dat wenselijk wordt 
geacht vanuit een moreel of humanitair perspectief. Als zodanig lijken de progres-
sieve benaderingen internationaal recht zoals het momenteel is te verwarren met hoe 
internationaal recht er idealiter zou uitzien. 
Gezien de kritiek op de zeer progressieve theorieën enerzijds, en gezien de evolutie 
die de traditionele benadering van internationaal gewoonterecht heeft doorgemaakt 
anderzijds, werd geconcludeerd dat de hedendaagse interpretatie van de traditionele 
benadering dient te worden gebruikt bij het toetsen of een recht op ‘remedial seces-
sion’ onder internationaal gewoonterecht tot stand is gekomen. Om het onderscheid 
tussen lex lata en lex ferenda te handhaven, werd een aanpak voorgesteld waarbij 
eerst en vooral de aanwezigheid van Statenpraktijk en opinio juris vereist zijn voor 
de vaststelling van nieuwe gewoonterechtelijke normen. Deze benadering erkent dat 
Statenpraktijk zowel fysieke als verbale handelingen van Staten omvat, en dat een 
tekort van de ene verschijningsvorm kan worden gecompenseerd door de kracht van 
de ander. Daarbij werd echter wel benadrukt dat de twee verschijningsvormen van 
Statenpraktijk niet volledig uitwisselbaar zijn als gevolg waarvan fysieke handelin-
gen geheel afwezig zouden kunnen zijn. De hedendaagse interpretatie van de traditi-
onele benadering staat toe dat het belang van fysieke en verbale praktijk wordt gezien 
in verhouding tot de hoeveelheid aanwezige activiteit op het betreffende gebied. Des-
alniettemin vereist deze benadering de aanwezigheid van fysieke praktijk voor de 
vorming van internationaal gewoonterecht. 
6. ‘Remedial SeceSSion’ alS een gewoonteRechteliJke noRm?
Op basis van het voorgenoemde kader richtte Hoofdstuk VI zich op de toetsing van 
het bestaan van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ onder internationaal gewoonte-
recht. Alvorens de internationale reacties op pogingen tot unilaterale secessie onder 
de loep te nemen, werd het belang van de erkenning van Staten voor deze studie 
uitgelegd. In dit kader kwamen de twee belangrijkste stromingen met betrekking tot 
erkenning aan de orde: de constitutieve en declaratoire theorie. Vervolgens werd de 
betekenis van erkenning in de context van pogingen tot eenzijdige afscheiding uit-
gelegd. Gesteld werd dat hoewel erkenning over het algemeen beschouwd wordt als 
declaratoir van aard, in het geval van eenzijdige afscheiding kan de vrijwel uniforme 
erkenning van de aspirant-Staat door al bestaande Staten het uiteindelijke succes van 
de poging tot unilaterale secessie bepalen en dus bewijs omvatten voor de positie 
als Staat (‘statehood’). Als zodanig kan brede erkenning onder omstandigheden een 
zeker constitutief effect hebben, waardoor erkenning invloed kan hebben op de ont-
wikkeling van Statenpraktijk met betrekking tot een recht op ‘remedial secession’, 
mits een dergelijke verwijzing expliciet wordt gemaakt.
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Vervolgens richtte Hoofdstuk VI zich op een analyse van de internationale reac-
ties op pogingen tot eenzijdige afscheiding. In deze analyse werd een belangrijke rol 
toebedeeld aan Kosovo’s poging om zich in 2008 af te scheiden van Servië en de 
internationale reacties daarop. Immers, Kosovo werd niet alleen vaak aangeduid als 
een test voor het bestaan van een recht op unilaterale  secessie, maar geeft boven-
dien unieke inzichten in de hedendaagse opvattingen van Staten met betrekking tot 
een recht op ‘remedial secession’. Eerst werden de algemene reacties van Staten met 
betrekking tot Kosovo’s unilaterale onafhankelijkheidsverklaring onder de loep geno-
men. Noch de debatten in de VN-Veiligheidsraad en Algemene Vergadering, noch de 
erkenningsverklaringen van individuele Staten weerspiegelden echter de erkenning 
van een recht op ‘remedial secession’. Verwijzingen naar het recht op (externe) zelf-
beschikking werden nauwelijks gemaakt en waar een dergelijke verwijzing wel werd 
gemaakt, was deze kort en vormde zij bovendien niet het belangrijkste argument. 
Integendeel, de algemene reacties op Kosovo’s poging tot afscheiding weerspiegel-
den voornamelijk sterke steun voor de soevereiniteit en respect voor de territoriale 
integriteit van Staten, zoals vastgelegd in het VN-Handvest en het (juridisch) kader 
dat VN-Veiligheidsraadresolutie 1244 (1999) biedt. In dit verband riepen de verkla-
ringen vaak op tot een wederzijds erkende oplossing van de kwestie, waarmee pogin-
gen tot eenzijdige afscheiding (impliciet) werden veroordeeld. Bovendien werden de 
reacties van Staten in de eerste plaats bepaald door niet-juridische overwegingen. De 
meerderheid van de Staten verwachtte dat de oprichting en erkenning van een onaf-
hankelijk Kosovo zou bijdragen aan de bevordering en het behoud van de vrede en 
stabiliteit in de regio, en voerde geen recht op zelfbeschikking of ‘remedial secession’ 
aan als rechtvaardiging van Kosovo’s onafhankelijkheid of de erkenning daarvan.
Behalve deze algemene reacties werden de schriftelijke en mondelinge opmer-
kingen van Staten bestudeerd die zij bij het Internationaal Gerechtshof inzonden 
dan wel presenteerden ten behoeve van de adviesprocedure inzake Kosovo’s eenzij-
dige onafhankelijkheidsverklaring. Deze inzendingen bevatten enige steun voor het 
bestaan van een recht op ‘remedial secession’. Diverse Staten waren van mening dat 
internationaal recht een recht op ‘remedial secession’ erkent. In het algemeen werd 
deze visie gebaseerd op een a contrario interpretatie van de zogeheten ‘safeguard 
clauses’ van de VN-Verklaring inzake Vriendschappelijke Relaties tussen Staten en 
de Verklaring en het Actieprogramma van Wenen, de Åland Islands-zaak, de beslis-
sing van het Canadese Hooggerechtshof in de Reference re Secession of Quebec, en 
de steun die te vinden is in de doctrine. Gelet op het feit dat er vrijwel geen verwij-
zingen naar de praktijk werden gemaakt, werd geconcludeerd dat Staten de inter-
nationale praktijk niet beschouwden als sterk bewijs voor het bestaan van een recht 
op ‘remedial secession’. De meeste van deze Staten zagen eenzijdige afscheiding 
als een ultimum remedium in gevallen waarin de autoriteiten van de Staat een volk 
het recht op interne zelfbeschikking ontzeggen. Ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen 
werden ook genoemd in deze context, ofwel als uiting van het gebrek aan interne 
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zelfbeschikking, ofwel als afzonderlijke en extra voorwaarde. Deze Staten betoogden 
in de eerste plaats dat onvoldoende bewijs voorhanden is voor het bestaan van een 
recht op ‘remedial secession’ en/of beriepen zich op de voorrang van het beginsel van 
respect voor de territoriale integriteit van Staten. Een tweede (subsidiaire) redenering 
betrof de vermeende neutraliteit van internationaal recht ten opzichte van secessie.   
Naast het geval van Kosovo werden enkele andere situaties bezien die soms 
worden aangevoerd als bevestiging van een recht op ‘remedial secession’. Daarbij 
werd duidelijk dat de praktijk buiten de context van dekolonisatie geen sterke en dui-
delijke bevestiging van een dergelijk recht biedt. Eerst werden enkele gevallen van 
staatsvorming verworpen als zijnde zuivere voorbeelden van unilaterale afscheiding. 
Als zodanig werden Eritrea en de Baltische Republieken (en andere opvolgerstaten 
van de Sovjet-Unie) genoemd. Gesteld werd dat indien überhaupt geen sprake is van 
eenzijdige afscheiding, de term ‘remedial secession’ niet van toepassing is. Daarop 
werd geconcludeerd dat de gevallen van Eritrea en de Baltische Republieken niet 
kunnen worden gezien als bewijs voor het bestaan van een recht op ‘remedial seces-
sion’. Vervolgens werden de gevallen van Bangladesh,  Kroatië en Slovenië nader 
beschouwd. Aangevoerd werd dat de gevallen van Bangladesh en Kroatië (exclusief 
Slovenië) inderdaad voorbeelden van eenzijdige afscheiding betreffen, gelet op het 
ontbreken van de instemming van de betreffende Staat. Daarnaast zou gesteld kunnen 
worden dat deze afscheidingen een remedie vormden, aangezien zij voortkwamen 
uit situaties waarin de moederstaat de betreffende bevolking ernstig onderdrukte en 
onderwierp aan ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen. Toch bleek dat beide aspirant-
Staten niet door de internationale gemeenschap werden erkend als gevolg van een 
vermeend recht op ‘remedial secession’, maar om andere redenen. De gevallen van 
Bangladesh en Kroatië kunnen daarom niet worden gezien als overtuigende voor-
beelden van ‘remedial secession’ die bewijs vormen voor de stelling dat een dergelijk 
recht vandaag de dag bestaat.
Na diverse pogingen tot eenzijdige afscheiding en de internationale reacties 
daarop te hebben behandeld, werd het mogelijk om de vraag te beantwoorden of 
een recht op ‘remedial secession’ bestaat onder internationaal gewoonterecht. Daar-
toe zijn de elementen van Statenpraktijk en opinio juris met betrekking tot een der-
gelijk recht getoetst. Met betrekking tot het objectieve element van gewoonterecht 
werd gesteld dat slechts enkele pogingen tot eenzijdige afscheiding mogelijkerwijs 
kunnen worden gezien als fysieke Statenpraktijk wat betreft ‘remedial secession’ 
en dat verbale Statenpraktijk hierover enkel werd gevonden in het kader het geval 
van Kosovo en zelfs daar slechts in beperkte mate. Het blijft onzeker of er in de 
praktijk tot nu toe überhaupt succesvolle voorbeelden zijn van ‘remedial secession’. 
Met betrekking tot het subjectieve element van opinio juris werd gesteld dat er een 
zekere mate van opinio juris bestaat wat betreft het bestaan van een recht op ‘reme-
dial secession’. Geconcludeerd werd echter dat deze opinio juris in geen geval sterk 
en eenduidig is. Kortom, beide componenten van gewoonterecht zijn in onvoldoende 
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mate aanwezig om onder de conventionele benadering van internationaal gewoonte-
recht, ook indien hedendaags geïnterpreteerd, het bestaan van ‘remedial secession’ te 
kunnen vaststellen. Zelfs wanneer de meer liberale en progressieve (maar omstreden) 
mensenrechtenbenadering – die het mogelijk maakt om onvolkomenheden in Staten-
praktijk te negeren wanneer sterke en eenduidige opinio juris bestaat – zou worden 
gehanteerd, werd geconcludeerd dat een recht op ‘remedial secession’ niet bestaat als 
gewoonterechtelijke norm.
7. concluSieS oveR een Recht op ‘Remedial SeceSSion’ de lege lata 
en de lege ferenda
Op basis van de analyse in dit onderzoek zoals hierboven samengevat, zijn vervol-
gens algemene conclusies getrokken. Daarbij is een onderscheid gemaakt tussen een 
recht op ‘remedial secession’ de lege lata enerzijds en een recht op ‘remedial seces-
sion’ de lege ferenda anderzijds.
7.1. Een recht op ‘remedial secession’ de lege lata
Alle bevindingen uit dit onderzoek in overweging nemend, werd geconcludeerd dat 
het concept van externe zelfbeschikking als een remedie tegen ernstig onrecht van-
daag de dag niet bestaat als een afdwingbaar recht onder het hedendaagse internati-
onale recht. Vastgesteld werd dat in verschillende bronnen van internationaal recht 
inderdaad een zekere mate van steun voor een dergelijk recht weerspiegeld wordt, 
met name in de doctrine en rechterlijke uitspraken en opinies. Deze steun is echter 
onvoldoende – in omvang, in gewicht, en in overtuigingskracht – om het vandaag de 
dag een positief recht te noemen. De theoretische basis van een recht op ‘remedial 
secession’ is relatief zwak en lijkt vooral te worden ingegeven door morele over-
wegingen en vermeende noodzakelijkheid, terwijl de praktijk evenmin getuigt van 
overtuigende steun voor een dergelijk recht. Zelfs wanneer wordt uitgegaan van de 
progressieve mensenrechtenbenadering van internationaal gewoonterecht, werd dui-
delijk dat onvoldoende Statenpraktijk en opinio juris bestaan om tot de conclusie te 
komen dat ‘remedial secession’ zich heeft ontwikkeld tot een gewoonterechtelijke 
norm. Op dit moment behelst het zelfbeschikkingsrecht geen unilaterale secessie, 
maar richt het zich op de interne dimensie en wordt het beperkt door traditionele 
beginselen van internationaal recht, zoals soevereiniteit en respect voor de territoriale 
integriteit van de Staat. Met andere woorden, zelfbeschikking dient in de eerste plaats 
intern te worden vormgegeven, dat wil zeggen binnen het kader van de bestaande 
Staat en op basis van de instemming van deze Staat. Als zodanig kan zelfbeschik-
king worden gerealiseerd door middel van bijvoorbeeld het introduceren van vormen 
van autonomie. Buiten de dekolonisatiecontext kan zelfbeschikking in haar externe 
manifestatie alleen worden uitgeoefend door middel van vreedzame desintegratie, de 
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vereniging met of integratie in een andere Staat, secessie op basis van een constituti-
onele machtiging of met instemming van de Staat.
Als zodanig kan worden gesteld dat het huidige internationaalrechtelijke kader niet 
voorziet in een collectieve remedie voor bevolkingsgroepen die door de Staat worden 
onderdrukt en onderworpen aan ernstig onrecht – in elk geval niet door middel van 
unilaterale secessie. Dat wil echter niet zeggen dat het internationale recht in geen 
enkel rechtsmiddel voorziet. Individuen kunnen zich beroepen op individuele men-
senrechten zoals vervat in diverse internationale mensenrechtenverdragen. Boven-
dien kunnen mechanismen voor minderhedenbescherming worden aangewend om de 
rechten van minderheden in te roepen. Via deze mechanismen kunnen zij echter geen 
aanspraak maken op een recht op ‘remedial secession’.  
7.2. Een recht op ‘remedial secession’ de lege ferenda
Hoewel is aangetoond dat onvoldoende bewijs voorhanden is om het bestaan van 
een recht op ‘remedial secession’ aan te nemen, werd in dit onderzoek ook duide-
lijk dat diverse bronnen van het internationale recht sporen van een dergelijk recht 
weerspiegelen. Uit deze sporen blijkt dat een zekere overeenstemming bestaat over 
de contouren van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ de lege ferenda. Dus hoewel 
benadrukt dient te worden dat dit nog verdere discussie, uitwerking en, belangrijker 
nog, brede steun van de internationale statengemeenschap vereist, kan op basis van 
de voorgaande hoofdstukken voorzichtig een kader worden geschetst voor de moge-
lijke toekomstige ontwikkeling van een recht op ‘remedial secession’. De sporen van 
een recht op ‘remedial secession’ in de bronnen van internationaal recht verwijzen 
meestal naar een recht dat slechts ontstaat in uitzonderlijke omstandigheden en onder 
bepaalde voorwaarden – zowel inhoudelijk als procedureel. 
De eerste inhoudelijke voorwaarde betreft de aanhoudende ontzegging van 
interne zelfbeschikking door de centrale autoriteiten van de Staat. Meer specifiek zou 
minimaal vereist zijn dat de Staat herhaaldelijk weigert om de bevolkingsgroep rech-
ten voor politieke participatie te verlenen en een representatieve regering te bieden 
voordat ‘remedial secession’ rechtmatig kan zijn. In dat opzicht is een sterk ver-
band tussen de interne dimensie van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht en de externe dimen-
sie aangetoond in zowel de doctrine als in de rechtspraak en Statenpraktijk. Er zijn 
echter sterke aanwijzingen dat enkel het ontbreken van interne zelfbeschikking niet 
zal volstaan voor een rechtmatige afscheiding. Naast deze inhoudelijke voorwaarde 
werden twee andere factoren vaak genoemd: de aanwezigheid van ernstige mensen-
rechtenschendingen en discriminatoire behandeling van een bevolkingsgroep. Beide 
factoren houden verband met het vereiste van gebrek aan interne zelfbeschikking 
en sommige auteurs hebben dan ook gesteld dat de aanwezigheid van deze factoren 
kan worden afgeleid uit het ontbreken van politieke participatierechten en een repre-
sentatieve regering. In het algemeen wordt het bestaan van flagrante schendingen 
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van fundamentele mensenrechten echter beschouwd als een separate voorwaarde, 
waardoor de lat voor het ontstaan van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ hoger wordt 
gelegd. Deze additionele parameter wordt breed gedragen in de literatuur en de recht-
spraak, en wordt tevens weergegeven in de verklaringen van Staten die de doctrine 
van ‘remedial secession’ in beginsel ondersteunen. De belangrijkste toetssteen voor 
een recht op ‘remedial secession’ is echter de ontzegging van interne zelfbeschikking. 
In aanvulling op de inhoudelijke voorwaarden hierboven beschreven, moet tevens 
aan een procedureel vereiste worden voldaan, namelijk dat ‘remedial secession’ 
daadwerkelijk een ultimum remedium is. Met andere woorden, dit procedurele ver-
eiste maakt het noodzakelijk dat alle effectieve en reële middelen om het conflict op 
vreedzame wijze op te lossen zijn uitgeput voordat unilaterale afscheiding als reme-
die gerechtvaardigd zou zijn. Vanzelfsprekend dient per geval te worden bezien of 
aan dit vereiste is voldaan. Immers, wat in de ene situatie als een laatste redmiddel 
zou worden beschouwd, zal in de andere situatie niet als zodanig gelden. In som-
mige gevallen kunnen de modaliteiten om het zelfbeschikkingsrecht intern te imple-
menteren, variërend van autonomie tot zogeheten ‘complex power-sharing’, nog een 
reëel en effectief alternatief voor afscheiding bieden, terwijl deze modaliteiten in 
een andere, meer ernstige en ontwrichtte situatie niet langer een redelijke oplossing 
kunnen bieden. In elk geval, gelet op de gevoeligheid van de materie enerzijds en 
de hoge drempel voor ‘remedial secession’ anderzijds, lijkt internationale betrok-
kenheid vereist. Die internationale betrokkenheid kan bijvoorbeeld vorm krijgen 
in de onderhandelingen tussen de Staat en de separatistische entiteit – bijvoorbeeld 
als gespreksleider of als mediator – of door hulp van internationale organisaties of 
andere  (gerechtelijke) instanties. Slechts dan zou de weg naar unilaterale secessie 
open staan.  
Bij het schetsen van de contouren van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ de lege 
ferenda dient benadrukt te worden dat een aantal uitzonderlijke omstandigheden in 
de weg staat aan de rechtmatige uitoefening van een dergelijk recht. Zelfs wanneer de 
parameters voor de uitoefening van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ zoals hierboven 
uiteengezet aanwezig zouden zijn, kan afscheiding onrechtmatig zijn wanneer daar-
mee een jus cogens norm wordt geschonden, zoals het geweldsverbod. In die situaties 
kan de VN-Veiligheidsraad gelet op de omstandigheden van het geval een poging tot 
afscheiding als illegaal bestempelen en de internationale gemeenschap oproepen de 
aspirant-Staat niet te erkennen.
8. enkele SlotbeSchouwingen oveR ‘Remedial SeceSSion’
Aan het einde van het boek zijn enkele afsluitende beschouwingen over het con-
cept ‘remedial secession’ gepresenteerd. Voortbordurend op de bevindingen uit de 
voorgaande hoofdstukken is eerst kort gereflecteerd op de vraag of het concept van 
‘remedial secession’ kan worden geëffectueerd door middel van erkenning. Hoewel 
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is geconcludeerd dat ‘remedial secession’ geen positief recht is onder het heden-
daagse internationale recht, betekent dat niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat ‘remedial seces-
sion’ niets meer is dan een theoretisch concept zonder enige praktische relevantie. 
Het betekent evenmin dat de mogelijkheid tot unilaterale secessie per definitie is 
uitgesloten. Gelet op de constitutieve effecten die brede erkenning kan hebben in 
het geval van pogingen tot unilaterale secessie, zou gesteld kunnen worden dat wan-
neer een entiteit eenzijdig een Staat wil worden, dit feitelijk alleen mogelijk is door 
middel van internationale erkenning. Sommige auteurs hebben dan ook gesuggereerd 
dat het concept van ‘remedial secession’ kan worden geëffectueerd door middel van 
brede erkenning van de aspirant-Staat door al bestaande Staten. Met andere woor-
den, hoewel ‘remedial secession’ geenszins een afdwingbaar recht behelst, zou het zo 
kunnen zijn dat Staten (meer) bereid zijn om entiteiten die zich vanwege onderdruk-
king van een bevolking in kwestie en ernstige mensenrechtenschendingen op hun 
grondgebied proberen af te scheiden van de Staat te erkennen en door dit op grote 
schaal te doen, het succes van een claim op een onafhankelijke Staat bepalen. Dat 
betekent niet dat erkenning daadwerkelijk een recht op ‘remedial secession’ creëert, 
maar wel dat erkenning het succes van een poging tot unilaterale secessie sterk kan 
beïnvloeden. Met name in situaties waarin het twijfelachtig is of aan de criteria uit 
de Montevideo Conventie wordt voldaan, kan wijdverbreide erkenning in dit opzicht 
verstrekkende gevolgen hebben. Een soortgelijke redenering werd gebruikt door het 
Canadese Hooggerechtshof in de Reference re Secession of Quebec. In deze zaak 
suggereerde het Hooggerechtshof dat Staten bij de beslissing om al dan niet te erken-
nen, de behandeling van de entiteit door de Staat laten meewegen. Gezien deze gro-
tendeels hypothetische mogelijkheid moet benadrukt worden dat de internationale 
reacties op Kosovo’s onafhankelijkheidsverklaring een ander beeld laten zien. Over 
het algemeen was een dergelijk causaal verband tussen mensenrechtenschendingen 
enerzijds en erkenning anderzijds niet zichtbaar. Slechts enkele Staten verwezen naar 
mensenrechtenschendingen op het grondgebied als een van de – voornamelijk niet-
juridische – factoren die leidden tot de beslissing om te erkennen. Het blijft dus de 
vraag of Staten het idee van ‘remedial secession’ in de toekomst als een leidraad 
zullen gebruiken in de besluitvorming omtrent erkenning. In het licht van de poli-
tieke beoordelingsvrijheid die Staten op dit gebied hebben en de politieke belangen 
die op het spel staan, zullen politieke overwegingen altijd een belangrijke – zo niet 
doorslaggevende – rol blijven spelen. 
Vervolgens is, tegen de achtergrond van de ontwikkeling die vaak wordt aangeduid 
als de humanisering van de internationale rechtsorde, gereflecteerd op de mogelijk 
toekomstige ontwikkeling van een recht op ‘remedial secession’. Met de humanise-
ring van de internationale rechtsorde wordt verwezen naar de transformatie van het 
internationale recht van een voornamelijk Staat-gericht systeem naar een meer mens-
gericht systeem, waarin Staten niet langer de enige actoren zijn en waarbij het accent 
in toenemende mate komt te liggen op het respecteren en bevorderen van de belangen 
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en de rechten van de mens – zowel van individuen als groepen, aangeduid als vol-
keren, minderheden en inheemse volkeren. Als zodanig raakt deze ontwikkeling aan 
enkele kernbeginselen van het klassieke Westfaalse systeem, voornamelijk het con-
cept van staatssoevereiniteit en de beginselen die hieruit voortvloeien. De humanise-
ring van de internationale rechtsorde kan worden beschouwd als een zoektocht naar 
een nieuw evenwicht waarin de belangen van Staten niet worden genegeerd, maar 
evenmin per definitie het zwaarste wegen. Hoewel dit een caleidoscopisch proces 
betreft, wordt de kern ervan op twee manieren zichtbaar: de rechten en belangen van 
de mens worden versterkt, terwijl tegelijkertijd de onaantastbare positie van de Staat 
wordt betwist. Het is tegen de achtergrond van de humanisering van de internatio-
nale rechtsorde dat het debat over de vraag naar externe zelfbeschikking na ernstige 
mensenrechtenschendingen en de opkomst van het concept van ‘remedial secession’ 
kan worden begrepen. Betoogd werd dat de suggestie van een ‘nooduitgang’ voor 
volkeren die door de Staat worden onderworpen aan ernstig onrecht aansluit bij de 
humaniseringstendens. Met dit idee van een ‘nooduitgang’ worden humanitaire over-
wegingen opgeworpen als een belangrijk tegenwicht voor de rechten en belangen 
van de Staat. Ook hierin wordt de tweevoudige manifestatie van de humanisering-
stendens weerspiegeld. Het idee van ‘remedial secession’ kan dus worden gezien als 
een bijdrage aan de geleidelijke transformatie van een Staat-gericht systeem naar 
een meer mens-gericht systeem. Het huidige gebrek aan steun voor het concept van 
‘remedial secession’ door Staten is echter symptomatisch voor de conclusie dat de 
ontwikkeling van de internationale rechtsorde van een Staatgericht systeem naar een 
mensgericht systeem nog geen nieuw evenwicht heeft gevonden. De zoektocht naar 
een dergelijk evenwicht zal naar alle waarschijnlijkheid blijven doorgaan. Gelet op 
deze voortdurende ontwikkeling en de sporen van een recht op ‘remedial secession’ 
die op dit moment zichtbaar zijn, is het dan ook niet ondenkbaar dat een dergelijk 
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